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The Brahmavadin Series. 



THE SKI-BHASHYA. 



PUBLISHED BY 
M. C. A L A S I N G A P P E R U M A L, B. A. 

The " Bra h mavadiu" Pr e ss, 
TRIFLJCANE, MADRAS. 



TH 

VEDArtTA-SUT-RAS 



WITH THE 



SRI-SHASHYA 



OF 



Translated into English 

BY 
M. RANGACHARYA, M.A., 

AND 
M. B. VARADARAJA AIYANQAR, B.A., B.L. 

VOLUME /. 



, a r a s : 

THE " BRAHMAVIDIN " PRESS. 

1899. 
( AH Rights Reserved. ) 



THIb VOLUME 

IS DEDICATED TO 

The Right Honourable Professor F. Max Mullen, 

by the 
TRANSLATORS 

in grateful recognition of his valuable services rendered 
to the cause of Sanskrit Literature. 



2052105 



PREF CE. 



THIS is the first of the three volume? in which it is pro- 
posed to bring out an English translation of Rama, 
nujacharya's Sri-Bhashya, his well-known commentary on 
the Vedanta-Sfitras of Badarayana. The Veddnta of India 
has now fully established its title to occupy a prominent place 
among the various systems of philosophy known to the 
world ; and one aspect of it commonly called the Adwaita- 
Vedanta has long been familiar to European scholars, and 
has even met with fair recognition at their hands. Rama- 
nujacharya's Sri tthdshya, is an exposition of the Visishtd- 
dwaita aspect thereof, and it well deserves to be quite as 
widely known and appreciated as the Adwaita-Veddnta of 
Sankaracharya. The Visishtddwaitins represent a school 
of Veddntic thought, of which Sankaracharya himself has 
taken cognisance in his writings, and there is evidence to 
shew that it must have come down in the form of an un- 
broken tradition from very ancient times. The Bhagava- 
tas and Pancharatras, who have obviously played a very im- 
portant part in the history of Hindu religion, are in all 
probability the original system-makers of this school, 
which appears to be as old as the Upamshads themselves. 
The Upamshads and the Bagavadgitd teach both jttana 
and bhakti ; that is, they teach that both wisdom and 
worship are capable of forming the means for the attain- 
ment of salvation. All along in 'our history some seekers 
after truth and salvation may be seen to have relied more 
upon wisdom than upon worship, while others have relied 



more upon worship than upon wisdom. This division in 
religious thought is truly representative of two dissimilar 
innate tendencies in human nature, and the Bhagavatas 
belong to the latter class. How far the Vi'sishtadwaita 
school interprets the Upamshads and the Bagava,dgita 
aright is thus a question to which each earnest student of 
the Veddnta has to find his own answer. The discussion 
of the various Veddntic problems dealt with in this volume 
is so full and so well expressive of the fundamental con- 
clusions embodied in the rl-8k&shya that it gives the 
volume a characteristic completeness, in spite of its being 
only a part of the whoie work. It is therefore expected 
that students of Indian philosophy and Hindu religion will 
find this volume to be interesting and instructive. 

For the purposes of this translation we have consulted 
three editions of the Sri-Bhdshya the Madras edition 
printed in Telugu characters, the Benares edition in Deva- 
nagari characters, and the incomplete Calcutta edition, also in 
Devanagari characters and published by the Asiatic Society 
We have found the Madras edition the most accurate 
among these, and have accordingly followed it in our trans- 
lation. The style of the Srl-Bkdshya is severely argumen- 
tative and controversial, and it is also technical and terse. 
We have, however, tried our best to make the translation 
smooth and intelligible without any way sacrificing its 
faithfulness to the original. The additions and alterations 
needed to make the English rendering full and accurate are 
all enclosed within curved brackets ; and the references 
to the various quotations and authorities cited in the work 
are generally given within square brackets, a few of these 
references being also given in foot-notes. Foot-notes have 
been sparingly given, and only in places where it was 
thought they were absolutely necessary for the elucidation 



Ill 

and proper understanding of the text of the translation. 
With the object of enabling the readers to make out 
easily the nature and the relations between the vari- 
ous parts of the closely reasoned arguments to be 
found in this volume, we have given in the beginning 
an analytical outline of the contents of the volume. A 
table showing our system of transliteration and a list 
containing the abbreviations used by us are given at 
the end of the volume. The word dtman is used in Sans- 
krit to denote the Brahman as well as the jiva ; hence it 
has been translated as Self where it denotes the former 
and as self where it denotes the latter ; and the pronouns 
who and which have been more or less indiscriminately 
used in relation to both of them. The word karman has 
been uniformly used in the form of karma, and its plural 
is given as karmas, as these forms seem to have be- 
come fairly current in English. The printing work has 
had to be done somewhat hurriedly, and a few errors have 
unavoidably crept in. The more serious ones among them 
are pointed out and corrected in a list of errata appended 
hereto. We do not know how far our English rendering 
of the Sri-B flashy a is all that it should be, but we have 
spared no pains to make it as good as we can. We are 
well aware that it is capable of much improvement ; and 
yet it may not perhaps be too much to hope that our 
attempt to present faithfully in English the thoughts of 
one of India's great teachers and religious reformers will 
be productive of some good in the way of helping on the 
world's appreciation of India's philosophic integrity and 
religious earnestness. 

NOVEMBER, 1899. ) M. R. 

MADRAS. ) M. V. B. 



CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER I. 

PART I. 

PAGE. 

1. Analytical outline of contents ... i-lxxv. 

2. Adhikarana I. ... ... i. 

3- H 257. 

4. III 264. 

5- IV 284. 

6. V 328. 

7- VI 346. 

8. VII 400. 

9. VIII 409. 

10. IX. ... ... 417. 

n. X. ... ... 419. 

12. ,, XI. ... ... 425. 

13. List of Abbreviations ... ... 437. 

14. Table of Transliteration ... 439. 

15. Addenda et Corrigenda. ... 441. 



AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE 
CONTENTS OF VOLUME |. 

In the Introduction to his Veddntadipa Ramanuja 
summarises the teachings of the Vedanta to the following 
effect : Of the three ultimate entities known to philosophy, 
the intelligent individual soul is essentially different from 
non-intelligent matter ; and God, who forms the Supreme 
Soul of the universe, is absolutely different from the indi- 
vidual soul. The essential differences thus existing between 
matter, soul and God are intrinsic and natural. God, who 
is the same as the Supreme Brahman, is the cause of the 
universe ; and the universe, which is made up of matter 
and soul, is the effect produced by Him. Matter and soul 
form the body of God ; and this body is capable of exist- 
ing in a subtle as well as in a gross condition. God with 
his subtle body constitutes the universe in its causal condi- 
tion ; and with His gross body He forms the created 
universe itself. The individual soul enters into matter and 
thereby makes it live ; and similarly God enters into 
matter and soul and gives them their powers and their 
peculiar characters. The universe without God is exactly 
analogous to matter without soul ; and in the world as we 
know it, all things are what they are, because God has 
penetrated into them and rules and guides them all from 
within, so much so that all things are representative of 
Him and all words denote Him in the main. 

The first part of the first chapter of the Vedanta- 
Siitras of Badarayana deals, says Ramanuja, with the 
question of what constitutes the cause of the world ; and 



ii ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

this volume contains his commentary on the aphorisms 
making up that first part. They are intended to demon- 
strate that the Prakriti (non-ego) and the Purusha (ego) 
of the Saftkhyas do not constitute the cause of the world, 
but that the cause thereof is the omniscient and omnipot- 
ent God Himself who is wholly pure and abundantly full 
of all auspicious qualities. Those aphorisms are as follow:- 

1. Then therefore the enquiry into the Brahman. 

2. (The Brahman is that) from whom (proceed) the 
creation, &c., of this (universe). 

3. (That the Brahman is the cause of the creation, 
&c., of the universe, follows altogether from the scripture ), 
because the scripture forms the source (of the knowledge 
relating to Him). 

4. That (viz. the fact that the scripture forms alto- 
gether the source of the knowledge relating to the Brah- 
man] results, however, from (His constituting) the true 
purport (of the scripture). 

5. Because the activity imported by the root iksh 
(to see i. e. to think] is predicated (in relation to what 
constitutes the cause of the world), that which is not 
revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the pradhana) is not 
(the Sat or the Existence which is referred to in the scrip- 
tural passage relating to the cause of the world). 

6. If it be said that it (viz. the import of the root 
iksh, to see) -is (here) figurative, (it is maintained that) it 
cannot be so ; because there is the word Atman (or Self 
mentioned in the context). 

7. Because (also) it is taught (in the context) that 
he who is firmly devoted to That (viz. the Sat) obtains 
final release. 

8. Because also it is not declared (in the context) 
that it (viz. what is denoted by the word Sat or Existence) 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. iii 

deserves to be discarded. 

9. Because (also) there would then be the contradic- 
tion of the proposition (enunciated in the context). 

10. Because (also) there is (mentioned in the context) 
the withdrawal (of the individual self) into its own cause 
(/. e. into the Sat}. 

11. Because there has to be a similarity of import 
(between the passage under reference and the other pas- 
sages relating to the cause of the creation, &c., of the world). 

12. Because also it is revealed (in the very LTpanishad 
in which the passage under discussion occurs, and in other 
Upanishads, that the Supreme Self is the cause of the 
universe). 

13. That which is denoted by the word Anandamaya 
(is the Brahman); because there is, (in the context), the 
repetition (of various grades of bliss which culminate in 
the Anandamaya or the Highest Bliss). 

14. It may be said that owing to there being the 
affix (may at) significant of modification (the Anandamaya) 
is not (the Brahman}\ but it is not (right to say) so; 
because that (affix mayat) signifies abundance. 

15. Because also He (the Anandamaya) is declared 
(in the context) to be the cause of that (which forms the 
bliss of the individual souls). 

1 6. (Because) also that same Being, who is denoted 
by the words of the mantra (in the context), is declared 
(there to be the Anandamaya). 

17. He who is other (than the Brahman) is not (that 
Being who is denoted by the words of the mantra), because 
(in such a case) there would be inappropriateness. 

1 8. Because also there is (in the context) the decla- 
ration of difference (between the individual self and the 
Brahman}. 



iv ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 



19. Because also His will (is in itself the cause of 
creation), the pradhdna is not needed (by Him in the act 
of creation just as it is needed by the individual self). 

20. (Because) also it (viz. the scripture) declares 
(that) his (/. e. the individual self's) acquisition of that 
(bliss takes place when he is) in (association with) this 
(Anandamaya). 

21. He (/. e. the Person) who is within (the Sun and 
the eye is the Brahman], because His attributes are de- 
clared (in the context). 

22. And He is different (from the Sun and other in- 
dividual selves), because., also there is the declaration of 
difference (between the Brahman on the one hand, and 
the Sun and other individual selves on the other). 

23. That which is denoted by the word Akasa (is the 
Brahman}, because His peculiar characteristics (are men- 
tioned in the context in relation to what is denoted by 
that word). 

24. For that same reason (which has been given in 
the case of the Akdsa), He who is denoted by the word 
Prdna (also in the context is the Brahman}. 

25. That which is denoted by the vrordjyotis (is the 
Brahman), because there is the mention of (His) feet (in a 
connected context). 

26. If it be said that, on account of the metre (known 
as the gdyatrl] being mentioned (in the context, the Light 
or Jyotis described above is) not (the Brahman), it is not 
(right to say) so ; because the teaching (here) relates to the 
concentration of the mind (on the Brahman) conceived as 
that same (gdyatri) : indeed the scripture declares it ac- 
cordingly. 

27. Because also it is appropriate only thus to de- 
clare that (intelligent) beings and other objects form the 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE o? CONTENTS, v 

feet (of the Gayatri). 

28. If it be said that, on account of there being a 
difference between the (two) teachings (given in the con- 
text, what is denoted by the wordjyotis or Light) is not 
(the Brahman), it cannot be (right to say) so ; because 
even in both those (teachings) there is nothing that is 
contradictory (of each other). 

29. That which is denoted by Prdna (Indra and 
other such words is the Brahman], because it is so under- 
stood in the sequel. 

30. If it be said that, oir account of the speaker 
(Indra) declaring himself (to be the object of worship, what 
is denoted by the words Indra and Prdna is) not (the 
Brahman, it is replied that it cannot be so); because 
there is here (in this context) the mention of a multitude 
of attributes belonging to the Inner Self. 

31. And the teaching (in the context) is, as in the 
case of Vamadeva, in accordance with the view found in 
the scripture. 

32. If it be said that, on account of the characteris- 
tics of the individual self and of the principal vital air (be- 
ing mentioned in the context) there is no (reference to the 
Brahman here at all, it is replied that) it cannot be (right 
to say) so ; because the worship (of the Brahman} has a 
threefold nature ; because (elsewhere) this (threefold nature 
of His worship) is taken for granted ; and because here 
(/. e. in the present context also) that (same kind of wor- 
ship,) may be appropriately referred to. 

In accordance with the general fashion of Indian 
writers, Ramanuja begins his Srl-Bhdshya with a stanza 
in praise of God, wherein he lays particular stress 
on man's duty of love and devotion to God, preferring this 
love and devotion even to the wisdom of the understand- 



Vi ANALYTICAL OUTLINE O$ CONTENTS. 

ing. Then in another stanza he speaks of the traditionally 
ancient character of the teachings contained in the 
Veddnta-Sutras, and gratefully recognises the value of the 
services rendered by early teachers in preserving and 
handing on those teachings, in accordance with which he 
himself undertakes to interpret the Veddnta-Sutras. (Vide 
page i). After declaring that his own explanation of the 
Sutras is in accordance with the interpretation given by 
' ancient teachers ', such as Bodhayana, Dramida, Taiika, 
&c., he commences the discussion of the meaning of the 
first aphorism " Then therefore the enquiry into the 
Brahman" The words of the Sutra are taken into consi- 
deration one after another, and their meaning and 
grammar are both clearly explained (pp. 2 to 4). He then 
gives what is called the Vakyartha of the Sutra, this 
Vdkydrtha being the full meaning that is conveyed by the 
aphoristic sentence as a whole. In keeping with the 
division of the revealed scripture of the Hindus into the 
Karmakdnda and i\\Qjfidnakdnda, there are two systems of 
philosophic enquiry known as the Karma-mlmdmsd and 
the Brahma-mlmdmsd. The former of these is what may 
be called a philosophy of sacrificial rites, and the latter is 
a philosophy that deals with the metaphysical foundations 
of the universe. The historical relation between the 
Karmakdnda or the Old Testament of the Vedas and the 
Jttanakdnda or the New Testament thereof is one of 
antecedence and sequence. And here this first aphorism 
is interpreted to mean that, immediately after acquiring 
the knowledge of the philosophy of Vcdic sacrificial rites, 
the study of the philosophy of the Brahman has to be 
begun, for the reason that ritualistic works yield only 
small and unenduring results while the 'knowledge' of 
the Brahman gives rise to immortality and eternal free- 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. Vll 

dom. Bodhayana is quoted in support of this interpreta- 
tion, and on his authority the two Mimdmsds are declared 
to form parts of one science (page 5). Since every Indian 
Arya is enjoined to learn the Karmakdnda as well as the 
Jildnakdnda of the Vedas, it may be argued that the study 
of the Karma-mimdmsd is quite superfluous. In answer 
to this view it is pointed out that, in that injunction, learning 
the Vedas means nothing more than merely learning them 
by heart, and that such learning is efficacious in making 
them serve better whatever purpose they are intended to. 
serve, and also in giving rise to a prima facie impression 
that ritualistic works yield insignificant and impermanent 
results while there is a mention made in the Upanishads 
of the attainment of everlasting immortality (pp. 6 
to 8). Then Veddntic texts are quoted to show the destruc- 
tibility of the results of mere ritualistic works and the 
indestructible character of the results arising from the 
knowledge of the Brahman, and it is concluded that the 
study of the Karma-mlmdmsd must precede the study of 
the Brahma-mlmdmsd ("pp. 8 to 10). 

Having thus stated his view of what meaning the 
word then conveys in this first aphorism, Ramanuja states 
the objections against his view with the object of meeting 
them so as to justify his own interpretation. A statement 
of objections that is given with an intention to meet them 
is called a Purvapaksha ; and the objection against Rama- 
nuja's interpretation of the word then here is known as the 
Laghu-purvapaksha or the ' small objection ', in as much 
as there is a 'great objection ' coming later on as against 
his interpretation of the word therefore. In this ' small 
objection ' the opinions of Saiikara and Bhaskara are 
shown to contradict each other, and Sankara's opinion re- 
garding the meaning of the word then is summarised thus : 



Vlll ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

The cause of the bondage (of the soul) is merely the 
perception of distinctions, which is based on unreality 
and has its origin in the avidyd (or ignorance) that veils 
the true nature of the Brahman ; this bondage itself 
is unreal ; solely by reason of its unreality it is de- 
stroyed to the very roots by means of knowledge ; the 
knowledge that (so) destroys (the bondage) is derived 
out of (scriptural) passages such as "That thou art" 
&c.; works are of no use in causing the origination of such 
knowledge in its own true nature, or in producing the 
effect of this knowledge that is so derived out of such 
passages, but the use of works consists only in (producing) 
the desire to know (the Brahman}] and the use of works - 
is to be found in causing the increase of sattva or the qua- 
lity of goodness an increase resulting from the destruction 
of rajas and tamas or the qualities of passion and 
darkness respectively, which form the roots of sin ; and 
therefore, having in view only this use of works, 
it is declared in the scripture--" Brahmanas desire to 
know, &c." Hence, on account of the uselessness of the 
knowledge of works, the aforesaid fourfold means alone 
has to be stated to be the necessary antecedent of the 
enquiry into the Brahman (pp. 10 to 15.). 

Then follows what is called the Laghn-siddhdnta or 
the ' small conclusion ' that is the answer to the ' small 
objection'. In this answer it is pointed out that it is not 
the mere knowledge of what the scripture says that tends 
to the removal of ignorance and the attainment o f immor- 
tality, but that devotion, meditation and worship alone can 
produce such a result. It is here shown how a purely in- 
tellectual realisation of the truth cannot eradicate the 
innate tendencies towards error, and how the word know- 
ledge is frequently enough used in the scriptures to mean 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONSENTS. ix 

the same things as devotion, meditation or worship. Tanka 
is quoted in support of this view and in support of the 
contention that the innate tendency towards error can be 
cured only by work and worship. It is further shown that 
the fourfold mental and moral equipment, which, accord- 
ing to Sankara, ought to precede the study of the Vedanta t 
can be acquired only with the help of devotion, meditation 
and worship, and that ritualistic elements such as the 
UdgilJia, &c., are also referred to in the Vedanta for the 
reason that they are helpful to meditation and to the 
acquisition of the needed mental and moral equipment 
mentioned above (pp. 15 to 27.). 

The meaning conveyed by the word therefore is then 
fully taken into consideration, and the Mahd-prtrvapaksha 
or the f great objection ' against the view of Ramanuja, as 
given by the followers of Sankara, is fairly fully stated (pp. 
27 to 53.). The main question dealt with in this Purvapa- 
ksha naturally bears upon what it is that forms the cause for 
leading us to enquire into the Brahman, and why it is that 
the enquiry into the Brahman has to be begun and con- 
ducted ; and the opinion of the Adwaitin on this question 
is given to the effect that the study of the Vedanta has to 
be undertaken to remove the avidyd or ignorance that is 
at the root of the world's manifestation of variety, so as to 
attain the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the 
Brahman, who is, by nature, eternal, pure, self-luminous 
and free (p. 53.). The various points mentioned in this 
1 great objection ' are the following : The unqualified 
absolute Brahman alone is real ; all other things are only 
assumed to exist in Him, and are therefore unreal (pp. 27- 
30.). Unreality is that which, being grounded upon what 
is perceived, is liable to be stultified by means of the 
knowledge of things as they .are ; and the world of 

B 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

phenomena is based upon ignorance or avidya, and is hence 
such an unreality (pp. 30-32.). Knowledge destroys this 
ignorance which forms the foundation of our world-percep- 
tion ; and the knowledge which so destroys ignorance and 
the consequent bondage of unreality is the knowledge that 
the self or the alman of the individual is one with the 
absolute Brahman (pp. 32-33.). Scriptural authority is all 
along aptly quoted in support of every one of these points. 
It is then shewn how, when there is conflict between 
scripture and perception, the former is of stronger authority 
and is capable of stultifying the latter (pp. 33-35.). There 
being scriptural passages which deal with the one absolute 
Brahman and those which deal with the phenomenal 
world of variety and distinctions, it is shown how the 
former passages are of stronger authority than the latter, 
and how it is even possible for some portions of the scrip- 
ture to stultify other portions thereof (pp. 35-37.)' Then 
the meaning of the definitive scriptural sentence ' The 
Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity ' is discussed 
from the Adwaitic stand-point, and it is shown how that 
sentence defines the absolute attributeless Brahman as He 
is essentially in Himself (pp. 37-42.). So far it is a discus- 
sion of the meaning of scriptural passages. After this the 
Adwaitic position is argued out on independent lines. At 
first it is brought out that perception apprehends only pure 
and unqualified existence, and that the distinction between 
things neither belongs to their essential nature nor consti- 
tutes any attribute of existence in itself (pp. 42-44.). It is 
then pointed out that all external objects are invariably 
apprehended as compounded of existence and experience, 
that in all perceptive cognitions existence alone unvary- 
ingly persists, while the differentiating peculiarities of things 
are seen to vary from thing to thing, and that therefore pure 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xi 

unqualified existence alone is real, and that, in as much as 
this compounded experience too persists like existence in all 
perceptive cognitions, experience also constitutes the reality 
and has to be the same as existence itself (pp. 44-46.). And 
the experience which thus constitutes the reality is there- : 
after declared to be so self-evident as to be the cause of its 
own knowability as well as of the realisation that it is 
knowable (pp. 46-48.). Then it is shown that this experi- 
ence or what is otherwise called consciousness is, on account , 
of its self-evident nature, eternal, unoriginated, immodi- 
fiable and undifferentiated, and that it is the same entity 
as the alman or the self (pp. 49-51.). Finally the question 
of personality is taken up for consideration, and it is argued 
that the alman or the self is not the same as the knowen 
in as much as the idea of knowership in relation to the self 
is the result of the limitation imposed upon the intelli- 
gent principle of consciousness by the material principle 
of egoity known as ahankdra, and in as much as again 
self-experience is possible even when there is no no- 
tion of egoity, as during dreamless sleep, swoon, &c. It 
is further argued that the internal self is a mere witness, 
and as such must be different from the knower which 
is the same as the ego or the thing '!'; and it is 
then shown that this limitation of personality cannot be 
an attribute of the self which is pure and undifferentiated 
intelligence, and that in the beatific state of final release 
the self is free from the limitation of personality, even as it 
is found to be so free in the condition of dreamless sleep. 
The one intelligent and undifferentiated principle of con- 
sciousness being thus shown to be the only reality, it is " 
arrived at that the reason for undertaking the study of the 
Vcdanta is to understand the nature of this reality, other- 
wise known as the Brahman, and to realise that everything 



Xli ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

which is in any manner whatsoever different from it is 
wholly unreal (pp. 51 to 53.) The Mahd-purvapaksha or 
the ' great objection ' is here brought to an end. 

Then begins the Mahd-siddhdnta or the ' great con- 
clusion ' of Ramanuja and his school regarding the mean- 
ing of the word therefore in the first aphorism. The 
meaning conveyed by this word is thus expressed (p. 242.) 
in Ramanuja's own words : " Mere ritualistic works yield 
only small and transitory results. On the other hand, 
such works as constitute the worship of the Highest 
Person, and are performed without attachment to results 
yield an infinite and ever-enduring result in the form 
of that experience of the real nature of the Brahman 
which is caused by the origination of the knowledge which 
is the same as steady meditation or worship. Both these 
cannot become known without a knowledge of the true 
nature of works. Without such knowledge there can be 
no rejection of mere ritualistic works as they ordinarily 
are, and no subsequent adoption of them in the form 
pointed out above. Therefore, for this very reason, the 
enquiry into the Brahman has necessarily to be conducted." 
This conclusion is arrived at only after meeting fully all 
the points raised against it in the ' great objection '. And 
they are met one by one in the following order. To start 
with it is shown that one's own experience, logical infer- 
ence, revelation, and definite as well as indefinite percep- 
tion, and all the other accepted criteria of truth prove only 
such things as are qualified by attributes, and that there is 
really no means of proving the thing which is absolute and 
unqualified. In this connection the nature of wJhat is called 
definite and also of what is called indefinite perception 
is distinctly explained, and the view which maintains 
that there is both difference and non-difference between a 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xiii 

thing and its qualifying attribute is shown to be wrong 
(pp. 53-60.). Next the position that perception must 
apprehend pure unqualified existence, in as much as it 
cannot have differentiation for its object and in as much 
as it is difficult to define differentiation, is taken into con- 
sideration and criticised ; and it is argued in reply that 
perception does apprehend distinctions, that distinctions 
so apprehended establish the difference, not only be- 
tween one qualified thing and another, but also between 
the distinguishing attributes themselves, and that there- 
fore the apprehension of particularity has necessarily 
to be admitted in connection with every state of con- 
sciousness. It is further shown that the senses, which 
naturally cannot perceive pure unqualified existence, 
perceive only the configurations of the attributes of 
things, and that it is these configurations that con- 
stitute the logical genera and at the same time denote 
whatever forms the distinction between things (pp. 60-64.). 
Then it is pointed out how it is erroneous to hold that jars 
and other such specific objects are unreal, the reason for 
their unreality being that they do not persist before con- 
sciousness in all perceptions, and how again it is not 
possible for experience or consciousness to be the same 
as the one unqualified and absolute existence (pp. 64-65.). 
Afterwards the self-luminous character of experience 
is properly explained, and it is shown how experience 
does not cease to be experience when it becomes cap- 
able of being itself experienced (pp. 65-67.). The con- 
tention that experience or consciousness has the character 
of an unoriginated entity is then contradicted. It is argued 
that the absence of what is called the antecedent non- 
existence of experience does not prove its unoriginated 
character, because there is no rule which binds experience 



XIV ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

to deal only with such objects as aie existent at the same 
time with itself; and accordingly memory, logical inference, 
revelation and yogic perception are shown to relate to 
things which belong to a different time from that of their 
own existence or duration (pp. 67-69.,). The reasoning 
involved in the supposition, that the antecedent non-exist- 
ence of consciousness is not at all made out by perception, 
is then pointed out to be untenable ; and it is shown that 
perceptual consciousness is conditioned by time, and that 
none of our cognising states of consciousness can be eternal 
or objectless (pp. 69-71.). Even during sleep, trance, and 
conditions of intoxication, consciousness cannot be absolute 
and altogether objectless, as there is no recollection what- 
soever of our having at any time had any experience of 
such consciousness. In all its states consciousness is asso- 
ciated with the idea of the ego, is definite and relates to 
particular objects; and hence it cannot be unoriginated and 
eternal (pp. 71-72.). And then the immodifiable character 
of consciousness is contended against, and it is shown that 
it cannot be undifferentiated (pp. 72-74.). The position 
that consciousness can have no qualifying attributes is 
next disproved (pp. 74-75.). Afterwards the question 
whether consciousness is the same as the self is taken up 
for consideration and criticism, and it is explained that 
consciousness cannot indeed be the same as the conscious 
subject, and that this conscious subject is permanent while 
the attribute of consciousness belonging to that subject 
is liable to be originated and destroyed ; and then it is 
demonstrated that the idea of an unfounded and object- 
less consciousness being the same as the self is contradict- 
ed by cognition, and that in consequence pure experience 
or absolute consciousness alone cannot be the highest real- 
ity (pp. 75-77-) 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. XV 

After this the discussion of the problem of the soul's 
personality is commenced from the stand-point of Rama- 
nuja, and it is at first pointed out that what consti- 
tutes the subjective self or the soul of the individual is 
nothing other than the ego which is here called the 
thing '/'; similarly the thing ' thoit' or the objective 
world forms the content of the notion of the non- 
ego ; such being the case, how can the knower and the 
known be identical ? (pp. 77-79.)- If the thing ' I ' is 
the self, then, like the self, it must be intelligent and have 
at the same time intelligence to constitute its essence ; and 
it is explained and illustrated how the thing T may be 
both intelligence and intelligent at the same time. Then 
scriptural and other authorities are quoted to shew that 
the self-luminous self is always the knower, but that it is 
never mere luminousness (pp. 79-81.). Consciousness is 
like luminosity, and must necessarily belong to a luminous 
self ; this self is the intelligent thing T, and the luminosity 
or intelligibility of consciousness itself is due to its associa- 
tion with the self which is undoubtedly the knowing ego 
(pp. 81-83.). Having thus shown that intelligence forms 
the essence as well as an attribute of the thing T, the 
view of the Adwaitin that the idea of knowership is fal- 
sely superimposed upon the undiffereritiated and intelligent 
principle of consciousness by ignorance or avidyd is next 
contended against. It is first shown that the knowership 
of the ego cannot be due to illusion, for the reason that 
the thing T and its knowership are both separately and 
simultaneously cognised, unlike the mother-of-pearl and 
the silver superimposed thereon. It is next shewn that this 
knowership of the ego cannot be said to be due to the 
common error of mistaking the body for the self (pp. 83-84.). 

does this knowership belong to the material principle 



xvi ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

of egoity known as ahankara, in as much as subjectivity 
can in no way belong to objective matter. The knower- 
shipofthe self does not contradict its immodifiable nature, 
and need not therefore be supposed to be due to modifia- 
ble matter in any form (pp. 84-87.). / Ahankara or the 
material principle of egoity cannot be supposed to have 
acquired the attribute of knowership either as a result 
of the reflection of the self's intelligence thereon, or 
as a result of its contact with the knowing self (pp. 
87-88.). Moreover, this supposed illusion of know- 
ership cannot be due to the material principle of egoity 
being the revealer of immaterial consciousness, in as 
much as the relation of the revealer and the revealed 
between any two things is mutually exchangeable and 
cannot exist when there is any incompatibility in nature 
between them. Xor is it appropriate to hold that ahah- 
kdra reveals consciousness at the same time that conscious- 
ness reveals ahankara ; because it is not possible to under- 
stand what this revelation of the self through ahankara 
may mean, in as much as the self is not within the province 
of the senses and nothing can therefore serve as the means 
of bringing it into relation with them (pp. 88-90.). Nor 
again can the idea of the ego be^due to the material princi- 
ple of egoity, on the score that this principle and this idea 
derived therefrom are useful in removing whatever ob- 
struction there is for our knowing the self. Indeed in no 
sense can there be a revelation of immaterial consciousness 
by means of the material principle of egoity (pp. 91-92.). 
Then it is argued that the nature of revealers is not to 
reveal the revealable thing as though it were within them- 
selves, and it is finally concluded that the subjective self 
itself forms the thing ' I ' which is in no way other than 
the knower (pp. 93-94.)- The idea of the ego which is 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. XV11 

thus intrinsically associated with the self does not get dis- 
sociated from it even in deep sleep ; because at the time of 
waking, the self shines forth in one and the same continuous 
form of the thing ' I ', even when we feel that, while asleep, 
we knew nothing at all, and that we did not know even 
ourselves (pp. 94-96.). The position that the self is a mere 
witness is explained not to mean that it is a witness only 
of ignorance; for, to be a witness is certainly the same as to 
be a direct knower, and even in sleep and other such states 
the self is luminous and shines forth as the ego (pp. 96-97.). 
In the final state of beatific release also the self continues 
to persist as the thing T; scripture also declares that it 
does so persist, and God Himself is revealed to us as a dis- 
tinct Person (pp. 97-100.). The material principle known 
as ahaftkara is indeed included among the things that go 
to make up our bodies ; and it is called by that name be- 
cause it forms the cause of the imposition of the idea of 
the ego upon the body. This false idea of the ego is sub- 
ject to stultification, while the ego-hood of the self is real 
and incapable of being stultified. Therefore the thing ' I ', 
which is the knower, is alone the self (pp. 100-101.). 

The next point taken up for consideration is the position 
of the Prtrvapakshin that, when there is conflict between 
scripture and perception, the former is of stronger authority 
as a criterion of truth, for the reason that the latter is 
grounded upon error. It is here shown that it is not possible 
to make out definitely what that misguiding cause is which 
makes perception false and erroneous; it is shown that 
whatever makes perception erroneous must necessarily tend 
to make the scripture also erroneous, and that the scripture 
which is thus based upon error cannot certainly stultify per- 
ception. It cannot be proved that, unlike perception, the 
scripture is incapable of being misled by an}* cruise of error 
C 



Xviii ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

such as avidya for instance ; and the phenomenal know- 
ledge derived from the scripture is in no way different from 
the phenomenal knowledge obtained through perception. 
Nor can it be maintained that the teaching of perception 
is stultified by the teaching which is given in the scrip- 
ture, while this latter teaching is not so stultified by the 
former, and that in consequence the scripture is not false 
and erroneous ; for, error is error even when it continues un- 
stultified (pp. 101-105.). There are certain analogies general- 
ly given to shew that the scripture, which, being based upon 
avidya or ignorance, is unreal, may form the means for the 
attainment of the highest reality known as the Brahman ; 
and these analogies are all one after another pointed out 
to be not at all suited to the case under consideration, in 
as much as it is seen that in every one of them a real re- 
sult is derived from a real cause. When auspicious and 
inauspicious dreams give rise to good and bad results in life, 
the dreams are indeed as really existent as the results they 
give rise to. When magic, medicinal herbs, incantations, 
&c., give rise to illusions which cause fear, love and other 
emotions, the illusions are as real as the emotions 
themselves. Death may result from a suspicion of 
snake-bite and of poisoning ; here the suspicion is as 
real as the death. The reflected image of a thing is 
as real as the thing itself. Dreams are real even in the ab- 
sence of the reality of the objects corresponding to them, 
in as much as what is required to make anything the ob- 
ject and the basis of any cognition is merely the manifes- 
tation of that thing to consciousness in some manner or 
other (pp. 105-107.). Even in the case of the apprehen- 
sion of the sounds of letters by means of the correspond- 
ing written signs, there is no cognition of the real by 
means of the unreal. When things are cognised by means 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xix 

of sketches and pictures, there is at the basis of the cogni- 
tion a real similarity between the things and their represen- 
tations. The apprehension of the real and absolute 
Brahman by means of the unreal and phenomenal 
teachings of the scripture cannot also be proved on 
the analogy of the apprehension of the absolute un- 
differentiated sound known as Sphota with the help 
of its numerous phonetic differentiations or nadas. 
Although the unreality of the scripture is not such as may 
be due to its absolute non-existence, it is difficult to arrive 
at the knowledge of the noumenal reality by means of the 
phenomenal teachings of the scripture. Nothing that is un- 
real can ever give rise to the knowledge of that which is 
real (pp. 107-110.). 

After this the proper meaning of various passages in 
the Upanishads is taken into consideration, and it is shewn 
that their Adwaitic interpretation is not accurate and allow- 
able. The passages first taken into consideration are 
"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning", 
from the Qihdndogya- Upanishad ^ " And that is the 
higher knowledge by which that Indestructible Being is 
known", from the Mimdaka-L r panis/md,-and "The Brah- 
man is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity", from the Taitti- 
riy a- Upanishad ; and it is proved that these do not relate 
to the absolute and unqualified Brahman, and that the 
grammatical equation to be found in the last passage is 
intended to establish that one and the same thing, namely, 
the Brahman is characterised by more than one attribute 
(pp. 1 10- 1 1 2.). Does the statement that the Brahman is 
one only without a second mean that the Brahman is 
not associated with a second thing even in the form of a 
quality ? It is shewn that it does not mean such a thing, 
and that the scriptural passages which speak of the Brah- 



xx ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

man as unqualified only declare that He is free from the 
qualities appertaining to material nature. There are also 
many passages which speak of the Brahman as qualified* 
and these declare that He is intrinsically possessed of all 
the auspicious and divine qualities. And His possessing the 
divine qualities is not contradicted by the non-possession 
of the qualities that appertain to material nature (pp. 1 1 2- 
ii 6.). The Ananda-valll of the Taittirlya-Upanishad 
teaches the Brahman to be possessed of qualities, and in 
doing so agrees with passages in the dihdndogya- Upanishad', 
and the Kena- Upanishad (II. 3.) does not declare that the 
Brahman forms no object of knowledge, in as much as this 
Upanishad has to agree in meaning with the Taittirlya- 
Upanishad and the Mnndaka- Upanishad wherein it is 
declared that the Brahman has to be known and is cap- 
able of being known (pp. 116-119.). The passage in the 
Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad " Thou shalt not see the 
seer of the sight, nor think the thinker of the thought "- 
is next shown not to negative the seer and the knower as 
distinct from sight and knowledge ; and then the state- 
ment that the Brahman is bliss is interpreted to mean 
that the Brahman is indeed the Blissful Being (pp. 119- 
I2i.). Finally it is pointed out that the Upanishadic 
passages which negative distinctions do not contradict 
those other passages which postulate distinctions, in as 
much as the world which is full of distinctions has the 
Brahman for its Self and has in consequence an organic 
oneness of nature ; and it is shewn that the author of the 
Vcdanta-Sulras is also of this same opinion (pp. 121- 
124.). 

The question, whether the Smritis and the Puranas 
teach the attributeless Brahman to be pure intelligence 
and the only reality, is next examined in detail ; and at 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. XXI 

the very commencement passages are quoted from the 
Bhagavadglta and the Vishnu- Pur ana to show that the 
Highest Brahman is full of all auspicious qualities and 
free from all evil, and that the world which is the mani- 
festation of His glory is as real as He is Himself real (pp. 
124-129.). Then the passages relied upon by the Adwai- 
tins to prove their peculiar monistic position are all inter- 
preted in full accordance with their respective contexts and 
in obedience to all the accepted rules of interpretation, 
. and it is concluded that in all the sastraic works there is 
no establishment of that thing which is devoid of attributes, 
no establishment of illusoriness in regard to the total- 
ity of perceivable objects, and no negation of the natural 
differences between the individual soul and non-intelligent 
matter and the Lord (pp. 129-156.). Incidentally it is 
pointed out how necessary it is to amplify and support the 
meanings of Vedic and Veddntic passages by means of the 
Itihdsas and the Pnrdnas, and how among these latter the 
Vishnu-Purdna is highly authoritative (pp. 134-135.). 
The statement found in the Vishnu-Purdna (II. 14. 31.), 
to the effect that ' dualists see things wrongly,' is shewn to 
negative only that ' dualism ' which postulates a difference 
in kind between one individual soul and another, but not 
that other ' dualism ' which believes in the natural distinc- 
tion between the ultimate entities known as God, soul, 
and matter (pp. 142-144.). In accordance with this view 
a few more Purdnic passages are explained ; and the con- 
clusion is arrived at that, in the same way in which there 
is no essential identity between the body and the indivi- 
dual self, there is also no essential identity between one 
individual self and another, and that similarly there is no 
essential identity between the individual selves and the 
Supreme Self. That there is no substantial unity between 



xxii ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

the individual selves and the Supreme Self is further con- 
firmed by references to Upanishadic passages and to aphor- 
isms in the Veddnta-Sntras (pp. 144-148.) At last the 
question of what the sastras say regarding the nature of 
the individual self in the beatific condition of final freedom 
from all association with matter is discussed clearly, and it 
is established that in that condition the released individual 
self does not become identical in essence with the Supreme 
Self, but that it only acquires most of the auspicious and 
divine qualities of the Supreme Self ; and it is shewn that 
the Brahman whom the individual self is said to attain in 
the state of moksha is not mere attributeless intelligence, 
that, on the contrary, He is full of goodness, power, and 
glory, and that the individual self becomes one with Him 
then for the reason that he attains the highest degree of 
equality with Him and is free from the bondage of karma 
(pp. 148-156.). 

Now begins the criticism of that theory of the Adwai- 
tins according to which a beginninglessly old ' ignorance ' 
known as avidya or mdyd is held to be at the root of our 
perception of the differentiated phenomenal world, and 
according to which also such an avidya has necessarily to 
be admitted on the authority of the scripture and has to be 
understood to be a certain something which is neither a 
positive entity nor a negative non-entity. Seven difficul- 
ties are pointed out to be in the way of this theory being 
true. The first of these is called Asray&nupapatti, and 
deals with the difficulty of finding something for this 
' ignorance ' to reside in. In as much as the self-hood of the 
individual self is itself projected by avidya, it is argued that 
this avidya cannot reside in the individual self and thus 
give rise to the illusion for which it is held to be responsi- 
ble. And in as much as the Brahman has the essential 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xxiii 

nature of self-luminous intelligence, it is shewn that on no 
supposition can the ttrahman be the seat of ' ignorance. ' 
This supposed avidyd therefore can have no abode to reside 
in (pp. 156-161.). The next difficulty in the way of the 
theory of mdyd is that this supposed ' ignorance ' cannot, 
as maintained by its upholders, conceal the Brahman whose 
essential nature consists entirely of luminosity ; for, the 
concealment of such a luminosity must mean nothing other 
than the destruction of the essential nature of the Brahman 
Himself. This difficulty is known as Tirodhdndnupapatti 
(page 1 6 1.). The third difficulty is called Swarupdnupapatti 
and deals with the essential nature of this avidyd. As 
long as it is a thing at all, it must either have the nature 
of a reality or the nature of an unreality. But it is not 
admitted to be a reality ; and it cannot be an unreality, 
for, as long as a real misguiding error, different from 
the Brahman Himself, is not admitted, so long it is 
not possible to explain this theory of illusion (pp. 161- 
162.). The fourth difficulty in the way of this theory 
of illusion is called the Anirvachaniyatwdnupapatti, 
and points out how it is not possible for the illusion-pro- 
ducing avidyd to be incapable of definition either as an 
entity or as a non-entity. All cognitions relate to entities 
or non-entities ; and if it be held that the object of a cog- 
nition has neither the positive characteristics of an entity 
nor the negative characteristics of a non-entity, then all 
things may become the objects of all cognitions (pp. 162- 

163.) 

Naturally the next question that is here discussed is 
whether there is any means by which this curious avidyd 
is brought within the range of our cognition ; and it is 
shewn that there is no means of proof by which such an 
avidyd can be arrived at and established, This difficulty 



XXIV ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

in the way of the theory of maya is spoken of as Pra- 
mananupapatti ; and its discussion is started with the plau- 
sible supposition that the ' ignorance ' known as avidyd 
is capable of being directly experienced and has thus the 
nature of such a positive entity as cannot be contradicted 
by the witnessing principle of intelligence, and that it is 
therefore quite consistent with reason to realise that this 
avidya is definitively associated with the thing T. And it 
is further shewn here supposititiously that it is possible to 
establish by logical inference also that there is an ' igno- 
rance ' or avidya which does not mean a mere negation 
of knowledge but is itself a positive entity of some sort 
(pp. 163-167.). These suppositions are then replied to 
one after another. It is first shewn that, so far as the 
relation to the intelligent internal self is concerned, there 
can be no difference between the ignorance that is a mere 
non-existence of knowledge and the other supposed ' igno- 
rance' which has the nature of a positive entity (pp. 167- 
168.). It is then argued that in the cognition 'I am 
ignorant; I do not know myself, nor do I know another' 
what is experienced is only that ignorance which is the 
antecedent non-existence of knowledge (pp. 168-169.). It 
is next shown that the Brahman can have no experience 
of any kind of avidya, and that, if it be a positive entity, 
there can be no removal of it by means of any knowledge 
(pp. 169-171.). The Brahman cannot be a witness of 
' ignorance '; because it is impossible for Him, whose essen- 
tial nature is absolute self-experience, to acquire the char- 
acter of a witness without the concealment of His own true 
nature. And the Brahman, who is without parts and with- 
out attributes, and who is pure luminosity itself, cannot 
at all be concealed (pp. 171-172.). This supposed con- 
cealment of the Brahman by means of ignorance cannot 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. XXV 

even be an indistinct manifestation of His altogether 
luminous and self-evident nature. In as much as it is 
possible for us to have an illusion without a really existing 
basis for it to be imposed upon, and without a positive 
misguiding cause for that illusion to be produced, the 
world-illusion does not necessarily prove a positive 'igno- 
rance' (pp. 172-174.). Accordingly the avidyd of the 
Adwaitins cannot be proved by perception. It cannot be 
proved by logical inference either ; because the syllo- 
gism that is intended to prove this positive 'ignorance' is 
also seen to prove the other unacceptable ignorance, and 
because also the illustrative example found in the body oj 
the syllogism is defective. Moreover, there are faultless coun- 
ter-syllogistic statements which go to shew that every one 
of the Ad wait ins predications about his avidyd is wrong and 
untenable. The predication, that this positive avidyd is 
capable of being removed by knowledge, cannot be main- 
tained on the analogy of fear and other such positive emo- 
tions disappearing as soon as it is known that they are 
due to a false cause ; because the positive emotion here is 
not destroyed by a subsequent stultifying knowledge, but 
disappears of itself on account of its own transitoriness. 
Therefore the logical process of inference also cannot estab- 
lish that f ignorance ' which has the nature of a positive 
entity (pp. 174-179.). The hypothesis of mdyd is next 
taken into consideration in relation with the five theories 
of perception known to Indian philosophy. Things be- 
come manifest to consciousness through perception, and 
their manifestation may either correspond completely to 
the reality or it may not. Thus all the five theories of 
perception get reduced into two that according to which 
perception presents to consciousness the thing as it is, and 
that again according to which perception presents tp 
D 



XXVI ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

consciousness the thing as it is not. Of these two 
theories the former which is realistic is shewn to be 
true on the authority of tradition and scriptural teach- 
ing, and illusion and its stultification are accounted 
for by means of the belief that every thing in the uni- 
verse has the characteristics of every other thing therein 
(pp. 179-186.). Scriptural and traditional authority is 
quoted to prove that even dream-perceptions are realistic. 
Then a number of exceptions apparently contradicting this 
realistic theory of perception such exceptions as the yel- 
low appearance of white things to the jaundiced eye, the 
circle of fire produced by the rotation of a fire-brand, 
<&c., are all explained so as to show that all perceptions 
are undoubtedly realistic (pp. 186-191.). The objects cor- 
responding to all perceptions are real ; only some percep- 
tions are experienced by certain particular persons only and 
last only for a short length of time, while others are experi- 
enced by all generally and have a longer duration. 
These latter stultify the former, as stultification is com- 
monly understood ; and a true theory of perception does 
not at all stand in need of a positive avidya (pp. 191-192.). 
It is next shewn that the scriptural authorities relied upon 
by the Ad wait ins to prove that there is an avidya, which 
cannot be described either as an entity or as a non -entity, 
are all to be explained otherwise, and do not therefore 
tend to establish in any way such an avidya (pp. 192-197.). 
The Itihasas and the Puranas are also shewn to give no 
support to the theory of maya, in as much as all such pas- 
sages in them as seem to lend any support to this theory 
have, when properly considered, to be interpreted other- 
wise (pp. 197-210.). 

The sixth difficulty in the way of this theory of the 
world being an illusion produced by mava is then fully 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS, xxvii 

discussed, and it goes by the name of Nivartakdnup&paUt. 
This difficulty is in relation to the idea that the cessation 
of avidya or 'ignorance' takes place solely by means of the 
knowledge which has the attributeless Brahman for its 
object ; and it is at first pointed out here that there are 
many scriptural passages, which do not teach the Brahman 
to be attributeless and unqualified, but teach on the con- 
trary that He is possessed of attributes and qualities. 
Then it is shewn that the grammatical equations found in 
the sentence ' That thou art' and in other similar sen- 
tences do not denote the oneness of any attributeless thing, 
in as much as every grammatical equation has to denote 
a thing which, while being only one, is capable of existing 
in two forms. It cannot be established that the gramma- 
tical equation in 'That thou art' is intended to give rise 
to the stultification of any illusion due to avidya ; it sim- 
ply shows the Brahman to be capable of existing in two 
different modes or forms. On this supposition alone can 
all the scriptural passages be harmoniously interpreted 
(pp. 210-214.). The universe is the body of which the 
Brahman is the Soul, and Vcdantic passages clearly 
declare that all things have acquired the character of being 
things and of being expressible by .means of words, only 
by reason of their having been entered into by the indivi- 
dual selves which are, in their turn, entered into by the 
Brahman as forming their Self. Thus the totality of all 
the intelligent and the non-intelligent beings becomes the 
same as the Brahman on account of the relation of the 
body and the soul existing between them (pp. 214-217). A 
grammatical equation can denote neither an absolute iden- 
tity nor an absolute and discrete dissimilarity be- 
tween the things mentioned therein. Hence those who 
maintain that there is only one attributeless -thing in the 



xxviii ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

whole universe, those who maintain that there i* both 
difference and non-difference at the same time between 
the Brahman and the individual souls, and also 
those who maintain that there is absolute difference 
between the individual souls and the Brahman will 
all find that such teachings regarding the sameness of the 
Brahman with the individual soul as are found in the 
Vcddnta are all aimless and meaningless (pp. 217-219.). 
However, to those who maintain that the whole world 
forms the body of the Brahman all those Veddntic teach- 
ings, which declare that the Brahman Himself constitutes 
the whole world, are sure to appear as appropriate expla- 
nations of the truth. Grammatical equations can and do 
point out the attributive character of material adjuncts ; 
and the equation that a man is an individual self cannot 
have a merely figurative significance, in as much as the 
human body has to form in this case a mode of the indivi- 
dual self. And the word which denotes a mode of the in- 
dividual self denotes the individual self also. Accordingly 
the words god, man, &c., include the individual self in 
their import. The individual selves form the body 
of the Highest Self, and hence possess the character 
of being His modes. Thus all the words which de- 
note individual selves include the Highest Self also in 
their import. Consequently all things may be gram- 
matically equated with the Brahman (pp. 219-224.). 
This position is then more fully explained and supported. 
All non-intelligent things constitute the objects of enjoy- 
ment, the intelligent things are the enjoyers thereof, and 
the Brahman is their Supreme Ruler ; therefore they are 
distinct from one another in nature, as may be made out 
from various passages in the Upanishads and the Bhaga- 
vad-Glla (pp. 224-227,). Both the intelligent and the 11011- 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xxix 

intelligent things form the body of the Brahman and have 
no separate existence from Him ; they are in consequence 
subject to His control. Since in this way the intelligent 
and the non-intelligent things are seen to be the modes of 
the Highest Person, it is easy enough to understand how 
the scriptures teach that He Himself exists in the form of 
the world in its condition of cause as well as in its condi- 
tion of effect. Although the non-intelligent thing, the intel- 
ligent thing, and the Brahman are distinct from one 
another in nature, the world must accordingly have the 
Brahman for its material cause ; and the Brahman who 
thus enters into the production of an effect retains, never- 
theless, His own immodifiable nature quite unaffected, in 
as much as there is and need be no transformation of His 
nature in the process of producing the effect. Such being 
the case, the statement that He is attributeless means that 
He is free from all evil qualities, and the statement that 
He possesses the nature of intelligence means that He i.s 
self-luminous and can be described only as intelligence in 
essence. The manifoldness of things which is negatived in 
the Vcddnta is only -such manifoldness as is due to the 
non-realisation of that oneness of the universe which results 
from the fact of the Brahman forming the Soul thereof. 
Only when interpreted thus can all the apparently conflict- 
ing scriptural passages be seen to agree with one another ; 
and the theory of may a which imposes ignorance on the 
Brahman is therefore unfounded ; and similarly the theory 
which subjects the Brahman to limiting conditions is also 
unfounded. The Highest Person is the one embodied Being, 
and matter and soul constitute His embodiment. Thus 
He is Himself all the three real entities God, soul and 
matter. Consequently the knowledge which has an attri- 
buteless Brahman for its object is impossible and cannot 



XXX ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

be the complete knowledge of truth ; and obviously such 
an impossible knowledge of the oneness of the attributeless 
Brahman cannot be the remover of the avidyd postulated 
by the Adwaitins (pp. 227-238.). 

The last difficulty pointed out by Ramanuja in the 
way ' of this theory of may a is called Nivnltyanupapalti '; 
and it points that the ' ignorance ' postulated by the Adwai- 
tins has to be irremovable. The individual soul's bondage 
of ' ignorance ' is determined by karma and is a concrete 
reality. It cannot therefore be removed by any abstract 
knowledge. Divine worship and divine grace can alone 
cause the freedom of the soul, and to know God is to seek 
salvation. According to the Adwaitins the differentiations 
of the knower, the knowledge, and the known thing are 
all unreal ; and even that knowledge which is capable of 
removing avidyd has to be unreal and has to stand 
in need of another real removing knowledge. Xor 
indeed can that ' knowledge ' which forms the essential 
nature of the Brahman constitute the knowledge, the 
birth of which means the destruction of avidyd. More- 
over the knower of this knowledge cannot be the 
unreal and superimposed individual self; nor can that 
knower be the Brahman, unless such knowership belongs 
to Him by nature and is not unreal. No knower will ever 
destroy himself as knower by means of the knowledge he 
knows, and the knowership of the Brahman cannot itself 
be equivalent to avidyd. For all these reasons the remov- 
al of the Adwaitins hypothetical 'ignorance' is quite impos- 
sible (pp. 238-241.). 

Thus the Mahd-siddhdnta is brought to a close ; and 
it is concluded that, as mere ritualistic works yield only 
small and transitory results, the enquiry into the Brahman 
has necessarily to be conducted so that we may know how 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. XXxi 

we are to worship Him and thereby attain Him and Im- 
mortality (pp. 241-242.), 

Then comes forward another objector, the Mimdm- 
saka, who says that the enquiry into the Brahman need 
not be conducted at all, in as much as such an enquiry 
cannot produce the result which is expected of it. His 
objection is called the Adhikarana-pftrvapaksha, and is 
largely based upon linguistic thought and reasoning. He 
says that the true signification of a word is always to de- 
note an action, and the import of the Vedas consists in 
the actions they prescribe. The Vcdanla cannot be author- 
itative like them and cannot teach the Brahman, for the 
reason that the meaning of the word Brahman is independ- 
ently established otherwise than as an inference from 
actions. The physical expression of the emotions caused by 
listening to spoken .sentences cannot enable us to 
tletermine the meanings of words, in as much as many 
things may give rise to similar emotions. Neither the 
etymology of a word, nor its relation to other words 
in a sentence can enable us to ascertain its mean- 
ing independently of all action ; because both these 
methods of interpreting words are obviously depend- 
ent upon action. Moreover, mere verbal statements can- 
not produce any kind of practical conviction and activity, 
and volition alone is the cause of all voluntary activity. 
Therefore that which induces voluntary activity has to be 
the thing that is expressed by words, and thus it is but pro- 
per that action forms the thing which is to be learnt from the 
Vcdas. The Brahman is neither an action nor anything 
that is definitely related to an action ; and the knowledge 
of such a Brahman cannot give rise to any infinite and 
eternal result in the shape of immortality. On the other 



XXxil ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

hand, ritualistic works themselves are declared in the 
Vedas to be capable of yielding eternal and indestructible 
meritorious results. Therefore the enquiry into the Brah- 
man need not at all be undertaken (pp. 242-246). 

The answer to this objection is called Adhikarana- 
siddJuinta, and it leads us to the conclusion that the 
enquiry into the Brahman has necessarily to be con- 
ducted. The linguistic argument of the Pfirvapakskm is 
here met by pointing out distinctly that the relation be- 
tween words and their meanings is not primarily made out 
by means of any inference from the actions to which the 
utterance of words generally does give rise. Certain 
things have somehow acquired certain names, and the re- 
lation between such things and their names is dependent 
upon usage and is of itself naturally established without 
the help of any inference. The use of language is taught 
to children by their elders ; and which words denote which 
tilings is distinctly and frequently enough pointed out to 
the young learners ; thus they learn to associate the 
words with the things. The meaning of words is primari- 
ly made out only in this fashion ; it may in some rare 
cases be made out also with the help of gestures. There- 
fore the rule that the meaning of words is only to denote 
actions is not binding (pp. 246-247). Even if the Vedas 
denote only actions, all such actions are seen to relate to 
the worship of the Brahman so that thereby He may be 
attained; and hence the knowledge of the true nature of the 
Brahman and His attributes is helpful to actions, and the 
Vcdanta which deals with the Brahman has to be studied 
accordingly (pp. 248-249). Even in sentences like l Bring 
the ox', the significance of words is not to be inferred from 
' action '; for, this < action ' has to be aimed at by the voli- 
tion of the speaker, and all activity proceeds from the 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. XXX111 

dependence of the accomplishment of desire upon effort. 
Volitional desire has to be expressed by means of language 
before it is worked out into 'action'; and this 'action' itself 
cannot be the thing desired, and it is not also capable of 
being defined as that which is accomplished by 
volition and which is also the principal object of 
volition (pp. 249-252.). Even when we take Vcdic 
commandments into consideration we find that the 
action denoted by the verb in them is not the object 
that is to be accomplished by obeying them ; nor is 
this object the Apurva that is produced by performing 
the action denoted by the verb of command. It must 
be some desirable and pleasing object like Swarga or it 
must be the avoidance of pain. A commandment is no 
pleasure in itself, and is not anywhere described as such 
in the Vedas ; and the mandatory passages found in the 
Vedas relate only to such actions as are indicated by the 
verbs that give the command. Therefore commandments 
are not obeyed and worked out merely for themselves. 
Sacrifices and other such works, enjoined by the scripture 
and denoted by the verbal roots in the scriptural com- 
mandments, have all the character of constituting the 
worship of the Highest Person who is the internal ruler of 
all gods ; and the result aimed at by those works flows to 
us altogether from that Highest Person Himself (pp. 252- 
255.). The knowledge of the meaning and nature of 
Swarga is necessary on the part of him who performs 
the Jyotishtoma sacrifice, in as much as Sivarga is the 
object to be attained and the sacrifice is the means 
therefor. Similarly the Vcddntic Brahman is the 
highest object to be attained by man, and Vcdic 1 works' 
are only the means to attain Him. The statement 
that the Qlidturmasya sacrifice yields indestructible 

E 



XXXIV ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

results is not to be understood literally, as there are 
many explicit statements in the scripture to the effect 
that the results derived from the performance of ritualistic 
works as works are unimportant and unenduring. Accord- 
ingly it is concluded that, although the meaning and nature 
of Brahman are self-established and underived from any 
' action', the study of the Vedanta which teaches such a 
Brahman has necessarily to be commenced and conducted 
(pp. 255-256.). 

The discussion of the one aphorism making up the 
J ijnasadlukarana is thus brought to a close. 

Like the first, the second aphorism also makes up a 
t whole Adhikarana, the object of which is to point out 
Avhat that Brahman really is who is stated to be the 
object of all Veddntic study and investigation. The aphor- 
ism itself runs thus : " The Brahman is that from whom 
proceed the creation, &c., of this universe." After explain- 
ing the grammar and the meaning of the words in the 
aphorism, the question whether it gives any admissible 
definition of the Brahman is taken up for consideration ; 
and the position of the Purvapakshin that it does not give 
any such definition is first stated. This aphorism is based 
on a passage in the Taittiriyopanishad (III. i. i.) wherein 
the Brahman is declared to be the creator, the preserver, 
and the destroyer of the world ; and the question is wheth- 
. er these characteristics of creation, &c., are competent 
to define Him. The characteristics of universal creation, 
preservation and destruction cannot define the Brahman ; 
'because Brahman may be a common noun, and because 
also these attributes being more than one may thus denote 
more than one Brahman as in the instance " The ox is 
that which is broken-horned, hornless and fully horned, 1 ' 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS, xxxv 

Xor can the attributes of creation, c., give rise to any 
accidental characterisation of the Brahman, in as much as 
all accidental characterisations denote onl}* such things as 
have already been definitively characterised in some form 
or other, and in as much as it is not possible to establish 
that there is any definitive characterisation of the Brah- 
man quite independently of the passage referred to in 
the aphorism. Therefore it is not possible to know the 
Brahman by means of any definition (pp. 257-259.). 

To these objections it is replied that the characteris- 
tics of universal creation, &c., mentioned in this aphorism 
are well suited to give us an accidental characterisation of 
the Brahman, and suited also to give a definition of the 
Brahman. It is not right to say that the Brahman 
is not at all known to us otherwise than through the char- 
acteristics of universal creation, &c.; etymology itself 
teaches us that He is a Being who is characterised by Su- 
preme Greatness and Growth and in the Upanishadic pas- 
sage under reference He is spoken of as a well known Be- 
ing. His greatness is really due to the fact of His being 
both the instrumental and the material cause of the universe, 
and the Brahman who is known to be all this may well be 
denoted by the characteristics of universal creation, &c. 
(pp. 259-261.). These characteristics of universal creation, 
&c., are also capable of defining the Brahman, in as much 
as they need not denote more than one Brahman. In 
the definition of the ox given above, all the three defining 
attributes are seen to conflict with each other ; and thus 
they tend to denote more than one ox. In the given 
definition of the Brahman there is no such contradiction 
between the attributes, for the reason that the world's 
creation, preservation, and destruction take place at 
different times. The attributes of universal creation, 



XXXVi ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

&c., define the Brahman to be the only cause of the 
universe, and the scriptural passage " The Brahman 
is- Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" denotes His essen- 
tial nature to be different from that of all other things ; 
and indeed there is no fallacy of reciprocal dependence 
between these two ways of knowing the Brahman. 
Thus the attributes of universal creation, &c., do de- 
fine the Brahman, and He is quite capable of being 
understood by means of a definition (pp. 261-263."). Con- 
sequently the Brahman cannot be a mere attributeless 
Being ; etymology gives Him the characteristics of Great- 
ness and Growth, this aphorism defines Him as the Cause 
of the Universe, and other aphorisms endow Him with the 
power of 'seeing', &c. These aphorisms and the scriptural 
passages on which they are based do not constitute any 
authority for holding the opinion that the Brahman is an 
altogether attributeiess Being. Logic deals with the simi- 
larities in the distribution of attributes among entities, 
and cannot of course prove an attributeless thing. Finally, 
it is not possible to interpret this aphorism to mean that 
the Brahman is the cause of the illusion of phenomena ; 
because this illusion has to be based upon avidya, and the 
Brahman cannot be identical with it, but has to be a wit- 
ness thereof. To be such a witness implies that He has 
the character of homogeneous luminosity, whereby He 
ceases to be attributeless; and to deprive Him of this 
characteristic attribute of luminosity is to convert Him into 
nothingness (pp. 263-264.). 

The third Adhikarana also contains only one aphorism 
which runs thus : "That the Brahman is th& cause of the 
creation, &c., of the universe, follows altogether from the 
scripture ; because the scripture forms the source of the 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. XXXV11 

knowledge relating'to Him." The aim of this aphorism 
is to shew that the Brahman, as defined in the previous 
aphorism, can be made out only by means of the Vedanla, 
and that there is no other means of knowing Him. The 
meaning of the aphorism is as usual explained and then 
the question it relates to is taken up for discussion. Against 
the above-mentioned view of the Vcddntin that the scrip- 
ture alone forms the source of all our knowledge relating 
to the Brahman, the Mlmamsakas, the Naiyydyikas, and 
the Vaiscshikas are the prominent orthodox objectors ; 
and the position of the Mlmdmsaka is given at first, after 
stating, however,'the general objection that the Brahman 
is capable of being made out by other means of proof than 
the scripture, and that the scripture has in consequence no 
special meaning or authority in this matter. The Mlmdm- 
saka agrees with the Vcddntin so far as the revelational 
authority of the scripture is concerned, but holds that the 
scripture is an inviolable authority in relation to ritualistic 
'works' also. Therefore he naturally contends that the 
Brahman cannot be proved either by perception, or by in- 
ference. External perception, internal perception, zndyogic 
perception are all shown to be incapable of proving the 
Brahman; audit is next pointed out that neither deduction 
nor induction can establish the Brahman (pp. 265-267.). 
Here the Naiyydyika comes forward and says that the 
world is seen to be made up of component parts, and is 
thus a produced effect. Whatever is a produced effect 
necessarily implies a competent producing agent, and such 
an agent is the Brahman. Moreover, the world that is pro- 
duced out of non-intelligent matter cannot but be subject to 
the control of a single intelligent being, who has to be the 
Brahman in this case. Accordingly He is capable of being 
proved by logic (page 267.). At this point the Mimdmsaka 



XXXViii ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OI-' CONTENTS. 

joins issue with the Naiyydyika and points out that certain 
material bodies are not produced by those who control or 
enjoy them, that certain other material bodies, when their 
parts are seen to be organically put together, do not stand 
in need of any intelligent agent to control their working, 
and that there is no reason shown why in the case of the 
world the controlling intelligent being has to be only one, 
and has also to be other than the individual selves whose 
existence is admitted on both sides. Then the argument 
that every produced effect implies a competent agent to 
produce it, and that the world is such a produced effect 
is criticised ; and in the course of the criticism it is distinct- 
ly shewn that this kind of design argument necessarily 
makes the world appear too much like a man-made thing 
and makes the Brahman Himself become too much like a 
human being, while there is really no impossibility in the 
way of the individual selves themselves satisfying the de- 
mands of this argument. Here a warning is given that 
from this it should not be understood that the Mlmdmsaka 
is of opinion that logic is of no use whatsoever in acquir- 
ing a true knowledge of the Brahman. His opinion is 
that logic is useful in understanding the sdstras aright, and 
that apart from the sdstras there is really no means by 
which God can be proved (pp. 267-271.). And now the 
Vaiscshika intervenes as against the Mlmdmsaka to shew 
that God is capable of being proved solely by means of 
the process of logical inference. The material world is 
made up of constituent parts ; it is inert and gross, and is 
nevertheless set in motion and has a definite form ; therefore 
it cannot but be a produced effect. To infer a producing 
agent from the fact of there being a produced effect is 
never unjustifiable not even when we do not know the 
producibility of the effect and the productive competency 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. XXXIX 

of the agent. Both these are rightly inferred from the nature 
of the effect itself. Thus we arrive at God. The distri- 
bution of pleasure and pain to individuals in accordance 
with the merit and demerit .of their karmas cannot take 
place of itself. Hence a Person who is capable of award- 
ing skilfully the fruits of karmas in accordance with the 
various karmas themselves is also to be necessarily postu- 
lated. It is not right to hold that the individual selves 
themselves are the producing agents of the world and the 
distributors of the fruits of karmas, as their power and 
knowledge are seen to be inadequate to serve such a pur- 
pose, and as the inferred cause must in every way be 
competent to produce the observed effect. Nor is it right 
to maintain that this design argument proves the inferred 
creator of the world to be too human and to be thus devoid 
of the qualities of omniscience and the lordship of all 
things. Non-omniscience and non-lordship do not affect 
the producibility of things ; and if they are not found in 
association with the producing Creator, surely there is 
nothing wrong in it. This design argument does not fail 
even on account of the fact that God has no material body 
in the way in which human agents have bodies. The will 
of God which is based on His mind is alone the active 
agent in creation ; and His mind is eternal and unassociat- 
ed with matter. Accordingly God can be conclusively 
proved by logic. However, it cannot be proved that He 
is both the instrumental and the material cause of the 
world, in as much as that which forms the material cause 
is seen to be extremely different from that which forms the 
instrumental cause (pp. 271-277.). 

This position of the Vaiseshika is then taken up for 
final disposal, and it is shewn that his design argument is 
defective in many ways. The world and its various parts 



xl ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

are, no doubt, produced effects ; but there is really nothing 
in the logic given above to prove that they were creat- 
ed by one agent at one particular time. All the 
things in the world do not possess the character of 
being a single produced effect, and a single agent 
cannot be proved to be their Creator. On the score that 
individual souls cannot be the creators of our wonderful 
world, and on the score that it is inappropriate to 
assume many individual souls to have been agents in 
the act of creation, it is not right to argue that 
there must be only one Creator of the world. Through 
the highly increased influence of their adrishta, individual 
souls can and do produce certain particular created effects. 
The conceptions of the simultaneous origination of all 
things and the simultaneous destruction of all things do 
not deserve to occupy the position of proved truth ; and a 
single person who is capable of creating all things at once is 
nowhere known to exist, and cannot be logically inferred, 
unless logical inference can make the improbable probable 
and the impossible possible. And scripture also contradicts 
the idea that all produced things have only one producing 
agent. God is not subject to karma, and is not actuated 
by the ' qualities ' of saliva, rajas, and tamas ; He can 
therefore neither desire creation nor produce creation. 
Further, He is without a material body and is devoid of 
all perceivable activity ; and an agent who produces 
through mere desire is unperceived and is hence unin- 
ferrible. Consequently, the Brahman who is the Highest 
Person can be proved only by the sastras ; and it is not 
opposed to reason, as shall be shewn later on, that He is 
the material cause as well as the instrumental cause of the 
whole universe, although there are portions in it which 
cannot be proved to be made up of constituent parts. Thus 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xli 

the scriptural passage on which this aphorism is based is 
amply authoritative and abundantly full of import, in as 
much as the Brahman cannot, by any other means of 
proof, be cognised as the creator, the preserver, and the 
destroyer of the world (pp. 277-284.). 

The fourth Adhikarana also is, like the previous three, 
made up of only one aphorism; and it runs thus : "That, 
viz. the fact that the scripture forms altogether the source 
of the knowledge relating to the Brahman, results, how- 
ever, from His constituting the true purport of the scrip- 
ture." Now, although the Brahman cannot be cognised 
by any means of proof other than the sdstras, is He after 
all really established by the sdstras ? This is the question 
which is discussed under this aphorism. After interpreting 
the words of the aphorism, some passages from certain 
Upanishads are quoted to shew that to teach the Brahman 
is the only aim of the sdstras; and then it is formally 
stated that, although He does not import any activity or 
cessation from activity, He alone constitutes the true pur- 
port of the Veddnta. Here the Mlmdmsaka comes for- 
ward with his objection that all sentences have their 
finality in some utility or other, either as relating to 
voluntary activity or cessation from activity, or as relating 
to knowledge ; that no sentence is thus capable of import- 
ing things, the ideas corresponding to which are already 
naturally established ; and that consequently the Veddnta 
cannot establish the Brahman, the idea corresponding to 
whom is already naturally established (pp. 284-287.). 

This objection is answered by the NishprapaficJiikara- 

na-niyoga-vddin who holds that the Upanishads give us 

the commandment to non-phenomenalise the Brahman, 

and that therefore they relate to action and have their 

F 



Xlii ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

finality in utility. Even if the Brahman is self-evident, 
there is nothing wrong in His being made the object of an 
'action' so that He may be realised in the non-phenomenal 
form (pp. 287-288). The Mlmdmsaka contends against this 
view also, and says that all those, who maintain like him that 
the syntactical meaning of sentences is a commandment, 
must also be prepared to distinctly point out like him, in 
every case under consideration, the commandment, the 
attribute of the person to whom the commandment is direct- 
ed, the special object of the commandment, the manner of 
carrying out the commandment, the details of procedure 
to be adopted in carrying it out, and the person who is to 
carry it out. It is fully possible to do this in connection 
with Vedic commandments all of which enjoin the perform- 
ance of ritualistic works. There is, for instance, the 
commandment bearing upon the Jyotishtoma sacrifice ; this 
commandment is to be found in the Yajiirveda ; the 
attribute of the person to whom the commandment is 
directed is the desire to attain Sioarga ; the_special object 
of the commandment is the Jyotishtoma sacrifice ; the 
yajamdna or the sacrificer is the performer thereof ; and 
the manner of performing it and the details of procedure 
to be adopted in so performing it are all distinctly laid 
down in authoritative works relating thereto. But in the 
case of the supposed Ved antic commandment enjoining the 
non-phenomenalisation of the Brahman, it is not possible 
to specify any attribute as that which has necessarily 
to belong to the person to whom the commandment is 
directed ; nor is it possible to know in this case what the 
special object of the commandment is, in as much as this 
special and immediate object of the commandment has to 
be different from the final aim thereof, in the way in which 
the Jyotishtoma sacrifice is different from Swarga. Further, 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xliii 

this supposed Vcdantic commandment cannot but be useless 
and absurd ; and the details of procedure to be adopted in 
carrying it out are indeed nowhere to be found in the 
sdstras. Therefore the Vedanta gives no commandment 
enjoining the non-phenomenalisation of the Brahman 
(pp. 288-293.). 

Then the Dhyana-myoga-vadin comes forward with 
his objection against the contention of the Mlmamsaka, 
and declares that the Vedanta is authoritative in teaching 
us the true nature of the Brahman by means of the injunc- 
tion bearing upon His meditation. The Dhydna-niyoga- 
vddm is he who, while agreeing with the Mlmdmsakain 
holding that the scripture cannot be of any authority in 
relation to anything the idea corresponding to which is 
already naturally established, maintains at the same time 
that the Vedanta is nevertheless authoritative in relation 
to the Brahman, in as much as it gives a commandment 
enjoining the meditation of which He forms the object. 
This commandment enjoining meditation implies the thing 
to be meditated upon, and that thing is no other than the 
Brahman,\\\\QSQ real nature also is described in the Vedanta. 
The Brahman alone is real while all else that is different 
from Him is unreal. Accordingly, when there is contradic- 
tion between distinction and non-distinction, the latter 
alone is the reality ; and the final beatific release of the 
soul is the same as its becoming identified with the Brah- 
man. The achievement of this identification is not possi- 
ble without the help of that meditation which entirely 
relates to Him (pp. 293-295.). 

Here the Adwaitin begins to oppose the Dhydna-niyoga- 
vddin^hd says that the freedom of the soul from the bond- 
age of avidyd can and does result merely from the 
knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences, 



xliv AfcALYficAL oufLiKE OF CONTENTS. 

and that the final beatific release of the soul must be such 
as cannot be accomplished under an injunction, in as much 
as any possible fresh accomplishment of it will certainly 
imply that it is non-eternal. Final release or moksha is 
the same as the unembodied condition of the soul, and this 
unembodied condition is its essential nature and is hence 
eternal and uncreatable. To accomplish anything anew 
must mean either its origination, or attainment, or modifi- 
cation, or refinement ; and it is not possible to predicate 
any of these things in regard to moksha. The knowledge 
of the syntactical meaning of sentences does not therefore 
produce moksha, but only removes the obstructions which 
are in its way. Final release follows immediately after 
the knowledge of the Brahman is acquired, and does not 
stand in need of anything that has to be produced by obey- 
ing a commandment given in the sdstras. The sdslras 
declare all phenomenal distinctions to be unreal and to be 
manufactured by avidya, and the commandment enjoining 
meditation is useful only in helping us to understand well the 
syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences. Immediately 
after the knowledge of truth is acquired, the bondage of 
unreality must necessarily give way; and to be released from 
this bondage, one need not wait even till the falling off of 
the body. It has thus to be made out that moksha is not a 
thing that can be accomplished by obeying the command- 
ment relating to meditation, and that the Brahman is not 
hence implied in that commandment ; indeed He is inde- 
pendently taught and known (pp. 295-301.). 

This contention of the Adwaitin is next met by the 
Dhydna-niyoga-vadin. He says that the phenomenal 
bondage of the soul is a concrete reality and is actually 
perceived to be such. Mere abstract knowledge of any 
kind is wholly incompetent to remove this bondage ; and 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xiv 

the knowledge derived from the scripture is no exception 
in this matter and cannot destroy the sensory perception, 
of differentiated phenomena. Moreover, meditation can- 
not be the means of knowing the syntactical meaning of 
scriptural sentences, in as much as the Brahman has to be 
known before He can be meditated upon ; nor can it 
produce the knowledge which relates to the oneness of the 
self with the non-phenomenal Brahman, because it has 
itself to pre-suppose many phenomenal entities. If it were 
possible to destroy the bondage of avidyd merely by the 
knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentenc- 
es, the commandment enjoining meditation would become 
purposeless. The bondage of phenomenal unreality can- 
not, however, be so destroyed ; and it follows as a matter 
of course thatftvanmukti, or the soul's release from such a 
bondage even while it is in the embodied condition, is 
altogether impossible. The idea ofjivanmukti is illogical, 
and is opposed to scripture ; it is discarded by a great 
teacher like Apastamba. Accordingly, bondage comes to 
an end only after death and by means of that injunction 
which relates to meditation and which produces the direct 
knowledge of the Brahman. What is accomplished under 
this injunction relating to meditation is not final release 
itself, but it is the removal of the obstructions to final 
release ; therefore this injunction cannot give a non-eternal 
character to moksha. Obeying this injunction purifies the 
mind ; the mind so purified realises the Brahman directly; 
and there is nothing in the scripture to shew that He 
cannot be made an object of meditation. Therefore the 
bondage of phenomenal unreality comes to an end only by 
obeying the commandment which enjoins meditation and 
the final result of which is the direct realisation of the 
Brahman (pp. 302-309.). 



xlvi ANALYTICAL OUTLlNt OF CONTENTS. 

At this point the Dhydna-niyoga-vadin anticipates the 
objection of the Bheddbhedavadins, according to whom 
there is no contradiction between distinction and non- 
distinction, and the Brahman is thus the seat of both dis- 
tinction and non-distinction at the same time. Every 
object that we perceive is suggestive of similarity as well 
as of diversity. When a thing is realised as the cause 
of another thing, there is the realisation of similarity 
or non-distinction between them ; for instance, when 
clay is made out to be the cause of a pot, we see that there 
is non-distinction between the clay and the pot. Similarly, 
when a thing is realised as representative of a genus, there 
is the realisation of non-distinction between that thing and 
the other things belonging to that genus. On the other 
hand, when a thing is realised independently in its condi- 
tion as an effect or in its condition as a particular individual, 
there is the realisation of distinction between it and other 
things. Thus it is nothing uncommon to realise the same 
thing as the seat of both distinction and non-distinction at 
the same time. In every process of recognition also there 
is the realisation of both distinction and non-distinction in 
relation to one and the same thing (pp. 309-31 1.). It cannot 
be maintained, however, that the commonly current superim- 
position of the idea of the self on the body indicates that 
there is both distinction and non-distinction between the 
body and the self ; because it is the unstultified idea alone 
which everywhere proves things. The idea of the serpent 
falsely perceived in a rope is soon stultified, and cannot 
prove any non-distinction as really existing between the 
serpent and the rope. Similarly the idea of the self arrived 
at in relation to the body is stultified, and cannot prove any 
non-distinction between the self and the body. Accord- 
ingly, the individual self is not absolutely distinct from the 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xlvii 

Brahman ; it is both distinct and non-distinct from Him ; 
and there is ample scriptural authority to prove this (pp. 
311-314.). In the state of final beatific release the indivi- 
dual self has to be absolutely identical with the Brahman ; 
and non-distinction alone is thus natural, while the distinc- 
tion of the individual selves from the Brahman as well as 
from each other is due to limiting conditions. The karma 
of the individual self gives rise to these limiting conditions, 
and they in their turn give rise to karma. The stream is 
thus kept up ; and according as the Brahman is or is not 
subject to these limiting conditions, He is realised to be 
distinct or non-distinct from the individual self. The spatial 
ether is, for example, distinct or non-distinct from the ether 
in a pot according as it is or is not limited by the walls of 
the containing pot (pp. 314-317.). 

The position of the Bhcddbhedavddin so stated is then 
attacked by the Dhydna-niyoga-vadin. The idea of non- 
contradiction between distinction and non-distinction is 
shown to be illogical and untenable, and it is pointed out 
that in every perception it is realised that a particular 
thing is of a particular nature. Here the characterising 
thing is the genus and the characterised thing is the parti- 
cular individual. The individual self is not, however, real- 
ised as belonging to the genus Brahman, and cannot 
therefore be both distinct and non-distinct from the 
Brahman. Non-distinction is based upon the sdstras ; 
and distinction is due to avidyd, which being unreal, is in- 
capable of tainting the Brahman. It is inconceivable 
how the supposed limiting conditions really do limit the 
Brahman who is only one and indivisible and homogene- 
ous. The individual self cannot be a bit of the Brahman 
cut off from Him by limiting conditions ; it cannot be 
such a part of the Brahman as is not cut off from Him and 



xlviii ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

is still associated with limiting conditions ; nor can it be 
the Brahman Himself in essence, though subject to limiting 
conditions ; nor finally can it be the limiting condition 
itself. Thus non-distinction between the Brahman and 
the individual self is alone the reality, and the Vcddnta is 
authoritative in relation to the essential nature of the 
Brahman, in as much as the knowledge thereof is needed 
as a complement to the injunction relating to meditation 

(pp. 3I7-323-)- 

Now the Mimdmsaka comes forward to meet finally 
the 'Dhydna-niyoga-vddin and maintains that, although the 
knowledge of the essential nature of the Brahman is need- 
ed as a complement to the injunction bearing upon medita- 
tion, there is indeed nothing to show that Veddntic passag- 
es import anything that is really existent. In connection 
with the commandment enjoining the realisation of the 
Brahman as a Name, we find that the completion of 
meditation is possible even when its object is a mere 
mental concept corresponding to which there may or may 
not be any external entity. The Vcddnta is devoid of 
utility in the form of inducing activity or cessation from 
activity ; and even when it is granted that it induces the 
activity of meditation, it is incapable of establishing the 
reality of the Brahman, in as much as an object of medi- 
tation need not always be real, and in as much as the idea 
corresponding to the word Brahman is already naturally 
established and known (pp. 323-325.). 

And at last the Veddntin comes forward and proves 
his case as against the Mimdmsaka, and points out that 
the Veddnta which teaches that Brahman, who is the 
highest object of attainment for all, cannot be said not to 
have its finality only in utility. Such scriptural passages 
a.s relate to activity and cessation from activity may, on 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. xlix 

the other hand, be said not to have their finality in 
utility ; because they give rise merely to that kind of 
knowledge which can be utilised only so long as there 
are desirable objects to attain. But Vcddntic passages en- 
able us to know that individual souls acquire unlimited and 
unsurpassed bliss at the time otmoksha, and enable us also 
to know that they continue for ever in the enjoy- 
ment of such bliss. Therefore there is really no end to 
the utility of the knowledge produced by the Veddnta. 
To know this invitingly attractive and worthy nature of the 
highest object of human pursuit is to be impelled to seek 
it so as to find it ; and herein is the utility of the Veddnta. 
This utility cannot indeed be well based merely on such an 
abstract conception of the Brahman as has no reality to 
correspond to it. If it be shewn that the Ifpanishads do 
not teach the real existence of the Brahman, then, 
although they may give rise to the conceptual knowledge of 
the Brahman, they can have no finality in utility. There- 
fore the Brahman is really existent, and the chief end of 
the Veddnta is to teach us to know Him (pp. 325-328.). 

The fifth AdJiikarana consists of eight aphorisms, 
commencing with the fifth and ending with the twelfth. 
The object of this Adhikarana is to establish that what is 
declared to be the cause of universal creation, &c., in the 
Veddnta is not Prakriti or primordial matter with all the 
potentialities assigned to it by the Sdnkhyas but that it 
is that omniscient and omnipotent Being who has been 
denoted by the name of Brahman. The cause of the world 
is spoken of as Sat in .the CJihdndogya-Upanishad y and 
the word Sat means Existence. Does this word Existence 
denote the Pradhdna or Prakriti of the Sdrikhyas, or 
does it denote the Brahman ? The doubt arises that 
G 



1 ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

it may denote the Pradhana ^ in as much as, whatever 
thing and whatever general nature thereof exist in the 
condition of a cause, that same thing and that same 
nature thereof have to exist also in the condition of an 
effect, and in as much as the world which is a produced 
effect and is hence made up of the qualities of saliva, rajas 
and tamas cannot therefore have the non-material 'qua- 
lity-less' Brahman for its cause. If the undifferentiated 
Pradhana- is not taken to be the cause of the world, it is 
impossible to understand how, by knowing a certain single 
thing, all things become known, as it is declared in the 
scripture ; and it is impossible also to understand why the 
statement relating to the cause of the world is, as given in 
the C/ihandogya- Upanishad, in the form of a proposition 
and an illustration. In reply to such a supposition it is 
pointed out in the first of the eight aphorisms of this 
Adhikarana that the Existence spoken of as the cause of 
the world cannot be the Pradhana, because the activity 
of seeing and thinking is predicated in relation to it. 
There is no doubt that the cause has necessarily to be in 
natural conformity with the effect ; and the Highest Per- 
son who owns all the intelligent and the non-intelligent 
things in their subtle state as His body is certainly in 
natural conformity with all produced effects, as taught in 
the Upanishad s and as maintained by the Sfitrakara him- 
self. The passage dealing with the cause of the world in 
the Qhhandogy } a- Upanishad is not really in the form of a 
syllogism, as the middle term is altogether wanting ; and 
hence it surely cannot be that that passage mentions the 
logically inferrible Pradhana to be the cause of the world 
(pp. 329-334.). The second aphorism in the Adhikarana 
is intended to show that the activity of 'seeing ' predicated 
in relation to the Sat which forms the cause of the worlcl 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. li 

is not to be interpreted figuratively, in as much as that 
Sat is spoken of as the Atman. The teaching in the 
Qihandogya-Upanishad (VI. 8. 7.) has in view the world 
which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, 
and points out that the Sat is the Atman or the Self 
thereof ; and surely the non-intelligent Pradhdna cannot 
be the intelligent Atman. The omniscient Brahman alone 
can be the world's Atman, and can also see and think 
(pp. 334-336.). The third aphorism of the A dh ikarana 
gives another reason \\~hy the Sat that is mentioned to be 
the cause of the world cannot be the material Pradhdna, 
and that reason is that it is taught in the context that he 
who is firmly devoted to that Sal obtains final release as 
a result of his devotion. What one worships here on 
earth determines what one attains finally ; and to attain 
the Pradhdna is not to obtain moksha, but it is to get into 
the bondage of samsdra. Indeed the Vcddnta is not so 
unkind as to impel us to get into this bondage (pp. 336- 
337.). The fourth aphorism here assigns another 

reason why the causal Sat cannot be the Pradhdna ; and 
that reason is that Svetaketu, who was desirous of attain- 
ing moksha, is taught in the context that he is the same 
as the Sat, which certainly cannot mean that he was mere 
matter ; for, if he were the same as the Pradhdna, he 
could obtain no moksha, and the idea of his being the 
same as the Sat would deserve to be discarded. But it is 
not taught that it is to be so discarded (page 337.). The 
next aphorism gives the fifth reason why the causal 
Sat is not the Pradhdna; and in it it is pointed out that, 
if the Sat were the Pradhdna, there would then be the 
contradiction of the proposition enunciated in the context 
to the effect that, by knowing a certain single thing, all 
things become known. This arises out of the fact that 



Ill 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 



non-intelligent matter cannot give rise to the intelligent 
individual souls, and cannot be their cause ; and hence, 
by knowing it, all things cannot become known (page 
338.). The next aphorism is based on a passage in the 
Qihdndogya-Upanishad (VI. 8. i.), in which it is declared 
that a sleeping person is in union with the Sat, and 
that while asleep he withdraws into his own cause 
and is also absorbed into his own cause. Here the 
Sal is the cause into which its effect, namely, the indi- 
vidual self withdraws ; and the non-intelligent Pradhana 
does not deserve to be the cause of the individual self. 
Until final release takes place the individual self is asso- 
ciated with names and forms ; in moksha and at the time 
of deep sleep he is embraced by the Brahman and gives 
up names and forms. It is thus that he withdraws into 
his own cause, and the Sal has therefore to be the Brahman 
(pp. 339-341.)- The next aphorism maintains that the 
cause of the world cannot be the Pradhana , because the 
Sal which is mentioned here as the cause must have the 
same meaning as whatever is elsewhere in the scripture 
declared to be the world's cause. In a number of scriptural 
passages the Lord of All is taught to be the cause of the 
world, and this causal Sal cannot therefore be other than 
the Lord (pp. 341-342.). The last aphorism of the 
Adhikarana says that more than all it is actually revealed 
in the Qihdndogya and other Upanishads that the Supreme 
Self is the cause of the universe, and that the causal Sal 
cannot at all mean in consequence any thing other 
than that Supreme Self, who is the Highest Person 
and is also the Brahman that has to be enquired into in 
the Veddnta. In conclusion it is pointed out at the end 
of this Adhikarana that the import of it as a whole is 
against the position of the A dwaitins, according to which 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. liii 

the Brahman is a mere attributeless intelligence and 
luminosity. Here the Brahman is declared to be associat- 
ed -with the real attribute of 'seeing', and His character 
as a witness cannot therefore be unreal. The 'seeing' and 
thinking Brahman must be an intelligent being, and to be 
an intelligent being is to possess the quality of intelligence. 
To be devoid of this attribute of intelligence is to be the 
same as the non-intelligent Pradhdna, which surely the 
Brahman is not. In the same way in which the Brahman 
cannot be attributeless, He cannot also be mere luminosity 
or intelligence. Indeed luminosity or intelligence is that 
which makes itself and other things fit to be realised by a 
cognising mind ; and a thing which is devoid of all attri- 
butes cannot possess this capacity. To grant that the 
Brahman has such a capacity is the same as to admit that 
He is none other than the all-powerful, all-knowing, and 
all-good God ; and an attributeless entity cannot but be a 
mere nothing that is totally unrealisable (pp. 342-346.). 

The sixth Adhikarana is \\\z,Anandamayadhikarana, 
and contains also eight aphorisms from the thirteenth to 
the twentieth. The object of the last Adhikarana, known 
as the Jkshatyadhikarana, is to prove that the Brahman 
declared to be the cause of the world is not the same as 
the Pradhdna of the Sdnkhyas ; and the Anandamayddhi- 
harana shews that that Brahman is different from the in- 
dividual sell also. This Adhikarana is based on the Anan- 
davalll of the Taittirlya-Upanishad, and the first aphorism 
here runs thus: "That which is denoted by the word Anan- 
damaya is the Brahman; because there is, in the context, 
the repetition of various grades of bliss which culminate 
in the Anandama\a or the Highest Bliss." Here the 
doubt arises whether this Anandamaya is the Highest Self 



liv ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

who is different from the individual self commonly known 
as thejlva, or whether the Anandamaya is the jlva him- 
self. It can be made out from the context in the Taittl- 
rlya- Upamshad that the Anandamaya denotes the Brah- 
man who is the cause of the world ; and whether this 
Brahman is different from the jlva or not has therefore to 
be determined by making out what the Anandamaya 
means. According to the Saitkhyas the association of the 
individual self with matter is the cause of all creation, and 
individual selves may accumulate the merit of karma to 
such an extent as even to become presiding deities at the 
commencement of what is called a creating kalpa or cycle. 
Hence they are the Purvapakshins here, and hold that the 
Anandamaya is the individual self. They say that since the 
Anandamaya is declared in the Taittirlya- Upamshad to 
be associated with an embodiment, it cannot be anything 
other than the individual self. Again, the fact that what 
is declared to be the cause of the world is, in scriptural 
passages, grammatically equated with the individual self, is 
evidence to them that the individual self itself is the cause of 
the world. The individual self can 'see' and think ; and its 
final object of attainment is freedom from association with 
matter, in as much as such freedom from the bondage of 
matter and ignorance constitutes its essential nature and 
its bliss. With the object of pointing out this essential 
nature of the individual self, the Taittiriya-Upanishad 
says that the Anandamaya is different from the body 
(annamaya), different from the life inside it (prdnamaya), 
different from the mind within (manomaya], and different 
even from the understanding therein (vijndnamayd}. The 
Anandamaya is thus the innermost entity in the body, 
and is the same as the individual self (pp. 3^6-350.). 
Here the Adwaitin steps in with his interpretation of the 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTEXTS. Iv 

Anandamaya. According to him the Anandamaya is 
not different from the Brahman who is the seat of 
joy, pleasure, satisfaction and bliss, all of which are 
described to be His constituent parts. The Brahman is 
of such a nature as distinguishes Him from all other things, 
He is the innermost essence of all and is called the Atman. 
The idea intended to be conveyed by the Adzvaitin is that 
the individual self is not essentially different from the Brah- 
man who is altogether one only without a second, and that 
this secondless Being is the Anandamaya. The Adzvaitin 
then meets a possible objection to the effect that the Ananda- 
maya may not be the Brahman, but may be something else; 
and he distinctly shews that the Anandamaya must not 
only mean the Brahman, but also must indicate that the 
Brahman is extremely different from pain, even as He is 
different from all things other than Himself. The differ- 
entiation of the individual selves from the Brahman and 
from each other is due to avid yd; otherwise there is no 
difference between the essential nature of the individual 
self and that of the Brahman. Viewed in relation to its 
essential nature the individual self deserves to be called 
the Anandamaya quite as much as the Brahman does ; and 
it is appropriate in the context to interpret the Ananda- 
maya as that individual self which is not in essence 
different from the Brahman (pp. 350-353.). 

Thus both the SaAkhyas and the Adtvaitins maintain, 
in their own respective ways, that the Anandamaya is 
nothing other than the individual self. At this point it is 
shewn that the aphorism quoted above indicates clearly 
that the Anandamava must mean the Brahman, who is 
distinctly other than the individual self. The reason 
assigned for this is that, in the Taittiriya-Upanishad, 
there is a graded repetition of several kinds of bliss, 



Ivi ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

ill an order in which eiich succeeding bliss is a hundred 
fold of the bliss preceding it, so as to reach that bliss 
which forms the summit of an unsurpassable condition. 
This last bliss is not possible to the individual self, and 
denotes therefore the Brahman who alone can be its 
abode. Accordingly this Upanishad declares the Ananda- 
maya to be different from the vijfianamaya, which latter 
has necessarily to mean the same as the individual self. 
The word vijftanamaya cannot mean mere intellect or 
understanding ; for, if it be so interpreted, the affix may at 
that is found in it would be meaningless ; it really means 
the knower or the individual self. It is true that in the 
passage " The vijftdna performs the sacrifice " the word 
vijttana stands for vijildnamaya ; but it has to be borne in 
mind that words which denote the essential attributes of 
things are often used so as to denote those things them- 
selves ; besides, there are grammatical rules according to 
which the word vijilana has to mean an intelligent agent 
but not mere intelligence. The vijilana that performs the 
sacrifice is indeed an agent, which the mere intellect or 
understanding can never be ; and this same vijfldna is also 
said to own a body as its home. The Madhyandinas and 
the Kanvas have two separate recensions of the Brihadd- 
ranyaka- Upanisliad. In the recension of the latter there is a 
particular passage (III. 7. 22.) in which the word vijftdna 
occurs; and in the corresponding passage in the recension of 
the former it is found that the word dtman is used instead of 
the word vijfldna. This decides that the vijndna which is 
used in the place of the vijfidnamaya can be nothing other 
than the individual self, and the word vijfidnamaya itself 
very appropriately denotes the individual self. Therefore 
the Anandamaya, which is positively declared to be differ- 
ent from the vijfidnamaya, cannot denote the individual 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. Ivii 

self, but must denote the Brahman who is other than the 
individual self (pp. 354-358.). 

Then this other position of the Purvapakshins that, 
because the Being, who is declared to be the cause world, is, 
in a numbe. 1( of scriptural passages, seen to be grammatically 
equated with the individual self, the Anandamaya has to 
be the S5<vhe as the individual self is taken up for consi- 
deration and criticism. The individual self is, no doubt, 
an intelligent being ; but that being cannot have the power 
of creating, preserving, and destroying the world in accord- 
ance with his own will. The scripture and the Sutrakara 
are both agreed on this point, and the individual self is 
essentially different from the Brahman. The grammatical 
equation between the Brahman and the individual self 
cannot denote that both of them are essentially the same ; 
it is indeed impossible for the all-knowing, all-powerful, 
and all-good Brahman to be essentially the same as the 
ignorant, weak, and impure individual self. Nor can it be 
maintained reasonably that a grammatical equation is 
appropriate only when either of the two equated things in 
it is taken to be false ; for, in the case of the Brahman and 
the individual self equated with each other, it is not easy to 
decide to which of them such a falsity belongs. Of course 
the Brahman is not unreal. The individual self may be so, 
on the supposition that the Brahman appears falsely as the 
individual self owing to the superimposition of avidyd ; 
but this would make the Brahman contradict Himself. 
This supposition cannot be forced on us to make the 
grammatical equations in the scripture significant ; for, 
what is inappropriate and opposed to reason should not be 
assumed even for the purpose of making the scripture ap- 
propriate. This supposed association of the Brahman with 
evil cannot at all be a reality; and if it be held that His 
H 



Iviii ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

attributeless character frees Him from such an association, 
it frees Him also from His association with all that is good 
and auspicious, and indeed makes all things unreal so that 
there remains nothing that is to be known through know- 
ing the Brahman. The proposition that, by knowing a 
certain single thing, all things become known, does not 
surely denote that all things are unreal. Against cannot 
be held that the unreality of all things is due to the fact 
of their being modifications of the one real thing which is 
attributeless intelligence. Theattributelessnessofthe.5ra#- 
man is itself contradicted by the scripture ; and in the equa- 
tion ' That thou art ' neither the That nor the thou can 
denote an attributeless thing, unless indeed both these 
words are interpreted figuratively (pp. 358-366.). This 
difficulty of having to interpret both the words in a gram- 
matical equation figuratively cannot be got over by main- 
taining that the purpose of a grammatical equation is not 
at all to denote any attributes, but is merely to denote the 
oneness of the thing referred to therein ; because the func- 
tion of a grammatical equation is to predicate in relation 
to a thing, either affirmatively or negatively, by means of 
certain words that that same thing, which has already a 
particular form denoted by some words, is also possessed 
of a certain other form. Only when one of the two attri- 
butes mentioned in a grammatical equation contradicts the 
other, is it right to interpret figuratively either of the two 
words denoting those attributes, in as much as the gram- 
matical equation has to denote only one thing as character- 
ised by two consistent attributes. Nor again can it be 
maintained that the words of a grammatical equation can- 
not import oneness in relation to the things they denote, 
on the ground that the thing correlated to any one attribute 
is distinct from the thing which is correlated to any other attri- 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. lix 

bute. This would be so, provided only that the mere correla- 
tion of a thing to two attributes is opposed to the oneness of 
that thing. Such is not always the case ; when the two at- 
tributes are contradictory, then they can not meet in one 
and the same thing. Many consistent attributes may 
and do meet in one and the same thing ; thus it is that 
grammatical equations become significant, and thus again 
it is that the perdurability of all perceived external objects 
can be maintained (pp. 366-371.). That the words in a 
grammatical equation have all the power of denoting a 
single thing, which is characterised by many attributes, is 
further shewn to be borne out by Jaimini in his Mimfimsd 
aphorisms ; and the Vcdic commandment "With the red, 
tawney-eyed heifer, one year old, let him purchase the 
soma plant " >is discussed fully from the stand-point of 
Jaimini. The conclusion here arrived at and illustrated is 
that, in any particular sentence forming a grammatical 
equation, a thing, which is characterised by one attribute 
or two attributes or many attributes, is denoted by certain 
particular words used in agreement either with the kdraka 
case-affixes or with the nominative case-affix ; that it is 
made out by means of the grammatical equation that the 
thing so characterised by all the attributes is only one ; 
and that this one thing is associated with the action deno- 
ted by the verb forming the predicate of the sentence. 
Two minor objections against this conclusion are then dis- 
posed of, namely, that, in a grammatical equation in which 
a substance is mentioned, a word denoting a quality 
merely denotes that quality but not a thing as qualified 
by that quality, and that, as the purchase of the soma 
plant is completely concluded with the exchange of the 
one year old heifer, its redness, has no necessary relation to 
this transaction of purchase (pp. 371-377.)' 



k ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

In accordance with the conclusion so arrived at 
regarding the import of a grammatical equation, the scrip- 
tural .sentence ' That thou art ' is interpreted so as to 
shew how, by means of the word ' thou ' also, it is the 
Highest Self alone that is denoted as forming the internal 
ruler of all individual selves. This interpretation is sup- 
ported by means of the teaching given in the scripture re- 
garding the differentiation of names and forms. The 
Brahman wishing to become manifold created the world. 
All the individual souls in the world entered, each ac- 
cording to its karma, into such material embodiments 
as were most suited to them. Then the Brahman Him- 
self entered into these souls so as to become their internal 
ruler. Thus it is that all things have become things, and 
that all significant words denote the Highest Self as asso- 
ciated with non-intelligent matter and the intelligent 
individual self (pp. 377-379.)- Scriptural authority is then 
sufficiently quoted to prove that the whole world accord- 
ingly forms the body of the Brahman, and that He Him- 
self constitutes the Self thereof ; and it is thence arrived 
at that all things form modes of the Highest Self, and that 
words denoting non-intelligent material things as well as 
words denoting intelligent individual selves finally import 
the Highest Self Himself. Therefore in the sentence 
' That thou art ' the grammatical equation of the word 
' That ' with the word ' thou ', which also thus denotes the 
Highest Self, has certainly a primary and natural signific- 
ance ; and there is no need at all to adopt here any figura- 
tive interpretation of any kind whatever. As long as the 
material embodiment of a thing may happen to be one of 
its modes, it is not right to hold that it is only words denot- 
ing generic and other qualities that can be grammatically 
equated with words denoting substances. In the case of 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. Ixi 

a thing which can exist as the mode of another thing, 
the existence, persistence, and realisation of that thing are 
invariably associated with this other thing. According!}-, 
the words which usually denote such things as are such 
modes denote also the things which are characterised by 
those modes. The material characteristics of the body do 
not taint the embodied individual soul ; similarly the 
weaknesses and deficiencies of individual souls do not 
affect the Brahman who is their Soul. In the grammati- 
cal equation ' That thou art ' the word ' That ' denotes, 
therefore, the Highest Self as the all-knowing, all-power- 
ful, and all-good cause of the world ; and the word ' thou ' 
also denotes that same Supreme Self as having for His 
body an embodied individual self. This interpretation 
of this grammatical equation is quite absolutely faultless ; 
and it denotes at the same time that the individual self 
which is a mode and hence an attribute of the Highest 
Self is for that very reason different from the Highest 
Self. The word Anandamaya has to denote this Highest 
Self; therefore it can neither denote the independent 
individual self of the Sdtikhyas, nor that other individual 
self of the Adwaitins which is in essence identical with the 
Supreme Self (pp. 379-383)- 

The contention of the Purvapakshins that the 
grammatical equation of the word denoting the Brahman 
with words denoting individual selves is calculated to prove 
the Anandamaya to be the same as the individual self- 
is thus finally disposed of ; and their other contention 
that, since the Anandamaya is declared in the scripture 
to be associated with an embodiment, it cannot be any- 
thing other than the individual self is then taken up for 
disposal. It is no doubt true that the Anandamaya is 
declared to be the embodied self of the vijft&namaya ; but 



Ixii ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

it is also declared that, in the series consisting of the 
annamaya t the prdnamaya, the manomaya, the vijndna- 
maya and the Anandamaya, the embodied self of that 
which succeeds is the same as the embodied self of that 
which precedes ; and the Brahman who is the cause of 
the world is spoken of in this Taittiriya- Upanishad itself 
as the Self of the whole series of created beings. More- 
over it is distinctly stated in the Subdla- Upanishad that 
all the constituent principles of the universe form the body 
of the Highest Self. Therefore it is this Highest Self 
Himself who forms the embodied Self of the annamaya, 
the prdnamaya, the manomaya and the vijndnamaya ; and 
the Anandamaya is Himself the embodied Self of Himself. 
Thus the Supreme Self also has an embodiment ; He alone 
is the unconditioned and ever blissful Embodied Self. 
This is the reason why the sdstra which deals with the 
Brahman is known to worthy persons by the name of the 
'Science of the Embodied Being.' Consequently the 
Anandamaya is the Highest Self, and is undoubtedly dis- 
tinct from the individual self (pp. 383-386.). 

In the next aphorism another objection against the 
above interpretation of the Anandamaya is answered. In 
the word Anandamaya there is the affix known as mayat. 
According to Sanskrit grammar this affix generally signifies 
modification, although it may occasionally denote abun- 
dance as well. In the context the affix mayat is uniformly 
used so as to signify modification. Therefore the word Anan- 
damaya cannot be interpreted to mean any thing that is 
immodifiable. Even if it be granted that the mayat here 
denotes abundance, there is the difficulty that an abun- 
dance of bliss implies at least a modicum of misery. 
Therefore it is the modifiable individual self who is subject 
to misery that is denoted by the word Anandamaya. 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. Ixiii 

Such is the position of the Pilrvapakshin, and it is counter- 
acted by this aphorism which says that the may at here signi- 
fies only abundance. In the giaded repetition of the various 
kinds of bliss, the highest unsurpassable bliss happens to 
be that which is attributed to the Anandamaya ; and the 
Anandamaya must therefore mean the immodifiable and 
ever blissful Brahman. In the context the affix mayat 
cannot be uniformly interpreted to mean modification, in as 
much as the \vordprdnamaya has to be interpreted to mean 
the same thing as the word prdna means, or to mean that 
which has the activity of the prdna in abundance. It is as 
common to use the affix mayat in the sense of abundance as 
it is to use it in the sense of modification. An abundance of 
bliss does not necessarily imply a modicum of misery ; on 
the other hand it only implies the negation of the smallness 
of bliss. The scripture says distinctly that the Brahmanis 
wholly free from sin and from misery. The unsurpassably 
large amount of bliss belonging to the Brahman implies 
also the smallness of the bliss belonging to others ; and it 
is not right to hold that the individual self is a modifica- 
tion of bliss, in as much as the knowledge and the bliss of 
the individual self are only in a state of contraction when 
in the condition of samsdra. Therefore also the Ananda- 
maya is different from the individual self and is the same 
as the Supreme Self. (pp. 386-390.). 

The next aphorism says that the Anandamaya is not 
the individual self, in as much as He is declared to be the 
cause of bliss to all individual selves. The source of bliss 
cannot be the same as he who receives bliss therefrom (pp. 
390-391.). The fourth aphorism in the Adhikarana says 
that that same Brahman, who is denoted by the words of 
the mantra which begins with 'The Brahman is Existence, 
Knowledge, Infinity/ is spoken of as the Anandamaya, 



Ixiv ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

and that therefore the Anandamaya cannot be the indivi- 
dual self. The Brahman is the object to be attained by 
the individual self who is the worshipper, and the object of 
worship cannot be the same as the worshipper (pp. 391- 
392.). The next aphorism gives another reason why the 
Anandamaya cannot be the individual self ; and that is 
that there is inappropriateness in supposing that the 
Anandamaya is any thing other than the Supreme Self. 
It may be maintained by a Purvapakshin that, although it 
is true that a worshipper's object of attainment is necessa- 
rily different from the worshipper himself, here the Brah- 
man, denoted by the words of the mantra referred to above, 
is not a different thing from the individual self. The 
mantra is intended to teach that the Brahman and the 
individual self are both one and the same, and that both 
of them have the same essential nature of attributeless and 
undifferentiated intelligence. Therefore the Anandamaya 
denotes only this essential nature of the individual self. The 
inappropiiateness in maintaining a position like this is 
that unconditioned omniscience will have to be attributed 
to the individual self, which has no omniscience at all in 
its bound condition of samsara. Even the released indi- 
vidual self cannot have such unconditioned omniscience as 
can 'see' and think in many ways, so as to create the world 
thereby, and make the Brahman manifold. Accordingly the 
Anandamaya has to denote the Brahman, who is the Su- 
preme Self and is other than the individual self. That 
speech and mind cannot grasp the Brahman does not 
mean that He is really attributeless, in spite of the scrip- 
ture attributing to Him innumerable auspicious qualities ; 
it only means that speech and mind cannot prove Him. It 
is said that the unsurpassable Bliss of the Brahman may 
be known, and that to know it is to cease to have any fear 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. l.KV 

Irom anywhere. Thus the Brahman described in the 
mantra has characteristics which are other than those that 
constitute the essential nature of the individual self; and 
the Anandamaya cannot again for this reason be the 
same as the individual self (pp. 392-396.). The next 
aphorism says that the Anandamaya is different from the 
individual self, for the reason that the Taittiriya-Upanish- 
ad itself declares that the individual self is different 
from the Brahman, (pp. 396-397.). There is again 
another reason given in the next aphorism to shew why 
the Anandamaya cannot be the individual self. The 
Brahman merely wills, and there arises creation ; and 
He does not stand in need of any association with non- 
intelligent matter in the course of His willing such a 
creation. But no individual self that is capable of engag- 
ing in creation can ever do so without being in asso- 
ciation with matter (page 397.). The last reason 
why the Anandamaya cannot be the individual self 
is given in the last aphorism of the adhikarana. Since 
the bliss of the individual self is the result of that 
self's association with the Anandamaya, the bliss-giver 
cannot be the same as the bliss-receiver. That the Brah- 
man is the supreme home of bliss and that He is Bliss 
Himself, so that without Him none can have any bliss of 
any kind, is amply borne out by scriptural authority. The 
j'lva, or the individual self, is not taught to be such an en- 
tity ; and therefore the conclusion of the Adhikarana is 
that the Brahman, who has been made out to be a differ- 
ent entity from the pradhdna or non-intelligent matter, is 
also a different entity from the jiva or individual self (pp. 
398-399.). 

The seventh adhikarana is called Aniar adhikarana, 
\ 



Ixvi ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

and consists only of two aphorisms. This and the follow- 
ing four adhikaranas, belonging to the first part of the 
first chapter of the Vedanta-Si'itras, are intended to estab- 
lish that the Brahman is different from certain particular 
non-intelligent entities,as also from the Sun, Prajapati,Indra 
and other such individual selves, who have attained god- 
hood and are in possession of peculiarly valuable merit 
due to their respective karmas. The first aphorism of 
the Antaradhikarana says that the Person, who is declared 
in the scripture to be within the Sun and within the eye, is 
the Brahman Himself, in as much as such attributes as 
belong only to the Brahman are seen to be applied to that 
Person. The Sankhyas are again the Pftrvapakshins here, 
and point out that this person is declared to be, like an in- 
dividual self, associated with a body ; and they contend 
that individual selves themselves may, through the accu- 
mulated merit of their karmas, acquire omniscience, omni- 
potence, and all the other sovereignties which are attributed 
to the Brahman, and that there need be nothing called 
the Supreme Self as distinct from the individual self. Ac- 
cording to them it is only a highly meritorious individual self 
that is the person within the Sun and within the eye (pp. 
400-402.). In answer to the Sdtikhyas it is first pointed 
out that "This same above-mentioned Person is risen above 
all sins," and that to be so free from sin is to be free from 
all subjection to the influence of karma. No individual self 
is, by nature, free from the influence of karma ; and the 
Brahman's freedom from the influence of karma is indeed 
the basis of all the auspicious qualities and sovereignties 
that are attributed to Him as being natural to Him. To 
possess these things thus, it is altogether impossible for 
any individual self. Therefore the Person within the eye 
and within the Sun cannot be an individual self. That this 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. Ixvil 

Person is declared to be associated with a body does not 
prove that He must, in consequence, be only an individual 
self; because it is possible for Him who wills the 
truth to will His own association with a body. Indeed 
there is incompatibility between His essential nature, 
which is free from the influence of karma, and His associa- 
tion with a material body, which is always controlled by 
karma ; but then His body need not at all be material. That, 
with the .object of favouring His worshippers, He often 
assumes suitable divine forms, that nevertheless He is free 
from the qualities belonging essentially to material Prakri- 
ti, and that the body which is at any time assumed by 
Him is immaterial and divine, are all capable of being well 
established by means of the scriptures. Consequently, He 
who abides within the brilliant orb of the Sun and within 
the eye is the Highest Self Himself, who is different from the 
Sun and other individual selves (pp. 403-408.). Then 

the other aphorism in the adhikarana draws attention to 
the fact that the scriptures themselves have declared this 
Highest Self to be different from the sun-god and other such 
individual selves ; and in proof of this, passages are quoted 
from the Brihaddranyaka-Upanishad and from the Snbdla- 
Upanishad and finally the adhikarana is brought to an 
end with the conclusion that the Supreme Self is altogether 
different from all the individual selves from the four-faced 
Brahma downwards (pp. 408-409.). 

The Aka'sddhikarana contains only one aphorism 
which says that what is denoted by the word Akd'sa in the 
Chhdndogya-Upanishad (I. 9. .1.) is the Brahman, in as 
much as His peculiar characteristics are, in the context, 
mentioned in relation to what is denoted by that word. Sat, 
At ma n, and such other words have already been shewn to 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

denote the Brahman, who is the cause of the world and the 
home of all auspicious qualities and divine sovereignties. 
Here, it is pointed out that the word Akasa is also used, in 
the passage referred to above, to denote that same Brah- 
man. The Pfirvapakshin here contends that the word 
dkdsa must be interpreted to mean nothing other than the 
material element of akasa or ether. No one has any right 
to interpret a word so as to make it have a meaning which is 
other than its usual significance; and, when it is said in the 
scriptures that all beings are born out of the akasa, what 
is meant to be taught is that the whole world has been 
evolved out of the material element known as ether. The 
qualities of ( seeing ', thinking, and willing are attributed 
to the cause of the world only figuratively. The word sat 
also means the material element known as dkdsa, and the 
word at man also may legitimately be interpreted to mean 
the same thing. That dkdsa is sometimes pointed out to be 
a produced effect, does not go against its being the cause of 
the world ; because it is capable of existing both in the 
unevolved and the evolved conditions. This view agrees 
also with other statements in the scripture regarding the 
dkdsa ; therefore the Brahman is not other than the well 
known element of akasa (pp. 409-413.). Against this 

contention it is argued that the Upanishadic passage on 
which this aphorism is based assigns to Akd'sa such attri- 
butes as cannot appropriately belong to the element ether. 
This element cannot be the cause of all things, in as much 
as the intelligent individual self cannot be born out of 
non-intelligent matter; it cannot be greater than all things, 
because to be greater than all things is to be unconditioned ; 
nor can it be the best refuge, as long as it is merely that 
non-intelligent thing which deserves to be discarded and the 
attainment of which forms no desirable aim of life. It is 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. IxJX 

not right to say that the word dkdsa cannot be interpreted 
to mean anything other than the well known material 
element ether ; for, in the context, that word is used so as 
to denote a thing that has been already described. The 
thing so described is the Brahman ; and in as much as He 
possesses the power of illuminating things, He is very 
appropriately called Akdsa. The forced adoption of an 
interpretation that is against the context is in no way 
reasonable. It is true that the word dtman is occasionally 
used so as to denote a non-intelligent thing, but the gene- 
ral rule is that it has to denote an intelligent entity ; and 
the scripture ascribes to what forms the cause of the world 
such attributes as belong only to an intelligent being. It 
is thus a settled conclusion that the omniscient, omnipo- 
tent and omnipenetrative Brahman alone is denoted by 
the word Akdsa in the context referred to above (pp. 



The Prdnddhikarana is a short one containing only one 
aphorism, which says that the word Prdna also is used in 
the CJihdndogya-Upanishad to denote the Brahman. Here 
prdna cannot mean merely life or vital air, in as much as 
it is used to denote a thing that has been otherwise describ- 
ed, and in as much as it is characterised to be an entity 
into which the world enters and out of which the 
world comes. Seeing that most things are dependent 
upon /i/e, we cannot interpret this causal Prdna to mean 
life. Stocks and stones and the essence of the intelli- 
gent individual self are all pervaded by the Brahman, 
and are thus dependent upon the Brahman ; but there 
is no life or physical vitality in them. Therefore the 
word Prdna also denotes, like the word Akasa, that 
all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good Brahman who 



Ixx ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

alone can be the cause of the universe and be its final 
home of refuge (pp. 417-418.). 

There are four aphorisms in the Jyotir-adhikarana, and 
they are intended to show that the word Jyotis and the 
word Gdyatrl are both used in the Qihdndogya- Upanishad 
to denote the Brahman who is the cause of the world. It 
may be held that the word Jyotis means the oridinary 
light that counteracts darkness, in as much as no particular 
characteristics specially belonging to the Highest Self are 
mentioned here as being in association with the thing de- 
noted by that word. This Jyotis is also mentioned to be 
the same as the digestive heat of the stomach, and even 
ordinary light is quite capable of being characterised by 
great splendour. The ordinary well known light itself is 
therefore the Brahman which forms the resplendent cause 
of the world. Against this view the first aphorism in this 
adhikarana says ihatjyolis or 'Light' here denotes the High- 
est Person Himself, as there is the mention of His feet in a 
connected context. It is said "All beings make up His one 
foot ; His three immortal feet are in the Highest Heaven." 
This means that all created beings indicate only a quarter 
of His power and greatness and glory, while the remaining 
three fourths are not made manifest in our visible universe 
at all. They are in the Highest Heaven, and this 'Light' 
is said to shine beyond that Highest Heaven. When it is 
taught that this Highest Person conceived as ' Light ' has 
to be meditated upon as forming the digestive heat of the 
stomach, it does not prove that Jyotis cannot denote the 
Brahman. In the Bhagavad-gltd the Lord has actually 
compared Himself to this digestive heat (pp. 419-421.). 
The mention of the feet here is also in relation to the Gdyat- 
rl } which again is declared in the CJj.handog\a- Upanishad 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. Ixxi 

to be the Brahman and to form the cause of all things. 
The second aphorism of this Adhikarana says that this 
word Gdyatrl does not mean the Vedic metre known by 
that name, but denotes the Brahman Himself. It is 
taught that one of the ways of meditating on Him is to 
conceive Him as the Gdyatrl metre, which has four feet even 
as He has His four feet. To use words which ordinari- 
ly denote metres in some other special sense is not un- 
common, and the word viraj is so used in this same Chhan- 
dogya-Upanishad. Therefore Gdyatrl also means the 
Supreme Self who is the cause of the world (pp. 421-423.). 
The next aphorism gives another reason why the word 
Gdyatrl has here to be understood to mean the Highest 
Person Himself. As in the case of the Highest Person, 
so in the case of the Gdyatrl also, it is pointed out that it 
has four feet and that all beings make up only one of these 
four feet. Therefore again the word Gdyatrl must denote 
the Brahman Himself (pp. 423-424.). The Jyotis or 
'Light' mentioned above is said to shine beyond the Highest 
Heaven, and the three immortal feet of the Highest 
Person are taught to be in the Highest Heaven. In the 
former statement the Highest Heaven indicates a boun- 
dary, while in the latter it indicates a position of locar 
tion. The last aphorism of this adhikarana says that, 
nevertheless, there is no incompatibility here to vitiate the 
conclusion that Jyotis really means the Highest Person. 
That Highest Person in the Highest Heaven, who is pos- 
sessed of unsurpassable splendour, is Himself the Light 
which is resplendent beyond the Highest Heaven. There 
is scriptural authority for this way of harmonising the 
above two statements. Consequently it is quite faultless to 
say that it is that Supreme Person Himself who is 
denoted by the word Jyotis or 'Light' (pp. 424-425.), 



XXll ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

The eleventh Adhiharana is known as the Indraprd- 
n&dhikarana, and consists of four aphorisms. This adhika- 
rana is mainly based on passages to be found in the Kau- 
shUaki-Brdhmana-Upanishad. In one of them Pratar- 
dana, the son of Divodasa, is said to have gone to the abode 
of Indra and there to have been told by him to choose a 
boon. On Pratardana saying that on his behalf Indra 
himself may choose such a boon as is most beneficial to 
man, Indra is declared to have said " Indeed I am the 
Prdna and the Omniscient Self. Worship and meditate on 
me as life, as immortality." Here Indra is seen to desig- 
nate himself as Prdna and to affirm that he is himself a 
worthy object of worship and meditation. Here the doubt 
naturally arises whether this Indra who calls himself Prdna 
is merely the individual self known as the god Indra, or 
whether he is the Supreme Self who is other than any indi- 
vidual self. The first aphorism of the Adhikarana main- 
tains that the words Indra and Prdna denote the Supreme 
Self, in as much as on that supposition alone the sequel be- 
comes appropriate, wherein it is said that this Prdna is the 
Omniscient Self who is blissful, undecaying and immortal, 
(pp. 425-427.). The context of the passage quoted above 
makes it quite clear that it is the god Indra who is the speak- 
er therein, and as if for recognition and identification he also 
calls himself here as the slayer of Tvashtra ; and when he 
says that he himself is a worthy object of worship and me- 
ditation, it cannot be that the word Indra denotes any thing 
other than the god of that name. The second aphorism 
here gives the reply to this objection, and says that it cannot 
be so, because there is in the context the mention of a 
multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self. The 
Kaushitaki-Brdhmana-Upanishad says that Prdna is the 
support of the whole universe that is made up of intelligent 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. Ixxiii 

and non-intelligent things. This quality of being 
the support of all things can be appropriate!)' attributed 
only to the Highest Self who is the Internal Ruler 
of all things. To be the worthy object of such worship as 
leads to final release and immortality, to be the im- 
peller of all activities, to be the support of all, to 
be the Lord of all, and to be blissful, undecaying and 
immortal, are all attributes belonging to the Inner Self ; 
and they are ascribed to Indra and Prana. Therefore the 
words Indra and Prana denote the Supreme Self Himself 
here (pp. 427-430.). How can Indra presume that he is 
the possessor of all these attributes of the Inner Self? The 
third aphorism here gives the answer to this question. 
That Indra looked upon himself as the Highest Self is in 
accordance with the teaching given in the saslras, and in 
accordance with what Vamadeva is said to have done when 
he realised and saw the Brahman. After realising that the 1 
Highest person is the Internal Ruler of all things, and that 
the universe is His body, Prahlada is also said to have 
declared that he was all things himself and that all things 
existed in him (pp. 430-432.). The characteristics of the 
individual self and of the principal vital air are mentioned 
clearly in the context wherein the words Indra and Prana 
occur. Therefore these words cannot denote the Brahman, 
who is different from the intelligent individual selves and 
from non-intelligent matter, and who is also the cause of the 
world. The last aphorism of this adhiharana gives, however, 
the reply to this supposition, by pointing out that it is 
allowable to worship and meditate on the Brahman in three 
ways, that those three ways of worship and meditation are 
assumed to be proper in the context here, and that one of 
those three ways is actually adopted therein. The Brah- 
man may be worshipped in His essential unembodied 
J 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. 

nature, or He may be worshipped as an embodied being ; 
and in this latter case He may be conceived and meditat- 
ed upon either as an individual self or as a material object 
Wherever particular individual selves and particular mate- 
rial objects are found so described in the scripture as to be 
in association with the peculiarly characteristic attributes 
of the Supreme Self, or wherever the words denoting those 
individual selves and material objects are seen to be gram- 
matically equated with words denoting the Supreme Self, 
in all such cases what is intended to be taught is the 
worship and meditation of the Brahman as forming the 
Inner Self of all those intelligent and non-intelligent en- 
tities. Accordingly the words Indra and Prana also de- 
note the Supreme Self (pp. 432-435.). 

Thus ends the commentary on the first part of the 
first chapter of the Vedanta-Siitras. The first Adhikarana 
establishes the need for the study of the Veddnta and 
points out the purpose of such a study. The second gives 
a definition of the Brahman. The third points out that 
this definition has altogether to be based on the scripture. 
The fourth says that the scripture accordingly forms the only 
source from which a knowledge of the Brahman is to be 
derived, in as much as the Brahman is the one thing which 
it throughout aims at teaching. These four Adhikarana^ 
contain only one aphorism each, and together they denote 
the need and the main object of Vcddntic studies. 
The fifth Adhikarana establishes that the Brahman, who 
has been defined to be the cause of the creation, preserva- 
tion and destruction of the whole universe, is other than 
the purely material Pradhdna of the Sdfikhyas. Thus the 
Veddnta does not believe in what may be called the omni- 
potence of matter, and there are eight aphorisms given to 
sh,ew that matter cannot be the creator of the world. Then 



ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. K'XV 

the eight aphorisms of the sixth Adhikarana demonstrate 
that, according to the teaching given in the Upanishads, the 
cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the 
world is not only not matter, but it is not also any 
one of the individual souls existing in the universe. The 
Brahman who is the Highest Person is the Creator ; and 
He is distinct from matter and distinct from soul. Then 
the remaining five Adhikaranas shew that it is only this 
Brahman who is mentioned as the Person within the Sun 
and the eye, and who is denoted in various contexts in the 
Upanishads by the words Ahasa, Prana, Jyotis, Gayatrl 
and Indra-and-Prdna. Accordingly it is proved that the 
Prakriti and the Purusha of the SfitikhyaS do not 
constitute the cause of the world, but that the cause 
thereof is the omniscient and omnipotent God Himself 
who is wholly pure and abundantly full of all auspicious 
qualities. 



SRT-BHASHYA. 



CHAPTER. I. 

PART I. 

May my understanding assume the form ofloving de- 
votion to that Highest Brahman who is the Home of 
LakshmT, x and to whom the creation, preservation, de- 
struction, &.C., of all the worlds is (mere ) play, whose main 
resolve consists in the protection of ho?ts of multiform 
subordinate beings, and who is specially seen to shine forth 
in what constitutes the head* of the IViftfx. 

May the fair-minded god-like ones of the earth drink 
in daily the speech-nectar of the son of Parasara <the 
nectar) which has been churned out of the heart of the 
milky ocean of the Upanishads, and quickens such souls as 
have lost hold of their life in God through the excessive 
flaming forth of the fire of sawsara* (may they drink in 
that nectar) which has been carefully preserved by ancient 
teachers and has (hitherto ) been held at a distance (from us 
all ) on account of the mutual conflict of many schools of 
thought, and which is now brought within the reach (of all ) 
by means of (our) appropriate words. 

i. Lakshml is the name of the god- wives of Vishnu. 

dess of fortune, mercy and beauty. She J. The Cpaxisiiiiiis are looked 

is otherwise known as Sri, and is re- upon as forming the head of the I'f- 

garded in Hindu Mythology as the Jos, and are also known as the IV- 

wife of Vishnu or Narayana. In dJnia. 

the Taitt. Tlr. in the passage :. Samsarx mean? the circuit of 

" Hrisrfa tf Lakshni'sctia patnyau,"' mundane existence consisting of fre- 

l>oth Lakshml, and HrT or modesty quent births and frequent deaths ami 

j>er?onified. are spoken of a< tho all their consequences. 



2 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. L 

Ancient teachers (such as Dramidacharya and others) 
abridged that extensive commentary on the Brahma-Su- 
tras* which was composed by the venerable Bodhayana. * 
In accordance with their opinion, the words of the sfilras 
(i. e. aphorisms) are (here) explained. 

ADHIKARANA. I. 

Jijftdsddhikarana. 
Sutra I. At ha to Brahmajijnasa. 

Then therefore the enquiry into the Brahman. 

Here the word then is used in the sense of coming im- 
mediately after ; the word therefore is used in the sense 
that that (enquiry) which has been concluded (viz. the 
enquiry into the Karma-kdnda* ) is the reason (for under- 
taking the present enquiry). With him who has (first) 
studied and learnt the Vedas with all their limbs 7 and 
head, and who, through realizing that the mere knowledge 
of (ritualistic) works gives small and transitory results, has 
the desire for final release born in him (with him), the 
desire for that knowledge of the Brahman, which is pro- 
ductive of infinite and eternal results, is, indeed, of subse- 
quent origin. 

Brahmano jijildsd Brah majijnasa. Brahmanas, the 

4. Brahma-Sutras is another name 7. In the same way in which the 
for the Veddnta-Sutras of Badarayana. Upanishads are looked upon as the 

5. Accordingly, Bodhayana is called head of the Vedas, the science of Sik- 
the Vrittikara or the author of the s/id or phonetics, which deals with the 
\\itti. ~ proper pronunciation and euphony of 

6. The Karma-kanda is that section words, grammar, metrics, Xirukta 
of Vedic scriptures which includes the which deals with the etymology and 
Manlras, the Brahmanas and such proper meaning of Vedic words, astro- 
portions of the Aranyakas as deal uomy, and Kalpa or the code of litur- 
with rituals and their performance. gy, form the six limbs of the Vedas. 



Adhik. /. Silt, i.] SRI-BHASHYA. 3. 

genitive of the word Brahman^ has (here) the objective sig- 
nificance, in accordance with the special rule " The geni- 
tive followed by a word having a krit* affix is used to 
denote the agent or the object." [Pdnini. II. 3. 65.]. Even 
if the genitive is taken as expressing relation in gener- 
al", the objective significance (of the genitive) is well esta- 
blished (here), because the desire to know requires an ob- 
ject. Yet again, because what is made out by the direct 
denotative power (of the genitive in accordance with 
Pdnini. II. 3. 65.) is more acceptable than what is ob- 
tained by a process of inference (in accordance with Pdnini. 
II. 3. 50., where the genitive is declared to be capable of 
expressing relation in general) - the genitive (here) has to 
be understood in the objective significance. It should not 
be supposed that because there is the rule " The genitive 
prescribed specially for particular words is not to be com- 
pounded" [Pdnini. II. 2. 10. Vdrtika.'], this genitive in 
the objective significance, (being one such), is prohibited 
from being compounded (with other words); for, there is 
the rule of counter-exception (to this), viz. " The genitive, 
with a krit following, is to be compounded." [Pdnini. II. 
2. 9. Vdrtika.~\ 

By the word Brahman is denoted the Highest Person 
who is, by nature, devoid of all evil, and is possessed of hosts 
of auspicious qualities, which are innumerable and unsur- 
passed in excellence. For, everywhere (/. c. in all contexts) 
the word Brahman is seen to derive its meaning from the 

8. See Paitini III. I. 93. Kridatih. a. A'ril is an affix used to form nouns 

Whenever a rule affecting a root ob- from roots. And a word ending with 

tains scope for its operation, then the a A'rit affix (A'ridanta) is also called 

affix which it' applied to that root in a A'rit. The woi d Jijflasa is a vei- 

accordance with that rule, and is other bal noun and is taken to be a A'rit 

than verbal personal affixes such as here. 

mi, si, tt, is called a A'ril. Generally, y. See rCinini. II. 3. 50. 



4 SRI-I3HASHYA. \Chap. L Part. L 

association of bnhativa, i. c. greatness, (with the thing 
denoted by it) ; and whatever greatness is, by nature as 
well as by qualities, unsurpassed in excellence, that is its 
primary and natural meaning 10 . And He (who possesses 
such greatness) is alone the" Lord of All. Hence the word 
Brahman is primarily used to signify Him alone. In cases 
where, on account of the association of a small modicum of 
that quality, other things than He are meant (by the word 
Brahman], it must be used in a secondary sense ; because 
it is improper to postulate a variety of meanings (for it), as 
(it is improper) in the case also of the word Bhagaval 1 * . 
For the sake of attaining immortality, He alone has to be 
desired and to be known by (all) those who are afflicted 
with the three miseries 12 . Hence, the Lord of All is in- 
deed the Brahman \vho forms the object of (our present) 
enquiry. 

Jijnasa is (literally) the desire to know. As (every) 
desire has for its basis the thing to be desired, here, that 

10. In Indian literature it is held the fact of such men possessing more 
that the power of words to denote or less the godly qualities of the 
meanings is of three kinds, vis. de- Divine Lord. 

notative, figurative and purportive. 12. The 'three miseries' are the 

The purportive signification of words three kinds of miseries known as the 

is by some maintained to be different Adhyatmika i. e. those which are due 

from the suggestive signification, and to one's self, the Adhidaivika, those 

accordingly the power of words is also that arise out of deities or are of 

said to be fourfold. See Kavya- supernatural origin, and the Adhi- 

prakasdi chapters, II. & III. bhautika, those that arise out of natur- 

11. The word Bhagavat means the al causes and beings. For example, 
Divine Lord. It is, however, used fever and other such diseases, anger, 
frequently enough as a term of re- desire, and other such passions form 
spect in association with the names of the misery known as the Adhyatmika. 
great and holy men, such as Vyasa, Thunder, storm, lightning, &c., pro- 
Bodhayana, &c. It is held that in all duce the Adhidah-ika misery. The 
such cases the applicability of the Adlribhaulika misery results from 
word as a term of respect is due to ghosts, devils, &c. 



Adhik. I. Sut. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 5 

very knowledge (of the Brahman], which is the thing desir- 
ed, is enjoined. 

What is said is this : As the (ritualistic) works learnt 
from the earlier part of the Mimdmsd are capable of 
producing only small and transitory results, and as the 
knowledge of the Brahman, conclusively dealt with in the 
latter part (thereof), is capable of producing infinite and 
indestructible results, for this reason alone, immediately 
after the antecedent knowledge of works, the Brahman 
has to be desired and known. Says the Vrittikdra (Bodha- 
yana) therefore : " The desire to know the Brahman 
comes immediately after the acquisition of the knowledge 
of (ritualistic) works is completed." Moreover, he says, in 
the following manner, that between the Karma-mlmdmsd 
and the BraJima-mlmdmsd there is a sdslraic (/. e. scienti- 
fic) unity (whereby the antecedence of the Karma-ml- 
mdmsd is implied) : " This Mimdmsd of the Embodied 
(/. c. of the Brahman) is composed so as to be one with 
that of Jaimini (/. c. the Karma-mlmdmsd) which consists 
of sixteen specific chapters ; and so there is the establish- 
ment of sdstraic unity between them." Hence the differ- 
ence between the Pilrva-mimdmsd and the Uttara-mi- 
mdmsd is due to the difference in the subject-matter taken 
up to be propounded, like the difference between the first 
six and the second six chapters (of the Pfirva-mlmdmsd), 
as also like the difference between one chapter and another 
(of either of the Mimdmsds). The Mlmdmsd-sdstra (as a 
whole), beginning with " Then therefore the enquiry into 
riharma**, (i. c. duty) " {Pur. Mini. I. i. i.] ; and 
ending with" There is non-return, according to scripture ; 

13. D/iaftna or duty is defined in commandment." 
the Purva-mlmSmsJl to be " that thing Chodanalakshanortho dharmah. 

which hus the characteristics of a [Jaimini's /';*-;/// wjwj. 1. 1. 2.]. 



6 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. /. 

there is non-return, according to scripture "--[ Vcd. Snt. 
IV. 4. 22.], has a certain order of sequence (in the treat- 
ment of its subject) in accordance with the peculiarity of 
the topics dealt with (therein). 

Accordingly, by the statement " The Veda (Swd- 
dhydya) has to be learnt" \Taitt. Ar. II. 15.], the mental 
reception, by means of oral recitation, of the collection of 
syllables known as the Veda, which is denoted by the word 
Swddhydya, is enjoined in the very beginning. And if it be 
asked, " Of what nature is that learning through oral reci- 
tation and how is it to be gone through ?" we reply as 
follows : The requirements (for learning the Vedas) are 
enjoined by means of this passage, viz. " A Brahmana of 
eight years of age should be initiated (as a Vedic student) 
and be taught (to repeat the Vedas) "[Sat. Br. ?] ; as 
also by means of the teaching about special preparatory 
and purificatory ceremonies and restrictions (as to time, 
place, food, &c.) such as are laid down in this passage 
among others, viz. " Having, according to scriptural injunc- 
tions, made preparations to begin (to learn the Vedas) 
either (on the full moon day) in the month of Srdvana (/'. e. 
July-August) or (on the full moon day) in the month of 
Praushthapada (/. c. August-September), and having be- 
come fitted (therefor), a Brahmana should learn the 
Vedas for four months and a half." \Manu. IV. 95.]. 
Thus it is understood that learning the Vedas turns out to 
be the mental reception of a collection of syllables, and 
consists in their recitation by the teacher followed by the 
after-recitation (of the pupil), who is in the habit of observ- 
ing special preparatory and purificatory ceremonies and 
restrictions, and who has been initiated by a teacher born 
of noble lineage, accustomed to pious observances, possess- 
ed of spiritual qualities, and also having a thorough know- 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRi-BHASHYA. 7 

ledge of the Vcdas. Learning the Vcdas is, moreover, a 
samskara (/. c. a refinement or an exaltation of excellence) 
in relation to the Vedas, since it is seen that Swadhydya 
forms the object (of such a samskara) in the passage 
/The Veda has to be learnt." \Taitt. Ar. II. 15.]. Sams- 
kara (/. c. refinement or exaltation of excellence), it is well 
known, is the means of qualifying (a thing) for the fulfil- 
ment of other objects (than those for which it is suited 
without that samskara). And it is proper for the Vcdas 
to be worthy of samskara (/. c. of getting their excellence 
exalted), because (when so qualified) they enable us to 
know (the nature of) duty, wealth, desire and final release, 
which form the fourfold objects of human pursuit ; and 
(they enable us to know also) the means of accomplishing 
them. And again (they are worthy of such samskcira), 
because, in the way of a mere silent repetition (of prayers), 
cS:c., they form, even as they are verbally, the means of 
accomplishing those (objects of human pursuit). Thus the 
injunction as to learning the Vedas finally comes to mean a 
mere mental reception of a collection of syllables, after 
(reciting) certain mantras 1 * and (obeying) certain regula- 
tions. 

Because the Vcdas, as learnt by oral recitation, are, of 
their own nature, seen to give us knowledge of purposeful 
(/. c. fruit-giving) things, the person who has learnt the 
Vcdas perceives, in the first instance, those purposeful (fruit- 
giving) things which are disclosed to him by the Vedas so 
learnt ; and then betakes himself, of his own accord, to 
the ' hearing ' ('/. c. the study ) of the Mimamsd which is of 

14. A Mantra is interpreted to properly, a hymn or prayer address- 
mean ;i sacred formula and its ed to a deity, and is supposed to 
thought which protect the thinker possess mystic and supernatural 
thereof from all danger. It is, powers. 



8 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

the nature of an enquiry into Vedic texts, having for its 
result the determination of the special character and mode 
of those (purposeful and fruit-giving) things. There (/. c. 
in the Vedas), after the true nature of the injunctions re- 
garding works has been ascertained, he observes the insigni- 
ficant and impermanent character of the result of works. 
And then because, from the passages of the Upanishads 
which are a part, of the Vedas learnt by oral recitation, a 
prima facie mental impression about an infinite and per- 
manent result in the form of immortality arises, he there- 
fore becomes qualified for the study of the Mlmdmsd of the 
Embodied (the Mlmdmsd} which is such an enquiry into 
Vcddntic texts as results in the determination of the nature 
of that (immortality). 

Accordingly, Vcddntic texts declare the destructibility 
of the results of mere works and the indestructible charac- 
ter of the results arising from the knowledge of the Brah- 
man: "Just as the world obtained by works perishes 
here, so also, there, the world obtained by merit perishes." 
[C/ihdnd. Up. VIII. i. 6.]. "To him that (world obtained 
by works) indeed comes to an end." [Brih. Up. III. 8. 10.]. 
" It is not reached by the non-eternal (works)." [Kat/i. 
Up. II. 10.]. ' Frail, indeed, are these floats in the form 
of sacrifices." [Mnnd. Up. I. 2. 7.]. " Having examined 
the worlds obtained by works, let a Brdhmana acquire 
freedom from all desires. The changeless is not (gained) 
by the changeable ; to know that, let him approach, with 
fuel in hand, a preceptor who is learned in the Vedas and 
has a sure footing in the Brahman. To him (/. e. to such 
a pupil) who, with restrained senses and fully tranquilled 
mind, has thus appoached him (7. e. the perceptor), that 
wise man (the Guru) should speak of that knowledge of 
the Brahman by which the ever-existent and indestructible 



Adhik. I. Siil. /.] SRi-BHASHYA. 9 

Person (Puritsha) is known." [Muni. Up. I. 2. 12 & 13.]. 
Should speak of has (here) the same meaning as should 
teach. " He who knows the Brahman attains the High- 
est." [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.]. "He comes not to death 
again who s ies that One." [ ? ]. "He who sees (that 
One) does not see Death." [Qihand. Up. VII. 26. 2.]. 
" He (who knows the Brahman) becomes free." [Qtihand. 
Up. VII. 25. 2.]. " He who knows Him thus becomes 
immortal here. There is no other path for the attainment 
of final release." [Taitt. Ar. III. 12.7.]. " Knowing the 
individual self and the Impeller (/. e. the Brahman) to 
be separate, and being therefore blessed by Him, he attains 
immortality". [Svct. Up. I. 6.]. To the same effect there 
are also other texts. 

It may, however, be said that Swarga (the celestial 
world of enjoyment) and other such results of works, the 
destructibility of Sioarga and -of such other things, and im- 
mortality as the result of the worship of the Brah- 
man are (all) undoubtedly made out merely by learning 
the Vcdas with their limbs;. and that (therefore) he, who 
( having so learnt the Vedas) is desirous of obtaining final 
release, may at once betake himself to the enquiry into the 
Brahman immediately afterwards. What then is the reason 
for the (alleged) necessity of the (previous) enquiry into (ritu- 
alistic) duty (dhanna) ? If so asked we reply "Let 
him not enter on the study of the MlmAmsd of the Embo- 
died also, since, by merely learning the Vcdas with their 
limbs, all things become known." It may be again said, 
however, " True, there certainly arises a prima facie no- 
tion (of all" those things mentioned above) ; still, as a 
sentence is capable of definitely importing a true meaning 
only when it is supported by logic, this notion, even though 
it at first sight aprears of itself, does not transcend doubt 
2 



io SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Fart. L 

and wrong apprehension. Hence to determine that (true 
meaning), an enquiry into Veda itlc passages has to be 
undertaken." If so, (we rejoin)-" You please see to it 
that the enquiry into (ritualistic) duty also has to be un- 
dertaken for that very same reason." 

But it may be said again (by the Ptlrvapakshin, ' 5 
or the objector) as follows : Whatever the enquiry into 
the Brahman invariably desiderates, that very thing should 
be stated to be the antecedent subject of enquiry (here). 
The enquiry into the Brahman does not desiderate the en- 
quiry into (ritulistic) dut) r (dharma), becuuse in the case 
of him who has learnt the Veda/ita, although he may 
have (previously) obtained no knowledge of (ritualistic) 
works, the enquiry into the meaning of Ved antic passages. 
is quite possible and appropriate. In this same ( Vcddnta) 
are discussed those uf.d :anas or forms of worship which are 
based upon the Udgitha (/. e. the sacred syllable Om), c., 
and are in themselves a part of fritua.isticj works. If it 
be held that one who has not obtained the knowledge of 
works is incapable of performing them ('/. e. of going through 
those forms of worship), then, whoever thinks so is ignorant 
of the import of the Science of the Embodied. In this sci- 
ence, it is aimed to propound the knowledge of the oneness 
of the Atman (i. e. of the Self), for the purpose of destroying 
that false knowledge, which is the source of all (kinds of) 
misery to him/vvho is sunk in the ocean of the sorrows which 
arise out of the samsara (or the circuit of mundane exist- 
ence), that is made up of biitli, old age, death, &c., and have 
for their cause the perception of the various distinctions 
which are due to the beginningless avidya, (or ignorance). 

1$. This objector is the Adwaitin necessary preliminary to the study 
who is of opinion that the Karma- of the Jndna-kandu or the Ved- 
kdnda need not be studied as the ata. 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. it 

How, then, is the knowledge of works, which depends upon 
distinctions, of any use to such a person ? On the contrary 
it is positively unfavourable (to him). Moreover, the dis- 
cussion of the Udgitha, &c., really forms a part of (the study 
of) works ; and yet as it (viz. that discussion) is closely allied 
to what constitutes knowledge, it is also (incidentally) con- 
ducted here (in the Vcdn>ita). Indeed, it (/. c. the conduct 
of that discussion here) is i.ot due to any direct relationship 
(of antecedence and sequence). Hence, whatever is desidera- 
ted by what forms the principal subject of this science --that 
very thing has to be mentioned as its antecedent. (The Bhd- 
skarlyas may, however, here interpose and say) " True ; 
but the knowledge of works alone is what is desiderated 
by it, because it is declared that final release (or moksha) re- 
sults from knowledge that is added to works. He (the 
Sfitra-kdrd) also says : ' There is need of all (works), be- 
cause there are scriptural statements enjoining sacrifices, 
&c.; just as (the harness is needed) in the case of the 
horse.' [ Ved, Snt. III. 4. 26.]. Moreover, when the desi- 
derate \ works are not (themselves-) made out, it is not 
possible to know the distinction, as to with which (of them) 
there is to be the cumulative association (of knowledge \ 
and as to with which it is not to be. Hence that (viz. 
karma) alone is the antecedent (subject of enquiry)." This 
view (we mention) is not proper, because the cessation of 
ignorance (or oiavidyd) is due soie.y to the knowledge of 
the Brahman, who is pure intelligence and hostile to all 
characterising attributes. In reality, final re.ei.se is merely 
the cessation o. ignorance. How can works which are subject 
to endless distinctions arising from the peculiarities due 
to tiie various conditions ana stages of iLe, (arising) from 
the ojjects which tlie^e have in view and from the means 
o/ accomplishing them, as also Irom the man her of 



12 SRI-BHASHYA. [C/w/. /. Part. L 

accomplishing them (how can such works) become the 
means for the destruction of ignorance, which(destruction) 
is, by nature, nothing other than the cessation of the percep- 
tion of all distinctions ? Scriptural texts also say that works 
are an obstruction to final release, inasmuch as their results 
are of a transitory nature ; and (they further say) that know- 
ledge alone forms the means of final release. " To him that 

O 

(world obtained by works) indeed comes to an end." [Brih. 
Up. III. 8. 10.]. " Just as the world obtained by works per- 
ishes here, so also, there, the world obtained by merit 
perishes." \hhand. Up. VIII. 1.6.]. " He who knows the 
Brahman attains the Highest." [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.]. "He 
who knows the Brahman becomes the Brahman indeed." 
[Muni. Up. III. 2. 9.]. " After knowing Him alone, one 
transcends death." [Svet. Up. III. 8.]. To the same effect 
there are also other texts. 

Besides, it has been observed that vidya (or the know- 
ledge of the Brahman) is dependent upon karma, such as 
sacrifice, &c. Now, it (viz. karma) is (by nature) hostile to 
what forms the principal subject (of the Brahma-mim&nsa)\ 
from this fact, as well as from a careful consideration of the 
words of the scriptural passages (enjoining karma}, it follows 
that, through previously purifying the internal organ (or the 
mind), it (viz. karma) is useful in producing the desire to 
know (the Brahman), but not in producing the fruit (in the 
form Oi fnoksha resulting from the knowledge of the Brah- 
man)\ and it is therefore that the word vividishanti (which 
means they desire to know) is mentioned in the scriptural 
passage (under reference, viz. Tame tarn VeddnuvacJiancna 
Brahmana vividishanti yajiljna dd:iena tapasana'sakena.) 
\Erih. Up. IV. 4. 22.]. The scripture itself declares in 
the following manner that after the desire to know (the 
Brahman) has come into existence, tranquil'ity, &c., consti- 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 13 

tute the inborn means for the evolution of knowledge : 
" Tranquilled in mind, with the senses restrained, having 
given up desires, resigned and patient, and absorbed in 
abstract meditation, let a man see the Self in the self." 
\_Brih. Up. IV. 4. 23.]. Therefore, after the desire to 
know (the Brahman) is thus born in one, whose sins have 
been destroyed by means of works done in hundreds of 
previous births without attachment to any particular result, 
(one's) avidya (or ignorance) is removed by means of the 
knowledge derived from such passages as the following 
among other* : " Existence alone, my dear child, this was 
in the beginning, one only without a second." \_Qihilnd. Up. 
VI. 2. i.] : "The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, In- 
finity." [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.] : " He is without parts, He 
is without actions and tranquil." [Svet. Up. VI. 19.]: 
" This dtman (the self) is the Brahman." [Brih. Up. II. 
5. 19. & IV. 4. 5.]*: " That thou art." [Qihdnd. Up. 
VI. 8. 7.]. 

'Hearing' (sravana), 'reflection' (manand) and ' steady 
meditation' (nididhyasana) are useful for the purpose of 
knowing the meaning of (scriptural) sentences. 'Hearing' is 
to receive ideas which are supported by logic from a pre- 
ceptor who has perceived the truth that Veddntlc passages 
declare the knowledge of the oneness of the Self. .'Reflection' 
is rationally to fix in one's self that, in a certain particular 
way alone, the idea thus taught by the teacher is true. 
' Steady meditation ' is the incessant contemplation of this 
very idea for the purpose of destroying that beginningless 
innate impression (raiand) of distinctions which is hostile 
to this (knowledge of the oreness ot the Self). The know- 
ledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences 

16. Vide also Mil/id Up. I. 2. 



14 SRl-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part.^I. 

removes the ignorance for avidyd) of him whose innate im- 
pression of distinctions has been removed by ' hearing ', &c.; 
and so whatever is desiderated by that ' hearing ' which is 
of this nature, should be . ta ed to be the necessary ante- 
cedent (of the enquiry into the Brahman). And that (which 
is so desiderated) is this fourfold means, namely, (i) the 
discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal 
things, (2) tranquillity of the mind, restraint of the senres, 
and an abundance of other J 7 (similar) means, (3) the re- 
nunciation of the enjoyment of the fruits (o" actions) here 
and hereafter, (4) and the desire for final release ; because 
without this (four old mean*) it is impossible for the desire 
to know (the Brahman) to co.ne into existence. Fro:n the 
very nature of the subject itself, this alone is made out to 
be the ne:e>sary antecedent (here). 

Wnat has bec.i said is this : That the cause of the bon- 
dage (of the soul) is merely the perception of distinctions, 
which is based on unreality and has its origin in the avidyd 
(or ignorance) that veils the true nature of the Brahman ; 
that the bondage itself is unreal ; that solely by reason of 
it-* inre-ility it is destroyed to the very roots only by means 
of knowledge ; that the knowledge th.it (so) destroys (the 
bondage) is derived cut of (scriptunv) passages such as 
"That thou art" [Qihand. Up. VI. 8. 7.], &c. ; that 
works are of no use in causing the origination of such 
knowledge in its own true nature, or in producing the 
effect oi this knowledge mat is so derived out of such 
pas<ag3s,J but that the use of works consists only in 
(proaiuing) the desire to know (the Brahman) ; and that 
it (viz. the use of works) is to be found in causing the 

17. i These other similar means patience, s.imiil.idna or equanim- 
are : uparati, or cessation from all ity, and sraddha or faith, 
d .13 ires, titiksha or resignation and 

i 



Adhik. L Srtt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 15 

increase of saliva (/'. c. the quality of goodness) (an in- 
crease) resulting from the destruction of rajas and tamas 
(or the qualities of passion and darkness respectively) 
which form the roots of sin ; and that, therefore, having in 
view (only) this use (of works), it is declared (in the scrip- 
ture) - -" Brlhmanas desire to know &c." \_Brih. Up. 
IV. 4. 22.]. Hence, .on account of the uselessness of the 
knowledge of works, the aforesaid fourfold means alone has 
to be stated to be the necessary antecedent (of the enquiry 
into the Brahman). 

Regarding this (view) it is said (in reply) as follows : 
The statement that the cessation of ignorance in itself 
constitutes final release, and that it results solely from 
the knowledge of the Brahman is admitted (by us). It has 
(however) to be discriminated, of what form that know- 
ledge is which it is desired to enjoin, by means of Vedantic 
passages, for the purpose of removing ignorance whether 
what is to be learnt fro n n. scriptural sentence is merely 
the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of that s-en- 
te:ic3, or whether it is knowledge which is based thereon 
and }.- the sume as worship. It is surely not the knowled ;e 
arising out of (the syntax of) sentences, because such (know- 
ledge) results logically from the sentence itself, even with- 
out an injunction (enjoining that knowledge), and because 
also the removal of ignorance does not result from just so 
much alone. Moreover, it should not be urged that, when 
the innate impression (vaiand) of distinctions remains unre- 
moved, the Vedantic sentence does not give rise to that 
knowledge which is destructive of ignorance ; that even 
if it (viz. such knowledge) come into existence (thus), it is 
nothing wrong if, all at once, the perception of distinctions 
does not cease for all, as in the analogous case of the per- 
sistence of the perception of two moons even when the 



1 6 SRI-BHASHYA. {Chap. I. Part. /. 

(real) oneness of the moon is known ; and that even 
though it (/. e. the innate impression of distinctions) has 
not ceased to be, since its roots have (already) been cut, 
it is powerless to bind (the self) : because it is impossible 
for knowledge not to come into existence when the neces- 
sary materials for it are available ; and because even where 
there is the wrong innate impression, it is seen that the 
knowledge which stultifies (such impressions) results from 
the teaching of trustworthy preceptors, and from the bases 
of logical inference, &c. It is not possible for you to say 
that even when there is the knowledge of the meaning of 
Vcddntic passages, the perception of distinctions continues 
to be, owing to the existence of a small vestige of the 
beginningless innate impression (of distinctions); because 
this innate impression, itself forming the means for the 
production of the perception of distinctions, is of the nature 
of an unreality, and is (therefore) removed at once by the 
genesis of true knowledge. If, even after the origination of 
knowledge, there be no removal of that (innate impression) 
which is unreal, then there can be nothing el c 'e to remove 
it ; and therefore there will never be the removal of this 
innate impression (yawna^. To say, that the perception of 
distinctions which results from such innate impressions has 
its roots cut and still continues to exist, is childish talk. In 
the case of the perception of two moons (when there is 
only one in reality) and in the case of other such things, 
even though the stultifier (of such a perception) is near at 
hand, the persistence of the false perception is not contra- 
dictory to reason ; because the really existing darkness 
and such other misguiding things, forming the cause of 
(such) false perception, are not (thereby) destroyed, owing 
to the fact that they are not injuriously affected by (true) 
knowledge. But the effects in the form of fear, &c., (due 



.drf/Vi /. Sfil. /,] SKI-BH4SHYA. 17 

to such a false perception of a^serpent in a real rope, &c.) 
disappear, when they are put an end to by powerful means 
of true knowledge (such as the verbal testimony of a trust- 
worthy person, and so on). Moreover, the genesis of know- 
ledge can never take place in those who hold that that 
genesis of knowledge results from the removal of the fit*- 
nate impression of distinctions. The innate impression of 
distinctions is beyond measure, (in strength), by reason of 
its accumulation, from beginningless time ; bat the mental 
conception which is hostile to it (/, c. to the innate imp res r 
don of distinctions) is weak ; therefore the removal of that 
(innate impression of distinctions or y&iana) is. .not possible 
by means of this (hostile mental conception or bhiijanS'). 
Hence that ' knowledge ' alone which is different from the 
knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences, and u 
imported by words such as dhyiina (meditation), ufawna 
(worship), &c., is what it is desired to enjoin by means of 
Vedii:itic passages., 

To that same effect are the (following) scriptural 
texts : " Having discovered (Him), let him practise know- 
ledge," \Vjfllya prajftii.n kurvita* Brih. Up* IV. 4. 
2i.,]. " Having discovered (Him), let him know." [Ann-. 
t)/.fyj! v:j.t:!3t:.~'J%k.iuJ^Up. VIII. 12. 6.]. " Meditate on 
tho Self as the Qoi." [jOm'iti eva dttmlnam dhyayatha. 
Muni. Up.. II, 2. 6,J,'' V -".Having perceived That, one w 
freed from the jaws'of'death." ' [Ni.ch.iyya tan mrityumu-, 
kh.ii 'pramiicjyate. Ka^'CU'p.lll. 15.]. ^ Let him worship 
the self aloiie as the object "to be^attained." [Atmjnam 
evx lokani upX$ita*~BiA. Up. I. 4. 15,]. " Veril}-, my 
dear one, the,Sglf has to ; be scan, h|ts,.|p :be Jieard, . has to 
be reflected upon, has- to-be steadily .-meditate;! upon;'-' 
^Af;n3'i<3 are srotavyo mantavyo 'hididhy(l:itavyCih:~-B'rifa 
Up* II, } 5-}- , " K'rJlA 3 /^Q 'be s blight "after^He'.ll^' txi -^- 
3 



rs 'R!-BHASHYA. {Chap. I. Part. L 

specially desired and known." [Soiweihtavyassavijififal- 
tavyah. ^Iiernd. Up. VIII. 7. i.]. To this same effect there 
are also other similar scriptural passages. The.-e (passages) 
have to import the same meaning as nididhyfistfayyaA, 
&c. } 8 ; accordingly, on account of the knowledge of the 
syntactical meaning of (scriptural) sentences being helpful to 
dhyXna for meditation), the passages F//#.//rt pra, ft.l'n 
kurvita, Anuvidya vija-ia'i and others, (drst) re-affirm 
(the need for) that (knowledge) by means of (the words) 
anu-jidya a.ndvij'fl.iya, and then they enioin dhydna by means 
of pra-'fll n kurvita and vijdnfi'i. Srotavyah also gives 
a restatement (of the need for knowing the syntactical 
meaning of sentences) because the need for 'sravaiKt 
(or ' hearing ') arises of itself from the tact that a person, 
who has learnt the Vedas with a view to attain desirable ob- 
jects, S2es that the Vedas are capable of affording instruction 
in regard to such desirable objects, and then betakes himself, 
of his own accord, to the ' hearing ' of the Vedas for 
definitely ascertaining what those objects are. ManiavycJt 
also means (such) a restatement, because manana (of 
reflection) serves the purpose of fixing in the mind what 
has (already) been ' heard.' Therefore, it is dhytim for 
meditation) alone that is enjoined (here). Says (the Sutra- 
ktird] also" Frequent repetition (is to be practised), as it is 
?o taught." \_Ved. Snt. IV. i, r.]. Therefore, this vedana 
for knowledge), which it is desired to enjoin as a means 
of obtaining final release, bas to be understood in the 



I?. The meanings of the Sanscrit having understood (Him); vijtn&i 

words used in the context here are a =let him know ; prajil'tm kurvtta= 

foMcf^s-.Hijid.hy.lsitmvych^.i-^ to U let him practise knowledge ; iro.'avycft 

teidi'y meditate.! upon ; anitvidya= has to be ' hear 1 ' j 
having Jictn-creJ (Iliij >, 



Adhik. L SuL i.] SRI-BHASHYA. if 

sen*e of up.l '.ana (or worship). For knowledge '(vidi) and 
worship (npa ://) arc seen to be used, the one for the other, 
in the beginning and the conclusion of Vedantic passages 
such' as the following: "Let him worship (up'dsHa) the 

mind as the Brahman, {^hdnd. Up.\\\. 18. i.]; He, 

who knows (veda) thus, shines and warms up through fame, 
greatness and spiritual glory." \Qihand. Up. III. 18. 6.]. 
" A, indeed, he is not all this, he does not know (veda). 

Let him worship (iip5iita\ Him as the self itself." \_Brih. 

Up. I. 4. 7.]. And " He who is the knower of that Brah- 
min (yastad veda), and that (Brahman) whom he knows 
(yatsa veda) both these have been explained to you by 

me. \QjhH:id. Up. IV. i. 4.]; Reverend sir, that deity 

whic'i you worship (up.lsse), commend that deity unto 
me." [2hhdnd. Up. IV. 2. 2.]. 

Further, dhyana (or meditation) is of the form of a succes- 
sion of memories (or remembrances), which is unbroken like 
a stream of oil. For, firm 'memory is declared to be a means 
of final release in this passage, viz. "The memory becomes 
finn ; when such memory is obtained, there is the loosening 
of all knots." [Qihand. Up. VII. 26. 2.]. And such memory 
is of the same form as direct perception, because it (viz. 
the above passage) has to agree in meaning with " When 
He who is the highest and lowest is seen, the knot of 
the heart is broken, doubts are all shattered, and his 
actions (or karma} perish." {Muni. Up. II. 2. 8.]. This 
being the case, it is decided by means of this passage viz. 
" The Self, my dear one, has to be seen, &c," \_Brih. Up. 
II. 4. 5.] that steady meditation (nididhyfaana) has the 
:-ame character as direct perception. Moreover, memory has 
the character of direct perception, because it is (simply) 
an intc.isific.ition (of the process) of mental concep- 
tion. 



Sfif -IVHASHVA. [Chap. I. Part. L 



' ' All thii ttas been well explained by the V 
lie says": f ' Vedana (or knowledge) is w/J ;rtwtf (or worship), 
nnce it is so mentioned in the scriptures as to refer to that." 
It has thereby been explained that the vedana (or knbw- 
ledge) which is enjoined in "all the Upanishads, as the 
means of attaining final release, is (the same as) nfaiana 
(or worship). After stating the position of an opponent 
to the effect that religious contemplation has to be gone 
through only once, for, by so doing, the intention of the 
scripture is fully carried out, as in the case of praya^a'-* 
xnd other such sacrificial offerings, it is finally determined 
by him (z. c. the Vatyahii-a), in the passage " From 
the word npd;ana y \t is conclusively established (that vcda~ 
na or knowledge means upft lana or worship)" that vedana 
frequently repeated is the means of final release. In the 
passage " 'Ufntana (or worship) is the same as firm me- 
mory, as it is seen so to be, and as it is so declared in the 
Hcriptiures " it is explained by him that that very same 
vedana (or knowledge), which is of the form of ufasana (Or 
worship), has the character of firm memory. Such memory 
i- declared to be the same as seeing ; and (for it) to possess 
the nature of seeing is the same as to have the character of 
direct perception. Scripture thus specifies the memory 
which has been proved to possess the character of 
direct perception, and to be the means of final release : 
" This Self is not reached either by reflection (pravcchana 
which means manana\ or by steady meditation (medka or 

19. The Vakyakara who is frequ- offerings. Thes? praya^a offerings 

cntly quoted by Ra nanuja in his and others like them cannot be offer- 

SrJ-Bkdtfya & Vedartha-saiigraAa is ed more than once in any one parti- 

known as Tanka. . . cular sacrifice. Vid^ Pur. Mini. XI. 

;o. Pray^as are the fore-o.Tcrings, I. 29 to 37. 
as opyoi:,} to Aituy'i <ti or the after- 



A dhik . I. S'ti. i .] S'RiiBH :\ s IIY A. it 

ndldhya -and)',' 01 " by largely ' he'aring'^tnV scriptures. 
Wno;iiso3vef 'He chooses, "by" him alone is "He readied. 
To him, this Self reveals Hi* own form." ' "[Muni. Lfp.'Ul. 
2. 3.]. By means; of this passage it is "(first) stated 'that 1 mere 
'hearing/ reflection arid steady meditation form ^"means 1 for 
the attainment of the Self, and then it iij" "declared that 
whomsoever this Self chooses, by Kim alone is He reach- 
eJ. For, it.. is indeed the dearest 'one 'that' becomes 
worthy to be chosen. To whomsoever He is unsirrpassing- 
ly dear, he alone is the dearest to Him. It is "stated by the 
Lord Himself, in the following manner, that 'the 'Lord 
Himself, of His own accord, so acts as 'to "cause His dearest 
one to attain Himself : "To those who areldesirous of ''an 
eternal union with Me, and, accordingly, worship Me, I 'give 
with love that faculty of understanding' by wm'cTi" they come 
unto Me." [B. G. X. i'b.1; He has al.^o'said--^ Indeed, I 
am inexpressibly deuf to him who has knowledge u of Me, 
and he is dear to Me." [B. G. VII. 17.]. Hferi^what'is 
said i.4 this : He alone; to -'whom this memory' of the'fdrm 
of direct perception is of itself ine"xpressibly."de<if, by rea- 
so.i of the inexpressible dearaess of 'the ' object Of that 
memory (he alone) is fit "to be chosen by * the "Highest 
Self; and so, by him alone is "the Highest Self attainable. 

Firm memory of this same diameter is denoted by the 
word bhakti (devotion) because the 'word' bncffit is : syno- 
nymous with upaiana (vvorship)V For this Very "reason, 
it is declared by the Sriitis** and'the^wni^ "as 'follows : 
"Knowing Him alone, one fransceiids ''death!" \Sv<?f.''Up t 

.': ; - '^-' ->': 

-- - - ' -- :;;i;:::'. j$ ;?. > 

21. The bruits and the Sni'itis to- work, Smjriti is so used^ as 16 signify 
Aether form the scripture of the Hin- all except tfre' Vedic 'portion of Hindu 
lus. Sruti means Vedic revelation; Scripture, and 



.ind Smriti. ordinarily means.the me- . is referr.ed to under the name, of 
trical luv-txjokb. But here,' m'thib -Sn.rid. 



22 SRI BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 2. 

III. 8 : .X " He who thus knows Him becomes immortal 
liere. There, is no other path lor the attainment of final 
relent." [Ta\tt. A . III. 12. 7;].-'- " It is not posible to 
free Me,, with the help of the '-facias, through the practice of 
religious austerity, through the giving of gifts, or through 
sacrifices, in the same manner in which you have seen Me 
(now). O Arjuna, destroyer of foes, it is possible really 
to know, to see, and to enter into Me, such as I am now, 
exclusively by means of bhakti." [B. G. XI. 53 & 54]. 
"That Highest Person, O 't on of Pritru, is attainable ex- 
clusively by bJiakti" [B. G. VIII. 22]. &c., &c. 

It will. be. demonstrated later on in connection with 
(the sutra which, says) "There is need of all (works), le- 
cau.-e there are scriptural statements enjoining sacrifices &c.; 
just as (there is the need of the harness) in the case of the 
horse" [Vc'd. Sfti. III. 4. 26.] that works such as sacri- 
fices, &c, fornrthe means of attaining the firm memory of 
the aforesaid character. No doubt, the sacrifices, &c., referred 
to in the scriptural passage "(Brihmanas) desire to know 
6:c"~ [Br'.h. Up. IV. 4. 22.] are of use in originating (in us) 
the de.-ircj. to know (the Brahman}. But yet, since such vc- 
dana (knqwledge) as is of the form of meditation, and is 
practised- every day, and acquires increased excellence 
through repeated practice, and is continued up to the time 
of departure from this li.e is of itself the means of attain- 
ing the Brahman ; for the production oi' that (vedana}, all . 
the works appertaining to the dsramas (or the various stages 
of life) have to be gone through as long as life lasts. He (the 
SMra+feFra) also says (the same thing) in the following and 
other aphorisms : "(Meditation has all along in the mean- 
while to be gone through) up to the time of death, for it is 
BO declared in the scripture "[Fed. 5/v/. IV. i. 12.] : "But 

22. Vide also r& SamA. .TXX". iS. ar.c! TiUt. .?r."m. 13. I. 



'Adhik. I. Sfd. i."\ SKI-DHASHYA, 2-3 

the Agnihotra, c.< (have to be performed) polely for pro- 
ducing that (viz. vidyd or knowledge), because it is so stated 
in the scripture " [ Ved. Sut, IV. i. 16.] : and "(Works 
have also to be performed) because of their helpfulners 
(in the production of knowledge)." \_Vcd.Sfit. III. 4. 33.]. 

The Vdk\akd:-a also says in the following manner 
that firm memory is the outcome of discrimination and 
other such qualities : "That (viz. firm memory) TesulU 
wholly from tvircka) discrimination, (vimoka) freec.om, 
(abhyaia) practice, (kri\a) work, (kalydia) attsp; iciousr.es?, 
(anavasdia) absence of weakness, and (anuddharsha) ab- 
sence of excessive merriment ; because it is only so pcfc*ible, 
and because also there is scriptural authority to that effect." 
He also explain* the true nature of discrimination , c,, 
thus: "Discrimination means fherej the purification of 
the body by means of the food which is not impure, 
either because of its own nature, or because of its source, 
or because of ?my (other) sf ecial cause." The scriptural 
authority for thte; is " When the food is pure, the mind 
(/. c. the internal organ) becomes pure, when the mind 
i. pure, thera is firm memory." [^Julnd. Up. VII. 26. 2.]. 
" Freedom is the absence of clinging to desires." The scrip- 
tural authority for this is" Tranquilled in mind, let him 
worship (the Brahman}!' [2&ka;id. Up. III. 14. i.]. "Prac- 
tice means the worshipping of (God) the Home of Good- 
ness again and again." The scriptural authority quoted by 
the Bhd^hyahdra (i. c. the Commentator Dramidacharya) 
in support of this is here taken from the Smr:t: ".Always 
with the mind fixed on His form, &c." [B. G. VJII. 6.\ 
11 Work means the performance of the five great sacrifice:-, 
&c., according to one's; abilities." The scriptural auth'ojity 
for this is" He who per lorms \vcjkc in the right 'manrer 
i the best of tha.'C who know the E 



24 



Up. III.. t,-4 : ] : also " Bralwanas desire to know Him 
by , red; ing the Vedas t by sacrifices,, by giving gifts, by 
religious austerities associated with, fasting." ["ZfrvA. Up. 
IV. 4.- 22,]. " Auspiciojusness .consists iri truth, uprightness, 
mercy, .liberality, harmlessnes?, and in not coveting an- 
other;*, property-" The ... scriptural authority for this is 
" He .4$<y$ Beached through truth." [l\fiind. Up* IIJ. i. 5.], 
and-." To. thefli, alone comes thi.s fruitipn of the Brahman 
f^^^.t^r* "/ *'> l6 ']v " Weakness is 
ss qlthe mind, due to the melancholy which is 
born QUt;O,fl-bievuntQwardness of time and place, and the recol,- 
lectioi^ QfrSptTowful things, &c. Us opposite is. the. absence 
of weakness." X^^'cript^ral authority lor this is " This 
Self is not 4Q: be. attained by one who is devoid of strength/' 
[Mitnl. -Up. III. -2>4.].' "Excessive merriment is the glad- 
ness derived from the opposites.of those (qualities which give 
rise to; mw$cllfi . /./ c* -weakness).;; ancl the opposite of that 
(gladness) -is the absence pf excessive merriment." That is 
to say , excessive joy ?.!so is obstructive (to the p. reduction of 
the- knowledge of the Brahman). The scriptural authority 
for this is" Tran.quijled in mind, with the senses restrain- 
ed, &c.' [Brih . Up. IV. 4. 23.]. What is said is this 
that to-' him, who is thus given to observe, scriptural regula- 
tions, the^ genesis of knowledge comes: altogether through 
the per foTmance of works enjoined in. connection with the 
(various) ti'sramas (or stages, of life). To the same; effect 
is another, scriptural passage : " Vid\ti;ii ch.widytim cha yas 
tadvdobhay.am'$3hal avidyayd mrityum tlrh\l vidyay.~t- 
inritJtritisnJitc." [h. Up. il.] Here what is denoted b/ 
the.wx)rd avidyais the vcrk which is enjoined in- conr.ec- 
tioa:. with "the. castes, and the dsramas ;.. ayidyQyd rnean.sv 
byrmeans:of. -work ; mritytvn .denotes the effects of tho 
j-at>w-prk wlticlr b -ob^trj^liv^ to the goKesL; af.-kn^.vlel^e ^ 



Adhik. I. Sl. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 25 

tirtvd means, having destroyed ; vidyayd means, by means 
of the knowledge (of the Brahman} ; amritam denotes the 
Brahman; and (asnute) means, he attains. [.=He who knows 
both vidyd (knowledge) and avidyd (work) together, first 
destroys by means of (present) avidyd (or work,) the effects of 
the past work (or karma) which is obstructive to the genesis 
of knowledge, and then attains the Brahman]. The avidyd 
which is said to be the means of destroying the effects of 
past karma is other than vidyd, and is the same as 
the work (karma) which is enjoined by the scriptures. To: 
that effect is this passage : " Having the knowledge of the 
Brahman as the object in view, he also relied upon (the 
scriptural) knowledge (of works) and performed numerous 
sacrifices, in order that he might destroy the effects of past 
karma by means of (present) avidyd (or work)." [ V.P.Vl. 6. 
12.]. Work which is obstructive to knowledge is of the form 
of merit and demerit. Both these are denoted by the word 
papa (sin), as they produce undesirable results, in consequ- 
ence of their obstructiveness to the origination of the know- 
ledge of the Brahman. Its (viz. sin's) obstructiveness to 
(such) knowledge is by way of the increase of rajas and 
tamas (passion and darkness), which act as obstructions to- 
pure unmixed sattva (goodness) that forms the means of 
producing (that same) knowledge. That papa (or sin) 
is obstructive to the origination of knowledge, is under- 
stood from the scriptural passage " He of Himself in-, 
duces him, whom He wishes to lead downwards, to do 
work which is not good." \Kaush. Up. III. 9.] It is de- 
clared by the Lord Himself in the following and other 
passages that rajas and lamas veil true knowledge and 
that sattva is the means of (acquiring) true knowledge : 
" Knowledge results from sattva." [Z?. G. XIV. 17], And 
therefore, to give rise to the genesis of knowledge, sinful 
4 



26 SRi-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

work (karma) has to be destroyed. Its destruction results 
from duty (dharmd) performed without attachment to re- 
sults. To that effect is this scriptural statement 2 3 " By 
means of duty (dharma) he gets rid of papa (or sin)." \M. 
Nar. 22. i.]. Thus that knowledge which is the means of 
attaining the Brahman desiderates all the works enjoined 
in connection with the various dsramas (or stages of life). 
Hence, as the knowledge of the true nature of the works 
so desiderated, and also the knowledge of the small and 
impermanent character of the results of mere works, are 
(both) conclusively dealt with in the Karma-mlmamsd 
that (Mimamsa) alone has to be mentioned as the necess- 
ary antecedent of the enquiry into- the Brahman, 

Moreover, the discrimination of the eternal and the 
non-eternal things*-, &c., do not come into existence without 
the ' hearing ' of the (whole of the) Mimamsa ; because, 
without coming to a decision regarding the particulars bear- 
ing on the fruits (of works), on the means (of performing 
them), on the modus operandi, and on the persons qualified 
(to perform them), it is difficult to understand the true 
nature of works, their results, the permanence or imper- 
manence thereof, and the eternity of the self, and such 
other things. That these also (viz, the discrimination of the 
eternal and the non-eternal things, &c.,) form the means 
(for acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman}, is understood 
from their prescribed auxiliary use ; and their prescribed 
auxiliary use is learnt from scriptural passages, from the 
bases of logical inference, &c. This (use of works) has to be 
made out from the third chapter (of the Pftrvamimdmsd.) 

The worship of the Udgitha, &c., although it (merely) 
serves the purpose of adding to works, really stands in. 

23. The reference given above is the Upanishads. 
according to Jacob's Concordance to 



Adhlk. 1. Silt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 27 

need of the knowledge of the Brahman, because it (viz. 
that worship) has to assume the form of the contempla- 
tion of the Brahman, and so has to be discussed here (i. e. 
in the Brahma-mlmdmsd) alone. And those works also 
(viz. the worship and meditation of the Udgltha, &c.), per- 
formed without attachment to results, produce the know- 
ledge of the Brahman ; and because they thus come to re- 
semble that (knowledge) in character, they are very appro- 
priately dealt with here alone. And it is agreed on all 
hands that they (viz. the meditation of the Udgltha and 
other such meditations) depend upon the knowledge of 
the true nature of (ritualistic) works. 

What they (the Purvapakshms^ * or the objectors) 
further say is as follows: 

The Brahman alone, who is pure intelligence and 
hostile to all characterising attributes, is real ; all other 
things than Him, such as the varied distinctions of the 
knower and the known and the knowledge arising there- 
from, &c., are merely assumed to exist in Him and are 
unreal : because, by means of the following and other 
sdstraic passages which are devoted to the teaching 
of the true nature of the principal subject (of the Brahma- 
mlmdmsa), it is declared that the Brahman alone who is pure 
intelligence and devoid of attributes is real, and that all else 
is unreal : " Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the 
beginning, one only without a second." [Ckhdnd. Up. 
VI. 2. i.] ; " And that is the higher knowledge (vidyd] by 
which that Indestructible Being is known that ( Be- 
ing) which is invisible, which cannot be seized, which has 
no family (or which has no name), which has no colour, no 
eyes, no ears : That which has no hands and no feet, and 

24. These Purvapakshins or object- as the Maya-radius. 
ors are the Adwailins known also 



28 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

That which the wise see as the source of all beings, is the 
eternal, the omnipresent, the all-pervading, the extremely 
subtle, and the imperishable One." [Mund. Up. I. r. 
6.] ; "The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." 
[Taitt. Up. II. i. i.] ; "He is without parts, without 
actions, tranquil, and without fault, without taint." [Svet. 
Up. VI. 19.]; " He who is of opinion (that that Brahman) 
is unknown to him (He) is known ; he who is of opinion 
(that that Brahman] is known to him he does not know 
(Him) : (because) to those who know well, (He) is un- 
known ; to those who do not know well, (He) is known." 
[Ken. Up. II. 3.] ; "Thou shalt not see the seer of the 
sight nor think the thinker of the thought." [Brih. Up. 
III. 4. 2.]; "The Brahman is bliss." [Taitt. Up. III. 6. 
i.] ; " That which is all this is this Self." [Brih. Up. IV. 
5. 7.] ; " There is nothing here that is many and varied. 
He who sees this world, as though it were varied, 
-obtains death (mrityii) from death." [Brih. Up. IV. 4. 
19. & Kath. Up. IV. 10.] ; "But where- there is duality, 
:as it were, there one sees another ; but where to one all 
this becomes the Self, there who shall see whom by what, 
and who shall know which by what ?" [Brih. Up'. II. 
4. 14. IV, 5. 15..]; "Modification (i.e. vikdra) is 
(mere) name having its origin in speech ; that it is all 
clay is alone the reality." [Qihdnd. Up. VI. i. 4.]; 
" For whenever he perceives in Him even the smallest 
distinction, then, indeed, there is fear for him." [Taitt. 
Up. II. 7. i.] ; " Not even on account of the peculiarity of 
situation can the twofold characteristics (viz. positive and 
negative) belong to the Highest, for everywhere (That is 
taught to be without distinctions)." [Ved. Sut. III. 2. u.]; 
" But it (/. e. the world of dreams) is altogether a mere 
illusion, on account of its being of an unmanifest nature." 



Adhik. I. Silt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 29 

Ved. Sut. III. 2. 3.]; "That in which difference!* have 
vanished, which is pure existence, which is beyond the 
sphere of speech, which is self-knowing That is the Intelli- 
gence, called Brahman by name." [F. P. VI. 7. 53.]; 
" (I bow) to Him alone who in reality is of the nature 
of Intelligence and is absolutely pure (/. e. devoid of all attri- 
butes), and who, nevertheless, exists, in consequence of (our) 
illusive vision, in the form of material objects." [F. P. I. 2. 
6.] ; "O Lord of the universe! Thou alone art the only reality, 
and there is none other." [F. P. I. 4. 38.]; " This which 
appears embodied belongs to Thee who art of the nature of 
Intelligence ; and those who are not Yogins (i. e. those 
who are ignorant) look upon it, on account of (their) 
illusive perception, as though it formed the world. All 
this world is of the nature of Intelligence. Ignorant 
men look upon it as though it were made up of material 
things, and are tossed to and fro in a flood of illusions. 
Highest Lord ! Those who know what is knowledge, 
and whose minds are pure, look upon the whole world 
as being made up of Intelligence and as consisting of 
Yourself." [F. P. L 4. 39 to 41.]; "Although He is to be 
found in one's own body and in that of all others, Intelli- 
gence, which is one and simple, indeed, constitutes His 
reality. Dualists see things wrongly." [F. P. II. 14. 31.]; 
"O, thou the best of kings, if there were any other like me 
or an}' other unlike me, then alone would it be proper to 
say that such an one is me and such an one is not me. 1 ' 
[F. P. II. 13. 90.]; "It is, in consequence of the difier- 
ence due to the holes in a flute, that the distinctions named 
shadja, &c., (corresponding to the pitch of the sound) 

25. Shadja is the name of the first The seven notes of the scale hare 

note of the gamut and corresponds to the following names in Sanskiit : 

the symbol do in do, re, mi, fa, sol, sfiadia, rishabka. gandhara, w 

ta, si, which are jrjven in Indian panchanta, dan'ata, nnhddha. 
music thus : sa, ri, ga, ma, pa. da, ni. 



30 SR! : BHASHYA, [Chap. L Part. I. 

result to the air, which pervades all without distinction; 
just so is it the case with the Highest Self." [V. P. II. 
14. 32.] ; " He is myself, and He is yourself, and all this 
is the same as the Self. Give up the illusion of distinc- 
tions. Thus taught by him, that great king saw the High- 
est Reality and gave up distinctions." [F P. II. 16. 23 & 
24.] ; " When the knowledge, which gives rise to distinc- 
tions, has undergone complete destruction, (then) who will 
create the unreal difference between the self and the Brah- 
man?' [F. P. VI. 7. 96.]; "O Gudakesa 2 *, in the form of 
the individual self, I exist within the heart of all beings." 
\B. G. X. 20.] ; " O Bharata, know Me also as the knower 
of the body (/. e. as the individual self) in all bodies." [/?. G. 
XIII. 2.]; " There does not exist any being, moveable or 
immoveable, which is without Me." [5. G. X. 39.]. 

Unreality is that, which, being grounded upon what is 
perceived, is liable to be stultified by means of the know- 
ledge of things as they actually are; as, for instance, it can be 
made out in the case of the (falsely perceived) serpent, &c., 
having for their foundation a (real) rope, &c. The assump- 
tion of the existence of that (serpent) there (i. e. in the 
rope) is due to something wrong that misguides us. Similar- 
ly, owing to a certain something that misguides us, all this 
world which is made up of the distinctions of gods, animals, 
men,immoveable things, &c.,is assumed to exist in the High- 
est Brahman whose essence is pure Intelligence ; and it (viz. 
the world) is liable to be injuriously affected by the know- 
ledge of the true nature of the Brahman as He is, and has 
therefore the character of unreality. And that something 
which so misguides us is the beginningless ignorance (avidya) 

26. Guddke'sa is one of the names of conquered sleep, or one who has a 
Arjuna. Vide also B.G.I. 24., II. 9. & profusion of hair. 
XI. 7. Literally it means one who has 



Adhik. I, Sill. /,] SRI-BHASHYA. 3.1 

which is the cause of the varied and wonderful superimpo- 
sitions that veil the true nature (of the Brahman), and is 
(itself) unfit to be described either as existence or as non- 
existence. From the following and other passages it is- 
evident that the Brahman Himself, who is devoid of attri- 
butes and is pure Intelligence, has His true nature veiled 
by the beginningless ignorance which is unfit to be describ- 
ed either as existence or as non-existence, and He thereby 
perceives the manifoldness existing within Himself : " For 
they (i. e. the creatures) are drawn away (from the Brah- 
man) by means of ignorance (awitaavidyd^)" \Qjhdnd. 
Up. VIII. 3. 2.]; "Those who are (dependent on them- 
selves) have ignorance ; their desires remain unfulfilled." 
\Qihdnd. Up. VIII. 3, iJ; "Then there was neither exist- 
ence nor non-existence, there was darkness (lamas =avid- 
ya)\ at first, Intelligence was veiled by darkness." [R. V. X. 
129. i & 3.] ; 27 "Know then that Prakriti (Nature) is 
mayd, and the great Lord, the Mdyin (i. e. the possessor of 
the mayo)" \Svet. Up. IV. 10.]; "Indra (/. e. the Highest 
Lord) is known to assume many forms through the power 
of illusions (mayo)" \_Brih. Up.ll.$. 19.]; "My mdya 
is difficult to transcend." [B. G. VII. 14.]; "When the 
individual soul, that has been asleep under the influence of 
the beginningless mayd, wakes up, (then he knows the 
Unborn One)." [Mdnd. Up. II. 21.]. 

To the same effect are the following passages : " Be- 
cause the Lord is of the nature of Intelligence, therefore He 
has the All for His form. But He is no material thing. 
Know then that the distinctions of mountain, ocean, land, 
&c., are indeed born out of Him and are the outcome of the 
display of illusion in Intelligence. But when, after all the 
effects of works are destroyed, there remains Intelligence 

27. Vide also Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. 



32 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

alone in Its own true form, pure and devoid of evil, then in- 
deed cease to exist those fruits of the tree of illusion (saftkalpa 
avidyd} which form the distinctions of things in things." [ V, 
P. II. 12. 39. & 40.] ; " Therefore, at no time and in no place, 
can there be any group of things other than Intelligence, 

thou, twice-born one. The One Intelligence is appre- 
hended in many ways, by those whose minds are variously 
constituted on account of the variety of their own actions. 
The Intelligence which is pure, devoid of evil, devoid of 
sorrow and is free from contact with all greed, &c., is one 
and always one, is the Highest and the Highest Lord ; He 
is Vasudeva, other than whom there is nothing. Thus have 

1 told you of what is real existence, and how Intelligence 
is real and all else unreal ; and I have told you also that 
this, which is phenomenally realised well for practical pur- 
poses, is indeed that on which the world is dependent". [ V. 
P. II. 12.43 to 45'] 

The following and other scriptural passages speak of 
the destruction of ignorance (avidyd}, by means of the 
knowledge of the oneness of the self with the Brahman, 
who is devoid of characterising attributes and is pure In- 
telligence : " He comes not to Death (mntyu) who sees 
that One". [ ? ]; "He who sees that One does 
not see Death". [Qhhdnd. Up. VII. 26. 2.]; " For, indeed, 
when he obtains fearless support in that which is invisible, 
incorporeal, undefinable, homeless, then he obtains fearless- 
ness." [Taitt. Up. II. 7. i.]; " When He who is the high- 
est and lowest is beheld, then the knot of the heart is 
broken, doubts are all shattered, and his karmas perish." 
[Mund. Up. II. 2. 8.] ; "He who knows the Brahman be- 
comes the Brahman indeed." \Mund. Up. III. 2. 9.]: 
" He who thus knows Him transcends death (mntyu 
avidyd} ; there is no other path for the attainment of final 



Adhik. I. Sfit. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 33 

release." [Svct. Up. III. 8.]; &c. Here aviciyd (ignorance) 
is denoted, by the word mrityu, as in this speech of Sanat- 
sujata : " I say that false perception is death (mrityu}, 
and I also say that right perception is always immortality." 
[M.Bh. V. 41.4.]. 

" The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge (or Intelli- 
gence), Infinity" [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], "The Brahman is 
Knowledge, Bliss" [Brih. Up. 111.9.28.], these and other 
such probative passages (in the Vcddnta} conclusively est- 
ablish the essential nature of the Brahman to be free from at- 
tributes ; and the knowledge, that this (Brahman} is ident- 
ical with the (individual) self, results logically from the 
following and other scriptural passages: "And he who 
worships another deity, thinking that that (deity) is one, 
and he another, he does not know." [Brili. Up. I. 4. 
10.]; " He (the self) is not all this.. ..Let him worship 
Him as the self itself." \Brili. Up. I. 4. 7.]; "That thou 
art." [Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.]; "Reverend deity, I am 
you, reverend deity, thou art me." [ ? ] ; "Therefore 
whatever I am, that is that (deity), and whatever that 
(deity) is, that am I." [Ail. Ar. II. 2. 4. 6.]. (The 
Sfttra-kara} also says the very same thing thus : " But 
they (viz. the Jabalas) worship (the Lord) as the self, 
and they (viz. the scriptural texts) make us comprehend 
(it as such)." [Vcd. Silt. IV. i. 3.] Similarly, the Vdk- 
yakdra also says "The Lord is to be comprehended 
as nothing other than the self, since everything is assum- 
ed to exist in Him." Thus by means of this knowledge 
of the oneness of the self and the Brahman, the de- 
struction of the bondage of unreality and of its cause 
comes on quite appropriately. 

However, it may be asked how is that cessation of 
all distinctions, which is contrary to perception, accomplish- 



34 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. 7. Par I. L 

ed by the knowledge that is derived out of the scripture ? 
or, how, (for instance), by means of the knowledge 
1 This is a rope, not a serpent ', is the destruction of the 
serpent-perception effected (the destruction) that has to 
contradict what is actually perceived ? Here (/. e., in 
the instance of the serpent falsely perceived in the rope) 
there is contradiction between two perceptions ; there, 
however, (the contradiction lies) between perception (on 
the one hand) and the scripture based upon perceptions 
(on the other). Under these circumstances, when there is 
contradiction between two equally strong things, how can 
there be between them the relation of the stultified and 
the stultifier? If it be said in reply that it (viz. the rela- 
tion of the stultified and the stultifier) results from the 
fact of the former (/. e. the thing stultified) being produced 
by a misguiding cause, and the latter (i. c. the stultifier) 
not being so (produced)/ then, this same (contention) 
is equally applicable to the case of scripture and percep- 
tion also. What is said is this : The cause of the rela- 
tion of the stultified and the stultifier is neither similar- 
ity, nor dependence, nor independence (in respect of any 
two things) ; because it is not possible to stultify (for 
instance), the direct perceptual knowledge, (of the single- 
ness of the flame in a lamp) by means of the inference 2 8 
regarding the (constantly) changing character of flames. In 
this case, the oneness of the flame is undoubtedly made out 

28. The body of the syllogism in the moment of its extinction) is born 

regard to this inference is given and extinguished from moment to mo- 

as follows : Madhyakshanaparampa- ment, because it also shares the de- 

ravartinl jicalapratikshanam utpatttii- structibility of the lit portion of the 
ndsarati, rartyavayavavind'situ<ayogal, . wick, in the same way in which the 

prathamacharamakshanaj-unllavat. That flame is seen to do so during the first 

is to say : The flame burning during moment of its birth and the la?t mo- 

the successive moments intermediate ment of its extinction. 
(between the moment of its birth and 



Adhik. I. Sat. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 35 

by means of direct perception. Such being the case, when 
there is contradiction between two means of knowledge, 
then, that one happens to be the stultified, the logical re- 
sult of which it is possible to realise otherwise, while 
that other happens to be the stultifier, (the logical result 
of) which cannot be otherwise established, and is, more- 
over, singular and undoubted. That this is the relation of 
the stultified and the stultifier is established in all cases. 
Therefore, it is but proper that the cessation of that 
bondage, which is of the form of varied superimpositions 
resulting from direct perception, &c., which allow room 
for possible errors, does take place by means of the 
knowledge of the oneness of the self with the Brahman, 
who is unmixed Intelligence, destitute of attributes, eternal, 
pure, free, intelligent, and self-luminous (the knowledge) 
that results from the scripture which, being in accordance 
with the tradition that is beginningless, endless and unbro- 
ken, does not admit of the smallest error, and is (as a 
means of knowledge) singular and undoubted (in value). 
But in regard to direct perception, which apprehends the 
world of distinctions resulting from varied superimpositions, 
the defect (or misguiding cause) known as avidyd (or igno- 
rance), which mainly consists of the beginninglessly old in- 
nate impression of distinctions, is admissible and has its 
scope. 

However, stultification may possibly result to those 
scriptures (or sastras) also, which are free from all de- 
fects on account of their being in accord with the beginn- 
ingless, endless, and unbroken tradition ; because they deal 
with distinctions in such passages as" Let him who is de- 
sirous of Swarga (or the celestial world of enjoyments) 
perform the Jyotishtoina sacrifice." - 9 Yes ; and the sastra 

29. Vide Taitt. Sam'i. VII. 4. i to 12. and Pur. Mini. IV. 4. 39 to 41, 



36 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

that deals with final release is of singular and undoubted 
authority; there fore, it (viz. the sdstra dealing with distinct- 
ions) is certainly stultified thereby, in the same way in 
which the sdstraic injunction 3 (imposing a penance) for 
an earlier disconnection (between the officiating priests 
connected together in a chain in the performance of the 
Prdtassavana sacrifice) is stultified (by the injunction 
relating to the later disconnection), when an earlier and a 
later disconnection do take place. In Veddnlic passages 
also this same rule holds good in respect of those injunc- 
tions which relate to the worship of the qualified Brah- 
man, because the Supreme Brahman is devoid of attributes 
(and has, therefore, to be realised after the qualified Brah- 
man is known). 

But it may be asked, how there can be the stultification 
of the following and other sdstraic statements which are in- 
tended to teach the essential nature of the Brahman : " He 
who understands all and who knows all" \Muitd. Up. I. 



30. In the sacrifice known us the for distribution among ,the priests). 

Pratassavana, five Kitwiks (or official- and then the whole thing is to be per- 

ing priests) move one behind the other, formed over again. I f the Pratiharlr 1 

taking hold of each other's girdle. disconnect himself from the Prastotri, 

The /V<w/0/r/ takes hold of the /I ay/war- then the expiation prescribed there- 

yu from behind, the Pratihartn takes for is, that all the property of the 

hold of the Prastotri similarly, the sacrificer should be distributed then 

Udgaln takes hold of the Pratihartn and there. If both the Udgatri and 

similarly, the Brahma priest takes the Prastotri disconnect themselves 

hold of the Udgdtn in the same man- from the chain of priests, one after 

ner, and the Yajamdna takes hold another,in the same sacrificial act,then 

of the Brahma, priest. While so the expiation prescribed in the case of 

moving, if the Udgdtn disconnect him- him who disconnects himself later on 

self from the Prastotri, then the expia- has alone to be gone through, but not 

lion prescribed therefor is, that the the expiation prescribed in the case 

sacrifice so interrupted has to be com- of the earlier disconnection. Vide 

pletcd, -without, however, distributing Pur. Mini. VI. 5. 49 to jb. 
the dakshind (or the money intended 



Adhik. I. Sru. i.] SRI-BHASHYA. 37 

i. 9. and II. 2. 7.]; "His supreme pcnver.is revealed, in- 
deed, as varied, natural, and as consisting of knowledge, 
strength, and action." [Svef. Up. VI. 8.]; "He who desires 
the truth and He who wills the truth" \Qhhdnd. Up. VIII. 
i. 5.]; c. If so asked, we answer that it (viz. such stul- 
tification) results from the power of the passages relating 
to the non-qualified (Brahman). What is said is this : The 
following and other similar passages, viz. " That which 
is neither gross, nor atomic, nor short, nor long" \Brih. 
Up. III. 8. 8.], "The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, 
Infinity." [Tailt. Up. II. i. i.], "That which is with- 
out attributes, without taint" [A. M. J\ r tlr. 7.], 31 
declare that the Brahman is Intelligence, eternally un- 
changeable, and devoid of all attributes : while others 
(declare that He is) qualified. There being (thus) a conflict 
between (these) two kinds of passages, it is nothing wrong if, 
according to that very rule which is applicable to the dis- 
connection (in the 'chain of priests), the passages relating 
to the non-qualified (Brahman) are found to be more 
powerful, for the reason that these (latter) desiderate the 
(predication of) qualities, and have, therefore, to come into 
operation after (the passages which relate to the qualified 
Brahman). 

But if it be said that in the passage " The Brahman 
is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" knowledge, &c., are 
declared to be the attributes of the Brahman, it is replied 
that it is not so ; because there has to be oneness in the 
meaning (of these words) due to the fact of their being 
grammatically equated. If it be (again) said that even 
in describing that which is characterised by many attri- 
butes, oneness in the meaning (of the words used to describe 
it) is not opposed to reason, then, (it has to be said that) 

31. See also Adh, up. 6B. 



38 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

whoever is (so) ignorant of the denotative power of words is 
(foolish like sheep which, being fit for sacrifices, are) beloved 
of the gods. Oneness in meaning implies that all the words 
(in a grammatical equation) denote the same thing. When- 
ever a thing that is characterised by attributes is described 
(in words), then, the difference in meaning between those 
(various characterising) words, in accordance with the 
difference in the characterising attributes (they denote), is 
unavoidable ; and therefore (such) oneness in meaning does 
not result (here). If, however, it does result even as against 
this, then all the words cannot but have a synonimity in 
meaning, in as much as they have (all) to denote one and 
the same characterless thing. But listen attentively how 
there can be no (such) synonimity even when they import 
one and the same thing. It is settled that (in a grammati- 
cal equation) there is oneness of import, and hence it is 
that the one particular thing (mentioned therein) has the 
power of being denoted by the opposite of what is contra- 
dictory to the meaning of the several words (used in that 
equation). It follows, therefore, that all the words (in a 
grammatical equation) have (their own) meanings, and 
have oneness of import, and are not synonymous. What is 
said is this: The Brahman, who has to be understood 
as He really is, is of a nature which is the opposite 
of all things other (than Himself). All things, which 
are fthusj by nature opposed to Him, are, in the result, 
negatived by these three words (viz. existence, know- 
ledge, and infinity}. Of these, the word existence refers to 
the Brahman as being other than that thing, which, on 
account of its being subject to modifications, is unreal ; 
the word knowledge refers (to the same Brahman} as being 
other than that thing, which is, by nature, non-intelligent, 
and the luminosity of which is dependent upon other things ; 



Adliik, L Snt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA, 39 

and the word infinity refers (also to Him) as being other 
than that which is limited by time, by space, and by its own 
definite character as a thing. Moreover, this logical exclu- 
sion (of all that is not a thing from what is that thing) 
forms no positive or negative characterising attribute 
thereof, but means the Brahman Himself who is not any 
thing other (than Himself). Just as, in the case of whiteness 
or any other such thing, the logical exclusion of it, from 
blackness or any other such thing, gives the true nature 
of that particular thing itself (viz. whiteness or any other 
such thing), but forms no new characterising property (of 
that whiteness or any other such thing); so also, these 
three words, by indicating that the one particular thing 
(mentioned in the given grammatical equation) is oppos- 
ed by nature to all things different from itself, are 
abundantly full of meaning, have one and the same import, 
and(yet) are not synonymous. Therefore, it has been de- 
monstrated that the Brahman, which is one only, is 
self-luminous and is free from all characterising attri- 
butes. 

It is only when the meaning of this sentence is thus 
propounded, that there will be agreement in sense between 
it and the following passage among others : " Existence 
alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, 
without a second." [C/ihdnd. Up.\l.2. i.]. The passages 
"Whence indeed all these beings are born "\_Taitt. Up. 
III. i.i.]; " Existence alone, my dear child, this was in 
the beginning." [Qhhand. Up. VI. 2. i.]; " Indeed the 
Self, this one only, was in the beginning." [Ail. Up. I. i.] 
these and other similar passages define the Brahman as 
the cause of the world ; and His essential nature is here 
described to the effect that " The Brahman is Existence, 
Knowledge, Infinity." Under these circumstances, in ac- 



40 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 7. 

cordance with the rules 2 which enforces faith (in the 
truthfulness of all that is said about any one thing) in all 
the recensions of the Vedas, it is the Brahman Himself, 
who is without a second and excludes (from Himself) 
(all) similars and dissimilars, that is to be made out 
in all the passages which characterise Him i;o be the 
cause (of the world). That essential nature, which is (here) 
intended to be propounded, and belongs to the Brahman, 
who is without a second and is pointed out to be the cause 
of the world, has (therefore) to be explained so as not to 
contradict this (aforesaid characterisation). The .scriptural 
text relating to His being without a second does not admit 
the existence of any second thing even in the form of a 
quality. Otherwise, there will be a contradiction also of 
the statement which says (He is) " untainted" and 
" devoid of attributes," &c. Therefore, this passage which 
defines (the Brahman} denotes only That which is indi- 
visible and homogeneous. 

It may however be said that there is an indicative 33 (or 
figurative) sense in the use of the words ' Existence,' 
' Knowledge,' &c., since, by losing their own proper mean- 

32. This rule termed the Sarra'sd- sacrifices in accordance with any re- 

kltdpratyayanyaya may be explained cension, because the essential nature 

as follows: The rituals known as the of those sacrifices has 'to be the 

new-moon and full-moon sacrifices same throughout. Consequently, 

are mentioned in several recensions the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices 

of the Vedas such as Kdthaka, Kd- are not different in the different re- 

nva, Mddhyandina, TaittirTya, &c. censions of the Vedas. Similarly, all 

Kach of these recensions mentions the statements made about any one 

only a few of the characteristics of particular thing in all the recensions of 

those sacrifices, and those that are the Vedas have to be taken together 

mentioned in any one of them are not as really characterising that particular 

all mentioned in the others. Never- thing in each recension. Vide Pftr. 

theless, all the characteristics men- Mlm. II. 4. 8 to 32. 

tioned in all the recensions have to 33. Vide supra \i. 4. note 10. 
be put together in performing those 



Adhik. 1. Silt. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 4 1 

ings, they express the nature of that thing which excludes 
the opposite of what they denote. This is nothing wrong, 
because the purportive power (of words) is stronger than 
their denotative power. It is surely agreed on all hands 
that the purpose of a grammatical equation is to be found 
solely in (its) oneness (of import.) Again, it may be said 
that all the words (in a sentence) are not commonly seen 
to be used in a figurative sense. What of it ? Such use is 
not seen in the case of even a single word, when, (in 
adopting the purely denotative sense of the words), there 
is no contradiction of the purport of the sentence. After it 
has been determined that such and such is the main purport 
of a group of words, which are used together (in a sent- 
ence), then, for the purpose of removing any contradiction 
(which the purely denotative sense of the words may give 
rise to) in relation to that (purport), (to adopt) the figura- 
tive interpretation in relation to two, or three, or all (the 
words), is in no way wrong, just as (it is not wrong to do 
so) in relation to any one (word). This is so admitted by 
(all) those who take their stand on the sastras. Those 34 
who maintain that the syntactical meaning of sentences is 
to be finally found in action, acknowledge that all the 
words that are found in the sentences of ordinary language 
possess the figurative significance ; because (according to 
them) the mandatory and other verbal forms such as the 
I in &<;., 35 are primarily used so as to signify the produc- 
tion of the (new unperceivable principle) aprirva* Q . The 

34. These are the Prdbhakaras It is said to be a new and invisible 
a school of Mimfimsakas who hold the something, representing either an im- 
position that words have a meaning perceptible afterstate of a work per- 
only in so far as they express actions formed in obedience to a command- 
er are associated with actions in one inent, or the state immediately ante- 
way or another. cedent to the production of the result 

35. Lin is the verbal form of the of that work. In either case, this new 
potential mood, and it is also used in principle is of itself held to be enough 
the sense of the imperative mood. to produce the good or the bad re- 

36. This apuri'a is otherwise called suits of works. 
aftf ishta by the followers of Jiumini, 



4 2 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

action signified by verbs is (only) figuratively made known 
by means of (their) mandatory and other forms. And 
those other words, which (being different from verbs) de- 
note their own meanings which are dependent upon action, 
have also their primary sense undoubtedly in producing the 
unperceivable principle apurva ; and hence to declare that 
they are (also) significant of action like verbs is (to make 
them) altogether figurative. Therefore, there is nothing 
wrong in (adopting) the figurative interpretation of even all 
the words (in a sentence), if it is to serve the purpose of 
counteracting the contradiction of the purport of sentences. 
Therefore the Vcdanta is undoubtedly expressive of 
all these conclusions, and is, in consequence, unquestion- 
ably authoritative. 

Moreover, it has been stated (above) that, in the event 
of there being a conflict (of the sdstras) with perception, 
&c., the sdstras are more powerful. It is only when there 
is any (such) conflict, that the higher authoritativeness (of 
the sdstras) has to be asserted. But there is -no (such) 
conflict noticeable at all, because perception (also) appre- 
hends the Brahman who is devoid of attributes and is pure 
existence. It may be asked, how it can be said that percep- 
tion apprehends pure existence, seeing that it has for its 
objects a variety of things, as when (it is perceived) that ajar 
exists, that a cloth exists, and so on. If (in perception) 
there be no apprehension of distinctions, then all percep- 
tions will relate to only one object, and will, accordingly, 
be the cause of only one realisation, as in the case of the 
knowledge which results from a continuous stream (of simi- 
lar perceptions). (This is, no doubt,) true ; and it shall be ex- 
amined here accordingly. How are existence and its differen- 
tiation made out when it is realised that a jar exists ? Both 
these realisations cannot indeed have perception for their 



Adhik. I. Silt. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 43 

basis ; because they result from knowledge born at different 
times, and because also perceptual knowledge lasts only 
for a moment. Therefore, it has to be ascertained whether 
that which forms the object of perception is the (essential) 
nature of things or (their apparent) differentiation. Since the 
apprehension of differentiation very naturally pre-supposes 
the apprehension of the essential nature of things, and also 
(pre-supposes) the remembrance of the correlatives of that 
(differentiation), for this very reason it has necessarily to 
be admitted that sense-perception has the essential nature 
of things for its object ; and so, differentiation is not 
apprehended by means of sense-perception. Therefore, 
the realisation of distinctions is altogether based upon 
error. 

Again, that something which is known as differentiation 
is not capable of being defined by those who know the sci- 
ence of logic. Indeed, differentiation does not constitute the 
essential nature of things. Otherwise, when the essential 
nature of a thing is perceived, then, in the same way in 
which there results the realisation of that essential nature, 
there will have to result (also) the realisation of the dis- 
tinctions differentiating it from all other things. The re- 
alisation that one thing is different (from another) desider- 
ates the remembrance of correlatives ; therefore, it should 
not be urged that, even when the essential nature of things 
is apprehended, there happens to be no realisation of dis- 
tinctions, for want of the remembrance, at that very time, of 
the correlatives of that (differentiation) ; for, surely, it is 
not allowable, on the part of him who holds that differentia- 
tion is not at all distinct from the essential nature of things, 
to posit that (before realising differentiation) it is necessary 
to know the connected correlatives ; because, (according 
to him) the essential nature of things and its differentiation 
have both the character of not being different from that 



44 SRI-BHISHYA. [C//o/>. /. Part. L 

essential nature. And if there is no need to know any 
correlatives in the case of the realisation of the essential 
nature of things, so also must it be in the case of the re- 
alisation of differentiation. And the statement that a jar 
is different (from other things), must then be, like the 
statement that the hand is the hand, an identical proposi- 
tion (affirming the admitted identity between the jar and 
its differentiation from other things). 

Nor is (differentiation) a qualifying attribute. If it 
have the character of a qualifying attribute, then it has 
necessarily to be accepted that it (viz., this qualifying 
attribute) is distinct from that essential nature of things 
(which is qualified by it). Otherwise, it (viz. differentia- 
tion) will certainly be the same as the essential nature of 
things. If it be granted that there is a distinction (between 
the essential nature of things and its differentiating attri- 
butes), then in regard to this differentiation (which has 
been hypothetically taken to be a qualifying attribute), its 
own character as a differentiation forms its qualifying attri- 
bute, and in regard to this also, (it being again different 
from the essential nature of things, its own character as a 
differentiation fonns its qualifying attribute, and so on) ; 
thus (arises) a regressus in infinitum. Moreover, (if it be 
held that differentiation is a qualifying attribute), then, there 
will also be the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence ; 
for, there will then result the apprehension of (individual) 
differentiation when there is the apprehension of things 
as characterised by (their) generic and other (such) qualities, 
and there will (similarly) arise the apprehension of things 
as characterised by (their) generic and other (such) qualities 
when there is (merely) the apprehension of (individual) 
differentiation. Therefore, differentiation being difficult of 
definition, perception brings to light pure existence alone. 



Adhik. L Si'tt. i.] SRI-BHASHYA. 45 

Again, from the instances such as a jar exists, a cloth 
exists, a jar is experienced, and a cloth is experienced, 
it is seen that all external objects are invariably 
apprehended as compounded of existence and experi- 
ence. Now, in all cognitions, existence alone is seen 
to persist always, and so it alone is the reality ; and 
the differentiating attributes (which are specific of jars, 
cloths, &c.,) are all unreal, on account of their having to 
be (one after another) excluded, as, for example, the 
(falsely perceived) serpent in a (real) rope (is excluded). 
That is to say, the rope is the (real) entity and forms the 
persistent basis (of all the false perceptions) ; and the 
(falsely perceived) snake, crack in the earth, stream of 
water, &c., are all unreal, in as much as they are all liable 
to be excluded one after another. 

To this it may be objected thus: In the case of the (false- 
ly perceived) snake, c., in a (real) rope, the snake, &c., are 
of an unreal nature, because (the perception in regard to 
them) is stultified by knowing the actual reality of 
their basis, such as the rope, &c., through making out that 
it (viz. the thing perceived) is a rope but no snake ; but not 
because those (perceptions) are one after another excluded. 
And the reality of the rope, &c., is not due to their persist- 
ence all along, but is due to their remaining unstultified (even 
by the knowledge of what forms their basic reality). But, in 
the present instance, how can there be unreality in regard 
to jars, &c., the perceptions whereof are not (so) stultified ? 
This objection is thus answered : The logical exclu- 
sion well, it has to be ascertained of what nature that 
(exclusion) is. Is it, (for example, of the nature of) the 
non-existence of cloth, &c., in the cognition that a jar ex- 
ists ? If so, it must be concluded that the stultification of 
(the cognition of) cloth, c., results from this (cognition) 



4 6 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. L 

that a jar exists. Hence logical exclusion is such a nega- 
tion of (the cognition of) objects as is based upon (such a) 
stultification. And this kind of (exclusion) establishes the 
unreality of those objects which are (so) excluded. Pure 
existence alone, being unstultified, persists all along, like 
the rope (for example, in the falsely perceived instances of 
the snake, the crack in the earth, &c., referred to above). 
Therefore, all that is other than pure existence is unreal. 
And the syllogistic statement (here) is as follows : 
Existence is real, because it continues to persist all along, 
like the rope, &c., in the instances of the rope-serpent, &c., 
(above referred to). Jars, &c., are unreal, because they 
are (all one after another) excluded, like the (falsely per- 
ceived) snake, &c., that have for their basis the (real) rope, 
&c. Such being the case, it is only experience, which con- 
tinues to persist all along, that constitutes reality, and it 
(viz. experience) is existence itself. 

It may, however, be said again that pure existence, 
being the object of experience, is different from it. It is not 
so,because (all such) differentiation has already been set aside, 
as not forming the content of perception, and as being diffi- 
cult of definition. And for this same reason, the idea that 
existence forms the object of experience can not be in 
agreement with any authoritative position in logic. There- 
fore existence is the same as experience. And this (experi- 
ence) is self-evident, (simply) because it has the nature of an 
experience. If it have any other proof (than itself), then, 
there will be room to characterise it as no experience, in the 
same way in which jars and such other things (are not exper- 
ience). Further, it is not possible to posit the necessity of one 
experience for (making out) another experience, because it 
(viz. experience) is capable of becoming evident merely by 
its own existence. Indeed, experience, while it exists, is not 



Adhik. I. Sul. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 47 

found to be incapable of becoming evident like jars, &c., 
(which are incapable of becoming evident simply because 
they exist). Otherwise, (/.<?. if experience be found to be 
incapable of becoming evident simply through its existence), 
it will have to be acknowledged that it has its knowabi- 
lity dependent upon something other than itself. 

Then perhaps you hold as follows: Even in the 
case of an experience that has (actually) come into 
existence, it is merely the object (of that experience) 
that is brought to light, as (for instance) when a jar is 
experienced ; because no one, who knows that a certain 
particular thing is a jar, also experiences at that very same 
time experience-in-itself, which forms no object (of experi- 
ence) and is not of the nature of what may be (externally) 
pointed to by the word ' this. Therefore, in the same way 
in which contact with the eye and other similar senses is 
the cause of the production of the knowability of jars and 
other external objects, an (external) entity alone forms the 
cause of the production of that same knowability in rela- 
tion to experience. Immediately afterwards, (that is, after 
perceiving an object) experience is inferred from the logical 
basis of distinct knowability which is momentarily associa- 
ted with that object. If that be so, it may be said that ex- 
perience, which is intelligence, acquires the nature of non- 
intelligence. What, then, is the nature of this intelligence 
known to be ? Surely, it cannot be the invariable associa- 
tion of knowability with its own existence, because 
(such knowability) is found to exist (also) in association 
with pleasures, &c. Indeed, pleasures, &c., while they 
exist, are never unfelt. Therefore, experience-in-itself is 
not experienced by itself, on account of the impossibility of 
such a thing (taking place), in the same way in which (it is 
impossible) for the finger-tip, which feels all other things by 



48 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

touch, to perceive itself by touching itself. 

(To all this, it is thus replied): That knowability 
which, like colour, &c., forms a property of objects, and is 
other than experience, is not (at all) known to exist; 
moreover, it is not proper to assume (the existence of) a 
property called knowability, when it is possible to realise 
all things by means of that experience alone which is ad- 
mitted by both (sides) ; for these reasons all this (above 
contention) is simply the foolish display of the intelligence 
of him who has not himself understood the peculiar nature of 
experience. Consequently, experience is not made out by 
means of inference, and is not also made evident by any 
other means of knowledge. But, on the contrary, exper- 
ience, which proves all things, proves itself, and the 
sj'llogistic statement here is as follows : Experience is 
that in respect of which its own characteristic property 
and the realisation thereof are (both) independent of any 
thing else; because it (viz. experience) forms, through 
its association (with another thing), the means of having 
that property and that realisation in connnection with that 
other thing; whatever is, by its own association (with 
another thing), the means of giving rise to a characterising 
property and its realisation in that other thing, that is 
seen to be independent of all other things in the matter 
of that (property) and that (realisation) in reference to 
itself. For instance, there is the case of colour, &c., in 
relation to visibility, &c. Colour, &c., while producing by 
means of their own association, visibility, &c., in the earth 
and such other things, are not themselves dependent upon 
the association of colour, &c., for the production of visi- 
bility, &c., in relation to themselves. Therefore, exper- 
ience is itself the cause of its own knowability as well as 
of the realisatoin that it is knowable, 



Adhik. I. Si'fl. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 49 

This same experience which is self-luminous is also 
eternal, because antecedent 3 7 non-existence and other 
non-existences are absent (in relation to it.) And such 
absence (of non-existence) certainly results from the self- 
evident nature (of experience.) Indeed, it is not possible 
to make out the ' antecedent non-existence' of self-evident 
experience,either by itself,or by other means. Experience 
if it have to cause the knowledge of its own 'non-existence' 
does not, as a matter of fact, cause such knowledge, while 
it is itself existent. While it is existent, simply because 
there will (otherwise) be contradiction, its ' non-existence' 
cannot exist. And so, how can it cause the knowledge of 
its own ' non-existence' ? Similarly, even when not exist- 
ent, it (viz. experience) does not cause the knowledge (of its 
' non-existence'). How can experience, being itself non- 
existent, become the means of proving its own 'non-exist- 
ence ' ? Nor is it possible to know it (viz. ( non-existence ') 
by other means, because experience is not the object of 
anything other than itself. The means of proof, that can 
prove the ' antecedent non-existence ' of this (viz. ex- 

37. Non-existence (or abhara) is but is incapable of having an end. For 

of four kinds viz. pragabhava, pradli- example, when a pot or any other 

wamsai&dva, anvonyabhdva, and at- such thing is destroyed, this particu- 

yantabhzva. Prdgabhava or antecedent lar non-existence comes into being 

non-existence exists antecedently to and thereafter persists for ever. Anyo- 

the production of an effect such as a nydbhdva or mutual non-existence 

pot ; that is, the pot is non-existent means that in any one thing there is 

before it is produced. Thus, this non- the non-existence of another, as when 

existence is incapable of having a it is said that a pot is not a cloth. This 

beginning but capable of having coincides with what is generally known 

an end. Pradhwamsdbhava is the as 'difference.' Atyantdbhdv a or abso- 

non-existence consequent on the des- lute non-existence is that kind of non- 

truction of a thing such as a pot ; existence which negates the existence 

that is, the pot is non-existent after it of a thing at all times. For instance, 

is destroyed. So this particular non- the horns of a hare are non-existent 

existence is capable of having an origin at all times, 

7 



50 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 1. 

perience), has to prove such ' non-existence ' after making 
out objectively what experience really is. It is not possible 
to know its ' non-existence ' by other means, because it is 
self-evident, and is not therefore capable of being perceived 
definitely as an external object, so as to say ' This it is. 
Hence, it cannot be said that experience is originated, as 
there is the absence of 'antecedent non-existence' in rela- 
tion to it. Therefore, it has also none of those other 
modifications 38 of the produced thing, which are invariably 
associated with origination. This un-originated experi- 
ence does not admit of any manifoldness (or variation) 
within itself, because, in relation to it, there is the realis- 
ation of what is contradictory to the predication (of 
such manifoldness /. e. the realisation of non-origination). 
Indeed, that which is not originated has never been 
seen to be manifold (or varied in character). More- 
over, distinction and such other things, are (themselves) 
capable of being experienced (/. e. of becoming the 
objects of experience), and cannot, therefore, be the qualify- 
ing attributes of experience, in the same way in which 
colour and such other things are not (such attributes). There- 
fore, as experience is of the nature of experience alone, 
nothing else that is capable of being experienced can be its 
qualifying attribute. For whatever reason consciousness 
is devoid of all distinctions, for that same reason, it has 
not, for its basis, a knowing subject called the dtnmn (or 
the self), which is different from its own essential nature 
(as consciousness). Therefore, and also because it has an 
intelligent nature, that very thing (viz. consciousness), 

38. These modifications aie stated Mr. I. I. 3. They are : Origination, 
to be six in number and are given as existence, modification, increase, de- 
follows : 'Shad bharai'ikai'a bhavan- crease and destruction. Vide also 
////' Varshyayanih jay ate asti viparina- V. P. I. 2. II, 
mil ft' varddhate apakskiyatt rinalvailh" 



.Adhik. L Sru. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 51 

which possesses the character of being sell-luminous, itself 
constitutes the atman (or the self). Non-intelligence also, 
which is invariably concomitant with what is not the self, 
and is logically excluded from consciousness, indeed, nega- 
tives (the view) that consciousness (itself) does not consti- 
tute the atman. 

It may,however, be said that the (self's) character of being 
the knower is established by the cognition ' I know'* It 
is not so; it results from illusion, in the same way in which 
the characteristics of silver are (illusorily perceived) in a bit 
of the mother-of-pearl. Because experience does not poss- 
ess the property of being the subject of any predication, of 
which it is itself the object; therefore, this character of being 
the knower is (simply) super-imposed (upon consciousness), 
in the same way in which, when one says ' I am a man,' the 
love of sell", due to the feeling that a thing is one's own, is 
(superimposed) upon the altogether external lump(of matter) 
that is characterised by the generic and other properties of 
the thing called man. To be the knower is, in. fact, to be the 
same as the subject of the predication of knowing. And 
it (viz. this knower-ship) is subject to modification, is non- 
intelligent and is seated in the knot of the evolved principle 
of egoity known as the ahaftkdra. 3 9 How can this become 

39. Ahahkara forms the third of dial Prakriti is held to give rise to 

the twenty-four material principles the Mahal or the 'Great Principle' 

that go to make up the objective which is also known us Buadlri, per- 

world according to the Sahkhyas. haps for the reason that the cognisa- 

The Purusha or the soul is the twenty- blity of the external world by the 

fifth principle, differing from all the Purusha is due to it. Out of this 

material principles on account of its Mahat is evolved the principle known 

intelligent character. The notion of as Akahkara, which is a kind of 

egoity is here held to be due to the 'mind-stuff' responsible for our sense 

association of this intelligent princi- of egoity and for the production of 

pic with matter or Prakrili. Primer- the senses and the- mind, c. 



2 RI-BHA~SHYA. [Chap. L Part. 7, 

possible in relation to the immodifiable witnessing principle, 
the dtman, which is entirely made up of pure intelligence ? 
The quality of being the subject of a predication and other 
such qualities do not form the attributes of the self, simply 
because they are, like colour and such other things, realis- 
able by means of direct perception. It is seen that there 
is self-experience, even when there is no notion of egoity, 
as during dreamless sleep, swoon, &c.; therefore, the self 
does not fall within the sphere of the notion of egoity. If 
the property of being the subject of a predication as well as 
the property of being the object of the notion of egoity be 
(both) admitted of the self, then, as in the case of the body, 
(which possesses both these properties), it is difficult to 
avoid, (in relation to the self), the resulting attribution of 
non-intelligence, externality, and non-self-hood, &c. It is, 
indeed, well-known among those, who follow the well- 
established criteria of truth, that the self, which is the en- 
joyer of Sivarga and other similar fruits of the actions of 
the body, is different from the body, which falls within 
the sphere of the notion of egoity, and is generally well 
known to be the subject of predications. And, similarly, 
it has to be understood that the internal self, the witness, 
is altogether different from the knower, which is the thing 
T. Thus the principle of egoity, which, though non-intelli- 
gent, reveals the self to be the same as the immodifiable 
experience, does reveal it as constituting its own basis. 
The nature of revealers is to reveal the revealed, as though 
they (/. e. the revealed things) were within themselves (/. c. 
the revealers). Indeed, a mirror, a sheet of water, a mass 
of matter, &c., (respectively) reveal a face, the orb of the 
moon, and the outline of a cow, &c,, as though these were 
(actually) within them. The illusion ' I know'; is due to 
this same fact. Do not ask how experience, which is 



Adhik. L Sfit. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 53 

self-luminous, can be revealed by the non-intelligent prin- 
ciple ofegoity, which is itself revealed by that (experience); 
surely, it is seen that the palm of the hand, which is 
revealed by a beam of the sun's rays, itself reveals them (at 
the same time). Indeed, the rays of the sun passing 
through the holes of a window are frequently seen to be- 
come more brilliant by means of (their contact with) the 
palm of the hand, which is (itself) revealed by them. In 
the cognition ' I know', for whatever reason, this knower, 
which is the thing T, forms ho real attribute of the self, 
which is pure intelligence ; for that same reason, it (viz. 
the thing T) does not find its way into the states of dream- 
less sleep and final release. Indeed, here (in these states), 
by reason of the cessation of the super-imposition of the 
thing T, the self shines forth altogether in the form of 
pure and natural experience. It is only in consequence 
of this fact that one who has risen from deep sleep observes 
sometimes ' I did not know even myself. Thus, conscious- 
ness alone, which, in reality, is destitute of all distinctions 
and alternations, which is destitute of attributes and is pure 
intelligence, which is homogeneous and eternally unchange- 
able, manifests itself, through illusion, as wonderfully and 
variedly manifold in the forms of the knower, the known, 
and knowledge. Therefore (the study of) the whole of the 
Vcddnta has to be undertaken to remove the ignorance, 
which is at the root of this (manifestation), so as to 
attain the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the 
Brahman who is, by nature, eternal, pure, self-luminous 
and free. 

This opinion of persons who are devoid of those spe- 
cial qualities which make one worth)'- of the choice of the 
Highest Person who is taught in the Upanishads of those 



54 SRI-BHASHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

(person*) whose understanding is, in its entirety, tainted 
with the innate impression of beginninglessly ancient sins, 
and who are ignorant of the essential nature of words and 
sentences and their correct meanings, and (are ignorant) 
also of such sound logical processes as enable (us) to pro- 
ceed rightly (in our reasonings), and as are (at the same 
time) based upon perception and all other (well known) 
criteria of truth, (this opinion of such persons) is found- 
ed upon that kind of unsubstantial and variedly fall- 
acious reasoning which is not applicable to any other 
similar case as an alternative ; and it therefore deserves 
to be disregarded by all those who are conversant with 
that knowledge of truth, which is based upon percep- 
tion and all other such criteria of truth as are supported by 
logic. 

And this conies out in the following manner : 
Those, who maintain the view 4 that there is a thing 
which is devoid of attributes, cannot say what criterion 
there is to prove that thing which is so devoid of attributes ; 
because, all the criteria of truth (that form the means of 
logical proof) deal (only) with such objects as possess attri- 
butes. And the convention that obtains in their own school, 
that it (viz. the thing devoid of attributes) is established by 
one's own experience, is counteracted by the fact of such ex- 
perience having, (nevertheless), the qualification of being 
witnessed by the dtman (or the self) ; because, all experi- 
ence relates to objects which are qualified by some attri- 
bute or other, as, for instance, in the specific cognition ' I 
saw this. If it have to be demonstrated, by some specious 
reasoning or other, that an experience, while it is being ex- 
perienced, is without attributes, although it is (in fact) pos- 

40. Vide supra pp. 27 et ; scq. 



Ad/iik. /. Silt, i.] SRI-BHASHYA. 55 

sessed of attributes, it can be so demonstrated only with 
the help of such natural qualifying attributes as are peculiar 
to that (experience) itself, and are different from its own 
existence. Therefore, even thus, it continues to be qualifi- 
ed by means of its own qualifying attributes, which form 
the basis of such demonstration, which are different from 
its own existence, and are also peculiar to itself. Under 
these circumstances, it is only some attributes that are 
denied in relation to a thing which is (already) qualified 
by other attributes ; therefore, the thing which is devoid 
of attributes can in no way be proved. 

To consciousness, indeed, belongs the quality of illum- 
inating external objects as well as the quality of self-lum- 
inousness, because perception becomes possible to the 
knower (only) in the way of bringing external objects to the 
light (of consciousness). We will, in our own turn, explain, 
with great clearness of judgment, that, (even) during 
dreams, conditions of intoxication, and swoons, experience 
is altogether qualified. There are, undoubtedly, many at- 
tributes, in regard to experience, such as eternity, &c., which 
are also admitted by you (our opponent). And it is not 
possible to declare that these also constitute the thing-in-it- 
self (which is pure and simple) ; for, even if they are 
taken to constitute the (attributeless) thing-in-itself, we find 
that there are conflicting views in regard to its various 
modes, and every one tries to establish his own position 
by means of such of its modes as are approved of by him. 
Therefore, it has to be stated that that thing is certain- 
ly qualified by such attributes as accord with the accept- 
ed criteria of truth. 

Verbal testimony (/. e. revelation) also possesses the 
power of denoting only such objects as are qualified by attri- 
butes, because it is extant in the form of words and sentences 



5 6 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

A word is, in fact, the result of the combination of roots 
and terminations. There is difference between the mean- 
ing of the root and that of the termination, and it is there- 
fore unavoidable that words denote only such things as 
are qualified (by attributes). And the difference between 
words binds us to a difference in (their) meaning. A sent- 
ence, which is a collection of words, gives expression to 
the peculiar relations existing between the meanings of the 
several words (therein), and is hence incapable of denoting 
any object which is devoid of attributes. Verbal testi- 
mony is, therefore, no authoritative means of proving the 
thing which is devoid of attributes. 

Perception, which is differentiated into the divisions 
of the indefinite and the definite, has not the power of 
being the means to prove the thing which is without 
attributes. Definite perception has for its object only that 
which is qualified, because it relates wholely to objects 
that are characterised by many things such as (their) 
generic and other properties. Indefinite perception also 
certainly relates to qualified objects, because all those 
things which are experienced in it (viz. in indefinite per- 
ception) are found to be synthetically put together in defi- 
nite perception. Indefinite perception is, indeed, known 
to be the perception of that which is devoid of some 
particular attribute or other, but not (the perception) of 
that which is devoid of all attributes ; because the percep- 
tion of such a thing is not seen to occur at any time, and 
because also it is impossible. Surely, all cognition is pro- 
duced in association with some defining attribute or 
other, so as to denote that a particular thing is of a 
particular nature. The perception of anything is impossible 
apart from the configuration of its characterising attributes, 
(in the same way in which it is not possible to perceive, for 



Adhik. I. Sut. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 57 

instance, an ox) apart from the triangular face, the dewlap, 
and such other things (as go to make up its configuration). 
Hence, indefinite perception is the first outline-perception 
in relation to things which are of the same kind ; and it 
is said that the second and the following outline-percep- 
tions are definite (perceptions). Here, in the first outline- 
perception, the generic properties of the ox and of such 
other objects (of perception) can not be made out to poss- 
ess (in relation to them) the property of continued persist- 
ence. The possibility of making out such continued per- 
sistence is to be found only in connection with the second 
and the following outline-perceptions. The generic proper- 
ties of the ox and of other similar objects of perception 
constitute the configuration of the thing which is ap- 
prehended in the first outline-perception ; that these 
(generic properties) possess the character of continued per- 
sistence, is conclusively made out in the second and follow- 
ing outline-perceptions ; and so the second and following 
outline-perceptions are characterised as being definite. The 
first outline-perception is characterised as being indefinite, 
because the continued persistence of such generic proper- 
ties of the ox and of other similar objects of perception, as 
constitute the configuration due, (for instance), to things like 
the dewlap &c., is not apprehended in that first outline- 
perception, but not because there is (in it) no apprehen- 
sion of the generic and other properties which together 
go to make up a (perceptive) configuration. Even in the 
first outline-perception, it is only such a configuration, that 
constitutes the thing which is apprehended,so as to be able to 
say that it is of a particular form ; for, the generic and other 
properties, which constitute such a configuration, have no 
characteristics other than those apprehended by the sens- 
es, and, further, the configurated cannot, as a matter of 



58 SRi-BHXSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

fact, be apprehended apart from the configuration. There- 
fore, just as the configurated and the configuration are 
always apprehended (together in perception), so also, in 
the second and following outline-perceptions, the generic 
properties, such as those of the ox and of other objects, are 
always made out to possess the character of continued per- 
sistence (in relation to those objects). Consequently, they 
(/. e. the second and following outline-perceptions) un- 
doubtedly possess the character of being definite. Thus, 
perception can never have for its object the thing which is 
devoid of attributes. 

For these same reasons, the theory which maintains 
(the thing perceived) to be distinct and non-distinct (at one 
and the same time) has also been throughout set at naught. 
In the cognition, 'This thing is of this nature' (Idam 
ittham), how is it possible to get any idea regarding the 
identity of the concepts denoted by the words id am 
(which means this thing) and ittham (which means of this 
nature) 1 Of these two, the concept denoted by the word 
ittham refers, (for example), to the configuration characteris- 
ed by the dewlap and such other things relating to the ox ; 
and the object possessing these characteristics is denoted by 
the word id am. Thus the identity of these two concepts is 
contradicted by perception itself. Accordingly, the thing, 
which is perceived, is, even in the very beginning, perceiv- 
ed, as if it is altogether excluded (and is thus different) from 
all other things. And this exclusion is due to the fact that a 
perception, which makes out a particular thing (such as an 
ox or any other object) to be of a particular nature, is in- 
variably associated with a particular configuration (of at- 
tributes), such as that which is made up of the generic pro- 
perties, &c., of the ox or of any other object. In all cases 
wherein the relation of the qualifier and the qualified is 



Adhik. L Sut. /.] SRi-BnlSHYA. 59 

perceived, it is quite clear, by means of that perception it- 
self, that they are quite distinct from each other. It being 
so, a stick, an ear-ring and other such objects, possessing 
distinct configurations of their own and existing in them- 
selves, may occasionally happen, however, to be here and 
there the characterising adjuncts of some other object (than 
themselves). But the generic properties of the ox and of 
other such objects become cognisable things only by rea- 
son of their making up the configurations of (those) ob- 
jects, and hence they form the attributes of substances. 
In both these cases (viz. in the case of the separable ad- 
juncts, such as sticks, ear-rings &c., and in that of the in- 
separable attributes, such as the generic properties of the 
ox and of other similar objects), the relation of the qualifier 
and the qualified is one and the same. And it is for this very 
reason (/. e. because both separable and inseparable adjuncts 
possess alike the power of qualifying things), that there re- 
sults also the perception of the difference between them 
(/. e. between the qualifier and the qualified). There is 
however, this much of peculiarity. Sticks and other separ- 
able adjuncts are capable of being perceived as existing 
separately ; whereas the generic properties of the ox, &c. ; 
are systematically incapable of it (/. c. of being perceived 
as existing separately from the thing they qualify). Hence, 
the statement, that the differentiation of things is contra- 
dicted by perception, can be made only by ignoring the 
true character of perception. Indeed, it is agreed on all 
hands that the true character of perception is to denote 
that a particular thing is of a particular nature. All this 
has been clearly enunciated by the Sfitrakara in. the 
aphorism " It cannot be true, because it is impossible (for 
contradictory attributes to exist at the same time) in one 
and the same thing." [Vcd. Sf/t. II, 2. 31.], 



60 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

And, in as much as perception has thus qualified 
things for its objects, inference also, relating as it does to 
such objects as are qualified by the relations observed in 
perception, &c, has to deal only with qualified things. 

Even where there is difference of opinion as to the 
number of the various means of knowledge, all the means 
of knowledge, accepted by all, deal with this same (qualifi- 
ed) thing. Therefore, by no means of knowledge can 
there be the establishment of the thing which is devoid 
of attributes. Whoever, while he is himself relying upon 
the natural qualifying attributes of a thing, declares that 
that very thing is devoid of attributes, he does not know 
the contradiction in terms to be found in his own speech, 
as when one enunciates the barrenness of one's own 
mother. 

It has been stated above 4 T that, because perception ap- 
prehends pure existence, it cannot have differentiation 
for its object ; and that differentiation is difficult to define, 
because it does not admit of any one of the-several alternat- 
ive views (in regard to its own nature). This (opinion) 
also has been driven away (as untrue), on the ground that 
perception has for its object only such things as are charac- 
terised by generic and other properties, and (also on the 
ground) that generic and other properties, by reason of 
desiderating their correlatives, form the means of realising 
the distinctions between themselves and the (distinctions 
between the) things (qualified by them). What has been 
admitted by you, (our opponents), in the case of conscious- 
ness and in the case of colour and other such qualities, to 
the effect that they, being the cause of particular realisa- 
tions in regard to other objects (than themselves), are also 

l. Vide *//< pp. 42 & 43. 



Adhik. I. Sat. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 61 

the cause of such realisations in regard to themselves, that 
certainly holds good in the case of differentiation also.There- 
fore, there is neither the fallacy of regressus in infinitum 
nor the fallacy of reciprocal dependence. 42 Even if percept- 
ual knowledge last only for one moment, yet, during that 
very moment, the generic properties which, (for example), 
belong to the ox and other such objects, which are the same 
as the distinctions between those things and constitute 
their configurations, they are (all) apprehended ; therefore, 
there is nothing else here (/. e. in perception) that remains 
to be apprehended in any other moment. Moreover, if 
perception apprehend pure unqualified existence, then there 
would result the contradiction of such (definite) cognitions 
as are realised in the instances, 'A jar exists' and ' A 
cloth exists.' If differentiation, which is a thing other than 
pure existence, and consists of generic properties and such 
other attributes as go to make up the configurations of things, 
be not apprehended by perception, why does one who is 
in quest of a horse turn away at the sight of a buffalo ? 
If pure existence alone be the object of all cognitions, why 
are not all the words which are associated with the objects 
of all those cognitions remembered in each one of those 
cognitions ? Further, if the two states of consciousness, re- 
lating to a horse and to an elephant (respectively), have 
the same thing for their object, then (the apprehension of) 
whichever of them is perceived later on would merely be the 
apprehending of the already apprehended,and so there would 
be the absence of any difference (between them) ; therefore, 
there would be nothing (here) to distinguish it (/. e. the latter 
state of perceptive consciousness) from memory. If, in every 
state of consciousness, the apprehension of particularity is ad- 

42. Vide supi'a p. 44. 



62 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 1. 

mitted, then surely it will have to be admitted that percep- 
tion has qualified things for its object. If all states of 
consciousness have the same thing for their object, there 
will then be the apprehension of all things by means of only 
one state of consciousness, and, in consequence, there will 
have to be the non-existence of persons affected with blind- 
ness, deafness, &c. 

Moreover, pure unqualified existence is not surely ap- 
prehended by the eye, because it apprehends colour, things 
possessing colour, and all such things as are characterised 
by inherent association with anything that has colour. Nor 
(is pure existence apprehended) by the sense of touch, 
because it has for its object things possessing tangibility. 
The sense of hearing and the other senses also have not 
pure existence for their object, but have for their object 
the characterising attributes of sound, taste, and smell. 
Therefore, here (/. e. in this world) there is nothing to be 
found which can apprehend existence-in-itself. If, solely 
by means of perception, there be the apprehension of pure 
existence which is devoid of attributes, then, the scripture, 
which also relates to it, will have to deal with a result already 
arrived at by some other means of knowledge, and will 
therefore acquire the character of what gives expression to 
a mere tautological repetition. And, for the same reason, 
there would also result cognisability in regard to the 
Brahman which is pure existence. You have yourself 
admitted that in such a case (/. c. when the Brahman 
becomes cognisable) non-intelligence, destructibility, &c., 
(would result to it also). Therefore, perception certainly 
has for its object only such things as are qualified by 
differentiation which is constituted by the configurations of 
things and has for its basis their generic and other pro- 
perties, 



Adhik. I. Sftl. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 63 

There is nothing other than 'this perceptive configuration 
which is seen to be capable of giving rise to the impression 
that several things are of only one form ; and it is possible 
to realise the generic properties, such as those of an ox 
and of other objects, merely by means of that (configur- 
ation) alone. And again, even when it is held that the gener- 
ic properties of things are distinct from their ; (corresponding) 
configurations, the perception of configuration has unavoid- 
ably to be admitted. Therefore, this (perceptive) configur- 
ation alone constitutes the genus (in logic). Configuration 
is well known to be that which constitutes a thing's own pecu- 
liarity, and so it has to be (severally) synthesised by percep- 
tion in accordance with the thing that is perceived. Because 
the realisation that one thing is different from another results 
solely by means of the apprehension of their (respective) 
generic qualities, and because no other thing than generic 
properties is observed (when such differentiation is perceiv- 
ed), and because also they (viz. the generic properties) are 
admitted as well by him who maintains that (differentiation) 
is distinct (from generic properties), therefore (/.<?. for all 
these reasons), generic properties such as those of an ox 
and of other objects, alone constitute differentiation. 

It may, however, be said that, if generic and other 
properties alone constitute differentiation, then, as soon as 
they are apprehended, there will be the realisation of 
differentiation also, in the same way in which they are 
themselves realised. True, differentiation too is so realised, 
through the realisation of the generic properties, (for in- 
stance), of the ox and of other such objects. Indeed, the 
generic iproperties, such as those of an ox, &c., are 
different from all things other than themselves, because, as 
soon as the generic properties such as those of an ox, &c., 
are apprehended, there results the removal of all other 



(q SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I Part. L 

impressions of similarity as well as (the removal) of their 
realisation. Surely, the negation of non-differentiation results 
wholly from the apprehension of distinctions. However, 
in the realisation ' This is different from that,' the declara- 
tion made in regard to these mutually exclusive correlatives 
(viz. ' this ' and ' that') desiderates (each of) those (corre- 
lativesj; it is, therefore, said that the realisation that one 
thing is different from another is dependent upon correlat- 
ives. 

The statement made above 43 to the effect that jars 
and other such specific objects are unreal, because they do 
not persist before consciousness in all perceptions, this is 
an erroneous assumption on the part of one who has not 
rightly considered the relation of the stultified and the 
stultifier, and the peculiar nature of the properties of logical 
exclusion and continued persistence (in regard to percep- 
tions). In fact, the relation of the stultified and the 
stultifier arises only when there is a contradiction between 
two cognitions ; and then (/. e. when it arises), there is 
certainly the exclusion of that which is stultified. Xow, 
in regard to (perceptions which relate to) jars, cloths, &c., 
there is no (mutual) contradiction at all (between them); 
because they are different from one another in point of 
time and place. If, when the existence of a thing (is 
perceived) in relation to any particular place and any 
particular time, its non-existence (also be perceived,) in 
relation to the same place and the same time, then there 
is contradiction. And in such a case, that which is the 
stronger (of the two) becomes the stultifier, and there 
arises the negation of the stultified. If a thing, which is 
experienced as existing in relation to a certain time and a 

4?. Vide supra p. ^.5, 



Adhik. I. Sul. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 65 

certain place, is perceived to be non-existent in relation to 
a different time and a different place, (then) there is no 
contradiction ; and so, how can there be the relation of the 
stultified and the stultifier in such a case ? Or, how can it 
be said,that, what has been (already once) negatived in one 
instance, is (again) to be negatived in another instance ? 
On the other hand, in the case of the rope-snake and other 
(illusorily perceived) things, there is the perception of 
their non-existence in that very place and that very time 
(wherein they are also perceived to exist); therefore, there 
arise contradiction, stultification and logical exclusion. The 
logical exclusion of a thing, (which is perceived in relation 
to a particular place and a particular time), from a differ- 
ent place and a different time, is not thus seen to be in- 
variably concomitant with unreality ; and therefore, mere- 
ly to possess the quality of being logically excluded, (so 
as not to persist before consciousness in perception), does 
not constitute the cause of unreality. The statement that 
existence (alone) is real, because it is persistent (before 
consciousness^, is in itself evident, and does not stand in 
need of any means (such as perception) to prove it. There- 
fore, pure existence alone is not the thing (which is appre- 
hended in perception). 

There is the relation of subject and object between 
experience and any particular entity (which is experienced); 
thus the difference (between them) is established by per- 
ception, and is incapable of being stultified ; therefore this 
(contention) also has been set at naught, namely, that ex- 
perience itself is existence. 

It has been further 44 stated that experience possesses 
the quality of self-luminousness. This is true in the case 

44. Vide snprtt p. 4(1. 
9 



66 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

of the self, which is the knower, only at the time it brings 
external objects to the light of consciousness. But there is 
no rule to the effect that it is so at all times in the case of 
all (persons) ; because the experience of others forms (to us) 
the object of such inferential knowledge as is based upon 
the acceptance and rejection (of things in accordance with 
their own likes and dislikes) ; and also because it is seen 
that one's own past experience becomes even an object of 
knowledge, as when (one says) ' I had known'. If, in this 
way, it is not possible to say that experience is self-evident, 
it is also wrong to declare that, if experienced, it loses 
the character of an experience ; because the character of 
being no experience at all would thereby result to one's 
own past experiences and the experiences of others, on the 
score that they are themselves experienced. And if it be 
not granted that the experiences of others can be made out 
(by us) by means of the process of inference, there 
would then result the non-apprehension of the relation 
between words 'and their meanings, in consequence of 
which there would arise the cessation of the use of all 
words. Further, it is only after making out by means of 
inference that the teacher is possessed of knowledge, that 
an approach to him is made (by the pupil); and this too 
would thereby become impossible. It cannot be that 
(experience) ceases to possess the character of an ex- 
perience, merely because it becomes the object of an- 
other experience. The character of an experience, indeed, 
consists in the fact that, while it lasts, it is luminous (/. e. 
intelligible) solely by means of its own existence, to that 
which constitutes its basis, (/'. e. to the self) ; or, it consists 
in the fact of its being the means of proving (the exist- 
ence of) its objects solely by means of its own existence. 
Although these two ("characterisations of experience) are 



Adhik. I. Sftt. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 67 

capable of being realised in an experience other than one's 
own, they do not (thereby) fall away, seeing that they are 
(at the same time) established by means of one's own ex- 
perience ; and so this character of an experience does not 
disappear (in relation to any experience, even though it 
becomes the object of another experience). And jars, &c., 
certainly do not possess the character of an experience, 
(simply) because they are devoid of this (above-mentioned) 
nature (of an experience), but not because they are cap- 
able of being experienced. Similarly, when an experience 
is incapable of being experienced, then it is difficult to 
avoid the result that it is not at all an experience ; because 
the flowers imagined to grow in the sky and other such 
imaginary objects, which are not capable of being experienc- 
ed, constitute no experience (at all). If it be said that 
the sky-flower and other (such purely imaginary) things 
are not experience, because they are non-existent, but not 
because they cannot be experienced, then let it be held 
that, in the case of jars and other similar things also, it is 
.the fact of their not being opposed to 'non-intelligence' 
which binds them to the condition of their being no experi- 
ence, but not the fact of their incapability to be experi- 
enced. Should it be said that, when an experience is cap- 
able of being experienced, then, like jars and other objects, 
it would acquire the character of not being opposed to 'non- 
intelligence,' then, surely, as in the case of the sky-flower 
and other (imaginary) objects,there would certainly result to 
it (/. c. to experience), even when it is not capable of being 
experienced, the quality of not being opposed to 'non-intelli- 
gence'. Hence it is ridiculous to say that, if it (viz. experi- 
ence) is capable of being experienced, then it has not the 
character of an experience. 

Again, the view in which origination \* denied to cpn.- 



68 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. L 

sciousness which is self-evident, on the score of the absence 
of its antecedent non-existence 4 8 and other non-existences, 
this view is very much like the presentation of a stick 
(for purposes of guidance) to one who is blind by another 
who is born blind. It is not possible to speak of the absence 
of (such) antecedent non-existence, on the ground that 
.there is nothing which can apprehend it ; because it 
(viz. that antecedent non-existence) is apprehended by 
experience itself. If it be asked, how experience, at the 
same time that it exists, can give us the contradictory 
knowledge of its non-existence, it is replied that there is 
no rule which binds experience to deal only with such 
objects as are existent at the same time with itself; for 
then there would result, to past and future occurrences, the 
quality of being no objects (of experience at all). But if 
you say that the antecedent non-existence and other 
non-existences (in relation to an experience), while they 
are being made out, are, as a rule, found to exist simultane- 
ously with that (experience), it is asked in return "Did 
you perceive this state of things in any case ?" Then (/. c. 
if it be possible so to perceive them), surely on account of 
that very perception, antecedent non-existence and other 
non-existences are proved to exist (in relation to experi- 
ence). Thus there can be no denial of such antecedent non- 
existence (in relation to experience). However, who is 
there but is insane that will say that a thing's antecedent 
non-existence is existent simultaneously with that (thing) 
itself? 

Indeed, this is the natural condition of the perception 
which is born of the senses that it has the power of appre- 
hending the thing which is existent simultaneously with 

+f. Vide supi\i p, 49, 



Adhik. /. Sftl. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 69 

itself, but such is not also (the condition) of all kinds of 
knowledge and of all means of true knowledge ; because 
in the case of memory, inference, revelation, yogic** per- 
ception, and the like, it is observed that there is the 
apprehension of the thing, the existence of which belongs 
to a time different (from that of their own existence). 
Hence also, no instrument of knowledge is ever dissociated 
from what is to be discerned by it. The relation of an 
instrument of knowledge, to the thing that is to be discern- 
ed by it, does not consist in the absence of the dissocia- 
tion of that (instrument of knowledge) from the thing 
which exists at the same time with itself; but, on the 
other hand, (such relation) consists in the negation of the 
unreality of that particular form of any particular thing 
which is discerned in association with any particular time, 
place, and other such (determining) conditions. Thus the 
position that memory does not deal with external objects, 
because even when the external object (to which it refers) 
has disappeared, memory is seen to continue, this is also 
set at naught. 

It may, however, be said : The antecedent non-exist- 
ence of consciousness is not at all made out by perception } 
because such (non-existence) does not exist. Nor is such 
(non-existence) made out by the other means of proof, 
because (in relation to it) the basis of logical inference 
and the other limbs of syllogistic reasoning are absent. 

46. This is the perception which to the conception in the mind of him 

peculiarly belongs to the Yogin, who, who practises it. Yctdri'sl bhiivanti 

by withdrawing the mind into itself yatra s'ddhirbhavati tadri'si. There is, 

and concentrating it on its own con- however, an opinion which maintains 

ceptions, has succeeded in actualising that Yogic perception is .a separate 

those conceptions in the form of di- means of knowledge, and gives rise 

rect perceptions. The realisation that to realisations which arc not possible 

results in Yoga is said to correspond otherwise. 



7 o SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

Indeed,there is to be found here no such basis of inference as 
is invariably associated with the antecedent non-existence 
of consciousness. Revelation also is not at all seen to deal 
with it (/. c. with such antecedent- non-existence). Hence, 
the antecedent non-existence (of consciousness) cannot be 
proved, because there is really no means of proving it. 
To this, it is replied thus : If, abandoning the peculiar 
support of the self-evident nature (of consciousness), you 
rely upon the absence of the means to prove that (non- 
existence), then it would be well for you to stop the 
discussion, bearing in mind that that (same non-exist- 
tence) is established by the negative proof of non-cognition 
relating to a necessarily associated thing. 

Moreover, perceptual knowledge, which during the time 
that it exists, proves (the existence of) its objects, such as 
jars &c., is not seen to give rise to the knowledge of their 
existence at all times. Therefore, the existence of jars and 
such other objects during periods antecedent and subse- 
quent (to their perception), is not made out (by means 
of perception). Such non-cognition is seen to be due to 
perceptual consciousness being conditioned by time. If per- 
ceptual consciousness, which has jars, &c., for its objects, 
is itself made out to be unconditioned by time, then, the 
objects of (that) consciousness, such as jars, &c., would also 
appear to be unconditioned by time, and so would be etern- 
al. If (this) consciousness which is self-evident be eternal, it 
should of itself appear to be so eternal. But it is not 
so made out. Similarly, if the inferential and the other 
cognising states of consciousness are made out to be un- 
conditioned by time, then they would make their objects 
also appear unconditioned by time ; and so all such objects 
would become eternal ; for every object has a nature which 
correspond^ to the state of consciousness (that represents 



Adhik. L Sut. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 71 

it). Again, there is no objectless consciousness, in as much 
as such a thing is unknown. Indeed,the self-luminous nature 
of consciousness has been demonstrated solely by means 
of the fact that perception brings external objects to the 
light of consciousness. If consciousness have not the power 
of bringing external objects to light, there would result 
to it the absence of self-luminousness ; in consequence of 
this (absence of self-luminousness), and also in consequence 
of the fact that experience is incapable of being experienced 
by any other experience, consciousness itself would become 
a mere nothing. 

Further, it should not be stated that during sleep, 47 
conditions of intoxication, swoons, &c., totally objectless, 
absolute consciousness alone shines forth ; because such a 
statement would be invalidated by the negative proof of 
non-cognition relating to a necessarily associated thing. If 
during these states also, experience is experienced, then, at 
the time of waking, there will have to be its recollection. But 
there is no such thing. It may, however, be said that it is 
not commonly seen that an object which has been experienc- 
ed, is, as a rule, remembered ; and therefore, how can the 
absence of recollection prove the non-existence of the (cor- 
responding) experience ? It is stated (in reply to this) that, 
provided there are no : such powerful causes as the dissolu- 
tion of the body, &c., which remove all innate mental 
impressions, then uniform non-remembrance establishes 
only the non-existence of experience. Surely, the non- 
existence of experience is not proved solely through the 
uniform absence of any remembrance thereof ; because it 
is possible for one who has just risen from sleep to real- 
ise by means of introspective observation alone that all the 

4". Vide an/n-a pp. 52 & 5?. 



72 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

while he did not know anything. Moreover, it is not pos- 
sible to say that, even when experience exists, the uniform 
non-remembrance thereof is due either to want of associa- 
tion with objects or to the destruction of the principle of 
egoity; because, the non-experience of some one thing (such 
as a jar) and the non-existence of another thing Csuch as a 
cloth; do not constitute the causes of the non-remembrance 
of some other experienced object (such as a wall). 

It will be explained presently that, in those states also 
(namely, sleep, intoxication, swoon, &c), the idea of the ego 
continues to persist. It has, indeed, been stated already 
that, during sleep and other similar states, it is possible to 
have such experience as is definite and relates to particular 
objects. What has been so stated is really true. Indeed, 
that (experience) is self-experience. And it will be est- 
ablished further on that that (self-experience) is definite 
and relates to particular objects. But, here, only such consci- 
ousness as is altogether objectless, and is without a basis, is 
denied. If mere consciousness alone is said to be self- 
experience, (we say) it is not so, because it will be explain- 
ed hereafter that it (viz. consciousness) is dependent upon 
(some thing else as) its basis. Hence it cannot be said 
that, because experience, while it exists, does not establish 
its antecedent non-existence, (such) antecedent non-exis- 
tence is disproved. In explaining the possiblity of experi- 
ence being experienced, its incapability to be proved other- 
wise (than by itself) has also been negatived. Therefore, the 
non-origination of consciousness merely on the ground that 
there is no proof of antecedent non-existence and other non- 
existences in relation to it that is not supported by logic. 
What has been stated 48 already to the effect that, on 

48. Vide snbra p. 50. 



Adhik. I. Sfit. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 73 

account of there being no origination of consciousness, other 
modifications are also negatived in relation to it, that also 
is unreasonable ; because such reasoning is too wide and 
inconclusive, holding good in the case of antecedent non- 
existence also. In fact, although it has no origination, it 
is seen to be capable of destruction. If, (for the pur- 
pose of meeting this difficulty), this (proposition) is qualified 
by saying (that it holds true only) in the case of entities^ 
then, indeed, (your) skilfulness in logical reasoning becomes 
quite manifest. Thus, for instance, the avidyd (or ignorance), 
which is accepted by you, is mi-originated ; and it is, never- 
theless, the seat of a variety of modifications, and is also 
put an end to after the origination of true knowledge. If 
you say that all its modifications are unreal, then, is 
there, according to you, any modification which has the 
nature of reality, so that this qualification (thus limiting 
the scope of the proposition mentioned above) may become 
significant ? But this (kind of modification that has the 
nature of reality) is surely not acknowledged by you. 

Again, what has been already 49 stated to the effect that 
experience does not admit of any differentiation in regard 
to itself, on account of its being unborn, that 'also is un- 
founded : because the self which is undoubtedly unborn is 
seen to be differentiated from the body, the organs of sense, 
and other such things ; and also because it has necessarily 
to be accepted that the self is different from the admitted- 
ly beginningless avidya (or ignorance). If you say that 
this differentiation is itself of the nature of unreality, (we 
ask), did you anywhere observe any differentiation which 
has the nature of reality and is the necessary concomitant 
of origination ? Indeed, if ignorance be not in reality 

49. Vide supra p. 50. 
10 



74 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. / 

distinct from the self, then, as a matter of fact, ignorance 
itself may become the self. In maintaining the distinctions 
between such perceivable objects as are realised in unstulti- 
fied perceptions, the distinction between the perceptions 
themselves is established ; in the same way in which the 
distinction between the various kinds of the process of 
cutting (is established) by means of the distinction between 
the things cut (accordingly). 

Moreover, the statements 30 already made to the effect 
that consciousness, which is altogether of the nature of con- 
sciousness, can have no qualifying attribute that is itself 
capable of being objectively perceived by consciousness,and 
that such (attributes) cannot qualify consciousness merely 
because they are objectively perceivable, both these also 
are not absolutely conclusive, because, in relation to it (viz. 
consciousness), there are the attributes of eternity, self-lu- 
minousness, &c., which are well established by the authori- 
tative criteria of knowledge, and are also admitted by your- 
selves (our opponents). Neither do these (attributes) consti- 
tute pure consciousness, because they are in their essential 
nature distinct (from consciousness). Indeed, consciousness 
is that which, solely by means of its own existence, makes 
intelligible to that which constitutes its own foundation, 
any external object whatsoever. Self-luminousness con- 
sists in being luminous, in consequence of a thing's own ex- 
istence, to that which constitutes that thing's own found- 
ation ; luminosity (or intelligibility) is that (quality) which is 
common to all intelligent and non-intelligent things alike, 
and makes them fit to be practically realised; eternity is, in- 
deed, existence through all time; unity is limitation by the 
number one ; &c., &c. Even when these (qualifying attri- 

50. Vide supra p. 50. 



Adhik 1. Sut. i.] SRI-BHASHYA. 75 

butes) constitute the negation of non-intelligence and 
other such things (as have to be excluded from consci- 
ousness), then, even as such, they form the qualifying at- 
tributes of consciousness ; therefore, it is inevitable that 
this reasoning becomes too wide (and inconclusive) in as 
much as they, nevertheless, continue to be the attributes of 
consciousness. If, for the reason that consciousness is op- 
posed to non-intelligence, and other such qualities, (merely) 
on account of their being different from its own essential 
nature, neither a negative nor a positive qualification can 
be admitted in relation to it, then, the (various) statements 
severally negating those ("qualities) will have to import 
nothing at all. 

Then, is consciousness provable (as existent) or not ? If 
provable, it must be characterised as being possessed of attri- 
butes. If not, it becomes a mere nothing like the ' sky- 
flower' and other (imaginary) objects. If you say that the 
proof itself is consciousness, it has to be asked whose that 
(proof) is, and to what it refers. If it do not belong to any 
one, and be not in regard to some thing, then that (proof) 
is no proof. Indeed, proving, like son-ship, belongs to some 
one and is in relation to some thing (or person). If it be said 
that (the proving) belongs to the self, (we ask) who this 
self is. Was it not stated by you that it (viz. the self) is 
consciousness itself ? Yes, it was so stated ; only, it is a 
wrong statement. And this can be made out thus. How can 
that consciousness, which, by reason of its making a number 
of objects intelligible to a person, is related to those (objects) 
and to that (person), experience that it is itself the self? 
What is said is this : Experience is that which, solely by 
means of its oWn existence, possesses the quality of making 
a thing fit to be realized in relation to what constitutes the 
basis of that (experience) itself; it has other names, such as 



7 6 .SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. 1. 

knowledge (jiland), comprehension (avagati*), consciousness 
(samvid), and the like ; it always relates to an object and is 
a particular attribute of the experiencing self : and again it 
is well known to all as possessing the qualification of being 
witnessed by the self, as when (one says), 'I know 
a jar,' ' I understand this thing,' ' I am conscious of a cloth/ 
&c. Indeed, it is on account of its possessing this aforesaid 
nature, that self-luminousness has been postulated in relation 
to it even by you. This (experience) which relates to an 
object and is a particular attribute of the subject (of the 
predication of knowing), cannot possess the quality of itself 
being the subject (of any predication), quite as much as (it 
cannot possess) the quality of being the object (thereof). 

Accordingly, the ,permanent character of this subject 
(of the predication of knowing) is directly ascertained ; and 
origination, existence, and destruction, in relation to that 
attribute which belongs to this subject and is called consci- 
ousness, are also ascertained to be true, in the same way in 
which they are (so ascertained) in the case of pleasure, pain, 
&c. The permanent character of this subject (of the predi- 
cation of knowing,) is indeed established by that kind of per- 
ception which leads to the recognition of identity, as (when 
one says), "This is that very thing which was formerly expe- 
rienced by me." Origination and other such things are also 
established in regard to consciousness, by the cognitions ' I 
know/ ' I. had known/ 'The knowledge which I, the know- 
er, had, is now lost'; and where then is its oneness (with the 
self) ? If consciousness, which is thus destructible moment 
after moment, be admitted to be the self, then it becomes 
impossible indeed, to have the recognitive cognition "I saw 
(again) on the next day that (same thing) which was seen on 
the previous day." Surely, there is no possibility of the recog- 
nitive cognition by one person of any thing experienced by 



Adhik. I. Sftt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 77 

another person. Again, when experience is admitted to 
be the self, and eternity too is predicated of it, then also 
there will similarly arise the absence of the cognition leading 
to recognition. Indeed, the cognition which leads to recogni- 
tion, as for instance (when one feels), ' I myself experienced 
this formerly also,' that establishes the experiencing sub- 
ject to continue unchanged in antecedent and subsequent 
intervals of time, but 'does not prove pure unconditioned 
experience. Surely, you also do not accept that experience 
is the same as the subject who experiences ; experience is 
merely experience (to you). It has already been stated (by us) 
that that unfounded or objectless something which is called 
consciousness cannot exist, because there is absolutely no 
knowledge (of such a thing). Thus the view, that that same 
consciousness, which is indeed admitted by both of us, is the 
self itself, is contradicted by cognition ; and all the 
specious arguments, which were intended to demonstrate 
that such pure experience alone is the highest reality, have 
also been thus completely refuted. 

It may however be said again thus: In the idea 
of the ego to be found in the cognition 'I know (this),' 
that which, (not being objective), is not denoted by 
the word 'this,' and which is homogeneous luminosity and 
is the thing denoted by chit (or intelligence), that is the 
self; now, the idea of the ego, resulting from the cogni- 
tion ' I know/ acquires, by reason of its being made lumin- 
ous in that (intelligence) through the strength of that (in- 
telligence), the characteristics of the thing 'thou' (or of the 
non-ego) ; and it is, therefore, other than pure intelligence, 
and means certainly the thing 'thou' (or the non-ego). It is 
not (right to say) so ; simply because, (in such a case), that 
perceptual knowledge, in which, as when one says 'I know 
(a thing)/ there is (between the knowing and the knower) 



78 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

the relation of an attribute to the possessor thereof, -that 
would itself be (thereby) contradicted. Moreover, " If the 
thing T (or the ego) is not the self,there will be no subject- 
ivity to the self. For, the subjective thing is distinguished 
from the objective thing by means of the idea of the ego. In- 
deed, he who is desirous of final release Retakes to the 'hear- 
ing' &c., (of the scriptures), with the intention that he may 
himself become devoid of all misery, the enjoyer of infinite 
bliss,and free. If any one holds that final release consists in 
the destruction of the thing T (or of one's own personality), 
then such an one will surely get away from even the merest 
scent of the discussion bearing upon the topic of final release. 
Xo one,who believes that,even after he ceases to exist,there 
is some kind of consciousness which is other than himself, 
will ever make any attempt to attain that (kind of conscious- 
ness as his goal after death) It is only by being associated 
with the self, that this (consciousness) has its own existence, 
has its own character as consciousness, and its other qualifi- 
cations. When this association with the self is severed, 
consciousness itself ceases to exist; in the same way in which, 
in the absence of the cutter and the object to be cut, there 
can be no cutting or any other such process. Hence it is 
settled that the thing ' I,' which is also the knower, is the 
subjective self. The scripture also says 'My dear one, by 
means of what is one to know the knower?' [Brih. Up. IV. 
5. 15.]. The /;///// also says 'Whoever knows this (bod}'), 
him they call the kshctrajila.' [B. G. XIII. 2.]. The 
Sutra-kdra also says the same thing opening it with the 
aphorisms ' The individual self is not (produced) as 
there are no scriptural statements to that effect' \Ved. 
Srit. II. 3. 18.], and ' For that very reason, (the individual 
sell) is the knower.' [Ved. Silt. II. 3. 19.]. Therefore it is 
decided that the self is not pure and unqualified conscious. 



Adhik. I. Sal. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 79 

ness." Indeed, the thing ' I ' is of itself established by the 
notion of the ego ; the thing ' thou ' is the content of the 
notion of the non-ego. It being so, to say that the knower, 
who is realised when one says ' I know,' is the non-ego, is, 
moreover, a contradiction in terms, very much like the 
statement ' My mother is barren.' 

Again, this knower, the thing ' I,' has not its luminos- 
ity dependent upon anything else, because it possesses 
self-luminousness. Indeed, to be self-luminous is to possess 
the character of intelligence. Whatever, like the flame of 
a lamp, possesses the character of luminosity, that possesses 
its own light independently of anything else. For, surely, 
the flame of a lamp and such other self-luminous things, 
seeing that they are made to shine out by means of the 
power of their own light, can not possess nqn-lurnjnousness, 
nor (can they possess) the character of having their lumin- 
osity dependent upon anviliing else. What then are 
they ? The flame of a lamp has the nature of light, and 
certainly shines of itself, and also makes other objects 
shine by means of its own radiance. 

What is said is this : One and the same substance tejas 
(or the material element of light and heat) exists, for in- 
stance, in the form of luminosity as well as in the form of that 
which is luminous. Though luminosity forms an attribute 
of the thing which is luminous, nevertheless, it is the sub- 
stance tejas, and nothing else. It is not a quality like 
whiteness, &c., because (unlike them) it can exist elsewhere 
also than in what constitutes its basis, and because also it 
is itself the possessor of colour. As it is of a different 
nature from whiteness and other such qualities, and possess- 
es the quality of luminosity, it is undoubtedly the substance 
tejas and nothing else. If a thing brings to light its own 
nature as well as other things, it is thereby said to possess 



8o SRJ-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

luminosity. And the practical realisation of this (luminosity) 
as a quality necessarily results from its invariably having 
that (substance lejas) for its basis, and also from its forming 
a dependent constituent thereof. It is not that the compo- 
nent parts of its basis (/. e. of the substance tejas), becoming 
scattered and getting into motion, are spoken of as light; 
for, (under such a supposition), there would be the destruc- 
tion of gems, of the sun, and of other such luminous 
bodies (through their mere shining). And in the case of 
the flame of a lamp also, there would at no time be the 
perception of an united whole. Indeed, it is not possible 
to say that lamp-flames, whose component parts have 
the nature of becoming scattered, do invariably get col- 
lected together into a whole only to the extent of four 
inches, rise up, and then spread about, at the same time 
and in the same form, horizontally and upwards and down- 
wards. Hence, it is ascertained, that lamp-flames which 
possess luminosity are produced and destroyed every 
moment ; because there is, (for their production), the order- 
ed convergence of sufficient causes (such as wicks, oil, &c.,), 
and because also, on the destruction of those (causes), 
they (/. e. the flames) are themselves destroyed. That light 
acquires greater brilliance, greater warmth, &c., near its 
own source, is capable of being proved by direct perception, 
in the same way in which, heat &c., are (seen to be greater 
in intensity) near fire, &c. In this same manner, the self, 
which is wholly of the nature of intelligence, is (also) charac- 
terised by the attribute of intelligence. 

Indeed, to possess the character of intelligence is to 
be self-luminous. To that effect are the following and 
other scriptural texts : " Just as a solid lump of salt has 
neither inside, nor outside, and is altogether one whole 
mass of taste, so also, my dear one, he, this self, who has 



Adhik. I. .Sut. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 81 

neither inside nor outside, is altogether one whole mass of 
knowledge, and is altogether made up of intelligence." 
\Brih. Up. IV. 5. 13.]: "Here, this purusha becomes 
self-luminous." [Brih. Up. IV. 3.9 & 14.]: "There is no 
disappearance of the knowledge of the knower." [Brih. 
Up. IV. 3. 30.] : " Then whoever feels 'I smell this', that 
is the self." \Qh1idnd. Up. VIII. 12. 4.]: "Who is the self? 
He is that person who is luminous in the proximity of the 
prdnas and the heart, and wholly consists of knowledge." 
\Brih. Up. IV. 3. 7.] : "He is, indeed, the s'eer, the hearer, the 
taster, the smeller, the thinker, the knower, the doer, and is 
the person who is made up of intelligence." [Pr. Up. IV. 9.] : 
" By means of what, my dear one, is one to know the 
knower." [Brih. Up. IV. 5. 15.]: " This person (/. e. purusha) 
surely knows." [ ? ] : " Whoever sees (that One) sees not 
death, nor disease, nor the state of sorrow." [Qt/iand. Up. 
VII. 26. 2.] : "He is the Highest Person..; he (in His presence) 
does not mind this body which has had birth." [CJihdnd. 
Up. VIII. 12. 3.]: " In this same manner, all these sixteen 
kalas* ' , which belong to the seer and are dependent on the 
Purusha, meet their end after attaining the Purusha." 
[Pr. Up. VI. 5.]: "Different from this which consists of 
mind is the inner self which consists of understanding." 
[Taitt.Up. II. 4. i.]. And the Sutra-kdra also says in the 
sequel-"For that very reason,' (the self) is the knower." [ Ved. 
Sut. II. 3. 1 8.]. Therefore, this self, which is self-luminous, 
is indeed the knower always, it is not mere luniinousness. 

51. Vide Pr. Up, VI. 4. where (10) Food, (11) Strength of body 

these are enumerated as follows: and of the senses, (12) Austerities and 

(1) The principal vital air Prdtta, penance, Tapas (13) The sacred 

(2) Faith, i. e. belief in the reality of hymns or Mantras (14) Works (sac- 
God (Sraddha) (3) Ether, (4) Air, rificial and other) (15) Sivarga and 
(5) Light, (6) Water, (7) Earth, other such results of works (i6J The 
(8) Mind, '1(9) The ten fnth-iyas, names of Sivarga &c. 

II 



82 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

Luminosity, as in the case of the luminosity of lamp- 
flames and other similar objects, must necessarily belong to 
something, simply because it possesses the character of lum- 
inosity. Therefore, consciousness in itself is not capable of 
becoming the self. Moreover, those that know the power 
and import of words say that the words samvid (conscious- 
ness), anubhfiti (experience), jUana (knowledge), &c., are 
words implying relation. It is not seen either in ordinary 
language or in the scripture that the verbs to know, &c., 
are at all used without an object or without a subject. 

What has been stated 3 2 to the effect that consciousness 
itself is the self, because it possesses the quality of intelli- 
gence, in regard to that (statement), this has to be asked, 
namely, what it is that is meant by intelligence. If it be 
replied that it is the possession of that luminosity which is 
due to the mere fact of a thing's own existence, then, in . 
that case, such an explanation, being also applicable to the 
flame of a lamp, is too wide. If, as apart from consciousness, 
this quality of luminosity is not granted at all, there will 
then result the fallacies of inconclusiveness and contradic- 
tion. 53 Moreover, (the definition that intelligence means) 
the possession of that kind of existence which is invari- 
ably associated with luminosity (or intelligibility), that 
has been already declared to be invalid, because it is too 
wide, being applicable also to the case of pleasures, &c. If it 
be said that pleasures and other such feelings, although in- 

52. Vide supra pp. 50 & 51. cause, not toadmit luminosity as 

53. Inconclusiveness results, be- apart from .consciousness, which is 
cause, without knowing luminosity, as itself defined by means of the idea of 
apart from consciousness, any defini- luminosity, is the same as to admit 
tion of consciousness in which the that that luminosity is a peculiarly 
idea of luminosity is involved, must characteristic attribute of the con- 
necessarily prove meaningless and in- sciousness which has been taken to be 
conclusive. Contradiction results, be- attributeless. 



Adflik. L Sut. I.] SRl-BHlSHYA. 83 

variably associated with luminosity, are like jars and other 
objects, made luminous (or intelligible) to a thing other 
than themselves, and are, in consequence, non-intelligent, 
and thereby constitute the non-self ; (it is asked in return) 
( Is intelligence, then, luminous to itself ?' It also is always 
luminous to another thing, the knower, which is the ego 
in the cognition 'I know'; in the same way (in which 
happiness is luminous to a thing other than itself) in the 
cognition ' I am happy.' Hence, the intelligence which 
has the character of self-luminousness is not proved to 
exist in relation to consciousness. Therefore that intelli- 
gent thing ' I ', which is proved to itself by the mere 
fact of its own existence, that alone is the self (or the 
atman}. 

The luminosity of consciousness also is dependent upon 
its association with that (self). Indeed, analogously to the 
case of pleasures and other such feelings, the intelligibil- 
ity of consciousness to the self, which constitutes its 
own basis, and its un-intelligibility to other things (than 
the self), are (both) wholly due to that (association with 
the self.) Therefore, the self is not pure consciousness 
itself, but is undoubtedly the ego, the knower. 

Again, what has been urged 3 4 to the effect that, because 
no illusion is possible without a basis (for it to be imposed 
upon), experience, which is, in truth, unfounded in any thing 
else and is objectless, constitutes the reality, but, neverthe- 
less becomes manifest, through illusion, as the knower ; just 
as the mother-of-pearl is made out, (through illusion), 
to possess the characteristics of silver; this (view also) is 
incorrect. If it were correct, then, the experiencing sub- 
ject, namely, the ego, would; in consequence of its being 

54. Vide supra p. 51, 



4 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. L Part. L 

equivalent to experience (itself), appear in the form ' I 
am (myself) experience'; in the same way in which silver 
and other (illusorily perceived) things are made out to be 
nothing other than the lustrous substances which are plac- 
ed in front of us. But, here, this same experience, which is 
itself separately cognised, qualifies some thing else, namely, 
the ego, just as a stick qualifies (or characterises) Devadat- 
ta (when he is holding it.) It is indeed thus that there 
arises the cognition, ' I experience.' Such being the case, 
how can the cognition ' I experience,' while showing the 
ego to be qualified by experience, be declared to relate 
entirely to this qualifying attribute, namely, experience, 
as if one may say that the cognition 'Devadatta 
is the possessor of a stick ' relates merely to the 
stick ? 

What has been further stated 53 to the effect that the 
(self s) quality of being the knower is seen to come out only 
in relation to him who, thinking that he is stout and so on, 
mistakes the body for the self, and that this (knowership) is 
therefore unreal, this (also) is incorrect ; because there 
would then result unreality to experience also, which is 
maintained by you to be the self, in as much as (such 
experience also) is cognisable only by him who possesses 
that (mistaken notion of the body being the self.) If it 
be said that there is no unreality in relation to experience, 
in as much as it is not contradicted by that knowledge of 
truth which stultifies all other things (than truth), then, in 
that case, certainly (the self's) quality of being the knower 
is not also unreal, on account of the absence of that same 
stultification. 

Then again it has been said thus : It is not possible 

55. Vide supra pp. 51 & 52. 



Adhik. L Sut. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 85 

to postulate, in the case of the self which does not admit 
of modifications, the quality of being the knower, which 
is the same as being the subject of the predication of know- 
ing. Thus, this quality of being the knower, which is of 
the nature of a modification and is non-intelligent, rests 
in the knot of the material principle of egoity which is 
capable of modifications and is itself a modification of 
prakriti (i. e. nature). Hence, knowership does not be- 
long to the self, but belongs to this material principle 
of egoity, which constitutes an internal organ. Indeed, the 
quality of being the subject of predications and other such 
qualities, are all attributes of perceivable objects, just as 
colour and other such qualities are. If the quality 
of being the subject of predications and the quality 
of being denoted by the idea of the ego are (both) admit- 
ted in relation to the self, then, as in the case of the 
body, so also, in the case of the self, there would result 
(to it) non-selfhood, objectivity, non-intelligence, &c. 
All this is not right ; because, this material principle of 
egoity which constitutes an internal organ (of the body), 
is, like the body, possessed of non-selfhood, the character 
of being a modification of the prakriti, perceivability, ob- 
jectivity, the character of being utilised by other things 
than itself, and other similar characteristics; and because 
also, the quality of being the knower has the peculiar 
character of belonging always to an intelligent thing. 
What is said is this : Just as the body and other simi- 
lar objects are, by means of their perceivability, ob- 
jectivity, and other such characteristics, distinguished from 
whatever is characterised by the opposites of these (charac- 
teristics), viz. the quality of being the perceiver, subjectivity, 
and the like ; so also, the principle of egoity which is ot 
the nature of an internal organ, being made up of the same 



86 SRI-BHA.SHYA. \Chap. 1. Part. I. 

substance (as the body), is distinguished by those very cha- 
racteristics (of perceivability, &c.,) from that (which is 
characterised by the other attributes of being the perceiver, 
&c). Hence, the quality of being the knower does not, 
like the quality of being consciousness, belong to this 
principle of egoity, for the mere reason that, (if it did), there 
would thereby be the contradiction of its own nature. Just 
as the quality of being consciousness is not admissible in re- 
lation to the principle of egoity, which is the object of that 
(consciousness), so also the quality of being the knower 
can not be admitted in relation to what constitutes the ob- 
ject of (knowledge) itself. 

Moreover, the quality of being the knower is not of 
the nature of a modification. The quality of being the 
knower is, indeed, the same as the quality of being the 
seat of the attribute of intelligence ; and intelligence, being 
the natural attribute of this eternal thing (viz. the self), is 
(itself) eternal. And he (the Sutrakara) speaks of the 
eternity of the self in the following aphorism and in others, 
"The self is not (a produced thing), as there are no scrip- 
tural statements to that effect." [Ved. Siit. II. 3. 18.]. In 
the aphorism " For that very reason, (the self) is the 
knower." [Ved. Sut. II. 3. 19.], by mentoning the (self to 
be) knower he declares that it is natural for the self to be the 
seat of intelligence. It has been stated that there is no- 
thing wrong in the (self), which is itself of the nature of 
intelligence, being (at the same time) the seat of intelligence; 
just as (there is nothing wrong) in gems and other simlar 
objects, (although they are made up of the material element 
of heat and light), being themselves the seat of luminosity. 
We will establish farther on that intelligence, which of itself 
is unconditioned, is capable of contraction and expansion. 
Hence, in the state of the knower of the body (/. c. as the 



Adhik. I. Sut. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 87 

embodied individual self), it exists, owing to its past ac- 
tions (or karmas), in a contracted condition, (the contrac- 
tion thereof) varying in degree in accordance with the 
nature of those particular actions ; and that (state of con- 
traction or expansion) is regulated by means of the sens- 
es. The statement about the rising and the setting (of 
intelligence) is made, having regard to this aforesaid pass- 
age of intelligence through the door- way of the senses. In 
the matter of this movement of the intelligence, there cert- 
ainly results (to the self) the quality of being an agent ; 
but that quality is not natural (to it), being due to its kar- 
mas (or past actions); and so the self has undoubtedly an 
immodifiable nature. Knowership, which is of this afore- 
said nature, belongs only to the self, whose essential 
character is intelligence ; and consequently, this knower- 
ship cannot possibly belong, at any time, to the non-intelli- 
gent principle of egoity (/. c. ahaftkard). 

If, however, it be said that, 1 in regard to this principle of 
egoity, whose essential nature is non-intelligence, there is 
the possibility of (its acquiring) the quality of knowership, 
on account of its proximity to intelligence and the conse- 
quent reflection (of qualities) therefrom, it is asked in 
return what is this reflection of intelligence ? Does the 
reflection of the principle of egoity fall upon consciousness, 
or, does the reflection of consciousness fall upon the princi- 
ple of egoity ? It (viz. the reflection of the principle 
of egoity) does not fall upon consciousness, because knower- 
ship is not admissible in regard to consciousness. It (viz. 
the reflection of consciousness) does not fall upon the 
principle of egoity, because it is impossible for that (princi- 
ple of egoity), which is admittedly non-intelligent, ever to 
possess the quality of knowership, and because also both 
(consciousness and the principle of egoity) are not capable 



88 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I Part. I. 

of being perceived by the organ of sight. And surely, no 
reflection is seen to take place in relation to invisible 
objects. 

Then again, it may be urged that the quality of being 
the knower results from contact with intelligence, in the 
same way in which the heat in a lump of iron results 
from contact with fire. It cannot be so here, however ; be- 
cause knowership is not admitted to be an intrinsic quality 
of consciousness; for that same reason, this quality of know- 
ership cannot, from contact with it, result to the principle 
of egoity, nor can it be apprehended (in relation to that 
principle). Since knowership cannot at all be predi- 
cated of the principle of egoity which is non-intelligent, 
there cannot, through contact with it, result to conscious- 
ness the quality of being the knower, nor can there arise 
(thus) the apprehension of that (quality of being the 
knower) in relation to consciousness. 

What has been further stated 56 to the effect that both 
of them (viz. consciousness and the material principle of 
egoity), do not, in reality, possess the quality of knower- 
ship, but that this material principle of egoity is the 
revealer of experience, and consequently reveals that expe- 
rience as though it were within itself, in the way in 
which mirrors and other such revealers do; this (also) is 
not right ; because, the self-luminous dtman cannot appro- 
priately be held to be revealed by the non-intelligent 
principle of egoity. This has been declared thus: "It 
does not stand to reason that the principle of egoity, whose 
nature consists in non-intelligent materiality, reveals the 
dtman which is self-luminous, in the same way in which (it 
does not stand to reason to hold that) a dead ember 

56. Vide supra pp. 52 & 53. 



- 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRi-BHlSHYA. 89 

(reveals) the sun." \_A. S.]. 37 Indeed, all things have 
their cognisability dependent upon self-luminous experience. 
It being so, those, who know the self, ridicule the idea that 
the non-intelligent principle of egoity, the luminosity of 
which is dependent on that (experience), reveals that same 
experience, the luminosity of which is, (on the contrary), 
neither producible nor destructible, and itself forms the 
means by which all things are cognised. Moreover, since 
there is incompatibility between the nature of the material 
principle of egoity and (the nature) of experience, and 
since also there will result to experience, (when it hap- 
pens to be a thing revealed by ahafikdrd), the char- 
acter of being no experience at all, there cannot be the 
relation of the revealer and the revealed (between them). 
This has been stated thus : -" The relation of the revealer 
and the revealed (between any two things) is mutually 
exchangeable, and cannot exist when there is any incompat- 
ibility in nature (between them). If the self be capable of 
being revealed, it would, like a jar, (for instance), acquire, 
in consequence, the character of being no experience at 
all." [A. 5.] 

Again, it is not very appropriate (to hold), in regard to 
consciousness, that it is revealed by the principle of egoity, 
which is itself revealed by consciousness, just as a beam 
of the sun's rays is revealed by the palm of the hand, which 
is itself revealed by that (very beam of rays); because, in 
this instance itself, there is really no revelation of the beam 
of the sun's rays by means of the palm of the hand. Surely, 
on account of their progress being obstructed by the palm of 



57. This stanza occurs in the manuja's reasonings in ihe 

.3/w*a<A/to'ofYamunacharya, the lead- karana are based upon the writings 

er of SrI-Vaishnavism in South India of Yamunacharya, as it may be made 

just before Ramanuja. Much of Ra- out from a study of his Siddhitraya* 

12 



QO SRI--BHASHYA. \Chap. 1. Par 1. 1. 

the hand, the rays become increased (through reflection 
and scattering) and are themselves very clearly perceived; 
thus the palm of the hand cannot possess the character of 
a revealer (of the sun's rays), in as much as it simply 
serves to increase them (thus). 

Yet again, of what nature is that revelation which is 
effected by the principle of egoity in relation to this self (or 
the atmwi), the essential nature of which is the same as 
that of consciousness ? It is not, surely, origination, be- 
cause it (viz. the dtmmi) is self-established, and it is in con- 
sequence impossible for it to be originated by any thing 
else. Xor does it (viz. such revelation) consist in making 
that (self) intelligible, because it (viz. the self which is the 
same as experience) is incapable of being experienced by 
any other experience. And for this same reason there can 
be nothing that is of use as a means for experiencing that 
(self). It (viz. this sort of instrumental utility of a thing) is 
indeed of two kinds. It consists either in serving as the 
means which brings the object of knowledge into relation 
with the perceiving senses ; just as in the matter of the 
apprehension of generic qualities, one's own face, and such 
other things the individual, the mirror, and such other 
things (respectively) form the means of bringing (those 
generic qualities, that face, and those other things) into rela- 
tion with the senses. Or, it (viz. such instrumental utility) 
consists in serving the purpose of removing the impurity 
found in one who is desirous of acquiring knowledge ; just 
as tranquillity, self-restraint, and such other things are^ 
(in the way of removing the impurities of him who is desi- 
rous of true knowledge.auxiliary) to the science which is the 
means of knowing the supreme reality. It is therefore de- 
clared accordingly : -"As it (viz. the ego) is not within 
the province of the senses, nothing can serve as the means 



Adhik. L Sut. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 91 

of bringing it into relation with them." 38 

Moreover, even if it be allowed that experience is cap- 
able of being experienced, it is not proper to say that the 
ego is useful as a means for experiencing that (experience). 
Indeed, it (viz. such instrumental utility thereof) may con- 
sist in the removal of any obstruction to the origination of 
the experience which is thus capable of being experienced ; 
in the same way in which lamp-flames and other luminous 
things serve, in relation to the organ of sight, as instruments 
for the removal of the deep darkness which is an obstruc- 
tion to the origination of the perception of colour and 
other qualities. But here (/'. e. in the case of experience 
or consciousness) there is no such removable obstruction. 
Surely, in the consciousness which is the same as the al- 
man, there is not anything to be found which, while being 
an obstruction to the origination of the knowledge of that 
(atman), is capable of being removed by the material 
principle of egoity. If it be said that there is (the 
obstruction offered by) ignorance (which has to be remov- 
ed), it is replied that it is not right to entertain such 
an opinion, for the reason that it is not admissible to hold 
that ignorance (or avidyd) can be removed by the material 
principle of egoity (or ahatlkara). Indeed, what removes 
ignorance is not anything other than knowledge. Moreover, 

58. Only the first half of the sioka self the knovver and therefore this 

from the Htmasiddhi is quoted above, (knower) cannot be purified by that 

but the other half also is pertinent to (ego) itself." It is, in accordance with 

the context. And the whole sloka, this opinion of Yamunacharya so ex- 

\vhen translated, runs thus : pressed, that Ramanuja argues out the 

" As it (viz. the ego) is not within impossibility of anything proving a 

the province of the senses, nothing helpful instrument, in either of the 

ran serve as the means of bringing it two ways mentioned above, in the 

into relation \\ilh them. The ego is it- mailer of the realisation of the a/man. 



9 2 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

it is not possible for ignorance to have consciousness for its 
basis, because it would then have the same basis for itself as 
knowledge has, and because also its objects would then be 
the same as those of that (knowledge). Ignorance cannot 
exist in the witness who is pure unqualified consciousness, 
and is free from the condition of being the knower as well 
as that of being the object (of knowledge). Just as jars 
and other similar objects cannot form the seat of ignor- 
ance, because they are not, even in the least, the seat of 
knowledge, so also pure unqualified consciousness cannot be 
the seat of ignorance, for the reason that it too is not the 
seat of knowledge. Even if consciousness be taken to 
be the seat of ignorance, that same (consciousness), which 
is (also) taken to be the self, cannot form the object of 
knowledge ; therefore the cessation of the ignorance which 
is found in it (viz. in this consciousness) cannot be brought 
about by means of knowledge. Knowledge, indeed, removes 
always the ignorance which relates to its own objects, as 
in the case of the rope and other things (where the false 
knowledge of the snake,&c., in relation to the rope, &c., is 
removed by the true knowledge of the rope as rope). Hence, 
the ignorance which has consciousness for its basis can never 
be destroyed by any thing whatsoever. It will be stated 
further on that the true nature of this ignorance, which is 
not capable of being described either as an entity or as a 
non-entity, is altogether difficult of definition. And because 
this ignorance, which is of the nature of the antecedent 
non-existence of knowledge, is not an obstruction to the 
origination of knowledge, it cannot, through causing its 
own destruction, serve as an instrument for producing that 
knowledge. Hence there can be no revelation of experience 
by the material principle of egoity in any manner whatso- 
ever, 



Adhik. I. Sfit. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 93 

Moreover, the nature of revealers is not to reveal the 
revealable thing as though it were within themselves ; be- 
cause such (a revelation) is not seen in the case of lamp- 
flames and such other self-luminous things, and because 
also knowledge, the instrument of knowledge, and all that 
helps that (instrument of knowledge in the production 
of knowledge) are all of such a nature as is consistent 
with the realisation of things as they are. And this 
fact is proved by the rule which declares that self-evident 
things prove themselves. Again, mirrors and other things 
are not the revealers of faces and other objects, but (only ) 
form the means to produce that cause of erroneousness 
which (for instance) consists in the bending back of the 
ocular aura (to one's own face.) And it being so, all false 
appearances arise from such a cause of error. But the 
revealers are (really) such things as are like the aloha' * 
(or the ocular aura). Further, here, in the present 
instance, it is not possible for the material principle of 
egoity to impose any such error upon the self-luminous 
consciousness. The logical genus represents the typical 
form of the individuals (that go to make it up); and it is 
therefore that it appears to be contained in the individuals, 
but not because it is revealed by the individuals. Hence, 
to give rise to the apprehension of consciousness as abiding 
in the material principle of egoity, which forms an internal 

59. "^loka which has been transhit- are due to reflection is supposed to 
ed here as Ocular Aura is a kind of be cauced by the mirror or any other 
influence, which, proceeding from the reflecting surface bending back this 
eye and falling upon external objects, dloka and, accordingly, a man sees 
is supposed to make them visible. his own face in a mirror, because the 
According to this theory of vision, dloka from his eyes goes to the mir- 
the eye sees only such objects as are ror, is there bent back, and finally re- 
touched, as it were, by its own dloka ; turns and falls on his own face, 
ihe perception of the images which 



94 SRi-BniSHYA. {Chap. I. Part. L 

organ, there is, indeed, nothing which can serve as a means, 
either in itself or through causing an error. Thus the 
quality of being the knower doe.s not belong to the mate- 
rial principle of egoity, nor is there any impression to 
the effect that it does. Therefore, the subjective self is 
the thing T, which is of itself made out to be the knower; 
but is not pure unqualified consciousness. 

It has also been stated already that, on the dis- 
appearance of the idea of the ego, consciousness cannot 
acquire the subjectivity (of the self). Although, (during 
deep sleep), the thing ' I ' for the ego) does not, owing to 
its being overpowered by the quality of darkness (or lamas), 
and owing also to the absence of the experience of external 
objects, distinctly and clearly manifest itself, still, because 
the self shines forth (as before) in one and the same contin- 
uous form of the T at the time of waking, there is no dis- 
appearance of the idea of the ego even in deep sleep. It has 
to be stated that the experience which is accepted by you 
does also shine forth in that very same form. As a matter 
of fact, no one, who has risen from sleep, introspectively 
realises, as existing simultaneously with the condition of 
sleep, any experience which is of the following form, name- 
ly, ".I who am (pure) consciousness which is free from the 
notion of the ego, and the nature of which is hostile to all 
other tilings, have (all this while) remained as a witness of 
ignorance." The introspective realisation of one who has 
risen from sleep is, indeed, to the effect "I have slept 
happily." By means of this process of introspective realisa- 
tion, it is made out that even at that time (/. c. during 
sleep) the self, which is the thing ' I ', possesses the quality 
of being the enjoyer of happiness as well as the quality of 
being the knower. It should not be urged that the realisa- 
tion is simply to the effect-" I so slept then as to feel 



Adhik. I. Sftt. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 95 

happy now"; because that realisation is not at all of such a 
form. Moreover, (it may be said that) a person who has 
risen from sleep realises by introspection the very thing 
which was experienced (by him) before, and then observes 
'This was done by me'. 'This was experienced by me,' 
'I said this'; and that, therefore, it is not right to think 
that the -quality of being the enjoyer of happiness cannot 
be consistently applied to the ego, on account of the 
impermanent character of this ego which is the self. But 
if it be said (in reply) that he also realises by introspection 
-'All this while (during my sleep) I knew nothing at all,' 
(we ask) 'What (follows) then '? If it be said that 'nothing 
at all' means (here) the negation of all things, it is replied 
that it can not be so, for the reason that the thing ' I/ the 
knower, must continue to persist when one can say ' I 
knew,' (even though his knowledge relates to nothing). In 
fact, this negation here relates only to knowable objects. 
If the negation by means of the word 'nothing' here 
relates to the entire totality of things, then that experience 
also, which is admitted by you (to be existent during 
sleep), will have to be denied. Now (it is held that) the sell 7 , 
which is the knower, and constitutes the thing 'I' which is 
continuously existent even during sleep,is (first) introspect- 
ively realised as the T (or the ego); and that that (ego) 
is then denied by means of the cognition 'I knew nothing 
at all.' Thus, this same introspective realisation 'I knew 
nothing at all.'--- is made to prove the reality of that know- 
ledge which is, however, denied to exist at that time of 
sleep), and (to prove) also the unreality of the thing ' I ', 
which is the knower and is continuously existent ; and let 
such a thing as this be proved only to the gods (who do not 
reply to arguments and criticism). 

If it be said that when one observes 'I- did not know 



96 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

even myself (in sleep)', the continued existence of the thing 
* I ' also is not then apprehended, it is replied that you the 
pftrvapakshinsdo not know even the contradiction (thus 
arising) between your own experience and your own de- 
scription (of it). Indeed, this experience and its description 
are to the effect ' I did not know myself.' If it be ask- 
ed what it is that is negated in the word ( myself, it would 
be indeed a pertinent question put by you. It is thus 
answered. It is not the essential reality of the continued 
persistence of the thing ' I ', which is the knower, that is 
denied (here). But (what is denied is) that the thing ( I ' 
which is, at the time of waking, made out to have been 
continuously existent, is characterised by caste, and the 
various stages of life, &c. When it is said ' I did not know 
myself,' the real import (of that utterance) has to be 
distinctly ascertained. The import of that particular portion 
(of the sentence) which is denoted by ' myself is the thing 
'I ' which is characterised by such peculiarities of caste &c., 
as are continuously applied to it in the condition of wake- 
fulness. The import of that (other) portion (of the sent- 
ence) which is denoted by ' I ' is the ego, which is well 
known to exist in the condition of self-absorption as alto- 
gether consisting of indistinct self-experience. The form 
of this experience is indeed to this effect, viz. ' I did not 
know even -myself, as being asleep, and as possessing a 
particular nature.' 

Moreover, your position 60 indeed is this, that, in deep 
sleep, the self exists as the witness of ignorance. To be a 
witness is certainly the same as to be a direct knower ; 
and one who does not know cannot at all possess the 
character of a witness. In the scripture as well as in the 



60. Videwf^rap. 53. 



Adhik. I. Snt. i.} SRI-BHISHYA. 97 

world, it is the knower alone that is spoken of as the 
witness. Mere knowledge is not (the witness). The vene- 
rable Panini also declares thus : " The word witness is an 
appellative term and means the person who directly sees." 
\_Pdnini. .2.91.]. The word w if ness is used always in 
the sense of one who knows. And this aforesaid witness, 
who is realised when one says ' I know/ is undoubtedly 
the thing ' I ' ; and it being so, how can the thing ' I' be not 
known to exist then (/. c. during deep sleep) ? Therefore^ 
it is a settled conclusion that the thing ' 1', being luminous 
to itself, shines forth invariably as the ' I ' ; and so, even in 
sleep and other such states, the self is luminous and un- 
doubtedly shines forth as the ego. 

Again what has been stated 6 ' to the effect that in the 
state of final release the thing ' I ' does not continue to 
persist this (also) is not good. If it do not (so persist), then 
final release would, in other words, come to mean the enun- 
ciation of the destruction of the self. Moreover, the thing 
T is no mere attribute, so that, even after its cessation, the 
essential entity may remain, as it does in the case of the 
removal of ignorance. On the contrary, the thing ' I' is it- 
self the self; and intelligence is its attribute ; because intelli- 
gence is, indeed, apprehended to be the attribute of the thing 
' I' in the cognitions f I know ', and ' Knowledge has come 
to me.' Further, he who considers the self to be afflicted 
with the ddhydtmika*- and other miseries, saying 'I am 
sorrowful/ and in whom the desire for final release is born 
to the effect (of making him feel) 'How may I become 
tranquilled and devoid of sorrow, setting aside the whole of 
misery, so that it may never occur again to me/ such a man 
alone strives for the attainment of that (release). Should 
he, however, come to think-' I shall be no more, if I utilise 

v 6l. Vide supra p. 53. 62. Vide supr* p. 4. n. 12, 



98 SRi-BniSHYA. {Chap. I. Part. L 

the means (for the attainment of release)/ he would flee 
away from even the semblance of any discussion bearing 
upon the topic of final release ; and then the whole science 
treating of final release would, (through want of scope), 
become unauthoritative, because there would be none at 
all having the needed qualification (for the attainment of 
final release). It may be said that that mere luminousness 
alone, which is indicated by the word ' I ', remains in the 
state of final release ; but then of what use is it ? Xo one, 
whose actions are based upon right understanding, will 
ever make any attempt (to obtain final release) with the 
knowledge that even though his ego ceases to exist, 
something which is mere luminousness remains. Therefore 
the thing ' I ' itself, which is made out to be the knower, is the 
subjective self. And this subjective self, even in the state of 
final release, shines indeed as the 1 1', because it is luminous 
to itself Whatever is luminous to itself, that always 
shines forth as the T. Thus, for instance, the self, which 
is subject to the round of births and deaths, is admitted by 
both the contending parties to be possessed of such lumi- 
nousness. Whatever does not shine forth as the T, that is 
not luminous to itself, like jars and other similar objects, for 
instance. This self in the state of final emancipation is 
luminous to itself. Therefore it (viz. the self) shines forth 
always as the 'I'. Ignorance, transmigration, &c., cannot 
be said to result to that (released self), in consequence of 
its thus shining forth as the T, because they (viz. ignor- 
ance, transmigration-, &c.,) are opposed to the condition 
of -final release, and because also, the notion of the ' I ' is- 
not the cause of ignorance and such other things. Ignor- 
ance, indeed, is either not to know a thing as it is, or to 
know it other than as it is, or to know it as contrary to 
what it K The essential nature of the self consists, indeed, 



Adhik. I. Silt, i.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 99 

in being the T; and so the notion of the '!', which is of 
the nature of the knowledge of the self itself, cannot 
cause ignorance ; and how can it cause the condition of 
transmigration ? On the contrary that (notion of the ' I '), 
being opposed to it (viz. ignorance), certainly destroys 
it. (The subjective self shines indeed as the ' I ' even in 
the state of final release), also because the experience of 
that self is seen to have been altogether in the form of the 
'I', in the case ofVamadeva and others who had their 
ignorance destro) r ed in its entirety by means of the direct 
realisation of the Brahman as constituting the Self of all. It 
is, indeed, heard declared in the scripture to the following 
effect: " After seeing this (Brahmaii), the sage Vamadeva 
experienced I have become Manuandthe sun also." \Brih. 
Up. 1.4. ID.]; "I alone exist and will exist." \Alh. Up. 
I. i.]. The Highest Brahman, who is not ignorant of any 
thing which is distinct (from Himself), and who is denoted 
altogether by the import of the word ' Sat ' (/. e. existence), 
is also (seen to be) accustomed to the same usage (of per- 
sonality) in the following scriptural passages : "Indeed, 
I (will enter) these three deities." \Qlhand. Up. VI. 3. 2.]; 
" May I become manifold and be born." [Qihdnd. Up. 
VI. 2. 3.]; "He thought May I create the worlds." 
[Ait. Up. I. i.]. Again that same (association of person- 
ality with the Highest Brahman] may be seen in the 
following and other passages also : " Because I transcend 
the destructible and am also superior to the indestructible, 
therefore, I am known as the Highest Person, both in the 
world and in the scripture." \_B. G. XV. 18.] ; " I am 
the Self, O Gudakesa." \_B. G. X. 20] ; " It is not that I 
did never exist." [B. G. II. 12.]; " I am the source as well 
as the end of the whole world." { L B. G. VII. 6.]. I am the 

63. Vide supra p. 30. n, 26. 



loo SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

source of all; everything goes forth from Me." [B. G. X. 8.] ; 
" I am their deliverer from the deadly ocean of the circuit 
of mundane existence." [B. G. XII. 7.]; " I am the seed- 
giving father." [B. G. XIV. 4.]; " I know the past things." 
[B. G. VII. 26.]. 

It ma}*, however, be asked" If the ' 1' constitute* 
the self, then, how is it that the principle of egoity is 
declared by the Lord to be among the things that go to 
make up the material embodiment (or kshetra of the 
individual self) as in the following passage : ' The great 
elements, the principle of egoity, the buddhi or the princi- 
ple known as mahat, the prakriti (all these thrown 

together have been declared to make up this changeful 
material embodiment)' ?" \B. G. XIII. 5.]. It is thus said 
(in reply to this): In all declarations regarding (His) essen- 
tial nature, the teaching is given (by Him only in the first 
person) as ' 1', and the essential nature of the self is also 
apprehended in that very same form (viz. as the ' I' or the 
ego); therefore, the true nature of the subjective self is surely 
in the form of the ' 1'. It is, indeed, declared by the Lord 
Himself that the principle of egoity, which is one of the 
various modifications of the prakriti, is included among 
the things that go to make up this material embodiment. 
And it is called the principle of egoity (or ahatikara) 
because it forms the cause of the imposition of the idea of 
the ego upon the body, which is other than the self. And 
again the etymology of this word ahaflkara (which means 
the principle of egoity) is to be made out on the supposition 
that the affix termed chvi* 4 has become applicable here on 
account of (our) assuming as really existing what does not 
so exist. Moreover, this same ahafikara, which (often) forms 

64. Vide Paniiti. V. 4. 50. Varlikn. 



Adhik. 7. Sat. i.] SRI-BHASHYA. toi 

the cause of disesteem in regard to men of position, and 
is otherwise named pride, is often declared in the scripture 
to be worthy of rejection. c3 Therefore such idea of egoity 
as is not stultified by any thing is directly within the pro- 
vince of the self itself. That other idea of egoity, which is 
within the province of the body, is certainly ignorance. 
To the same effect it has been declared by the reverend 
Parasara (also) : "C thou, worthy son of thy family, listen 
also to the teaching regarding the true nature of ignorance 
as well. It is the imposition of the idea of the self on that 
which is no self." \_V. P. VI. 7. 10.] If mere consciousness 
alone constitute the self, then, the body which is not the 
self, but which is, (nevertheless), mistaken for the self, 
would illusorily appear as mere consciousness, but not 
appear as the knower. Therefore, the thing ' 1 ', which is 
the knower, is alone the self. It has been taught : "Thus, 
the self which is the knower shines forth as the ' I', because 
it can be so established by direct perception, and because 
the aforesaid arguments and scriptural texts are applicable 
so to prove it, and because also ignorance cannot (really) 
be associated with it." \_A. S.~\ To the same effect 
is this passage : "The self is other than the body, the 
senses, the mind and vitality ; and is self-evident. It is 
eternal, all-pervading, different in each body, and happy in 
itself." \_A. S.] To be self-evident is to be self-luminous ; 
to be all-pervading is to possess the power of getting into 
the inside of all inanimate things by reason of its own 
extreme subtlety. 

It has been stated 66 that sense-perception, which em- 
braces all distinctions, is grounded upon error and is, in con- 
sequence, liable to give rise to false knowledge ; and that 

65. Vide B. C. XVI. 18. M>. Vide siifra \>\\ 33 to 35* 



102 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. 1. Part 1. 

therefore it is apt to be stultified by scripture. Here, it has 
to be questioned what this error is, grounded whereon, 
perception becomes capable of giving rise to false knowledge. 
If it be replied that the beginninglessly old innate impression 
of distinctions itself is, indeed, the cause of error, then it is 
asked whether it has been already ascertained elsewhere that 
this innate impression of distinctions possesses, like 'dark- 
ness', 07 &c., the character of being the cause of (our) appre- 
hending things as being other than what they really are. If 
it be said again that this is made out by that same (afore- 
said) scriptural stultification (of perception), it; is replied 
that it cannot be so, for the reason that the logical fallacy 
of reciprocal dependence would thereby result (in the 
following manner). When it is settled that scripture 
gives rise to the knowledge of that thing which is devoid 
of all attributes, then (alone) is it demonstrable that the 
innate impression of distinctions forms the misguiding cause 
of error (in relation to perception); and again, when the 
innate impression of distinctions is proved to be of the 
nature of a misguiding cause of erroneous perception, then 
(alone) is it demonstrable that scripture gives rise to the 
knowledge of that thing which is devoid of all attributes. 
Moreover, if, by being based upon the innate impression of 
distinctions, perception gives rise to such knowledge as is 
other than the reality, then scripture also, being similarly 
based thereon, would acquire the same character (of giving 
rise to false knowledge). It may be urged again that, 
although based upon error, the scripture forms the stultifier 
of perception, in as much as it is the means of that 
knowledge which is destructive of all the distinctions 
apprehended in perception, and is therefore of stronger 

67. Vide infra p. 104. n. 69.. where name also of an eye-disease, 
this darkness is explained to be the 



Adhik. 1. Sut. /.] SRI-BH.ISHYA. 103 

authority as a criterion'of truth; if so, it is replied that it can 
not be so, because, when it is known that it (viz. scripture) 
is based upon error, the idea that it is stronger as a criteri- 
on of truth can serve no purpose. For, when the fear 
caused by the false perception of the snake in a real rope 
is found to exist in a man, that fear is not seen to cease even 
after he is told ' This is no snake, do not be afraid ' by 
another who knows that he is labouring under an illusion. 
That scripture is based upon error can, however, be thought 
of only at the time of 'hearing' it; because reflection, 68 
c., consist in practically realising that knowledge of the 
oneness of the Brahman and the self, which is destructive 
of all the distinctions apprehended at the time of ' hearing.' 

Again, by what means have you come to know what 
the scripture is and how it is incapable of being erroneous, 
while perception is capable of being erroneous ? That self- 
evident experience (of yours) which is devoid of all attributes 
cannot, indeed, give rise to this knowledge, because it is whol- 
ly objectless and because also it can lend no special support 
to the scripture. Xor does sense -perception (give rise to 
this knowledge), because, being based upon error, it relates 
to what is other than the reality. The other means of proof 
(such as inference, &c.,) being themselves based upon that 
(perception), cannot also (give rise to that knowledge). 
Hence, on account of the unavailability of any means of 
proof to establish your own position, there can be no proof 
of the position accepted by you. 

It may, however, be said that we also have to make 
use of (such) means of proof and (such) objects of know- 
ledge as appertain to the phenomenal world. But what is 
this which you call phenomenal ? If it be said that it is 
that which results from first impressions, and is then made 

68. " Reflection &c." means reflection and steady meditation, 



j04 SRT-BHISHYA. [Chap. I Part. I. 

out to be (really) otherwise when examined by means of 
appropriate reasoning, it is asked in reply, of what use 
that can be. Even though it be accepted as a means of 
proof, it cannot effect what a means of proof has to ac- 
complish, because it is capable of being itself stultified by 
appropriate reasoning. 

Again it may be said that, although both scripture and 
perception are based upon ignorance, the objects of percep- 
tion are found to be stultified by the scripture, 1 while the 
object of the scripture, namely, the Brahman, which is the 
only existence without a second, is not seen to be so stultified 
subsequently; and that, in consequence, the Brahman alone, 
which is pure experience and devoid of all attributes, is the 
highest reality. To say so is wrong, because whatever is 
based upon error, even though it continues unstultified, can 
be demonstrated to possess the character of unreality. 
What is said is this : All those men, for instance, who are 
affected by timira 6 , who do not know that they are them- 
selves so affected by timira, who dwell in such mountain 
caves as are inaccessible to other men, and who are free 

(>(). Titnira commonly means dark- and invades the third coat of the eye, 
ness, and is here used to denote it comes to be known as kdcha. In 
obviously a disease of the eye. In this disease the eye is always directed 
the Sabdakalpadruma of Raja Radha- upwards, and the vision is hazy and 
kanta Deva, it is said that this dis- often coloured ; faces appear noseless, 
ease itself is called ' darkness,' be- single objects appear multiplied, and 
cause it darkens vision. According straight objects appear crooked, &c., 
to Vabhata who is quoted here, this &c. When kdcha grows, it leads to 
disease affects the fourth coat of the blindness. On pages 16 & lO2,we have 
eye, obstructs vision in all directions, translated timira as darkness, so that 
and finally causes blindness. In this it may mean either the ordinary dark- 
disease, it is said, that single objects ness resulting from want of light, or 
appear double or multiple, and that the eye-disease known as aarkness, 
short objects appear long and vice because both these act as misguid- 
, Sic., Sic. If the disease grows ing causes of false perception. 



Adhik. I. Sut. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 105 

from all other causes of error in vision, such as the eye-disease 
kdrha, &c., have without distinction, the perception of two 
moons (when there is only one in reality), as they are all 
equally subject to that misguiding cause (of false perception) 
which is known as timira ; here, there is no apprehension of 
any stultifier (of such a perception), and (yet) it cannot for 
that reason be other than false ; accordingly, the moon's 
duality, which forms the object of that (perception), is also 
undoubtedly false. Indeed, an error-producer is that which is 
the cause of false knowledge. In this same manner, the 
knowledge of the Brahman, although free from the notion 
of any thing that may stultify it, has to be undoubtedly 
false ; and with it, its object, which is the BraJiman, (has 
also to be false); because that (knowledge) is (held to be) 
based upon ignorance. And the forms of the sj'llogistic 
statement in this connection would be as follow : (i). 
The Brahman which is (now) the subject of discussion 
(between us) is unreal, because it is the object of the 
knowledge which is produced in one who is possessed of 
ignorance ; as, for example, the phenomenal world, (ii). 
The Brahman is false, because it is the object of know- 
ledge (or experience); as, for example, the phenomenal 
world, (iii). The Brahman is unreal, because it is the 
object of that knowledge which is produced by false 
causes ; as, for example, that same phenomenal world. 

Moreover, it should not be urged that the unreal per- 
ception of elephants and other objects arising in dreams do 
form the cause of the attainment of real good and evil (in 
life); and that it-is not opposed to reason to hold that, simi- 
larly, the scripture, which, being based upon ignorance, is 
unreal, forms the means for the attainment of the object 
which is known as Brahman and constitutes the highest 
realit : because the conition arisin in dreams is not at all 



io6 SRi-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part.L 

of an unreal nature. Indeed, here (in dreams), there is 
unreality only in relation to the objects (perceived therein), 
because stultification is seen only in relation to them, but 
not in relation to the perception itself. Surely there is not 
born in any one the belief that will make him feel " That 
conscious state itself which was experienced by me during 
dreams is non-existent." As a matter of fact, the idea of 
stultification here is in the form " The conscious state is 
existent, but the objects (thereof) are non-existent." 

That knowledge which consists of illusions, and is caused 
by the incantations (mantras} and medicinal herbs, &c., of 
the enchanter, is quite real and forms also the cause of love 
and fear ; because, in this case also, the knowledge (or the 
conscious state so produced) remains unstultified. That 
perception of the snake, &c., which is imposed upon the 
rope, &c., and is produced by means of the misguiding 
causes relating to the objects of perception and the perceiv- 
ing senses, &c., that is also truly existent and forms the 
cause of fear and other emotions. The impression resulting 
from the proximity of the snake to one's self, to the effect 
that one has been bitten (by it), even when not so bitten, 
this also is undoubtedly real. The idea giving rise to a 
(false) suspicion of poisoning is also certainly real, and forms 
the cause of death. The reflected appearance of the face, &c., 
in water, &c., is a really existing thing, and forms the 
means of ascertaining the particular characteristics found in 
the face which is a really existing thing. The reality of 
these various states of consciousness is conclusively estab- 
lished, in as much as they have an origin, and also form 
the causes of actions which are determined by motives. 
If it be asked, how, even in the absence of the elephant 
and other objects (perceived in dreams), the forms of cog- 
nition relating to them can be real, we reply that that 



Adhik. L Sat. i.] SRI-BHISHYA. io; 

(question itself) is not right ; because these forms of cogni- 
tion merely require, as a rule, some object (whether it be 
real or unreal) to depend upon, and to relate to. For, what 
is required to make a thing the basis and the object of any 
cognition, is merely the manifestation of that thing (to 
consciousness) ; and there certainly does exist such a mani- 
festation under the influence of the misguiding cause 
(which is productive of such manifestation). However, 
that (thing which is so made manifest to consciousness), is, 
when stultified, conclusively proved to be unreal. And it 
has been already declared that that cognition which conti- 
nues unstultified relates certainly to the reality. 

Further, in the case also of the apprehension of the 
sounds of letters by means of (the corresponding) written 
signs, there is no cognition of the real by means of the un- 
real, because the written sign itself is really existent. To 
this, it may be objected that the sign is taken to be of the 
same nature as the sound, and is thus the cause of the 
cognition of the sound here, but that its identity in nature 
with the sound is unreal. This is not so; because the unreal 
(or non-existent) nature of the identity (of the sign) with 
the sound cannot form the means (of producing such a 
cognition). Indeed, it is not seen, nor is it possible, that 
what does not exist, and is not cognisable, can form the 
means (of proving any thing). Again, it may be said that 
the imposition of the idea of the alphabetic sound on that 
(written sign) is the cause (of the apprehension of the sound 
with the help of the sign). If it be so held, then, there 
would not be here, (as you contend), the cognition of the 
real by means of the unreal, simply because that (super- 
imposed) idea is (itself) real. Moreover, there would then 
result also the oneness of the means of proof with the 
object to be proved, because both of them possess the same 



io8 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I- 

character of being the cognition of alphabetic sound. And 
again, if a written sign forms the means (for the cognition 
of an alphabetic sound), by reason of its supposititious and 
unreal identity in nature with that sound, then it is easy 
enough for any one sign to be so supposititiously and un- 
really identical in nature with all the alphabetic sounds ; 
and thus there will have to result the cognition of all the 
alphabetic sounds by looking at any one written sign of 
a letter. Then again, it may be said that, just as there is 
the convention of using ' Devadatta ' and other nominal 
words in relation to particular masses of matter, so also, 
there is the convention of associating a particular sound, 
which is perceivable by the ear, with a particular written 
sign, which is perceivable by the eye ; and that, conse- 
quently, a particular written sign is the cause of the 
cognition of a particular alphabetic sound. Well then, 
there is, in that case, the cognition of the real by means 
of the real, because both the written sign and the (phonet- 
ic) convention are of a real nature. The cognition of the 
real wild ox by means of the written outline of the wild ox 
is founded upon similarity, and this similarity is itself real. 
Again, there is no cognition of the real by means of the 
unreal, even in the case where, by means of particular 
phonetic differentiations, the one undifferentiated sound 
(known as sphota) 7 is seen to become the means of 
apprehending a variety of meanings; because this one un- 
differentiated sound is revealed by numerous phonetic 

70. This is what is known as the expressed by sounds are traceable to 

Sphota of the grammarians, according that one eternal sound. The Pitrva- 

to whom, this Sphota which is eternal mimamsa also ascribes eternity to all 

is ' the cause of the manifestation of Vedic sounds. Vide Pur. Mini. I. I. 

all sounds,' and so they hold that all 5 to 23. Vide also Manu. I. 31. & 

the things in the world which are Taitt. Br. II. 2. 4. 2. 



Adhik. I. Sul. i.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 109 

differentiations (or nadas), and forms the cause of the 
origin of the knowledge of a variety of meanings, owing 
to the apprehension of its relation with various meanings, 
according as they are severally revealed by the various 
phonetic differentiations (thereof). It is not also proper to 
hold that sound possesses (at all) the undifferentiated 
character of unity ; because ga and the other phonetic 
elements of language, which undoubtedly import meanings, 
do themselves constitute sound, in as much as they (alone) 
are perceived by the ear. 

Therefore, by means of the scripture, which is false, 
it is difficult to arrive at that knowledge the object of 
which is the real Brahman. 

An objection may, however, be raised against this 
conclusion to the following effect : The scripture is not 
false, in the same way in which the flowers imagined to 
grow in the sky (are false) ; because it is made out to be a 
real entity (or sat) before the knowledge of non-duality (is 
born). Indeed, it is only after the knowledge of the truth 
is born, that the scripture acquires the character of being 
untrue. And then it is that the scripture can not form the 
means of knowing the Brahman, which is pure intelligence 
and is devoid of all distinctions. When it, however, does 
form such a means, then the scripture is really existent, 
for the reason that it is then made out to be so existent. To 
this objection, it is replied that it cannot be so ; because, 
when the scripture does not really exist, to make out that 
it does exist is false. What (follows) then ? Then (follows) 
this : In consequence of the unreality of the knowledge 
produced by the unreal scripture, there will result unreal- 
ity to the Brahman also which forms the object of that 
(knowledge) ; in the same way in which, owing to the fals- 
ity of the knowledge of fire inferred by means of aqueous 



no SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

vapour wrongly perceived to be smoke, the fire also which 
forms the object of that (inferential knowledge) is unreal. 
Moreover, the absence of any subsequent stultification (of 
the scriptural knowledge of the Brahman after it is actual- 
ly produced) is not also proved ; because such stultification 
of that (scriptural knowledge) is really to be found in the 
statement (of some 7 ' Buddhists) that nothingness alone 
is the reality. If it be - said that that (statement) is 
based upon illusion, it is replied that it has been already 
declared by you that this (scriptural knowledge) also is 
based upon illusion. Indeed the absence of any such 
stultification is to be found only in relation to that (state- 
ment that nothingness is alone the reality) ! We have now 
done with the ridiculing of such ill-founded and fallacious 
reasoning. 

What has been urged 7 2 -by t\\e Pfirvapakshins to the 
effect that Veddnta passages such as " Existence alone, my 
dear child, this was in the beginning" [Qhhdnd. U'p. VI. 2. 
i .] , and the like, are intended to establish that thing alone 
which is devoid of attributes and is of the uniform nature of 
intelligence, this (view also) is incorrect ; because in the 
way of proving the proposition 7 3 that, by knowing a cer- 
tain One Thing, all things become known, it is declared 
that the Highest Brahman, which is denoted by the word 
Sal (or Existence), is the material cause of the world, 
is the efficient cause of the world, is omniscient, omnipot- 
ent, wills the truth, pervades all, supports all, controls all, 
and is characterised by innumerable other auspicious quali- 
ties ; and that the whole world has that (Brahman) for its 

71. These are the Madhyamikas ; of refutation, 

rind the -statement quoted above is 72. Vide supra p. 27. 

also mentioned in the Sdiikhya apho- 73. Vide Chhdnd. Up. \'\. \. 3. 

ristns of Kapila. I. 44., for the purpose wherein this proposition is given. 



Adhik. I. Si'tt. /.] SRi-BHlSHYA. HI 

Soul ; and that, in consequence, the context (wherein the 
above scriptural passage occurs) proceeds to teach Sveta- 
ketu that he is of the same nature as the Brahman thus 
described. Indeed, this subject is discussed (by us) at 
length in the Vedartha-sangraha 74 . In this work also 
\Ved. Sut. II. i. 15.], in the section treating of the origin of 
the world, this (subject) will be discussed well with great 
clearness. In this passage also, namely, "And that is the 
higher (knowledge) by which that Indestructible Being (is 
known)"-[3fj(rf. Up. I. i. 5], the evil qualities appertaining 
to matter (or praknti] are first negatived (in relation to the 
Brahman), and then it is declared that the Highest Brahman 
possesses innumerable auspicious qualities such as eternity, 
omnipresence, subtlety, all-pervasiveness, indestructibility, 
the quality of being the source of all, omniscience, and so on. 
By means of this passage also, namely, " The Brahman 
is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], 
that thing which is devoid of attributes is not arrived at, be- 
cause the fact of their (/'. e. of Brahman, Existence, Know- 
ledge, and Infinity) being grammatically equated has to be 
understood to mean the denotation of some one thing which 
is characterised by more than one attribute. Indeed, (for 
words) to be grammatically equated is to import only one 
thing through a variety of significations. Regarding the use 
of these words so as to import only one thing, either by signi- 
fying those qualities which form the primary and natural 
meaning of the words, ' Existence,' ' Knowledge ', &c., or 
by denoting the opposite of what is contrary to each of 
those particular qualities, a difference between their signi- 
fications has necessarily to be accepted. Here, however, 

74. Vide pp. 20 to 60, Vedartha- malacharya and A. K. Yijayaragha- 
safigraha, edited at Madras, in vacharya. 
Teliigu characters, by Messrs J. Tirq- 



H2 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

there is this much of peculiarity. In one case, the words 
have their primary and natural meaning ; and in the 
other, they have a figurative significance. To be opposed 
to what is ignorance, &c., does not surely constitute 
the essential nature of the entity Brahman; for, (if it did), 
the true nature of (that) Brahman would be full}" made out 
by means of only one word, and the use of the other words 
would, in consequence, be meaningless. Moreover, under 
such a circumstance, there will not be any grammatical 
equation between these words, for the (mere) reason that 
those words, all of which denote only one thing, cannot 
have a variety of significations. Furthermore, a variety 
of qualified conditions results to one and the same thing 
from a variety of qualifying attributes, and consequently 
the words (in a grammatical equation) acquire a variety of 
meanings; and this is not incompatible with their being 
grammatically ,equated, because an equation between 
words is, indeed, intended to establish that one and the 
same thing is characterised by more than one attribute. 
In fact, grammarians 7 3 declare that a grammatical equation 
(between words) means that words having a variety of 
significations are used so as to import only one thing. 

It has been further urged by the Pi'irvapakshins to 
the following effect : In the passage, " One only without 
a second" [Qhhand. Up. VI. 2. i.], the word advitlya 
(which means without a second) does not admit of (the 
Brahman) being associated with a second thing even in 
the form of a quality. Hence, according to the rule 70 which 
enforces faith in all the recensions of the Vcdas, it has to 

75. Vide Kaiyyata's commentary on yyata under Fdnini r. 2. 42., runs as 

Patanjali's Maha-Bhashya, \riddhy- follows : Bhinnapraivittinimittayuk- 

dlinika and also the portion relating tasya anekasya labdasya ekasmin urthe 

to Panini I. 2. 42. The definition of a irittis sdmdnadhikaranyam. 

grammatical equation as given by Kai- 76. Vide supra p. 40. & n. 32. 



Adhik. I. Silt. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 113 

be admitted that the passages which relate to (the Brah- 
man as) the cause of the world, are all intended to estab- 
lish that Thing which is without a second. The defini- 
tion of that Brahman, which is characterised as the cause 
of the world, and is without a second, is given here to this 
effect : "The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infini- 
ty." \Tailt. Up. II. i. i.]. Hence that Brahman, which 
it is intended to define, is certainly devoid of attributes. 
Otherwise, there would be the contradiction of all such 
statements as (declare the Brahman to be) ' without 
attributes', 'without taint ', [Ad/i. Up. 68.], and so on. 

To hold so is not appropriate, because the word 
advitlya is intended to establish the possession of won- 
derful powers by the Brahman, who is the material cause 
of the universe, by pointing out that there is no other who 
is the ruler thereof and is different from Himself. Similarly, 
the following among other passages, viz. " It thought, may I 
become manifold and be born; It created the element 
lejas." -\Q!ihand. Up. VI. 2. 3.], also makes known the pos- 
session of such wonderful powers (by the Brahman). If it be 
asked, how by the unqualified statement (that the Brah- 
man is) advitlya for without a second,) the negation merely 
of any other cause (than the Brahman) is made out, (it is 
said thus in reply) : The Brahman, who is desirous of creat- 
ing, is the material cause of the world, as declared in the 
passage " Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the 
beginning" [C/thand. Up. VI. 2. i.]. And in accordance 
with the very nature of the production of effects, some 
other cause (than the material one) is also then naturally 
thought of in the mind, and that, consequently, the word 
advitlya negatives only that (other cause). Indeed, if it 
be taken that all things (other than the essential Brahman) 
are negatived (by the use of that word aduitiyq), eternity 

1$ 



H4 SRi-BulSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

and other qualities which are accepted by you, and 
which you desire to establish (in regard to the Brahman], 
would also be thus negatived. In the present instance, 
the rule 7 7 which enforces faith in all the recensions of the 
Vedas produces results contrary to what you desire ; be- 
cause, omniscience and other qualities mentioned in all 
the recensions of the Vedas in relation to what forms 
the cause of the world, have, (in accordance with that rule) 
to be brought together here. Hence, it is understood, even 
from the nature of the passages relating to (the Brahman 
as) the cause of the world, that it is the qualified thing alone 
which is declared in the passage "The Brahman is 
Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." \_Taitt. Up. II. i. i.j. 
Moreover, there does not thus arise any contradiction of 
the passages which describe the Brahman as being free from 
attributes, because these passages such as, "(He is) without 

attributes without taint" [Adh. Up. 68.], "(He is) 

without parts, without actions, tranquilled" [Svet. Up. 
VI. 19.], and others, deal with qualities which appertain to 
prakriti (i. c. nature), and which (therefore) deserve to be 
rejected (in any description of the Brahman). 

Those scriptural texts also, which maintain that the 
essential nature of the Brahman is pure unqualified intelli- 
gence, declare that that Brahman has, fat the same time), 
the essential nature of intelligence. By this much (it is not 
meant) that pure unqualified intelligence which is devoid 
of attributes is alone the reality ; because he who is the 
knower can alone possess the essential nature of intelligence. 
Indeed, it has been already stated that it is proper for him 
alone who is of the essential nature of intelligence, to 
be the seat of intelligence ; analogously to the case of 

77. Vide supra p. 40. n. 32. 



Adhik. 1. Silt. /.] SRi-BHlSHYA. 115 

gems, of the sun, of lampflames, &c., (which, being them- 
selves of the nature of the luminous element tejas, are also 
the seat of luminosity). Indeed, all the scriptural texts 
declare (in relation to the Brahmaii) that He is undoubted- 
ly the knower. 

The following and other scriptural passages declare that 
auspicious qualities, like the quality of being the knower, 
are natural to the Brahman who is Himself of the essential 
nature of intelligence, and also that (the Brahman), is (at 
the same time), destitute of all such qualities as deserve 
to be rejected : " He who understands all and who knows 
all "[Mund. Up. I. i. 9.]; " It thought" \Qihand. U'p. 
VI. 2. 3.]; "This same deity thought" [Qihdnd. Up. 
VI 3. 2.]; " He thought may I create the worlds " [Ail. 
Up. I. i.]; "The Eternal among the eternals, the Intelligent 
among the intelligent, who, though One, fulfils the desires 
of the many" \Kath. Up.V.-i^. & Svel. Up. VI. 13.]; 
" The two unborn, the intelligent and the non-intelligent, 
(are) the Lord and the non-lord" [Svct. Up. I. 9.]; "May 
we know that highest adorable God who is the ruler of 
the worlds, who is the greatest Lord being the highest 
of Lords, who is the highest Deity among deities, 
and who is the highest Protector among protectors. 
He has neither the body nor the senses and organs, 
and there is seen neither His equal nor His superior. 
His supreme power is revealed, indeed, as varied, natural, 
and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action."- 
\_Svet. Up. VI. 7 & 8.] ; " This Self is devoid of sin, is free 
from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from 
hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the 
truth." [Qthand. Up. VIII. i. 5. VIII. 7. i 3.]. In 
the portion beginning with ' devoid of sin ' and ending 
with 'free from thirst/ this (last) passage negatives (in 



ill 



SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 



relation to the Brahman) all evil qualities ; and then it 
mentions the auspicious qualities of the Brahman by 
means of the expressions " desires the truth," and " wills 
the truth"; and in itself it (thus) discriminates between 
the meaning of the passages which deal with the Brahman 
as unqualified and that of passages which deal with the 
Brahman as qualified. Therefore there is no contradiction 
between the passages which speak of the Brahman as qua- 
lified and again as unqualified, and it can not hence be 
suspected in the least that either (of those two sets of 
passages) depends upon and relates to unreality. 

This scriptural passage (from the Taiitiriya-Upanishad , 
viz. II. 8 & 9. Annvakas) 78 begins by describing the auspi- 



78. The Atiuvakas here referred to run 
as follows : '' 'Through fear of Him 
the wind blows ; through that fear 
the sun rises ; through fear of Him 
fire and Indra (perform their duties), 
and Death runs as the fifth.' Now, 
what follows is an enquiry into (the 
nature of) bliss : Let there be a. 
young man, noble and well versed in 
the Vet/as, very quick and active, firm 
and strong, and let the whole of this 
earth full of wealth belong to him, that 
is the unit of human bliss, and like- 
wise of the sage who has a sure foot- 
ing in the fWr/s, (and has the know- 
ledge of the Brahman), and is free 
from desires. One hundred times 
that human bliss is the unit of the 
bliss of 'human' Gandharvas, and like- 
wise of the sage who has a sure foot- 
ing in the Vedas and is free from de- 
sires. One hundred limes that bliss 
of 'human' Gandharvas is the unit of 
the bliss of 'divine' Gandharvab and 



likewise of the sage who has a sure 
footing in the Vedas and is free from 
desires. One hundred times that 
bliss of 'divine' Gandharvas is the 
unit of the bliss of the Fitris who 
have acquired long-enduring worlds, 
and (it is) likewise (the unit) of the 
sage who has a sure footing in the 
Vedas and is free from desires. One 
hundred times that bliss of the Pitris 
who have acquired long-enduring 
worlds is the unit of the bliss of the 
Devas born in the world known as 
"Ajana, and (it is) likewise (the unit 
of the bliss) of the sage who has a 
sure footing in the Vedas and is free 
from desires. One hundred times 
that bliss of the Devas born in the 
world known as Ajiina is the unit of 
the bliss of the gods known as 
Karma-devas who have become gods 
(Devas) through (the performance of 
sacrificial) acts, and (it is) likewise 
(the unit) of the sage who has a sure 



Adhik. I. Sul. i.] SRi-BnlsHYA. 



117 



cious qualities of the Brahwan,s'dymg "Through fear of Him, 
the wind blows"; then it speaks of the unsurpassable bliss of 
the kshetrajna (or the soul), in a regular order of increasing 
succession, saying "That which is a hundred times, &c."; 
and then it declares with very great regard the infinitude 
of the auspicious qualities of the Brahman, saying "Who- 
ever knows the bliss of that Brahman, without being able 
to attain whom speech returns with the mind, &c." 

The passage which makes known the result of the 
worship of the Brahman, viz. Sosnutc sarvdn kdmdn saha 
Brahmand vipaschitd \_Taitt. Up. II. "i. i.], speaks also 
of the infinitude of the qualities possessed by the Highest 
Brahman who is intelligent. (The prose order of this sentence 
runs thus) Vipaschitd Brahmand saha sarvdn kdmdn 
samasnutc. The word kdma is derived from the root ka m to 



footing in the Vedas and is free from 
desires. One hundred times that 
bliss of the gods known as Karma- 
deras is the unit of the bliss of the 
(original) Devas (to whom alone sacri- 
fices are offered) and (it is) likewise 
(the unit) of the sage who has a sure 
fooling in the Vedas and is free from 
desires. One hundred times that 
bliss of the (original) Devas is the 
unit of the bliss of Indra, and like- 
wise of the sage who has a sure 
footing in the Vedas and is free from 
desires. One hundred times that 
bliss of Indra is the unit of the bliss 
of Brihaspati and likewise of the sage 
who has a sure footing in the Vedas 
and is free from desires. One hund- 
red times that bliss of Brihaspati is 
the unit of the bliss of Prajapati and 
likewise of the sage who has u suic 



footing in the Vedas and is free from 
desires. One hundred times that 
bliss of Prajapati is the unit of the 
bliss of the Brahman, and likewise 
of the sage who has a sure footing in 
the Vedas and is free from desires. He 
who is in i\\z punis/ia and He who is 
also in the sun, (both) are one and the 
same Being. He who knows this, after 
departing from this world, reaches the 
Self which consists of 'food,' reaches 
the Self which consists of vitality, 
reaches the Self which consists of 
mind, reaches the Self which con- 
sists of understanding, and reaches 
(finally) the Self which consists of 
bliss. Accordingly, the following sloka 
is given : ' Whoever knows the bliss 
of the Brahman, without being able 
to attain whom, speech returns with 
the mijid, he need notfcur anything."' 



iiS SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. L 

covet and means that which is covetable, /. c. auspicious 
qualities. The meaning (of the passage accordingly) is that 
he (the successful worshipper) attains along with the (intelli- 
gent) Brahman all those (auspicious) qualities. The word 
' with ' 7 9 (is used) to bring out prominently the (possession 
of) qualities (by the Brahman], as it is brought out in con- 
nection with the Dahara-vidyd 8 y viz. "What exists within 
that (small space inside the heart), that has to be sought 
after." [Qi/iand. LTp. -VIII. i. i.]. That, between wor- 
ship and its result, there is a similarity of nature, is proved 
conclusively by the scriptural passage which says. " Of 
whatever nature a man's worship is in this world, of that 
same nature that man becomes after death." \_Ctih and. 
Up. III. 14. i.]. 

If it be said that by means of the passage " He who 
is of opinion (that the Brahman] is unknown, to him (the 

Brahman] is known to those who know well, (He) 

is unknown " [Ken. Up. II. 3.], the Brahman is declared 
to form no object of knowledge, it is replied that in such 
a case there ought not to be any teaching to the effect that 
final release results from knowledge, as (it is found declared) 
in the following passages : " He who knows the Brahman 
attains the Highest"- [Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1.], "He who knows 
the Brahman becomes the Brahman indeed " \JMund. Up. 
III. 2. 9.]. The scriptural passage " Whoever knows the 
Brahman as non-existent, he becomes non-existent indeed. 

79. Vide Pdnini. II. 3. 19. meditated upon is declared in the con- 
So. Dahara-vidyd is that vidyd or text to be the ' Self who is devoid of 
form of worshipping the Supreme sin, is free from old age, free from 
Brahman, which consists in medi- death, free from sorrow, free from 
tating on Him as dwelling in the hunger, free from thirst, and desires 
small etherial space within the heart. the truth and wills the truth.' Vide 
In connection with this rii/ya or form also M. Ndr. X. 7. & XI. 7. 
of worship, the Brahman who Jus to be 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 119 

Whoever knows the Brahman as existent, him, therefore, 
they know as existing" -[Taitt. Up. II. 6. i.] speaks of 
the destruction of the self and the continuance of the self as 
resulting (respectively) from the non-existence and the exist- 
ence of that knowledge the object of which is the Brahman. 
Therefore all the scriptural texts enjoin only that knowledge 
which relates to the Brahman, for the purpose of attain- 
ing final release. And the knowledge (so enjoined) is of 
the nature of worship, and it has been already stated that 
the object of such worship is the Brahman who is possessed 
of attributes. In the passage " Without being able to at- 
tain Him, speech returns with the mind " [Taitt. Up. II. 
9. i.] it is declared that the Brahman is infinite, is 
possessed of innumerable attributes, and is incapable of 
being measured by speech and mind as possessing any defi- 
nite magnitude ; and then it is said of those, who suppose 
that they have any definite knowledge of the Brahman to 
the effect that the Brahman is of such and such magni- 
tude, that they do not know the Brahman well and have 
no correct opinion (of the Brahman], because the Brahman 
is immeasurable. Otherwise, in the passage " He who 
is of opinion that (the Brahman) is unknown to him (the 

Brahman) is known to those who know well, (He) is 

unknown." [Ken. Up. II. 3.], the statement about (the 
Brahman) being rightly made out and (the Brahman} be- 
ing well known would meet with contradiction in that very 
same context. 

It has been stated 8 ' by the Pfirvapakshins that the 
scriptural passage "(Thou shalt) not ^see) the seer of the 
sight, nor (think) the thinker of the thought." [Brih. Up. 
III. 4. 2.], negatives the seer and the knower as distinct 

8l. Vide supra p. 28, 



120 SRl-BHiSHYA. [Chap. I. Part, I. 

from sight and knowledge. This (objection) is invalidated by 
understanding that what the passage teaches is as follows :- 
"Understand that it is only fallacious reasoning which arrives 
at the conclusion that the knower has the essential nature 
of ignorance, on the ground that his quality of sentiency 
is of an accidental character ; and then, do not look upon, 
and do not think of, the self as such (in reality), but look 
upon the self, who is the seer and the knower, as being 
also surely of the nature of sight and knowledge." Or the 
meaning of the passage is this : " Set aside the individual 
self who is the seer of sight and the knower of knowledge 
and then worship the Highest Self alone who is the Soul 
within all beings." Otherwise, there will be the contradic- 
tion of the following and other scriptural passages (relating 
to the Brahman) as the knower : " My dear one, by what 
means has one to know the knower?" [Brih. Up. II. 
4. 14.]. 

What has been urged 8 2 -by the PftrvapakshinstQ the 
effect that from the passage "The Brahman is bliss." 
[Taill. Up. III. 6. i.], the essential nature of the Brahman 
is (made out to be) pure bliss, that is met by saying 
that this passage declares the essential nature of the 
Brahman, who is the seat of knowledge, to be knowledge 
(itself). Indeed, that conscious state which is agreeable 
is said to be bliss. The meaning of the scriptural passage 
"The Brahman is intelligence, bliss "- [Brih. Up. III. 9. 
28.], is that that state of consciousness which is of the nature 
of bliss is alone the Brahman. Hence, also, results that 
uniform homogeneity of nature (in relation to the Brahman) 
which is advocated by you. It has been already stated 
that, in regard to this Brahman, the true nature of which 

83. Vide supra p. 28, 



AdJuk. 1. Sui. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 121 

is intelligence itself, the quality of being the knower also 
is undoubtedly established by hundreds of scriptural texts. 
In the same manner, by means of these distinct state- 
ments also "That is the unit of the bliss of the Brahman" - 
[Taitt. Up. II. 8. 13.], and" Whoever knows the bliss of the 
Brahman, e.," [Taitt. Up. II. 9. i.], (it is established 
that) the Brahman is not mere bliss, but is the blissful 
One. To be the Knower is/indeed, to be the blissful One. 
Again, it has been affirmed 83 that the negation of dis- 
tinctions (in regard to the Brahman] is asserted in various 
ways in the following passages : " But where there is 
duality, as it were,"- [Brih. Up. II. 4. 14. t S: IV. 5. 15.] ; 
" There is nothing here that is many and varied. He 
who sees this world, as though it were manifold, obtains 
death from death." -[Brih. Up, IV. 4. 19. & Kath. 
Up. IV. 10.] ; " But where to one all this becomes 
the Self, there who shall see whom by what ?" 
[Brih. Up. II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.]. This (objection) is 
invalidated when it is made out that the whole universe, 
which is the effect of the Brahman and has that (Brahman) 
for its internal ruler, is one with (the Brahman Himself) 
in as much as it has that (Brahman] for its Self, and that 
the manifoldness contrary to that (oneness) is what is 
negatived in those (passages) ; but that other manifoldness 
of the Brahman which is grounded upon His volition 
to be born as many, in accordance with the scriptural 
passage " May I become manifold and be born" [Tail I. 
L"p. II. 6. i. & Qihdnd. Up. VI. 2. 3.], and which (mani- 
foldness) is (again) well established by the scripture, that 
is not negatived. If it be said that, by reason of the 
negation of manifoldness, all this (scriptural authority) 

83. Vide supra p. 28. 



122 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. /. Part. I. 

relates to things which are unreal; then it is replied that it 
is not so ; because, after predicating in relation to the 
Brahman such manifoldness as cannot be made out by per- 
ception and all the other means of proof, and as is difficult of 
realisation, to say that that same thing (viz. manifoldness) 
is negatived (in relation to the Brahman)- -this is indeed 
matter for laughter. 

It has been stated 8 4 that in accordance with the passage 
" For, whenever he perceives in Him even the smallest 
distinction, then there is fear for him " [Taitl. Up. II. 7. 
i.], fear comes to him who sees manifoldness in the Brah- 
man. This is wrong ; because the .continued meditation 
of the manifoldness of that (Brahman) is taught to be the 
means of tranquillity in the following passage: "Let a man 
meditate, having been tranquilled by the knowledge- -'All 
this indeed is the Brahman; all this is born in It, is absorbed 
into It, and lives in It.'" [Qihdnd. Up. III. 14. i.]. Accord- 
ingly, here (in this passage), tranquillity is taught to result 
from the continued meditation of the fact that it (viz. the 
world) has that (Brahman} for its Self, in as much as the 
work of creation, preservation, and destruction proceed from 
Him in regard to the whole world. Therefore, the conti- 
nued meditation of the fact that the world which is full of 
differentiations owing to the varieties of gods, animals, 
men, immoveable objects, and other things that are (all) 
really existent (therein), has the Brahman for its Self, 
forms the cause of tranquillity ; and is hence the cause of 
the attainment of fearlessness ; and so there can be no room 
to suppose that it (viz. such meditation) forms the cause 
of any fear. If so, it may be asked, why it is declared - 
" Then there is fear for him." [Taitt. Up. II. 7. i.]. To this 

84. Vide supra p. 28. 



Adhik. I. Sut. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 123 

it is replied thus : When that support in the Brahman 
which, in the passage " For, indeed, when he obtains 
fearless support in that which is invisible, incorporeal, 
indefinable, homeless, then he obtains fearlessness."- 
\_Taitt. L7p.ll. 7. i.], is declared to be the cause of fearless- 
ness, is interrupted, then there results fear. To the same 
effect it is declared by the great sages in the following 
and other passages : " If Vusudeva is not meditated upon 
(at least) for the short interval of a mnhilrta 83 or even 
lor a mere moment, that is loss, that is great weakness, 
that is illusion, and that is unnatural activity." 80 The (word) 
anlara (which is in the first passage quoted above) means 
breach of continuity in the meditation that has its support 
in the Brahman, and is indeed its interruption. 8 " 

It has been urged 8S that, in the aphorism begin- 
ning with- "Not even on account of the peculiarity of 
situation " [ Ved. Silt. III. 2. 1 1.], he (the Stlirakdra) men- 

85. A Mii/iiirla is one-thirtielli p;irt S;. 'I he passage from the 7'aiftirf- 
of a day i.e. a period of 48 minutes, \a-L~panishad [II. 7- !], which, ac- 
a day being equal to 24 hours. It is cording to the Adivaitins, negatives 
however used to denote any short manifoldness in relation to the lirah- 
space of time. man is interpreted by them thus : 

86. This passage, in all probability, " For whenever he perceives in Him 
occurs in more than one Vais/ntava even the smallest distinction, then, in- 
Pnraiia, and is to be found in the deed, there is fear for him." Here 
following form in the Garuda-Purd- the word anlara is understood to mean 
na : Sd hcinih tat mahat chhidramsa distinction. But Ramanuja takes 
cjia andhajadamiikata \ yat mu/uli-lain ihis same word to mean brtach of 
kshaiiam vdapi '\dsudevah na cjtint- continuity or interruption, and inter- 
yate\ [CCXXX1V. 23.]. "If Vasude- prets the passage thus : " For when- 
va is not meditated upon (at least) ever he causes the smallest intermp- 
for the short interval of a inuhurtti lion in the meditation that i.> based 
or even for a. mere moment, that is on Him, then indeed there is fear 
loss, that is great weakness, and that for him." 

is blindness, dullness and dumbness." 88. Vide supra p. 28. 



124 SRi-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. I. 

tions the Brahman to be devoid of all attributes. This is 
not so ; because there lie speaks of the Brahman as being 
undoubtedly possessed of attributes. And it has been said 
that in the aphorism beginning with " But it is a mere 
illusion "- [ I f ed. Sut, III. 2. 3.], the objects experienced in 
dreams also are declared to be mere illusions, because they 
are different from the things which are experienced in 
the wakeful state. But therein, he (the Sulrakard} says 
that they also, like the objects experienced in the wakeful 
state, possess the characteristics of reality. 

What has been asserted 89 to the effect that, in the 
Smrilis and \\\ePurdnas also, pure intelligence alone, which 
is devoid of attributes, is taught to be real while all else- 
is unreal, that (again) is incorrect. 

" Whoever knows Me as the unborn, as the begin- 
ningless, as the great Lord of the world "- -[Z?. G. X. 3.]. 
"All beings abide in Me and I do not abide in them. 
And the beings do not also abide in Me. See my 
sovereign glory and power. The protector of all beings, 
I do not abide in beings. My will is the producing 
cause of all beings." [B. G. IX. 4 & 5.]- "I am 
the source as well as the destruction of the whole world. 
O Dhananjaya ; there is nothing else higher than Me. All 
this (creation) is strung on Me like a number of gems 
on a thread." [B. G. VII. 6 7.]. "I stand support- 
ing the whole world by a small part (of my power)." 
[B. G. X. 42.]. "The Highest Person is another ; and He 
is called the Highest Self who, having entered the three 
worlds as the Imperishable Lord, supports (them). Be- 
cause I transcend the destructible and am also superior to 
the indestructible, therefore am I celebrated in the world 

89. Vide sn/ira pp. 29 \ 30, 



Adhik. I. Silt, i.} SRI-BHA.SHYA. 125 

and in the Vcdas as the Highest Person." [/?. G. XV. 17. 
cS: 1 8.]. "O sage! He (\r/.. the Lord) transcends the 
/m/T/// 9 (which forms the natural and material founda- 
tion) of all beings, (transcends) all its modifications, 91 all 
the blemishes (arising out) of its qualities. 92 He, who is 
the Self of all, has passed beyond all veils, 93 and by Him is 
pervaded all that is within the inside of the universe. He 
is of that nature which is characterised by all the auspicious 
qualities ; He has, by a small part of His own powers, 
held up the whole creation ; He assumes at His will any 
desirable and worthy form, and He htfs accomplished the 
good of the whole world. He is the one collection of 
splendour, strength, sovereignty, great powers of know- 
ledge, excellent heroism, and other such qualities. He is 
high among the highest, and in Him, who is the Lord of the 
higher and the lower, are never found the afflictions and all 
other such undesirable things. He is the Lord in the 
individual form and also in the form of the totality ; 
He has an unmanifest nature and also a manifest nature. 
He is the Lord of all, the Seer of all, the Knower of all. 
He possesses all powers, and is known as the highest 
Lord. That, by means of which that Brahman who is 
devoid of all evil, pure, high, devoid of all blemishes 
and is of one form, is either seen or attained that 

90. This is the Arvatla which i.s that organs of activity, the mind, the 

state of primordial nature that ini- gross elements and the subtle ele- 

niediately precedes the evolution of mcnts. 

the various constituent elements of 92. These are: fi) Sa/fra, the quu- 

the universe. lity of goodness ; (2) Rajas, the qua- 

(jl These 'modifications' arc the con- lily of passion ; (3) Tantas, the quali- 

stituent principles of the universe such ty of darkness. 

as the Mahal or the 'great principle', 93. These 'veils' arc: flj Karma or 

the A/iaiik,fi-ii or the principle of ignorance, (2) \'il>an t i or 'innate 

cgoity, the organs of perception, the impressions.' &c. 



126 SRI-BHASHYA. {Chap. I. Part. 1. 

is called knowledge and all else (is called) ignorance." 
[V. P. VI. 5. 82 to 87.]. "O Maitreya! The word 
Bhagavat (Divine Lord,) is used to denote the High- 
est Brahman who is pure and is well known as the pos- 
sessor of great sovereignty, and is the cause of all caus- 
es. The syllable bha is associated with two meanings, 
vix. that He makes all materials ready (Tor creation), and 
that He is the upholder. Similarly, the meaning of the 
syllable ga, O sage, is, that He is the leader (/. c. the pre- 
server), the destroyer, and the creator. Bhaga (which is 
made up of these two syllables) is an affirmation (in rela- 
tion to Him) of the (following) , six (qualities) in their en- 
tirety, namely, sovereignty, heroism, renown, glory, know- 
ledge and dispassion. The meaning of the syllable va is to 
the effect that all beings abide in Him, who is the Self of 
all beings and is also the Self of all, and that He (abides ) 
in all beings and is therefore imperishable. Knowledge, 
power, strength, sovereignty, heroism, splendour all these 
are fully expressed by the word Bhagavat only evil (un- 
desirable) qualities and other such things are not. Such, O 
Maitreya, is this important word Bhagavat. (It is applied) 
to Vasudeva who is the Highest Brahman, and is not appli- 
.cable to others. Here, this word, denotes, by convention, 
a thing deserving of worship, and is not used in its secondary 
sense ; elsewhere, indeed, it is used in its secondary 
sense." [F. P. VI. 5. 72 to 77.]. "Wherever, O king, 
all these powers 94 are [established, there i-< another great 
Form of the Lord, which is different from His Universal 
Form, He, out of His own playfulness, causes that (Form 

(34. These are the three path's or power of the individual self, and 

powers, viz. the Vishnu-'sakti which is the third power is that which is deno- 

the power of Vishnu and is the high- ted by the word avidya. or karma. 

ct>t, the fCs/ulrajfla-iakti or the Vide V. /'. VI. f. Oi to 70. 



Adhik. 1.' Sul. /.] SRi-BniSHYA. 127 

of His) which is endowed with all power*, to become act- 
ively manifest under the names of gods, animals, and men. 
That (activity) is (intended) for the good of the worlds and 
is not produced by means of karma (/. c. the effect of works 
operating upon Him). The activity of that unknowable 
(Brahman) is all-pervading and is of an irresistible nature." 
[K P. VI. 7. 70 to 72.]. "The highest abode called 
Vishnu is, in this manner, stainless, eternal, all-pervading, 
imdecaying and free from all evil." [F. P. I. 22. 53.]. 
"The Supreme Self is high among those that are high and is 
the highest ; and is firmly established in the self (of all be- 
ings) and is devoid of the defining attributes of form, co- 
lour, &c. He is free from waste, destruction, modification, 
growth, and birth and is capable of being spoken of abso- 
lutely as that which always is. Because He abides every- 
where and all things abide in Him, therefore He is called 
Vasudeva by the learned. That Brahman is the highest, is 
eternal, unborn, indestructible, imperishable and is always 
of one nature, and is pure through the absence of evil. That 
alone is all this and is possessed of a manifest and an un- 
manifest nature. Moreover, It exists in the form of Purii- 
sha (or Person) as well as in the form of Time." [ V. P. I. 
2. 10 to' 14.]. "The praknli (/. <>. nature) which has been 
spoken of by me as possessing a manifest and an unman ifest 
nature, and the pnnisha (/. e. the self), are, both of them, 
absorbed into the Highest Self. And the Highest Self is 
the support of all, and is the Highest Lord. He is celebra- 
ted under the name of Vishnu in the Vcdas and in the 
Vedanta." \_V.P. VI. 4.39 C S: 40.]. "That Brahman 
has two forms, viz. the embodied and the unembodied. These 
two possess (respectively^ a destructible and an indestruct- 
ible nature, and are found to exist in all beings. The inde- 
structible is that Highest Brahman, the destructible is the 



128- SRi-BnlSHYA. \Chap. I. Part. 7. 

whole of this world. The whole of this world is the mani- 
festation of the power of the Supreme Brahman, in that 
same way in which spreading light is (the manifestation) of 
the fire located in a particular spot." [_V. P. I. 22. 
55 t 57-] " The, power of Vishnu is called the higher, 
that known as the kshelrajna** (/. c. the individual self), is, 
similarly, the lower (power). Another named avidva (igno- 
rance) and karma is-said to be the third power, by which, 
O king, the all-pervading power known as the kshetrajila 
is completely enveloped. The : power known as the kshetra- 
jila acquires, on account of its being covered by that (avidyd 
or karma), all the ever-recurring miseries belonging to the 
circuit of mundane existence, and exists in all beings in dif- 
ferent degrees, O thou, protector of the earth." [ V. P. VI. 7. 
6 1 to 63.]. "O thou, the most intelligent one, the mutually 
interrelated prakriti and purusha (/. c. nature and soul) are 
encompassed by the power of Vishnu which pervades all 
beings as their Self. That same power (of Vishnu) is the 

cause of their separation and interrelation Just 

as, from a mass of -water, the wind bears away hun- 
dreds of minute drops without itself being moistened (by 
them), so also is that same power of Vishnu (related) to 
all that is of the nature si prakriti and puntsha" [T. P. II. 
7. 29 to 3 1.]. "O thou, the best of sages, all this world 
above-mentioned is undecaying, eternal and is subject to the 
alternations of expansion and contraction, birth and de- 
struction." [F. P. I. 22. 60.]. 

By means of these and other such passages, the Highest 
Brahman is (first of all) declared to be, by nature, free from 

95. The individual self goes under hhetra i. e. of the material body, with 
the name of kshetnijfia, because, in . which u is associated. 
;hat condition, it is the knower of vhe 



Adhik. I. Sftt. /.] SRI-BH.ISHYA. 129 

even the smallest taint of all that is evil, and to possess that 
nature which is characterised by all the auspicious qualities, 
and to be engaged, out of free sportiveness, in the creation, 
preservation, destruction, inter-penetration, control, &c., of 
the world ; and then all the intelligent and non-intelligent 
existences (in the universe), which exist in all conditions 
and are undoubtedly real, are stated to be of the same form 
as the Brahman owing to their constituting His body, 
because the words sarlra] (embodiment), rftpa (form), tanu 
(bod}'), am'sa (part), sakti (power), vibhuti (glory), and 
the like, are used (in the above passages), and because also 
they are equated with 'That' (viz. the Brahman} ; and 
then the intelligent thing (viz. the self), which forms the 
glory of that (Brahman}, is said to exist (freely) in its own 
essential nature, and also (to exist) in the form of the 
kshctrajiia owing to its association with non-intelligent 
matter ; and, (lastly), it is laid down that in the condition 
of the kshctrajfia it (viz. the self) is veiled by the avidyd 
(or ignorance) which is of the nature of meritorious and 
sinful actions, and that it has, in consequence, no unbroken 
remembrance of its own natural condition as intelligence, 
but continuously thinks (of itself) as existing in the form 
of things which possess a non-intelligent nature. Therefore, 
it is made out that the Brahman is possessed of attributes, 
and that the world which is the manifestation of His glory 
is undoubtedly real also. 

In the passage -~" That in which differences have 
vanished" [F./*. VI. /.~53.]> oc it is declared that the true 

96. Yida supra p. 29, where the trans- nished, which is pure existence, which 

lation of this passage, in accordance is beyond the sphere of speech, which 

with the interpretation of the Adwai- is self-knowing That is the Intelli- 

tins, is given in full as follows : gence. called Brahman by name." 
" That in which differences have va- 



130 SRl-Bn.vSHYA. [Chap. L Par/. I. 

nature of the self, even when it is united with particular 
modifications of the prakriti, such as gods, men, &c., is 
inexpressible by words like god, c., which denote distinc- 
tions in relation to it, because it is devoid of intrinsic 'dis- 
tinctions ; and that it is to be defined as wholly consisting 
of intelligence and existence ; and that it is self-knowing, 
and is invisible (even) to the mind of one who has gone 
through the practice of yoga (/. r. mental concentration 
and meditation). Therefore, from this (passage) the negation 
of the world does not follow. If it be asked, how this is 
arrived at, we reply that it is thus: In the context 97 
(wherein this passage occurs), yoga is stated to be the only 
remedy to bring about the cessation of the circuit of 
mundane existence; then the constituent parts of the yoga 
are mentioned up to pratyahara ; 08 and then with the 
intention of pointing out a good and worthy object for 
the purpose of accomplishing dharana** (or concentration), 
the two forms of the Highest Brahman i. c, Vishnu, which 
are denoted by the word power sakti are declared to 
consist of the divisions of the embodied and the unembodied. 
Then again the division called the embodied, that is the 
kshetrajfta, which is associated with non-intelligent matter 
and is encircled by that ignorance (or avidyd) which is known 
as karma and forms the third power (of Vishnu), is affirmed 
to be bad and unworthy (for purposes of meditation) on ac- 
count of its being connected with the three 1 (undesirable) 
conceptions : afterwards, the character of being a good and 

97. Vide V. P. VI. 7. 100. These conceptions are: (i)thc 

98. Pratyahara means the withdraw- conception that we become the Brah- 
nl of the senses from external objects. man Himself; (2) the conception that 

99. DharanT, means steady concen- we merely do the work ; (3) the con- 
tration of the mind on a particular ception that we become the Brahman 
object. and do the work. 



Adhik. I. Stil. i.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 131 

worthy object (to help concentration) is denied (also) in re- 
lation to the second division called the unembodied, which is 
devoid of ignorance, is separate from non-intelligent matter, 
and is altogether of the form of intelligence, on account of 
its being an object worthy to be meditated upon only by 
accomplished yogiiis, and on account of its being incapable 
oi proving a support to the mind of a beginner in yoga, and 
also on account of its being devoid of uncaused intrinsic 
purity: (lastly), the embodied (universal) form (of the Brah- 
mati) which is the seat of His three powers, viz. the higher 
power which is this (above mentioned) unembodied (form 
of the self), the (other) lower power which is the (self's) 
embodied form called the kshctrajfta, and ignorance (or 
avidya) which is of the nature of karma and is known as 
the third power and which forms the cause of leading the 
self, which is of the nature of the higher power, to assume 
the condition of the kshetrajfia (this embodied form of the 
Brahman] which is peculiar to the Divine Lord, and is 
ascertained by means of Vcddnta passages like" He is of 
sunlike lustre." \Svct. Up. III. 8. & B. G. VIII. 9.] 10> 
(this) is declared to be the good and worthy object (for the 
accomplishment of dharana). In this context, the passage 
" That in which differences have vanished &c. " [ V. P. 
VI. 7. 53.], is intended to show that the self which has the 
pure unembodied nature is unfit to be a good and worthy 
object (for the accomplishment of dharana). According!}-, 
it has been stated (in the same work, viz. VisJmu-Purana): 
"O king! That (unembodied -form of the Lord) is not fit 
to be meditated upon by one who begins the practice of 
yoga" [V. P. VI. 7. 55]. "The highest home which is 
the second (unembodied form) of Him who is called Vishnu 

101. Vide also Taitt. 2r. III. 12. f. 



132 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

is fit to be meditated upon by yogins Wher- 
ever, O king, all the.se powers are established, there 
is another great Form of the Lord, which is different 
from His Universal Form". [V. P. VI. 7. 69 & 70.]. In 
the same manner, after stating that the (four-faced) 
Brahma, Sanandana, and others who are beings inside 
the universe, are unfit to be good and worthy objects, 
(to help concentration) owing to their being covered by 
means of ignorance (or avidya), the character of being 
(such a) good and worthy object is denied by the venerable 
Saunaka in- relation also to those bound souls in whom 
knowledge is originated only later on by means of yoga, 
and who have (thus) realised their true nature, for the 
reason that they are themselves devoid of uncaused intrinsic 
purity. It is stated (by Saunka) in the following and other 
passages that the natural and peculiar form of Vishnu, who 
is the Highest Brahman, can alone be (such a) good and 
worthy object (for the accomplishment oidharana} : "Be- 
cause all living things from Brahma to a clump of grass, that 
are within the world, are within the grasp of the ever chang- 
ing circuit of mundane existence caused by karma, there- 
fore, they are not helpful in meditation to those that 
meditate. Indeed, they are all in ignorance (or avidya} and 
are subject to the ever-recurring succession of births and 
deaths. Those also in whom knowledge of truth is born later 
on are not at all helpful in meditation. Their knowledge 
of truth is not natural to them, because it is derived from an- 
other source. Therefore that pure Brahman is, alone, by 
nature, full of (such) knowledge." [ V. DhS ~ CIV. 23 to 26] . 
Consequently in this passage (viz. V. P. VI. 7. 53. "That 

102. This Vishnu-Dharma forms a is said to have been taught by S.iuna- 
portion of the Bfiaris/iyat-Puranx and ka. 



Adhik. L Silt, i.] SRl-BHASHYA. 133 

in which differences have vanished ", &c.,) the negation of 
distinctions is not brought out. 

Also in the passage "(I bow to Him alone) who in real- 
ity is of the nature of intelligence," &c., \V. P. I. 2. 6.], 1 s 
unreality is not established in relation to the whole aggre- 
gate of those objects which are distinct from intelligence, be- 
cause therein only this much is stated, viz. that the false ap- 
prehension of the self, which is of the nature of intelligence, 
in the form of gods, men, and such other objects, is a mere 
illusion. Indeed, if it be said that the false apprehension oi 
the mother-of-pearl as silver is an illusion, it does not 
follow that all the collection of silver in the world becomes 
thereby unreal. There is the appearance of unity between 
the Brahman and the world due to the fact of their being 
grammatically equated (in the sdslras); and it may be 
urged that it is an illusion to apprehend, in consequence, 
the Brahman whose essential nature is Intelligence, in the 
form of things (other than Intelligence); and if it beheld 
that when it is so urged, the whole collection of things in 
the world would acquire the character of falsity, (it is de- 
clared in reply that) that (opinion) is wrong ; because, 
that Vishnu who is the Highest Brahman, who is devoid 
of even the smallest taint of all such evil things as igno- 
rance and the like, who is identified with all the auspicious 
qualities, and is the owner of great sovereignty, is taught 
in this saslra, and it is thus impossible to have any illusory 
vision in relation to Him. Moreover, it will be presently 
established, that the declaration of unity (between the 

103. This passage has been already gence and is absolutely pure (/. e. 

translated from the stand-point of devoid of all attributes), and who, 

the Adwattint and is to the following nevertheless, exists in consequence of 

effect : "(I bow) to Him alone who (our) illusive vision in the form of 

in reality u of the nature of Intclli- material objects.'' Vide supra, p. 29. 



134 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. /. Part. 1. 

Brahman and the world) resulting from the fact of 
their being equated, does not admit of .stultification and is 
not opposed to reason. Therefore this passage also [viz. 
V. P. I. 2. 6.] does not stultify the natural reality of 
external objects. 

Accordingly, from this scriptural passage, viz. " From 
whom all these beings are born, in whom, when born, 
they live, and whom they enter when they perish ; do thou 
desire to know that well; that is the Brahman" -[Taitt. 
Up. III. i. i.], it may be concluded that the cause of the 
origin, &c., of the world is the Brahman, ; but then we 
learn from the sdstraic commandment, "The Veda should 
be amplified and supported by the Itihasas and the Pura- 
nas, ' 4 because the Veda is afraid of him who has little 
learning that he would do it wrong." [M.Bh. I. i. 264.], 
that amplification and confirmation are necessarily to be 
effected with the help of the Itihasas and the Purdnas in 
relation to what is taught (here in the above scriptural 
passage). To amplify and support is indeed to elucidate 
the meanings of the Vedic passages which are known to 
oneself by means of the sayings of those who know all 
the Vedas and their meanings, and who have, by the 
great power of their yoga, directly perceived the things 
constituting the truth of the Vedas. Amplification and 
confirmation, indeed, have necessarily to be effected (in 
connection with the import of Vedic passages), because 
it is difficult to understand the meanings of all the passages 

104, An Itihasa like the Jidrrtayatta lion of form-possessing conscious 

or the Maha.bha.rata. is a. work pur- and unconscious bodies, genealogy of 

porting to deal with ancient history. the gods &c., periods of time known 

Purdiias are works which treat of the as the Ma.mjuantaras, and the history 

five topics, viz. primordial creation or of the dynasties of kings, 
evolution of matter, primordial crea- 



Adhik. I. Sni. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 135 

found in all the recensions of the . Vedas by knowing only 
a small part thereof, and it is in consequence impossible to 
attain certainty without that (amplification and confirma- 
tion). Here (/. c. in the context Wherein the passage "(I 
bow to Him alone) who in reality is of the nature of 
Intelligence " occurs), Maitreya.'desires to get his own 
knowledge of the teachings of the Vedas amplified and 
supported at the hands of the reverend Parasara, who 
was in possession of that knowledge of the reality of the 
Highest Divinity which he had obtained from Pulastya and 
Vasishtha as a boon bestowed upon him, and questioned 
(Parasara) thus : " Again I wish to hear from you, O 
thou, the knower of religion and duty, how this world 
came into existence, and what will become of it again. 
O thou, glorious one, what does the world consist of? 
O thou, reverend one, whence (came) all this moveable 
and immoveable creation ; how and where was it hidden, 
and into what will it be absorbed?" [F.P.I, i. 4 & 
;.]. By means of these and other passages, the particular 
nature of the Brahman, the characteristics of the different 
kinds of His glory, the nature of worshipping Him, the 
particular results (of such worship) are all here questioned 
about. In the question regarding the particular nature 
of the Brahman, the efficient and material causes ( of the 
world) are enquired about in the query " Whence 
(came) all this moveable and immoveable (creation) ?" ; 
(therefore), in the query "What does it consist of "--it is 
asked of what nature that world is which is the object of 
creation, preservation, and destruction ; and the reply to 
this is "And the world is that (Brahman)." [-F! P. I. i. 
31.]. This sameness (of the world with the Brahman) is 
due to the invariable association (of the world with the 
Brahman) on account of His constituting the Self (there- 



136 SkKBRvSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

of) as its internal ruler; but is not due to the oneness in 
substance between the subject and the predicate (in the 
proposition "And the world is that Brahman}" ; because 
the equation (between the world and the Brahman] in 
the passage " And the world is that (Brahman)" forms 
the reply to the question " What does it (/. a. the world) 
consist of ? " The affix may at in yanmavam (i. e. what 
does it consist of) 105 does not denote modification; other- 
wise, this separate question would (relate to what has al- 
ready been asked and thus) be purposeless. Xor is it used 
in the sense of importing that very thing itself which is 
denoted by the word to which it is affixed, as in the case 
of the word prdna-maya, ' c because the reply " And the 
world is that (Brahman)" -would be inappropriate (in such 
a case). Indeed, in such a case, the reply should have been 
"(And the world is) Vishnu Himself." 107 Hence that 
(affix mayaf) imports only the abundance (of that thing 
which is denoted by the word to which it is attached). 
(Here) the affix may at is (used) in accordance with the 
rule which says ",The affix may at is (to be employed) 
wherever an abundance of a thing has to be expressed." 

105. That part, of the sloka which answer " And the world is that 
contains the affix mavat is as follows : Brahman" posits two different enti- 
Yanmttyam hi jagat brahman ya- ties, and it would become an identity 
lah ch_i etat cfiaracjiaram. if the affix mayat were to have no 

1 06. Here i.e. in the word prana- significance. When it is possible to 
rnaya, the affix may at gives to that make the affix mayaf signiikant, that 
word the power of importing that interpretation in which it loses all sig- 
very thing which is denoted by the nificance, as it would do if the above 
word priini itself; cf. Pranamayam supposition were right, is. not held to 
atmanam itpasaiikramya. Taitt. Cp. be correct according to the accepted 
III. IO. 5. rules of interpretation in '\'e<ld ntic 

107. The equation between the Bra/i- literature. 
man and the world, contained in the 



Adhik. L Sftt. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. .137 

[Pdnini. V. 4. 21 J. Certainly, the whole world being the 
body of that (Brahman) is abundantly full of Him. There- 
fore it is settled that the equation in the . statement "And 
the world is that (Brahman}" made in reply to the question 
" What does it consist of ?" results from there being, bet- 
ween the world and the Brahman, the same relation as there 
is between the body and the soul. Otherwise, all these 
questions and answers would not be appropriate in the 
sdstra which is admitted to be devoted to the establish- 
ment of that thing which is devoid of all attributes ; 'and the 
sdstra which is intended to be an explanation of that thing 
would also be thus inappropriate. Indeed, in such a case, 
to the one question of the form " What is the ba'sis of the 
illusion of the world ?" there would be only one answer in 
this form, viz. "Pure intelligence that is devoid of all attri- 
butes." If the equation (contained in the statement "And 
the world is that Brahman'} denote the unit}' of substance 
between the world and the Brahman, then the fact of His 
being the sole seat of myriads of auspicious qualities such 
as the quality of willing the truth, &c., as well as the fact 
of His being the opposite of all that is evil, would be stulti- 
fied,and the Brahman would also become the seat of all evil. 
It will be established later on that the fact of (the Brah- 
man and the world) being equated denotes primarily 
the same relation (between them) as there is between the 
soul and the body. Hence, by means of the passages 
commencing with " (The Supreme Self) is high among those 
that are high and is the Highest", &c., \_V.P. I. 2. 10.], 
(Parasara) proceeds to explain in extenso the idea briefly 
conveyed in the stanza " The world came into existence 
from the will of Vishnu, and it is altogether existent there- 
in. He is the cause of the preservation and destruction of 
this world, and the world is Himself." [F. P. I. i. 31.] ; 
IS 



I3 8 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. L Part. I. 

and with that object in view, he first bows to the Divine 
Lord Vishnu,who is in His own natural form and is the High- 
est Brahman, by repeating the stanza commencing with 

"(I bow) to the Immutable " [V.P. I. 2. i.]; 108 and 

then again he bows to the same (Vishnu) who is existent in 
the form of the trinity made up of Brahma (the creator), 
of His own incarnation (as Vishnu), and of Siva, and (is also 
existent in the form of) prakriti (or nature), Time, kshe- 
Irajfta (or the individual self), the aggregate creation and 
the individual created beings. In that context, this stanza, 
which begins with- " (I bow to) Him (alone) who is in 
reality of the nature of intelligence," speaks of the nature 
of that Highest Self which is in the form of the individual 
entities known as kshetrajftas. Therefore, here (/. e. in 
this stanza), the thing which is destitute of attributes is 
not taught. 

If the sdstras relate to the establishment of that illu- 
sion which is based upon the Brahman, whose nature 
is (pure and simple) intelligence devoid of attributes, 
then the objection-" How is it posssible for the Brahman 
who is without qualities, who is unknowable, pure and 
devoid of evil by nature, to be the agent in the acts of 
creation, &c., 109 (of the world)?" [V. P. 1.3. i.] would 
be inappropriate here ; and similarly its invalidation as 
given in the following passage, would also be (inappropri- 
ate)" O thou, the best of ascetics, there are, in all things, 
powers which cannot be brought within the sphere of 
thinkable (or explicable) knowledge, and for that very same 

108. The whole of this stanza is as is the ' conqueror ' or, in other words, 
follows : "(I bow) to the Immutable the possessor of all." 
Vishnu who is eternally pure and 109. The et cetera here implies pre- 
forms the Highest Self, who has a servation and destruction in relation 
uniformly homogeneous nature and to the world. 



Adhik. I. &e. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 139 

reason, those acts of creation, &c., constitute the inherent 
(inexplicable) powers of the Brahman, as heat (constitutes 
the inherent power) of fire." [F. P. I. 3. 2 & 3]. Indeed, 
if that be the case (/. e. if the sdstra relate to the establish- 
ment of illusion as aforesaid), then the (above mentioned) 
objection (in regard to the sdstra declaring the thing that 
is devoid of attributes ), and its refutation would (severally) 
run thus : (i). How is it that the Brahman which is 
devoid of qualities becomes the agent in the acts of creation, 
&c ? (ii). The creation proceeding from the Brahman is not 
real, but is manufactured by illusion. But the objection 
really is to this effect " The work of creation, &c., is seen 
in association with those who possess the qualities of 
saliva, ' ] c., who are imperfect, and are bound by 
karma ; and so, how is it possible for Him who is devoid 
of the qualities of saliva, &c., who is perfect, who is not 
bound by karma, and who cannot have any association 
with karma, (how is it possible for such a Person) to be 
the agent in the acts of creation, &c ? And the answer to 
this objection also is really to this effect " The union of 
all powers in the Brahman, who is distinct from all perceiv- 
able things and is altogether of the aforesaid nature, is 
not incompatible with reason, in the .same way in which 
the association of the power of heat, &c., with fire, &c., 
which are distinct from water, &c., (is not incompatible 
with reason). 

, The statement 1 ' J " Thou alone art the only reality, 
&c.," [F. P. I. 4. 38.], does not also speak of the unreality 

1 10. These are : Satlva, goodness, has been already given as follows : 

ftajas, passion, and 7'awas, darkness. "O Lord of the universe ! Thou alone 

ill. This is half of the stanza, V. P. art the only reality and there is none 

I. 4. 38. And, its meaning according other." 
to the Adwtutifts (vide p. 2(). sii/-a'). 



140 SRI-J3HA.SHYA. [Chap. L Part.L 

of the whole (world), but (speaks only of) the unreality of 
that thing the existence of which is (held to bej independ- 
ent of That (viz. the Brahmaii), the reason being that the 
whole (world) has that (same Brahman} for its Soul. He (i.e. 
Parasara) declares again the same thing thus " That 
greatness by which all this moveable and immoveable 
(creation) is pervaded is Thine." [ V. P. I. 4. 38. ]. 112 
Because all this moveable and immoveable (creation) is 
pervaded by Thee, therefore, all this has Thee for its Soul; 
and so there is nothing other than Thee. Hence, as being 
the Self of all, Thou alone art the only reality. Hence 
(also) it has been stated that what constitutes Thy great- 
ness is Thy omnipenetrativeness. Otherwise it should 
have been stated that it (viz. Thy omnipenetrativeness) is an 
illusion; and the expressions 1 ] 3 <O, Lord of the Universe', 
' Thou/ c., would then have a figurative (or second- 
ary) significance; and there would be the contradiction 
of the context wherein the Divine Lord's great boar in- 
carnation is glorified as He is sportively lifting up the 
earth (from beneath the waters). 

The whole world is, as if by its Soul, pervaded 
by Thee who art of the nature of intelligence, and 
constitutes Thy body; therefore those, who do not pos- 
sess the means of perceiving (the world) as having 
Thee for its Soul, make out through illusory percep- 
tion that this (world) is altogether made up of gods, 
men, and other such things ; accordingly, he (/. e. 
Parasara,) says in this connection "This which appears, 



112. This is the second half of the thus in the Sanskrit original: Para- 

stanza V. P. I. 4. 38. m^rthah tvam eva ekah tta anva/i asti 

113. These expressions are contain- j iga'ah pate \ tava e>>liah niahimft yena 

ed in V. P. I. 4. 38., which runs rya/>!anl elat chardfhnram.\ 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRi-BnlSHYA. 141 

&c. [V.P. 1.4.39.]."* 

To perceive the world, which, in reality, has Thee for 
its Soul, as made up of gods, men, and other such things 
is, no doubt, an illusion in itself; but the perception which 
apprehends the individual souls, that have the nature of 
intelligence, as though the}" were made up of gods, men, 
and other such material configurations, is also an illusion; 
accordingly, he (/. c. Parasara) says in this connection 
"All this (world) is of the nature of intelligence, &c." 
[V.P. 1.4.40.] " 3 

Those who, on the other hand, are intelligent and 
understand the self, the nature of which is intelligence, and 
whose minds are well purified by the acquisition of what 
gives rise to the experience that the whole (universe) has the 
Divine Lord for its Soul, they perceive that all this world 
has the characteristics of the body, being (itself) made up of 
such particular modifications oiprakriti (or nature) as gods, 
men, &c., and then look upon it as constituting Thy body, 
and as having Thee, who art different from the body and hast 
the essential nature of intelligence, for its Soul : accord- 
ingly, he (i.e. Parasara) says in this connection " Those 
who know what is knowledge, &c." [ V. P.I. 4. 41.].' 16 

114. This stanza is understood by rant men look upon it as though it 
the Adivaitins as follows: " This were made up of material things, and 
which appears embodied belongs to are tossed to and fro in a flood of 
Thee who art of the nature of Intelli- illusions." Vide supra p. 29. 

gence ; and those who are not Yogins 116. This stanza as interpreted by 

(i.e. those who are ignorant) look \heAdwaitins has been already given 

upon it, on account of (their) illusive as follows : "Highest Lord! Those 

perception, as though it formed the who know what is knowledge, and 

world." Vide supra p. 29. whose minds are pure, look upon the 

115. This stanza is interpreted by whole world as being made up of 
the Adwailins thus: "All this world Intelligence and as consisting of Your- 
is of the nature of Intelligence. Igno- self." Vide supra p. 29. 



142 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

Otherwise, among the stanzas, there would be a redundant 
repetition ; the words (therein) would acquire a figurative 
(or secondary) significance ; there would be the contradic- 
tion of things (as made out by perception and the other 
means of knowledge), the contradiction of the context, and 
also the contradiction of the purport of this sdslraic 

work. 117 

In this stanza also, namely, "Although he is to be 
found in one's own body and in that of all others, (intelli- 
gence) which is one and simple, &c.," [ V.P. II. 14.31.],' ' 8 
what is meant is, that, while all the individual selves are 
similar in nature for the reason that they solely consist of 
intelligence, the perception of duality (or difference) in 
relation to individual selves, as though they (also), owing 
to their association with certain material masses, which are 
particular modifications- of the prakriti and are known 
as gods, men, &c., had the nature of gods, &c., (that 
perception of difference) is unreal. The duality (or difference) 
found to exist in relation to masses of matter, and (the 
duality or difference) found to exist in relation to indivi- 
dual souls are not in fact denied (here). The meaning is, 
that the thing called the self, which exists in (association 
with) the varied and wonderful masses of matter known 
as gods, men, &c., is all alike ; and to that same effect 
it has been declared by the Lord (Himself) in the following 
and other similar passages: "The learned look alike 

117. The sastra:c work here mention- Adwaitins are made to quote this 
ed is the Vishnu- Pur ana of Paras'ara stanza as follows :" Although He is 
from which the above stanzas [I. 4. to be found in one's own body and 
38 to 41.3 as well as others, are all in that of all others, Intelligence 
quoted, as the references given above which is one and simple indeed con- 
show, situtes His reality. Dualists see 
1 1 8. Vide supra p. 29. where the things wrongly." 



Adhik. I. Sut. i.] SRI-BHISHYA. 143 

upon a dog and upon an outcast (or a Chanddla)" [B. 
G. V. i8.]; 119 "Indeed, the brahman (i. e. the indi- 
vidual soul here) is (by nature) devoid of all evil and 
is alike in all beings." [/?. G. V. 19.]. Accordingly, 
in the passage, "Although he is to be found in one's 
own body and in that of all others, &c.," [V. P. II. 14. 31.], 
the distinction between one's self and that of another is 
also distinctly mentioned as existing in relation to the 
thing which is other than the body (viz. the individual 
soul). 

In this passage also which begins with " If there were 
any other like me or any other unlike me " [V. P. II. 13. 
90.],' 20 the essential identity of individual souls is not 
taught, because it is not admissible to use the word para 
(which means another like me) and the word any a (which 
means another unlike me] in one and the same sense, as 
though the statement meant " If there were any one other 
than me other than me." There (/. c. in that passage), the 
word/ara (which means another) denotes the self which is 
distinct from one's own self; and in as much as that (self) 
also is altogether of the nature of intelligence, the word an- 
ya (or different) means the negation of any other nature (to 
the self than that of intelligence). What is said is this : " If 
some individual self other than my own self be of a differ- 
ent nature from intelligence which is my nature, then, it is 

119. The whole of this stanza is as tadd eshah ayam ay am cha any ah 
follows : " The learned look alike vaktum evam api ishyate.\ Vide supra 
upon a person who has an abundance p. 29. where the Adwaitins interpret 
of know ledge and humility, upon a it as follows : "Q them, the best 
Brahmana, a cow, an elephant, a dog, of kings, if there were any other 
and an outcast." like me, or any other unlike (or differ- 

120. This sloka runs thus in the ent from) me, then alone would it be 
Sanskrit original : Yadi anyah ash proper to say that such an one is me 
parahkahapimattahpdrthh'Qsatttima \ and such an one is not me," 



-J44 SRI-BHISHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

possible to mention ' I am of this nature, he is of a diff- 
erent nature.' But it is not seen to be so, because all ("the 
individual selves) are wholly of the nature of intelligence, 
and are therefore undoubtedly alike in nature." 

In this passage also which begins with "It is in conse- 
quence of the difference due to the holes in a flute", 
[V. P. II. 14.32],' - * what is declared is that the difference 
of character in relation to the individual selves is not due to 
their essential nature, but is due to their having entered the 
(various) masses of matter known as gods, c.; and it is not 
(declared herein) that all the selves are one (in essence). In 
the illustrative example also, there is no substantial sameness 
between the particles of air which are associated with the 
several holes (of the flute), but there is only similarity of 
nature (between them). Indeed, those (particles of air) are 
all of one character, because they possess the same aerial 
nature ; and they have a variety of 'names 'such as shadja, 
&C., 1 -- because they pass out through a variety of holes. 
In the case of the individual selves , also, the variety of 
names, such as gods, &c., results in a similar way. The 
things which form portions of the elemental substances fire, 
water, and earth are one in nature with those substances, 
on account of their being themselves made up of those 
particular substances ; (but really) there can be no essen- 
tial identity between them (/. c. between the part and the 
whole). Thus it has necessarily to be accepted that the 
various particles of air are also distinct from each other in 
essence, (though similar in nature). 

121. This stanza is found on pp. ing to the pitch of the sound) result 

29 & 30. to the following effect : " It to the air, which pervades all without 

is, in consequence of the difference due distinction; just so is it the case 

to the holes in a flute, that the distinc- with the Highest Self." 

tions named Shadia &c., (correspond- 122. Vide supra p. 29. n. 25. 



Adhik. I. Sill. /.] SRi-BHiSHYA. 145 

In the stanza 1 2 3 which begins with" He is myself and 
he is yourself" [V. P. II. 16. 23 &24.],he(/. e. Parasara) 
recalls to mind, by means of the word 'he', the aforesaid 
character of intelligence belonging to all -the individual 
selves; then concludes, from myself, yourself, &c., being 
(here) grammatically equated, that intelligence alone con- 
stitutes the character of the things denoted by myself , your- 
self, &c.; and he at last says " Give up that illusion of 
distinction between individual selves which is based upon 
the distinction of such material forms as gods, &c." 
Otherwise, in relation to that (self) which is to be taught 
here as being essentially different from the body, it would 
not be appropriate to point out those differentiations (in the 
forms of /, thou, &c.,) that are .to be found in the state- 
ment that /, thou, and all this have the essential nature of 
the self. And it is not also possible for the words 7, thou, 
&c., to be the accidental indicators (of the nature of the 
self), because they are grammatically equated with what 
constitutes the thing that has to be so indicated by means 
of accidental attributes; that is, (because they are equated) 
with all this has the essential nature of the self. It is said 
that he (viz. the person so taught) acted up to that teach- 
ing, and "gave up the idea of distinction after seeing 
the highest reality." If it be asked, how this conclusion (of 
ours) is arrived at, (we reply) that it is arrived at because 
the teaching has reference to the process of discrimination 
between the body and the soul. And that (teaching) begins 

123. This stanza runs in the Sans- supra thus : " He is myself, and He 

krit original as follows : Salt a/iam is yourself and all this is the same as 

sa cjMj.vam sa cha sarvam etat atma- the Self. Give up the illusion of 

su-arfipam tyaja bhedamoham \ itJniah distinctions. Thus ; taught by him, 

tt'na sa rajavaryah tafyiija bhedam that great king, saw the Highest 

paramarthadrishtih\ This stanza has Reality and gave up distinctions," 
been already trajislate.d on p. .30, 

19 



146 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

thus : " Because the body which is characterised by head^ 
hand, &c., is distinct from the puntsha (i.-e. the self)" \V . 
P. II. 13. 89.].' 2 * 

The stanza 123 beginning with " When the knowledge 
which gives rise to distinctions", [F. P. VI. 7. 96.] is also 
not intended to establish the essential oneness in the 
nature of individual selves. Xor (is it intended to estab- 
lish the essential oneness) of the individual self and the 
Supreme Self. The essential oneness of the indivi- 
dual selves is negatived in the manner already stated. 
There is also no essential identity between the individual 
self and the Supreme Self, in the same way in which 
(there is no essential identity) between the body and 
the individual self. To this effect, indeed, are the fol- 
lowing and other Veddntic passages : " Two birds, which 
possess similar attributes and are inseparable friends, cling 
to the same tree ; one of them eats the sweet pippala 
fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating 
at all." \Mitnd. Up. III. i. i.]; "Those who know the 
Brahman, and who have worshipped the five fires and also 
the trinachiketa fire, declare that there are the two that 
enjoy 1 - >c the reward of works in the world of good deeds, 
that they have entered into the cave (of the heart), in the 
transcendentally excellent ether of which they reside and 
are as shadow and sunlight." [Kath. l?p. III. i.] ; "He 
who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are 
born, and is the Self of all." [Taitt. At: III. 24.]. In this 

124. The latter half of this sloka where it is given as follows : "When 
is to the following effect : " There- the knowledge which gives rise to 
fore which of these am I to designate distinctions has undergone complete 
hy this name of T?" destruction, (then), who will create 

125. This stanza has been already the unreal difference between the 
translated while stating the position self and the "Brahmanl" 

of the Adwat'tins.^Vide supra p. 30. 126. Literally, drink in. 



Adhik. L Sut. /.] SRi-l3HASkYA. 147 

sdstraic work (also, viz. the Vishnu-Purdna), the distinction 
(betwen the individual self and the Supreme Self) is declar- 
ed in the following manner : " O sage ! He (viz. 
the Lord) transcends the praknli (wliich forms the natur- 
al and material foundation) of all beings, (transcends) all 
its modifications, and all the blemishes (arising out) of 
its qualities. He, who is the Self of all, has passed be- 
yond all veils, and by Him is pervaded all that is within 
the universe. He is of that nature which is characterised 
by all auspicious qualities.... He is high among the high- 
est, and in Him, who is the Lord of the higher and the lower, 
the afflictions and all other such undesirable things have no 
place." [ V. P. VI. 5. 83 to 85.] ; ' - 7 " Another (power) named 
avidya (or ignorance) and karma is said to be the third 
power by which, O king, the all-pervading power known as 
the kshetrajfia is completely enclosed." ' - 8 [ V. P. VI. 7. 6 1 
&62.]: and (the same difference is taught) in the following 
aphorisms also, viz. "And both of them (i.e. both the recen- 
sions Qt\\\QBn]iaddranyaka-(Jpa)iishad, viz. the Kdnmi and 
the Madhyandina] speak of it (/. c. of the individual self) as 
being different (from the internal Ruler who is the Highest)." 
[Ved. Sut. I. 2. 21.]; "And on account of the declaration 
of difference, (the Supreme Self is) different (from the indi- 
vidual self)." [Ved. Sui. I. i. 22.] ; "(The Brahman is) in- 
deed other than (the individual self), because of the (scrip- 
tural) declaration of difference (between them)." [ Ved. 
Sut. II. i. 22.]. Moreover, the following and other Veddnt- 
ic texts, viz. " He who dwelling in the self, is within the 
self, Whom the self does not know, Whose body is the 
self and Who internally rules the self. (He is your Self 
&c)." [Mddh. Bnh. Up. III. 7. 22.]; "He is embraced by 



127. Vide supra, p. 125. I2S. Vide mifra p. 133 



148 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

the omniscient Self." [Brih. Up. 4. 3. 21.]; "He is ridden 
upon by the omniscient Self." [Bn'/i. Up. IV. 3. 35.], 
determine that the essential nature of the individual self 
and that of the Supreme Self are both of a mutually exclu- 
sive character. (For all these reasons there can be no 
substantial unity between the individual self and the 
Supreme Self). 

Moreover, in the case also of one who has been releas- 
ed from avidya by adopting the means (intended therefor), 
there cannot be essential unity with the Supreme Self, 
(which is incapable of being the seat of avidya or ignorance); 
because that which is capable of being the seat of igno- 
rance can never acquire the character of what is (naturally ) 
unfit to be the seat thereof. To the same effect, it is taught 
in the following passage : " If it be held that the identity 
of the Highest Self with the individual self is the highest 
truth, it is wrong (to hold so); because any substance 
which is different from another cannot indeed acquire the 
character of that other substance." [V. P. II. 14. 27.]. Be- 
sides, it is stated in the BJiagavad-Gltd, that a released 
soul attains only His character, (but not His essential na- 
ture) : " Depending upon this knowledge, those who at- 
tain sameness 129 of nature with Myself are not born at the 
time of creation, and are not hurt at the time of dissolution." 
[B. G. XIV. 2.]. Here (/'. c. in the Vishnu-Pnrdna) also, 
there is the following passage to the same effect : " O 
sage, that Brahman, by His own power, makes this 
worshipper, who is deserving of a change of state for 
the better, acquire His own nature in the same way in 
which a magnet makes the metal acquire its own magnetic 

iJ<j. The idea is that the released one in substance with the Supreme 
soul possesses the same nature as the Self. 
Supreme Self, but does nut become 



Adhik. 1. SuL /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 149 

character." \V. P. VI. 7. 30.]. The word tltmabhdva (in this 
stanza) ' 3 means His own nature. Surely, the thing which is 
attracted does not become identical with that which attracts. 
Says (the same thing the Sutrakara) also thus : "Except 
in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation &c., 
of) the world, (the released souls possess all the powers 
belonging to the Lord), because (the Lord Himself forms) 
the topic of the contexts (wherein the above-mentioned 
activity is referred to), and because also (the individual 
souls) are not mentioned (therein)." \Ved. SuL IV. 4. 17.]; 
" And on account of the characteristic of equality (between 
the individual self and the Supreme Self) being solely 
confined to enjoyment "-\_Ved. Si'tt. IV. 4. 21.]; "And 
on account of (the Brahman) being taught to be that which 
is to be approached by the released (souls.)" [ Ved. Sut. 
I. 3. 2.]. The Vritti also (of Bodhayana) states it thus : -- 
" Except in the matter of the activity relating to the creation 
of the world, (the released soul)is equal to the Highest 
Light (/. c. to the Brahman}." And the commentator Drami- 
da also says " On account .'of close association with the 
Deity, he who is devoid of the body (/. e. the released soul) 
may become capable of enjoying all desirable objects like the 
Deity Himself." (To the same effect) are also the following 
and other scriptural texts : "Those who depart from here, 
after having known the Self and also His eternal and 
auspicious qualities, for them there is free movement in 
all the worlds." \Qihdnd. Up. VIII.i. 6.] ; "He who 
knows the Brahman attains the Highest." [7a///. Up. II. 
i.i.]; "He attains, with the intelligent Brahman, all the 

130. The stanza quoted above runs iitHianah laklyH loliain ak 
thus: ^tmalhavam nayati entim tul yathii\ 
brahma dliydyinam nnine \ vik&ryam 



I 5 o SRi-feHiSHYA. [Chap. L Part. L 

auspicious qualities." [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.] ; "He (/. c. the 
released self), having reached that Self which consists of 
bliss and moving about in all these worlds, enjoying what- 
ever things he likes, and assuming whatever form he likes, 
(sits down singing this saman. Hd, vnhd, vftha, vft)." 
[Taitt. Up. III. 10. 5.]; "He moves about there." [Ckhdnd. 
Up. VIII. 12. 3.]; "Bliss indeed is He. Having ob- 
tained this very Bliss, he becomes blissful." [Taitt. Up. II. 
7. i.] ; " Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing 
their name and form, so also the wise man, freed from 
name and form, reaches that Divine Person who is higher 
than the highest." [Mund. Up. III. 2.8.]; "Then the 
wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untaint- 
ed, attains the highest degree of equality (with the Brah- 
man)" [Mund. Up. III. 1.3.]. 

In the following and other aphorisms " Bliss and 
other qualities (have to be assumed in all the vidyds} ^ 31 
because the possessor (of those qualities happens to be the 
same Brahman in all the vidyds)." [Ved. Sfit. III. 3. 1 1.]; 
" Because they (viz. the vidyds) do not differ in their re- 
sults,there is freedom of choice (in regard to them)." [ Vcd. 
Snt. III. 3. 57.], it is stated by the Sntrakara himself that 
the qualified Brahman alone is the object of worship in all 
the vidyds relating to the Supreme Being, that the result (of 
all such meditations or forms of worship) is of one and the 
same nature, and that, therefore, there is freedom of choice 

131. The Vidyas are forms of vvor- danavidya. is a form of worship taught 

ship. For example, the Sad-vidyd to Pratardana by Indra in Kaush. Up. 

taught to Svetaketu in Chhand. Up. III. The Daharavidya is another 

VI. is that form of worship in which form of worship in which the Bra/i- 

the 'Brahman is taught to be worship- man is taught to be worshipped as 

ped as the self-existent Soul of ^ residing within the -null etherial 

the universe. Similarly the Prahir- space of the heart. CJihand, Up. VIII. 



Adhik.LSui.i.] SRi-BHlSHYA. 151 

in regard to the vidyds. By the Vakya-kara (Taaka) also, 
in the passage " That (object to be attained) is what is 
possessed (of qualities), because worship relates to that which 
possesses qualities" it is stated that the qualified Brah- 
man alone is worthy of being the object of worship, 
and that there is freedom of choice in regard to the 
vidyds (relating to the attainment of the Brahman). This is 
also similarly explained by the commentator (Dramidachar- 
ya) in the passage beginning with 1 3 - " Even when one is 
bent upon meditating on (the Brahman as) pure existence." 
This passage " He who knows the Brahman be- 
comes the Brahman indeed." \_Mimd. Up. III. 2. 9.], has 
to import the same thing as the following and other 
passages: "Freed from name and form, he reaches the 
Divine Person who is higher than the highest." \Mund. Up. 
III. 2. 8.]; "Being untainted, he attains the highest degree 
of equality (with the Brahmaii}'.' [Mttnd. Up. III. i. 3.]; 
" Having reached the Highest Light (/. e. the Brahman) he 
(/. e. the released soul) manifests himself in his own true 
form." [Qthand. Up. VIII. 3. 4.) ; therefore, here also, 
one, who is freed from the name and form that belong to 
prakriti (or nature) and who is destitute of the distinctions 
resulting from that (name and that form), is said to possess 
the same character as the Brahman, for the reason that he 
also is (then) solely of the nature of intelligence. Moreover, 

132. This passage is quoted in pure existence, one should not steudi- 

full in the Vedartha-sahgraha of Rama- ly pursue in one's own mind merely 

ntija and it runs thus : Yadyapi a collection of qualities as unassoci- 

sntrjntto no, nirbhugnadan'atam gxnv- ated with the Deity ; even then, one 

gnn.tm manasftnudkavet tathapyantar- worships that Deity alone which is 

gunameva devatiim bhajata iti tatrafli possessed of qualities, and so, in such 

sagunaira deratd prilfiyatf. Its a case also, that deity alone which is 

meaning is: Even when one is bent possessed of qualities is attained, 
upon meditating on the T$rqhman as 



152 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

when one thing possesses the same nature as another, then 
the experession that this thing is the same as that other 
has a real and natural significance, 133 as, in the instance, 
" This (thing) here is an ox." Here also (i.e. in the Vishnii- 
Puranci) in the passage " O king, that which leads (us) to 
the object of (our) attainment (viz. the Brahman] is know- 
ledge. Similarly, what has to be led (unto the Brahman] is 
the individual self in whom all the bhdvanas* 34 are extin- 
guished." \V. P. VI. 7. 93.], it is (first) declared that, by 
meditating on the Highest Brahman, the individual self, 
who is, like the Highest Brahman, freed from all the bha- 
vands, that is, from the three. 1 35 bhavanas, namely, karma- 
bhdvand, brahma-bhdvand and nbhava-bhdvand, becomes 
worthy to be led (unto the Brahman] ; then in the pas- 
sage "O, thou, the twice-born one, the kshctrajila (or the 
individual self) is the owner of the means (for obtaining 
final release), and knowledge is the means which is thus 
at his disposal. After accomplishing the end, namely, final 

133. Vide supra p. 4. n. 10. the mind-substance. The three lihava- 

134. Bhai'anas mean here the innate tiasor wrong conceptions referred to 
tendencies for indulging in wrong above are: (i). The conception that 
conceptions regarding the ultimate we merely do the work, (2) the con- 
nature of things. In Indian psycho- ception that we wholly become the 
logy, a fi/idvand is spoken of as a sams- Brahman, and (3) the conception 
kdra i. e. as an innate impression or that, on the other hand, we do the- 
an innate tendency. Memory (smriti) work and also become the Bra/iman. It 
and bhdvand (conception) are both seems to be held here that, in religion, 
classed as samskdras, and curiously it is as wrong to rely solely upon the 
enough elasticity (sthitiathdpaka) also performance of prescribed duties, as 
is spoken of as a samskdra ; the idea to believe in the possibility of our 
being that, just as the elasticity of attaining identity in essence with 
bodies is no more than a tendency the Supreme Self; because the perfec- 
impressed upon the particles of those tion of the individual indeed constitutes 
bodies.so also, memory and conception the true goal of every true religion. 
are innate tendencies impressed upon 135. Vide nn. 100. & 134., supra. 



Adhik. I. Sut. i.} SRI-BHISHYA. 153 

release, it (/. e. that knowledge) will cease to operate as a 
means, having fully performed its functions." [V. P. VI. 
7. 94.], it is stated that the means, which is in the form 
of the meditation of the Highest Brahman, ceases to oper- 
ate as a means, after having fully performed its function in 
the way of causing, to the individual self, the attainment of 
its own nature which is free from all the bhavands ; and 
then it is said that, in consequence, meditation should be 
practised till the accomplishment of the end in view ; and 
then at last the essential nature of the released self is thus 
described in the following passage : 136 " Having then 
attained the state which corresponds to the nature of that 
{Brahman}, he (viz. the released self) becomes ' non-differ- 
ent ' from the Highest Self, and distinctions (in relation to 
him) are the products of his ignorance." [V. P. VI. 7. 95.]. 
(Here) the word tadbhdva means the bhava of the Brah- 
man, that is, His nature ; (but it does) not (import) 
substantial unity (between the individual self and the Sup- 
reme Self); because, if it did, the second word bhava, in 
the expression tadbhdvabhdvamdpannah, would be of no 
use, and because also there would then arise the contra- 
diction of the teaching given before. Whatever constitutes 
the condition wherein the Brahman is completely free from 
all the bhavanas, the attainment of that is the attainment of 
the state corresponding to the nature of that {Brahman). 
When one has (thus) attained that state, then one becomes 
'noo-different' from the Supreme Self, that is, one becomes 
free from difference. This (individual self), by reason of its 
possessing the nature of intelligence, is itself of the same 
character as the Supreme Self, and hence its difference from 

136. This passage is as follows in the adsau paramatmana \ bhavatyabhedt 
original : Tadbhav ibhavamapanws ta- bheaa'scjka tasyajilanakrito bhavet\ 
?0 



154 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

Him consists in its having the form of gods and other 
(material embodiments). The association of this (individual 
self) with such (an embodiment) results from the ignorance 
which is of the nature of karma, but is not due to its own 
essential nature. When karma, which has the nature of 
ignorance and forms the root of all distinctions in the form 
of gods, &c., is destroyed by means of the meditation of 
the Highest Brahman, then that distinction of gods, &c., 
ceases to be, owing to the cessation of the cause thereof; 
and accordingly, he (/. e. the released soul) does not differ 
(from the Brahman}. It is thus stated in this passage: 
"But the distinction of one individual self (from other simi- 
lar selves) which are all of the same nature results from the 
external covering of karma. When the distinction of gods, 
&c., (in relation to them) ceases to exist, the covering 
altogether ceases to exist, and indeed he alone remains.'' 
I V. P. II. 14. 33.]. The same thing is explained elsewhere 
thus : " When knowledge which produces distinctions has 
undergone complete destruction, (then) who will create the 
unreal difference between the self and the Brahman?' [V. 
P. VI. 7. 96.].' 87 (Here) the word vibheda means various 
kinds of distinctions, such as those which are found in the 
(varied) forms of gods, animals, men and immoveable things. 
This same thing is stated by Saunaka also thus: "This 
fourfold distinction also is dependent upon false know- 
ledge." [ J 7 . Dh. C. 20.]. The meaning is this: Ignorance, 
otherwise called karma, forms, in regard to the individual 
self which is of the nature of intelligence, the cause of 
the various kinds of distinctions, such as gods, &c.; and 
when it is totally destroyed by means of the meditation 

137. This stanza is as follows in mano bhedam asantam kah karish- 
the original: Vibhedajanake jilane yati\ Vide supra p. 30. 
n<fs<im atyaittikfim gate \ atmapo brah- 



Adhik. I. Sat. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 155 

of the Highest Brahman, then who is there that will per- 
ceive, between the individual self and the Highest Brahman, 
the distinction that consists injiaving the forms of gods, &c., 
which owing to the non-existence of the cause thereof, has 
itself become non-existent ? In this very work itself (/. e. in 
the Vishnu-Pur ana) it has indeed been stated that " An- 
other (power) named avidyd and karma (forms the third 
power of the Brahman}" \V. P. VI. 7. 6i.]. 188 In the 
passage "And know also the kshetrajfta (or the individual 
self) to be the same as Myself." [B. G. XIII. 2.], and 
in others, the declaration of oneness (between the indivi- 
dual self and the Supreme Self) is based on the (Brah- 
man) constituting the Self of all in the form of their internal 
ruler. Otherwise, there would arise the contradiction of 
the following and other passages : " The destructible 
is (made up of) all created beings, and it is stated that 
the indestructible is the eternally unchangeable. Different 
from these is the Highest Person." [B. G. XV. 16 & 
17.]. In this very work (viz. the Bhagavad-Glta), it is 
explicitly stated by the Lord Himself that He is the Self 
of all in the form of their internal ruler, as for instance, 
in the passage " O Arjuna, the Lord exists in the region 
of the heart of all beings." [B. G. XVIII. 61.], and also 
in the passage " And I am also seated in the heart of 
all." [B. G. XV. 15.]. The same thing is also declared 
in the passage " O Gudakesa, I am that Self who is 
established in the interior of all beings." [B. G. X. 20.]. 1 39 
In fact, (here), the word bhuta denotes the body which 
includes the self also. Because He is the Self of all, for 
that very reason, all things constitute His body ; and 
hence their separate existence is negatived in the passage 

138. Vide supra p. 128. the original: A/itim<itin t l guddkcla 

139. This passage is as follows in sarvaMiitasayasthitak. 



156 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. L 

"That exists [not which is without (Me)." \B. G. X. 39.]. 
This passage contains the summary of the Lord's sovereign 
glories, and has therefore to be understood to possess such 
a significance (as has been given above). Next to this, it 
is stated "Whatever thing is full of glory, or of wealth, or 
of power, know thou that particular thing to proceed from 
a part of My splendour." [B. G. X. 41.], and "I stand 
supporting the whole world by a small part (of My power)." 
[B. G. X. 42.]. Therefore, in all the sastraic works, 1 4 there 
is no establishment of that thing which is devoid of attri- 
butes, nor is there the establishment of illusoriness in regard 
to the totality of perceivable objects, nor also is there the 
negation of the natural difference between the individual 
self, non-intelligent matter, and the Lord. 

It has been also declared 141 by the Purvapakshins to 
the following effect: The whole universe, with its infinite 
distinctions in the form of the ruler and the ruled and the 
like, is the result of the superimposition of error on an attri- 
buteless and self-luminous thing. And that error is the be- 
ginningless ignorance (or avidya) which .cannot be defined 
either as existent or as non-existent, and which, (neverthe- 
less) is the cause of those varied and wonderful illusory pro- 
jections that conceal the true nature of things. And that 
avidya has necessarily to be admitted, because there is the 
following among other scriptural texts (to prove it): "For 

140. The saslras are works of religious Itihdsa deals with ancient history, 

authority and include four different and the Puranas are semi-historical 

kinds of them, known by the names of works containing also myths and le- 

Sruti, Smriti, Itihdsa and Pu.ra.na in gends which are intended to illustrate 

the order of their importance. Srutt is important principles of religion and 

revelation and is made up of the Vedas conduct. 

and the Upanishads, &c. Sni^iti embo- 141. Vide s/ra pp. 27, 30, & 31. 

dies tradition and the sacred laws. 



Adhik. L Sal. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 157 

they (/. c. the creatures) are drawn away (from the Brah- 
man) by means of ignorance." [C&hdnd. Up. VIII. 3. 2.]; 
because also there would (otherwise) result in regard to 
the Brahman the impossibility of His being one with the 
individual self, in accordance with what is learnt from 
the grammatical equation found in the passage "That thou 
art" J 4 2 and in others like it. That (avidyd) again is no real 
entity, because in relation to it there is no illusion and no 
stultification (of illusion). And it (viz. that avidyd) is not a 
non-entity either, because (in relation to it) there is no ma- 
nifestation and no stultification (of manifestation) . ] 4 3 
Therefore those that know the truth hold that this avidyd 
(or ignorance) is different from both these alternative ways 
of looking at it. 

This (view) is improper. Indeed, residing in what, does 
it (viz. avidyd) produce illusion ? Surely, (it does) not (pro- 
duce illusion), itself residing in the individual self; because the 
self-hood (of the individual self) is itself projected by avidyd 

142. Vide Chhand. Up. VI. 9. 4 ; being an entity, is capable of being 
VI. 10. 3; VI. ir. 3; VI. 12. 3; VI. perceived as a rope, or as something 
13. 3; VI. 14. 3. VI. 15. 3; VI. 16. 3. other than the rope, for instance, as 

143. The way in which the object a snake. This perception of the 
of any notion is made out to be either snake in the rope is an illusion 
a real entity or a non-entity is given which is capable of being stultified,and 
in this brief formula: Sannabadhyate, the rope is thus an object of illusion 
asannaprattyate, which means that the as well as of the stultification of that 
perception of the real entity is never illusion. The horns of a hare, being 
altogether stultified, and that the non-existent, are of course incapable 
non-entity is never really perceived. of being perceived. Nevertheless, they 
In the passage above, avidyd i.e. are manifest to the mind, in as much 
ignorance, is said to be neither an as they constitute the object of a notion 
entity nor a non-entity neither an corresponding to them, and also of the 
entity like a rope, nor a non-entity stultification of the reality of the 
like the horns of a hare. The rope, contents of that notion. 



158 SRi-lBHASHYA. \_Chap. L fart. 1. 

(or ignorance). Neither (does it produce illusion), itself resid- 
ing in the Brahman ; because He has the essential nature of 
self-luminous intelligence, and is thus opposed to avidyd (or 
ignorance). Moreover, it is admitted (by you) that it (viz. 
avidyd} is destroyed by knowledge. " If ignorance, which 
has the nature of unreality and is removable by knowledge, 
may veil the Highest Brahman who has the nature of 
intelligence, then who is there that is competent to be its 
remover ? If it be said that to know the Brahman to be 
(pure) intelligence is what (really) removes ignorance, (we 
say) that it (viz. such knowledge) also cannot, like the Brah- 
man, certainly be the remover of avidyd (or ignorance); be- 
cause, it (viz. that knowledge) makes that same (Brahman] 
luminous (/. e. intelligible). If it be possible to have the cog- 
nition that the Brahman is (pure) intelligence, there would 
then result cognisability (to the Brahman}; but,according to 
your own saying, it must be that the Brahman should not 
possess the (cognisable) character of an experience". J 4 4 
If it be said that that knowledge, which is to the effect 
that the Brahman has the essential nature of intelligence, 
is the destroyer of that avidyd (or ignorance), but not that 
(other) knowledge (or intelligence) which constitutes the 
essential nature of the Brahman, we reply that it is not right 
to hold so ; because while both possess in common the 
power of bringing the true nature of the Brahman to 
light, it is not possible to make out any differentiating 
peculiarity (about them) to the effect that one of them 
is contradictory of avidyd (or ignorance), and that the 
other is not. What is said is this : Whatever is, by means 
of that knowledge which is to the effect that the 

144. The above quotation is in all famous Yamunacharya known in the 
probability from the Nyayatattva. of Tamil land as Alavandar. 
Is'atliarauni. the grandfather of the 



Adhik. 1. Sfit. i.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 159 

Brahman has the nature of intelligence, made out 
to be the true nature of the Brahman, that becomes 
evident of itself on account of the self-luminous character 
of the Brahman ; and so, in the matter of contradicting 
avidyd (or ignorance), there is no differentiating peculiarity 
about the knowledge (or intelligence) which constitutes 
the essential nature (of the Brahman}, or about that (other) 
knowledge whose object is that (essential nature of the 
Brahman}. 

Moreover, according to you the Pflrvapakshins, the 
Brahman whose essential nature consists of experience is 
incapable of being experienced by any other experience; 
and so (to you) there can be no knowledge which has that 
(Brahman} for its object. Therefore, if knowledge (or in- 
telligence) is held to be contradictory of avidyd, then He 
(viz. the Brahman] is of his own nature opposed (to that 
avidyd}; and thus it is not possible for that (avidyd or igno- 
rance) to reside in the Brahman. The mother-of-pearl and 
other such substances, (on which illusions are superim- 
posed), are themselves incapable of bringing their own real- 
ity to light, and are not opposed to the ignorance which 
relates to themselves; therefore they require some other 
knowledge for the removal of that (avidyd or ignorance). 
But the Brahman constitutes the reality of Himself, as 
established by His own self-experience ; and so, He is 
opposed to that ignorance which relates to Himself. For 
this very reason, it (viz. that ignorance which relates to the 
Brahman} does not further stand in need of any other 
means to remove it. 

However, it may again be said that the knowledge of 
the unreality of what is other than the Brahman is op- 
posed to this ignorance. But it is not so. (Here) it 
has to be discriminated whether this knowledge of the 



160 SRl-BHISHYA. \Chap. I. Part. I. 

unreality of what is other than the Brahman is opposed 
to the ignorance of the real nature of the Brahman, or, 
whether it is opposed to that (other) ignorance which 
is to the effect that the world is real. Surely, this 
(knowledge) is not contradictory of the ignorance which 
relates to the real nature of the Brahman, because it has 
not that (real nature of the Brahman} for its object. Indeed, 
there arises contradiction only when (both) knowledge 
and ignorance have one and the same thing for their object. 
The (true) knowledge that the world is unreal is contra, 
dieted by the ignorance (or false knowledge) that-the world 
is real. By that (knowledge which establishes the unreality 
of the world), only that ignorance is contradicted which 
leads to the conclusion that the world is real. Hence the 
ignorance relating to the essential nature of the Brahman 
surely continues to persist. It may be said that the ignorance 
which relates to the essential nature of the Brahman is in- 
deed to the effect that He has a second,and that that (igno- 
rance) is removed, as a matter of fact, by the knowledge 
of the unreality of what is other than that (Brahman], and 
that the true nature of the Brahman is made out by self- 
experience. But this is not so. If it is established by 
self-experience that the true nature of the Brahman is to 
be without a second, then there can arise neither that 
ignorance which is opposed to that (true nature) and is 
to the effect that He has a second, nor can there arise any 
stultification of that (ignorance). If it be said that this 
secondlessness is an attribute (of His), we say it is not 
so ; because you have yourselves declared that the Brah- 
man is essentially of the nature of (pure) experience, and 
is thus free from all attributes that are capable of being 
experienced. Therefore, solely on account of (such) in- 
compatibility, the Brahman, whose essential nature is 



Adhik. I. Sut. /.] SRl-BniSHYA, 161 

intelligence cannot be the abode of ignorance (or avidya). 

Moreover, he who declares that the Brahman, whose 
essential nature entirely consists of luminosity, is (never- 
theless) concealed by avidyd (or ignorance), by him is 
declared the destruction of nothing other than the very 
essential nature of the Brahman Himself. The conceal- 
ment of luminosity means either the obstruction of the 
origination of luminosity or the destruction of existing 
(luminosity). Since it is admitted that this luminosity of 
the Brahman is incapable of being a produced thing, the 
concealment of luminosity (here) means only the destruc- 
tion of luminosity. 

Then again it is said that, on account of a misguiding 
thing resident in itself, this objectless and self-luminous 
experience which is not dependent upon anything else, 
realises itself as having an infinite number of abodes, and 
as having an infinite number of objects to experience ; 
and here it has to be determined whether this misguiding 
thing, which is resident in that (experience) itself, is of the 
nature of a reality, or is of the nature of an unreality. 
Surely, it is not a reality, in as much as it is not admitted 
(by you) to be so. Nor is it an unreality. For if it 
were an unreality, 145 it (viz. this misguiding thing) must 
be acknowledged to be either the knower, or the known 
object, or the knowledge. Surely, it is not knowledge, be- 
cause distinctions in relation to the essential nature ofknow- 

145. The distinctions in the thing which is the result of such maya 

universe in the forms of the knower, or ignorance has to be made out 

the known object and the knowledge either as the knower or as the known 

are held by the Adwaitins to be due object or as the knowledge, which 

to maya. Consequently any unreal togetherimake upthe visible universe, 
21 



1 62 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

ledge (or consciousness) are not admitted (by you); and 
because also unreality is not admitted (by you) in relation 
to consciousness itself which forms the basis of illusion, lest 
such (an admission) should give room to the hypothesis 
of the Madhyamikas. 1 ^ The knower, the known object, 
and the knowledge (or consciousness) conditioned by them 
(both), may themselves be characterised as constituting the 
misguiding error (for the reason that they are conditioned); 
but then they require another error at their root (to make 
them conditioned and erroneous) ; and thus arises a regres- 
sus in infinitum. And then, wishing to avoid this (difficul- 
ty), you may say that the really existent experience itself, 
which is the same as the Brahman, forms this misguiding 
error. And if the Brahman Himself form the misguiding 
error, then, the appearance of the phenomenal universe 
would itself be dependent upon that (Brahman). What is 
the use of assuming (in such a case) another avidyd (or 
ignorance) which is similar in nature to the phenomenal 
universe? If the Brahman Himself have the character of 
the misguiding error, (then), owing to His eternity, there 
would be no final release (to the individual self). There- 
fore, as long as a real misguiding error, different from the 
Brahman Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not 
possible to explain (the theory of) illusion. 

Again, what is the meaning of the (alleged) impossi- 
bility of definition (in relation to avidyd) ? It may be 
said that this consists in its (?'. e. avidyd's) having the 
characteristics neither of an entity nor of a non-entity; 
if so, such a thing is sure to be incapable of definition, be- 



146. The Madhyamikas are Nihi- 30. for a fuller discussion and criti- 
listic Buddhists. Vide Ved. Sitt. II. 2. cism of their theory. 



Adhik. I. Sill, i.] SRi-BHlSHYA. 163 

cause there is no means of knowing a thing of that kind. 
What is said is this : The whole of the totality of things 
has to be established as existent (only)by means of (mental) 
cognitions, and all cognition relates to entities or non-enti- 
ties. And if it be held that the object of a cognition, which 
vhas (thus) to relate to entities or non-entities, has neither 
the characteristics of an entity nor those of a non-entity, 
then all things might become the objects of all cognitions. 

It may be again stated here as follows : A certain 
particular thing which conceals the true nature of all things, 
which is the material cause of various internal and 
external superimpositions, which is itself incapable of being 
defined either as an entity or as a non-entity, which is 
denoted by the words avidya, ajftdna, &c., and which is it- 
self capable of being removed by the knowledge of the real 
nature of things, (such a thing) is indeed made out, by 
means of perception and inference, to be altogether existent 
in the form of an entity, in as much as it happens to be dif- 
ferent from the antecedent non-existence 147 of knowledge. 
The superimposition of such distinctions, as egoity (or 
knowership), knowledge, and the thing known,, on the 
internal self, the essential nature of which is concealed by 
that (avidya) itself, and which (however) is (really) un- 
changeable and is made up of self-luminous intelligence, 
(such a superimposition) has for its material cause the 
"Brahman who is conditioned by that (same avidya). 
For the reason that there are various particular states 
of that same (avidya), there also arises, in regard to 
the world which is itself a super-imposition, the further 
superimposition, which consists of (the falsely perceived) 

147, Vide supra p. 49. n. 37. 



164 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. I. Part. /. 

snake, silver, &c., that are capable of being stultified 
by (correct) knowledge, and consists also of the (correct) 
knowledge relating to all the various particular things 
(in the world 1 ). And the fact also, that all things which 
possess the nature of unreality have that (avidya) for 
their material cause, is made out by the force of the. 
reasoning, that, of a thing which is unreal, the cause also 
deserves to be certainly unreal. Indeed, the perception 
which has for its object that avidya, which forms the cause 
(of such a world), is a direct manifestation (of avidya) to 
consciousness to the effect " I am ignorant, I do not 
know myself, nor do I know another." But this (direct 
perception of ignorance) has not for its object the antece- 
dent non-existence of knowledge; for, that (antecedent 
non-existence) is made out with the aid of the sixth means 
of proof, 1 48 whereas this (perception of ignorance) is quite 
as direct as when (one feels) " I am happy." Even when it 
is granted that non-existence (of knowledge) is capable of 
being directly experienced, this experience can not deal 
with the non-existence of knowledge in the self ; because 
there is the knowledge (of such non-existence) even at the 
time of this experience, and because also, if it (viz. such 
knowledge) were not existent then, there would be the im- 
possibility of making out that there was no knowledge. 
What is said amounts to this : In this experience 

148. The six means of proof the non-existence of things. It is 

are: (l). Pratyaksha, perception by said that, according to this last, we 

the senses; (2) Anutnana,interence; (3) make out the non-existence of a pot, 

Upamana, analogy or comparison ; (4) for instance, by not perceiving it. 

Sabda or 3ptavacAana, verbal testimony There are also three other means of 

or revelation; (5) A rthapatti, circum- proof known to Indian philosophers, 

stantial presumption; (6) A nupalabdhi namely, SamMava, equivalence; 

or Abhavapratyaksha, negative proof Aitihya, tradition or fallible testi- 

of non-cognition intended to establish mony ; and Cheshtd, gesture. 



Adhik. I. Sut. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 165 

' I am ignorant ', is there or is there not any cognition of 
the self, namely, the ' I ', as the thing which has the non- 
existence of knowledge for its characterising attribute, and 
also (is there or is there not any cognition) of know- 
ledge as the thing which is opposed to ignorance ? 
If there is, then, wholly owing to self-contradiction, 
it is impossible to have any experience of the non- 
existence of (all) knowledge. If there is not, then that 
experience of the non-existence of knowledge cannot 
at all come into existence, in as much as it depends upon 
the knowledge of the thing characterised by that (non-exist- 
ence of knowledge) and also upon the knowledge of the 
thing which is contrary (to the same non-existence of 
knowledge). This objection holds good eqflially in the 
case where non-existence of knowledge is taken to be dedu- 
cible by inference, and also in the case where it is taken 
to form the object that is to be establshed by the means of 
proof known as abhdva (or anupalabdhi}.* ** When, how- 
ever, it is granted that this avidya (or ignorance) has the 
nature of an entity, then, even though there is the know- 
ledge of that thing which has this (non-existence of know- 
ledge for its) characterising attribute, and also (the know- 
ledge) of that thing which is contrary (to the non-existence 
of knowledge), it has to be admitted that there is no con- 
tradiction (between this knowledge and that avidya or 
ignorance which is not merely the negation of knowledge, 
but is a positive entity of some sort). Therefore, this ex- 
perience ' I am ignorant ' relates only to that avidya (or 
ignorance) which has the nature of a (positive) entity. 
Again, it may be objected that, although (this) ignorance 

149. Anupalabdhi is the negative blish the non-existence of things, 
proof of non-cognition intended to esta- Vide supra n. 143. 



1 66 SRi-BnlSHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

(or avidya) has the nature of a (positive) entity, yet, it is con- 
tradicted by the witnessing principle of intelligence, the 
nature of which is to make the truth of things manifest. But 
this is not right. The witnessing principle of 'intelligence 
does not deal with the truth of things, but deals with this 
ignorance ; for, otherwise, the manifestation to consciousness 
of all such things as are unreal would be impossible. Indeed, 
(this positive) ignorance (or avidya) is not removed by that 
knowledge which has (that same) ignorance for its object ; 
and, accordingly, there is here no contradiction (between 
this positive entity called ignorance and the knowledge of 
that same ' ignorance '). 

And again it may be said : This ignorance, although 
it possesses the nature of an (independent) entity, becomes 
a thing that is directly cognisable by the witnessing prin- 
ciple of intelligence, only in definitive association with a 
particular (external) object. And the object here (which by 
association defines this ignorance) is itself capable of being 
established independently of any means of proof. There- 
fore, how can this ignorance (or avidya), which is defi- 
nitively associated with the thing ( I ', (that is not an exter- 
nal object), become a thing cognisable by the witnessing 
principle of intelligence ? There is, however, nothing wrong 
in this. The whole of the totality of things is made up of 
objects which are cognisable by the witnessing principle of 
intelligence, either in the form of known things or in the 
form of unknown things. It being so, there is need of the 
interposition of a means of proof to prove only that thing 
which happens to be known as non-intelligent. But to 
prove the thing which is intelligent, subjective and self- 
evident, there is no need of the interposition of (such) a 
means of proof. Therefore, the presentation of this thing 
(viz. the thing ' I ') to consciousness, as that which is al- 



Adhik. I. Sftt. i.] SRI-BHISHYA. 167 

ways definitively associated with avidyd (or ignorance) is 
quite consistent with reason. And consequently, by means 
of direct perception which is supported by logical reason- 
ing, this ignorance (or avidya) is made out to have indeed 
the character of a positive entity. 

This ignorance (or avidya) which has the nature 
of an entity is established by means of inference also thus : 
That knowledge, which is obtained with the help of the 
accepted means of proof and (the nature of) which is the 
subject of dispute (between us), has, for its antecedent in 
time, another existent thing which is different from the 
antecedent non-existence of that (knowledge) itself, and 
veils the objects of that same (knowledge), and is 
capable of being removed by that (very knowledge), and 
is existent in the same place as that (knowledge) ; 
because it brings to light objects which were unknown 
before, and is thus like the light of the lamp-flame first lit 
up in the midst of darkness. Darkness is merely either the 
absence of light or the absence of the perception of colour, 
but is not a substance ; and if, (on this supposition), it be 
asked how it is that it is put forth here as an illustration 
to prove that ignorance (or avidya) which has the nature 
of a positive substance, it is replied that, because darkness 
is perceived to possess the conditions of density, thinness, 
&c., and because also (it is perceived) as having colour, it 
cannot but be a distinct substance. Therefore this (argu- 
ment here advanced) is unobjectionable. 

To all this, we make the following reply : In the cog- 
nition ' I am ignorant, I do not know myself, nor do I 
know another,' that ignorance which has the nature of an 
entity is not made out either by perception in itself or (by 
perception) as supported by logical reasoning. The contra- 
diction, that has been pointed out in relation to (the ignor- 



168 SRI-BHISHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

ance which forms) the antecedent non-existence of know- 
ledge, applies equally well to this (other) ignorance also 
which has the nature of an entity. Is the internal subject 
(viz. the ego) made out or not made out to be that which is 
definitively distinct from ignorance by forming the abode 
and the object (thereof) ? If you hold that it is so made 
out, then when it is so made out, how can there remain 
yet that ignorance of it which is capable of being re- 
moved by the knowledge of its true nature ? If you hold 
that it is not so made out, then, how is it possible to expe- 
rience the ignorance which is not associated with the ne- 
cessary concomitants of an abode and an object ? 

Then again, it may be said that the opposite of igno- 
rance consists in the distinct manifestation of the true 
nature (of the ego), and that (to us however) there is that 
apprehension (of the ego) the true nature of which is in- 
distinct ; and that, therefore, even when there is the 
knowledge of that (ego) which forms the abode and the 
object (of this positive ignorance), there is no contradiction 
at all in experiencing such ignorance. Indeed, if this is 
true, the antecedent non-existence of knowledge also forms 
the object of that (ego) the true nature of which is 
distinct, (/. e. this antecedent non-existence of knowledge 
is thus like your ' positive ignorance '). And the know- 
ledge of the abode of this (negative ignorance also), as 
well as of what constitutes its contradiction, relates to that 
(ego) the true nature of which is, (of itself), indistinct^ 
Therefore, (in upholding your ' positive ignorance '), there 
is nothing special, apart from the stubborn adherence to 
your own views. 

Even that ignorance, which has the nature of an enti- 
ty ,is, while it is being made out as ignorance, really depend- 
ent upon other (correlated) things; just as the apprehension 



Adhtk. 2. Snt. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 169 

of the antecedent non-existence (of knowledge) is (so de- 
pendent). Accordingly, ignorance may be either the absence 
of knowledge, or what is different from that (knowledge), 
or what is the opposite of it. In the case of all these three 
(ways of looking at ignorance), the need for making out the 
true nature of that (knowledge, the absence of, the differ- 
ence from, or the contradiction of which constitutes ignor- 
ance) has necessarily to be admitted. Surely, in making out 
the true nature of darkness, there is no need of light. 
Nevertheless, when that (darkness) has to be made out 
to be the same as that which is the opposite of light, 
there certainly is needed the (previous) knowledge of 
light. The ignorance admitted by you is never realised 
as it is in itself, but is merely realised as that which 
is not knowledge. Such being the case, it (viz. the 
ignorance assumed to be a positive entity by you) is 
as dependent upon knowledge as (is the idea of) the non- 
existence of knowledge. And the antecedent non-existence 
of knowledge is admitted by you also, and it is moreover 
understood by all. Therefore, it has to be granted that, in 
the cognition ' I am ignorant, I do not know myself, nor 
do I know another,' what is experienced is only that ante- 
cedent non-existence of knowledge which is accepted by 
both of us. 

Moreover, the experience of ignorance (or avidyd) is 
not possible to the Brahman, whose essential nature is alto- 
gether made up of eternal, free, self-luminous and uni- 
form intelligence ; because He is Himself of the nature of 
self-experience. If it be said that, even the Brahman, whose 
essential nature is self-experience, perceives ignorance (or 
avidya) when that essential nature of His is concealed, it is 
asked, what it is to have the concealment of one's own essen- 
tial nature. If it be replied that it is the possession of an 
22 



i;o SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

unmanifest nature, it is asked again how that Brahman, 
whose essential nature is self-experience, can possess 
an unmanifest nature. If it be again said, in reply, that it is 
possible for that Brahman, whose essential nature is 
self-experience, to acquire an unmanifest character through 
the influence of something other than Himself, then, as has 
been already stated, there would result to the Brahman 
the destruction of His own essential nature, owing to the 
influence of that other thing ; because (according to you) 
luminosity (or, in other words, manifest intelligibility) has 
to constitute the essential nature of that (Brahman), owing 
to the fact that an attribute called luminosity is not ac- 
knowledged (by you in relation to the Brahman}. Again, 
this ignorance (or avidya), which forms the cause of the 
concealment of the essential nature of the Brahman, 
conceals the Brahman, only after it is itself experienced 
(by the Brahman} ; and it is after (thus) concealing the 
Brahman, that it in itself becomes the object of His 
experience. Thus there arises the logical fallacy of re- 
ciprocal dependence. If it be said that it (viz. avidya) 
conceals (the Brahman} only after it is experienced (by the 
Brahman}, it would follow that that Brahman, whose essen- 
tial nature is not concealed, Himself experiences that igno- 
rance (or avidya). . Then the hypothesis of concealment 
would be purposeless, as also the hypothesis of this (con- 
cealing) ignorance itself ; because it must be possible for 
the Brahman to perceive the world also which is acknow- 
ledged to be the result of ignorance (or avidya), in the 
same way in which (it is possible for Him) to perceive this 
ignorance (or avidya). 

Further, does the Brahman, of Himself, experience this 
ignorance, or (does He experience it) through the influence 
of something other than Himself ? If it be said that He 



Adhik. I. Sut. /]. SRI-BHA.SHYA. 171 

of Himself (experiences it\ we reply that, because the ex- 
perience of ignorance is thus associated with the essential 
nature of the Brahman, there can be no release (from it). 
Or, owing to the fact that the Brahman, whose essential 
nature is experience, acquires thus the character of being 
the experience of ignorance, there will arise the destruction 
of the essential nature of the Brahman Himself, through 
the knowledge which is destructive (of that ignorance or 
avidya);m the same manner in which the perception of silver 
(in a mother-of-pearl) is destroyed by means of the know- 
ledge which stultifies the falsely perceived silver. If the 
Brahman experience ignorance (or avidya) through the 
influence of something other (than Himself), what is 
that other thing ? If it be said that it is another igno- 
rance for avidya ), there would result the fallacy ' 3 of 
regressus in inftnitum. If it be (again) said that after hav- 
ing concealed the Brahman Himself, it (viz. ignorance or 
avidya) becomes the object of experience, then it is re- 
plied that, in such a case, like kdcha* 5 J and other causes of 
false perception, this ignorance (or avidya) also, through the 
mere fact of its own existence as an entity, conceals the 
Brahman ; and that, in consequence, there will be no 
removal of ignorance (or avidya} by means of knowledge. 
It may be said again that this ignorance (or avidya) 
is itself beginningless, and that it causes the Brahman to 
be the witness ' 5 2 of (that ignorance) itself, at the same 



150. Because this other ignorance ignorance produces the concealment of 
would have to depend upon a third the Brahman at the same time that it 
ignorance, which again would have to causes Him to be a witness of itself, 
depend upon a fourth, and this again and so there is no such fallacy 
upon a fifth, and so on ad infinitum. as requires thepostuhuion of a series 

151. Vide supra p. 104. n. 69. of avidyds. 

152. In this case, one and the same 



i;2 SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

time that it also (produces) the concealment of the essential 
nature of the Brahman, and that there is, in consequence, 
no room for fallacies like regressiis in uifinitum, &c. 
But it is replied that this is not right ; because it 
is impossible for the Brahman, whose essential na- 
ture is self-experience, to acquire the character of being 
a witness without the concealment of His own true na- 
ture. If it be said in reply that (the true nature of the 
Brahman) is concealed by some other cause (than igno- 
rance or avidya), then, it is pointed out that the beginning- 
lessness of this ignorance (or avidya] is (thereby) given up, 
and the aforesaid fallacy of regressiis in infinitum also 
follows. If one, whose essential nature is altogether uncon- 
cealed, acquires the character of being a witness, then that 
one cannot possess the character of being altogether the 
basis of self-experience. 

Furthermore, when the Brahman is concealed by 
ignorance (or avidya), does not that Brahman shine forth 
even a little ? Or does He shine forth a little ? On the former 
supposition, the Brahman, whose essential nature is pure 
luminosity, becomes non-luminosity; and, as it has been 
already stated more than once, He (thus) acquires the cha- 
racter of a mere nothing. On the latter supposition, it is 
asked, which is the part concealed, and which is it that 
shines forth, in the Brahman who is uniformly Exist- 
ence and Intelligence and Bliss throughout ? As it is im- 
possible for a thing, which is destitute of parts, destitute 
of attributes, and is pure luminosity, to have two distinct 
forms, concealment and luminosity cannot, at one and the 
same time, exist together in that thing. 

Then, again, it may be urged that, when concealed by 
ignorance (or avidya), the Brahman who is uniformly Exist- 
ence and Intelligence and Bliss throughout, appears like 



Adhik. I. Si'tt. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 173 

a thing which has an indistinct nature. Then, of what nature 
is the distinctness and indistinctness of that thing the 
essential nature of which is pure luminosity ? What is said 
is this : Whatever is possessed of parts, whatever is 
possessed of attributes, whatever forms the thing illum- 
ined by luminosity, the complete manifestation of 
that thing is distinct manifestation. That manifestation 
in which a few of the attributes (of a thing) are 
absent is indistinct manifestation. It being so, whatso- 
ever aspect of the thing is unknown, in that aspect, 
there is the absence of luminosity ; and for that very rea- 
son, there can be no indistinctness in relation to luminosity. 
Whatsoever aspect of the thing is known, in that aspect 
the luminosity relating to it is undoubtedly distinct. Hence, 
under all circumstances, there can be no indistinctness in 
relation to what constitutes luminosity. Even in per- 
ceiving an external object as it is, even then indistinct- 
ness consists in not knowing a few of the attributes 
belonging to it. Therefore, when the Brahman who is 
not the object of perception, who is devoid of attri- 
butes, and is pure luminosity, is of Himself completely 
manifest in His own true nature, then that indistinctness, 
which consists in the non-perception of a few of His attri- 
butes and which is said to be the result of ignorance (or 
avidya), cannot at all exist (in relation to Him). 

Moreover, does this indistinctness which is the result of 
ignorance (or avidya) disappear at the rise of the knowledge 
of truth, or does it not ? If it does not disappear, then 
there cannot be the beatific state of final release. If it dis- 
appears, then it has to be determined of what form the 
reality is. If it be said that it has a distinctly manifest na- 
ture, then, it is asked, whether or not this distinctly mani- 
fest nature existed before (that reality was veiled by igno- 



174 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. I. 

ranee or amdya}. If it did exist before, then, (in relation 
to that reality), there cannot be that indistinctness which 
is the result of ignorance (or avidya), and (there cannot be) 
also the disappearance of that (same indistinctness). If it 
did not exist before, then the beatific state of final release 
acquires the character of an effect, and thus becomes 
impermanent. 

And it has been already stated 1 33 that this ignorance 
(or avidya) cannot exist, simply because its abode cannot 
be defined. Moreover, even he, who maintains that illu- 
sion has an unreal misguiding cause at its root, will find it 
difficult to establish that illusion does not arise without 
a (really existing) basis (for it to be imposed upon); because 
illusion is possible, even when its basis is unreal, in the 
same way in which that illusion is possible when the mis- 
guiding cause producing the illusion and (the reality form- 
ing) the seat of (such) a misguiding cause are (both) unreal. 
And from this (possibility of illusion without a real basis) 
there will only follow the nothingness of all things. 

What has been stated already to the effect that ignor- 
ance (or avidya), which has the nature of an entity, is 
established by the logical process of inference also, that 
is not right; because (such) a logical process of inference is 
impossible. But it may be said that the inference intended 
to establish this has already been given. True, it has been 
so given; but it is wrong ; because, in (establishing) the ig- 
norance (accepted by you), the middle term of the syllo- 
gism 1 84 proves also that other ignorance which is not accep- 
table (to you), and is hence unfavourable (to you). There 
(/. e. in your syllogism), if it (viz. the middle term) does not 

153. Vide supra pp. 157. et seq. syllogism is given in full. 

154. Vide su^ra p. 167. where this 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRi-BniSHYA. 175 

form the means of proving that other ignorance, then it ceas- 
es to be absolute. 1 53 If it does form the means of proving 
that (ignorance) also, then this other ignorance prevents 
(the Brahman] from becoming the witness of the ig- 
norance (or avidya accepted by you) ; and consequently, 
the hypothesis of (a positive) ignorance (or avidya) becomes 
purposeless. 

Moreover, the illustrative example 136 is deficient in 
regard to the middle term, because the light of the 
lamp-flame does not really possess the power of illumin- 
ing such things as were unknown before. Indeed, every- 
where, it is intelligence alone that possesses the power 
of illumining (things). For, even when the lamp-flame is 
in existence, in the absence of intelligence, there will 
be no illumination in relation to objects. The senses 
also are merely the means of producing knowledge ; 
but they do not possess the power of illumining (things). 
The light of the lamp-flame possesses only the power 
of being helpful to the knowledge-producing sense of 
sight, through removing the darkness which obstructs 
(the production of knowledge). The current notion 
that the lamp-flame is an illuminator, depends upon its 
being a serviceable means to the sense of sight, which is 
engaged in the production of that knowledge which illu- 
mines (things). It may be said " The light of the lamp- 
flame has been cited by us as an illustration, not 
because we admit it to possess the same illuminating 

155. If the middle term of the prove the ignorance or avidya which 

syllogism here prove an ignorance or is other than the positive one under 

avidya, other than what has the na- discussion, then the reasoning be- 

ture of a positive entity, then the comes too narrow. In either case, this 

reasoning becomes too wide. If the syllogism cannot but be fallacious, 
same middle term do not, however, 156. Vide supra p. 167. 



176 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

character as knowledge has ; but because we admit that 
knowledge itself has the power of causing such illumina- 
tion as conies after the removal of what conceals its own 
object." This is not, however, right. Surely, the charac- 
ter of an illuminator does not consist merely in the re- 
moval of what obstructs (illumination); but (consists) 
wholly in the definite presentation of things (to conscious- 
ness), or, in other words, (it consists) in making things fit 
to be realised. And this (power) belongs only to intelligence. 
If the power of illumining things, that were not illumined 
before, is admitted in relation to such things also as are 
helpful (in the production of knowledge), then, surely 
the power of illumining things not illumined before has 
to be admitted in relation to the senses also, because, (in 
the production of knowledge), they are helpful in the 
highest degree. If it be so admitted, then, because, (in 
producing knowledge), they (viz. the senses) are not 
preceded in time by some other thing capable of being 
removed by them, the middle term (in your syllogism) 
ceases to be absolute. And now let us have done with 
this (kind of criticism .) 

And in this connection there are the following counter- 
syllogistic statements : That ignorance (or avidya), which 
is the subject of dispute (between us), has not for its 
abode the Brahman who is pure intelligence : because it 
(viz. that avidya) possesses the character of (illusory) non- 
knowledge, * 3 7 like the (illusory) non-knowledge which re- 
lates to the mother-of-pearl, &c ; indeed this has the know- 
er for its abode. That ignorance (or avidya), which 
is the subject of dispute (between us), does not conceal the 

157. Non-knowledge is used here ledge, or the opposite of knowledge, 
so as to denote, either false know- or what is other than knowledge. 



Adhik. I. SfU. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 177 

Brahman who is pure intelligence : because it possesses 
the character of (illusory) non-knowledge, like the (illusory) 
non-knowledge which relates to the mother-of-pearl, &c ; 
indeed this conceals (only external) objects. That 

ignorance (or avidya), which is the subject of dispute (be- 
tween us), is not capable of being removed by knowledge: 
because it does not possess the power of concealing the ob- 
jects of knowledge. Whatever non-knowledge is removed 
by knowledge, that (non-knowledge) conceals the objects of 
knowledge, like the non-knowledge relating to the mother- 
of-pearl, &c. The Brahman is not the seat of ignorance 
(or avidya), because, (according to you), He, like pots, &c., 
does not possess the qualit3 r of being the knower. The 
Brahman is not concealed by ignorance (or avidya) ; be- 
cause He is not, (according to you), an object of knowledge. 
Whatever is concealed by non-knowledge, that has to be an 
object of knowledge, like the mother-of-pearl, &c. The 
Brahman is not that ignorance (or avidya) which is 
capable of being removed by knowledge ; because He 
is not an object of knowledge. Whatever non-knowledge 
is capable of being removed by knowledge, that (non-know- 
ledge) is an object of knowledge, like (the non-knowledge 
relating to) the mother-of-pearl, &c. That knowledge 
which is acquired with the help of the accepted means of 
proof, and (the nature of) which is the subject of dispute 
(between us,) has not, for its antecedent in time, any 
ignorance (or avidya) which is different from its own 
antecedent non-existence ; because that (knowledge also) 
possesses the character of such knowledge as is ob- 
tained with the help of the accepted -means of proof; 
like the knowledge which, being derived with the help of 
the accepted means of proof, proves (according to you) 
the ignorance (or avidya) that is admitted by you. Know- 



178 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

ledge cannot be the destroyer of an entity; because 
it possesses the "character of knowledge, even when it is 
not associated with the manifestation of any particular 
(constructive or destructive) power. Whatever happens to 
be the destroyer of an entity, that is seen to be either the 
knowledge or the non-knowledge which is associated with 
the manifestation of a particular power, like the knowledge 
which is possessed by the Lord, and by Yogins and others, 
or like the (non-knowledge which is found in a) club and 
other similar objects. That ignorance (or avidyti) which 
has the nature of an entity is not capable of being destroy- 
ed by knowledge; because it possesses the nature of 
an entity, like pots, &c., (which are not destroyed merely 
by any knowledge). 

It may be said again here that we (actually) see the 
(subsequent) stultifying knowledge destroy fear 1 58 and other 
such emotions, which are (positive entities) caused by the 
previous (false) knowledge (of a serpent superimposed upon 
a rope, for instance). But that is not right. Indeed, the 
disappearance of those (emotions of fear, &c.,) is not due 
to knowledge ; because, being transitory, they themselves 
go out of existence, and because also, when their cause is 
removed, they never recur again. Their transitoriness is 
made out from the fact that they are experienced, 
like knowledge, only in the presence of that which brings 
them into existence, and also from the fact that they 
are not experienced otherwise. And if fear and other 

158. This is an oil-quoted illustra- in a rope, and that they can be de- 

tion of the 2iwaitins. They hold stroyed by the knowledge of the real- 

tha.t fear and such other emotions ity. So also ignorance or avidya has the 

are of the nature of positive entities, nature of an entity and can be de- 

and may arise from illusory causes stroyed by the knowledge of the Brah- 

like the false perception of a snake man. 



Adhik. I. Sftt. i.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 179 

such emotions are not transitory, then, in a continuous 
succession of the same mental impressions which form the 
cause of fear and other such emotions, every one of those 
mental impressions will, without any difference whatever, 
act as the cause of the production of fear and of other such 
emotions ; and thus there will be room for many fears (to 
arise without cessation from the same cause to the same 
person) : and therefore also (they cannot but be transitory). 

By the mention of purposeless qualifications in the 
statement that (knowledge) has, for its antecedent in time, 
another existing thing which is different from the antece- 
dent non-existence of that (knowledge itself), 1 39 your 
wonderful skill in using words is indeed well shown forth. 

Therefore, by means of the logical process of inference 
also, there cannot be the establishment of that ignorance 
(or avidyd) which has the nature of an entity. 

It will be stated presently that ignorance (or avidya) 
cannot be established by scriptural evidence as well as by 
the evidence of circumstantial presumption in relation to 
the interpretation of the scriptures. This proposition 1 cu 
also, namely, that the cause of a thing, which is unreal, 
is also certainly unreal, will be disproved by the logical 

159. Vide supra p. 167., where ignorance or avidya. is a positive en- 
the statement in which these qua- tity, but not simply the negation of 
lifications occur, runs thus; "That knowledge. This idea that it is an en- 
knowledge, which is obtained with the tity is expressed by the use of the word 
help of the accepted means of proof vastu which means an existent thing, 
and' (the nature of) which is the Therefore it is pointed out in the 
subject of dispute between us, has for argument, here, that all the qualifica- 
its antecedent in time, another existing tions attached to that word vastu so 
thing which is different from the an- as to make it signify an entity are 
tecedent non-existence of that (know- redundant in as much a?, of itself, it 
ledge) itself." The object of the stale- signifies an entity, 
ment above quoted is to prove that 160. Vide supra p. 164. 



i8o SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

arguments that are appropriately given in the section 101 
which begins with the aphorism. "(The Brahman] is not 
(the cause of this world) being different from this world 
&c." [Ved. Sut.ll. 1.4.]. 

Hence, there can be no perception which has that 
indescribable ignorance (or avidyd] for its object. It (viz. 
that ignorance) can not be admitted to be of such (inde- 
scribable) nature even though (in relation to it), there are 
perception, illusion, and stultification. Whatever becomes 
manifest to consciousness, that alone forms the object of 
perception, illusion, and stultification. It is not proper to 
assume that what is not arrived at by means of these modes 
of manifestation, as well as by means of any other mode of 
manifestation, forms the object of these (very modes of 
manifestation). It may be said again, thus: There is the 
perception of silver, &c., in the mother-of-pearl, &c.; 
and even at the time of this perception there is the 
stultification to the effect that it (viz. silver) is not in exist- 
ence (there); and one thing cannot, possibly, appear like 
another : for all these reasons, it has to be assumed that 
a new indescribable "something in the form of this silver 
becomes manifest under the influence of a misguiding cause. 
But it is not right to say so : because, even when such an 
assumption is made, the appearance of one thing like an- 
other is not avoided; and because it is possible to have 
perceptual manifestation, volitional activity, illusion, and 
stultification (of illusion), only when it is admitted that 
it is possible for one thing to appear like another ; ajid 
because also it is improper to assume the existence of a 

161. This section comprises sutras man is not the cause of this world, 

II. I. 4 to 12. and goes by the name being different from this world ; and 

of the 'Vilakshanat-wadhikarana, on such difference is made out from the 

account of the first sutra in the sec- scripture." 
tion being as follows: " The BraA- 



Adhik. /. Sftl. /.] SRi-BniSHYA. 181 

thing which is absolutely unseen and has no originating 
cause whatsoever. Indeed, this (silver) which is assumed 
(by you) to be indescribable is not perceived (then at the 
time of the illusion) to be indescribable, but (is perceived) 
to be nothing other than real silver. If, (however), it 
appeared to be altogether indescribable, then, there would 
be no room for illusion, for stultification, and also for 
volitional activity. Hence, you also have to admit the 
view that it is only the mother-of-pearl and other such 
things which appear to consciousness in the form' of silver 
and other such things ; because, when one thing does not 
appear like another, it is not possible to have (the related) 
manifestation, volitional activity, stultification, and illusion 
(in connection with things), and because also it is not 
possible to avoid that (kind of otherwise-manifestation). 

Moreover, even those, who hold other opinions 
regarding the manifestation of things to consciousness, have 
necessarily to accept the appearance of things otherwise 
than as they are, although they may have gone very far (in 
their course of reasoning). According to the view 1 c 2 which 
says that what becomes manifest to consciousness is mere 
non-existence, (this non-existence has to appear) in the form 
of existence. According to the view 163 which says that 
what becomes manifest to consciousness is merely the idea, 
(this idea has to appear) in the form of objects. According 
to the view 104 which says that what becomes manifest 
to consciousness is the non-apprehension (of the differ- 

162. This refers to Nihilism or The names of the several khyahs 
the view of the Madhyamikas. or theories of perception are given 

163. This refers to Idealism, or the in this commonly quoted sloka 
view of the Yogacharas. "^.tmakhydtiyasatkhydtirakhydtihkhydtir- 

164. This is the view of those anyathd \ iathdnirrachartakkydtirily- 
who are known as Akfiydtivadiits. etatftfty ! 3tifaHckal:am\\ 



182 SRI-BHA.SHYA. {Chap. I. Part. L 

ence (between two things), the characteristic of one thing 
has to appear as the characteristic of another tiling, and 
two perceptions have to appear as only one ; and even on 
the supposition that there is no object corresponding to this 
erroneous perception, (a non-existent) object has to appear 
as existent. 

Moreover, he, who holds the view that here (/. e. in the 
mother-of-pearl) a kind of new and indescribable silver is 
born, has also to state the cause of the origin of that (silver). 
It (viz. the cause of the origin of that silver) can not be the 
mere manifestation of that silver, because that (manifesta- 
tion) has that (same silver) for its object, and so cannot 
itself come into existence before the production of that 
(silver). That (a particular manifestation) has arisen with- 
out relating to any particular object, that that (manifestation 
itself) has afterwards produced that (object), and then has 
made it its own object, this is indeed the teaching of very 
great men!! Again (it may be said that) it (viz. the cause 
of the origin of that silver) is an error (or defect) found in 
the senses, &c. This is not so, because it (viz. such a cause 
of erroneous perception) abides in the person, and so 
cannot have the power of producing an effect that is found 
in relation to external objects. Then again it is not the 
senses (that form the cause of the origin of such silver), 
because they are the means of producing knowledge. Xor 
are the wrongly affected senses (the cause of the origin 
of that silver), because they also are capable of giving 
rise to something peculiar, only in relation to that know- 
ledge which is produced by themselves. That the beginning- 
less ignorance (or avidya) constitutes the cause (of the pro- 
duction of that silver) has, indeed, been already disproved. 

Again, how is it that this indescribable and newl}* 
produc'ed totality of things is made to be the object of the 



Adhik. I. SuL i.] SRi-BulSHYA. 183 

notion and of the word which denote silver and other (such 
falsely perceived) objects, but is not made the object of the 
notion and of the word which denote pots and other (cor- 
rectly perceived) things? If it be said that it is due to their 
similarity with silver and other (such falsely perceived) ob- 
jects, then let the notion and the word (which denote this 
new and indescribable totality of things) denote that (tota- 
lity) to be the same as that (silver and other such things 
which are perceived to be unreal). If it be said that it is due 
to their association with the genus of silver and of other 
(such falsely perceived) objects,it is asked whether this genus 
is real, or whether it is unreal. Surely, it cannot be real ; 
because, (in such a case), it cannot be (inseparably) asso- 
ciated with what is unreal. Nor can it be unreal; because, 
(then), it cannot be in (inseparable) association with what 
is real, and because also it is not possible for the notion and 
the word which denote reality to be made to denote that 
which is unreal. Thus we have had enough in the way of 
criticising unripe and fallacious reasoning. 

On the other hand, (the truth is as follows): "The 
opinion of those who know the Vcdas is that all knowledge 
is real, because, according to the Srutts and the Smritis, 
every thing may become manifest in the form of every other 
thing. At the commencement of (the portion dealing with) 
creation and the other acts (of the Lord) which are preced- 
ed by His volition 'May I become manifold' [QJthand. 
Up. VI. 2. 3.] it is urged in the Sruti itself '(I will make) 
each of these 165 tri-partite'. 1 66 [Qt/iand. Up. VI. 3. 3 & 

165. These, namely, the things constituted as to possess the character 
fire, water and earth. Vide Chhand. of all the three elements of tfjas, 
L'p. VI. 2,3 4. water, and earth. This composition 

166. Tripartition is the process is said to be caused at the beginning of 
by which each one of the three things creation. Vide Qi/idnd. Up. VI. 3. 
namely, fire, water mid earth is so 4 & $. Thus, when the thing fire is 



184 



SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 



4.]. Thus, indeed, the tri-partition (of the elements) is 
made out by direct revelation. The red colour of fire 
is the colour of (the element) tejas, the white (colour of 
fire,) is (the colour of the element) of water, and the black 
(colour of fire) is (the colour of the element) of earth. 1 cr 
Thus this tripleness of form is shown by the Sniti itself 
to exist in relation to fire itself. It is so stated in 
the Vishnu- Pur ana*** also at the commencement of (the 
portion dealing with) creation, in the following and other 
passages: 'Then they (viz. the constituent elements 169 

divided into two equal parts, one of \vhichpreponderatesovertheothers. 
these halves is found to be made up of 
the element of fire; and if the other 
half be again subdivided into two 
parts, one of these would be seen to be 
made up of the element of water, and 
the other, of the element of earth. 
Such is the case also with watery and 
earthy things. Hence 50 per cent of 
the thing fire, is made up of the ele- 
ment tejas, 25 per cent, of the ele- 
ment of water, and 25 per cent, of the 
element of earth. To this thing the 
name of fire is given, because in it the 
element tejas preponderates over the 
other two elements. Similarly that 
thing is called water in the composi- 
tion of which the element of water 
preponderates over the other two 
elements of tejas and earth. And 



that thing is called earth in the 
composition of which the element of 
earth preponderates over the other 
two elements of tejas and water. In this 
manner every thing in the world may 
be said to contain every other thing in 
the world, but it derives its name from 
that element in! its composition 



167. ViteChhand.UpXl.i. I to 6. 

168. Vide V. P. I. 2. 

169. The constituent elements 
or Ttlttvas of the universe are as 
follow in the descending order: (/) 
Pradhdna or Prakriti, nature, (2) 
Mahal or Buddhi, the ' great principle', 
(?) Ahahkdra or egoity; the Tan- 
matras or the subtle and rudimentary 
elements characterised by (4) Sabda, 
sound, (5) Spar'sa, touch, (<J) Rupa, 
form or colour, (7) Rasa, taste, (<) 
Gandha, smell ; the grosser elements 
corresponding to these Tanmatras are 
(9) Akasa, ether, (id) Vdyu, air, 
(//) Tejas, light or heat, (72) Ap, 
water, (/j) Sahghata or Prit/uv?, the 
earth ; (14) the mind ; the senses of 
(75) Sro/ra, hearing, (16) Ttak, touch, 
(77) Chakshus, sight, (18) Rasa, taste 
(19) Gandha, smell ; and the or 
gans of (20) speaking, (27) work- 
ing, (22) walking, and the organs 
connected with (2j) defalcation and 
(24) reproduction. The 2$th element 
is the individual soul, which is beyond 
the \Pratriti, in the ascending order. 



Adhik. I. Sul. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 185 

themselves) possessing varied powers were, while sepa- 
rate, wholly unable to create beings, without (themselves) 
having been thrown together. Having secured combination 
with each other, and abiding in each other, the elements, 
that begin with the universal principle known as the 
mahat and end with the (well known) particular principles, 
have gone to make up the universe indeed.' J ~ Further, 
the Sutrakara (viz. Badarayana) also has similarly spoken 
of the tripleness of form, belonging to the elements, to 
the effect that, although all created things consist of 
the three elements (of lejas, water and earth), still the 
mention of water as the name of a particular thing is 
due to the preponderance of that element in it ; ' 7 ' and 
thus arises a difference of names (in relation to things). 
The wise hold that the direction of the Sruti to use the 
putlka plant in the absence of the soma plant is due to 
the presence of the constituents of the soma (in the 
pntlka). The use of wild rice (for offerings) in the 
absence of cultivated rice is due to (the wild rice) possess- 
ing the characteristics of the cultivated rice. That which 
is found to form a part of any (homogeneous) substance 
that alone is similar (in essence) to that (substance). The 
presence of silver, &c., in the mother-of-pearl, &c., is thus 
taught by the Sruti itself. The difference in the names of 
things such as silver, mother-of-pearl, &c., has preponder- 
ance for its cause. Moreover, the mother-of-pearl, &c., 
are perceived as being similar to silver, &c.. Hence, the 
presence here (/. c. in the mother-of-pearl) of that (viz. 

The SaiiJihvas admit only these 25 tall- the .Mahal downwards, vide supra n 

ngf or principles. The VeJantins how- 169. These are called universal pi in 

ever add the Brahman as the 26th tat- ciples, and the remaining sixteen arc 

Ira, above and beyond the individual called particular principles. Vide V.T. 

soul. Cf. M. B/i. II. 223. & Manu. 1. I. 2. 52 to 54. 

170. For the seven principles from 171. Ved. $t~it. III. I. 2, 



1 86 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. /, 

silver) is determined by perception. Sometimes, on 
account of a defect in the sense of sight, &c., the 
silver-part (in the mother-of-pearl) is apprehended without 
the shell-part ; and, accordingly, one in quest of. silver 
begins to act in obedience to volition. When the defect is 
removed, and the shell-part of the mother-of-pearl is appre- 
hended, that (volitional activity in regard to silver) ceases. 
Therefore, the perception of silver &c., in the mother-of- 
pearl, &c., is real. The relation of the stultified and 
the stultifier also, (existing between these perceptions), re- 
sults from the preponderance of the one (perception) over 
the other, according as the apprehension of the preponder- 
ance of the mother-of-pearl (over the silver) is partial or 
complete. Therefore, this (relation of the stultified and 
the stultifier) is not dependent upon their relating to unreal 
things and real things. The rule that every thing has the 
characteristics of every other thing is thus established." 
In the condition of dreams also, according to the merit 
and demerit of living beings, God Himself creates corres- 
ponding objects, which are capable of being perceived by 
certain particular persons, and which come to their end after 
a certain particular length of time. To this same effect is 
the following scriptural text relating to the condition of 
dreams : "There (i.e. in the condition of dreams), there are 
no chariots, no horses to be yoked, and no roads. But He 
creates the chariots, the horses to be yoked, and the roads. 
There is no bliss, no happiness and no joy, but He creates 
bliss, happiness and joy. There, there are no puddles, no 
lakes, and no rivers, but He creates the puddles, the lakes, 
and the rivers. Indeed, He is the creator." \Brih. Up. IV. 
3. 10.]. Although these things are not at that time (of 
dreaming) capable of being perceived by all persons other 
(than the dreamer), yet the Lord creates such things 



dhik. L Sat. /.] ^Ri-BHisHYA. 187 



to be perceived only by each particular (dreaming) per- 
son. Indeed, He is the creator. That kind ofcreatorship is 
appropriate to Him who wills the truth and whose powers 
are wonderful. This is the meaning (of the above scriptural 
text). Again (it is stated in the scripture thus) : " That 
Person, who, engaged in creating things according to His 
free will and pleasure, is ever wakeful, while all these are 
asleep, That is the Brilliant One, That is the Brahman, 
That alone is called the Immortal. All the worlds abide in 
Him, and there is none to transcend Him." [Kath. Up. 
V. 8.]. The Sftlrakdra also, (first of all) in these two apho- 
risms, namely, "In the intermediate state (/. e. in the dream- 
ing state), there is creation, for, it (vi/. the scripture) says 
(so)." [Vcd.Sni. III. 2. i.], "And some (say the indivi- 
dual self is the creator, sons and others (being the things 
created)." {Veil. Silt. III. 2. 2.], supposes the individual 
self to be the creator in relation to the things seen in dreams; 
then by means of this aphorism, namely, "But it (viz. all 
that is seen in dreams) is merely the may a ' 7 - (of the Lord 
but not the creation of the individual self), because they 
(viz. the attributes of willing the truth, <c.,) have not 
their nature manifest in full (the individual self in the 
samsdra state)." [ Vcd. Sill. III. 2. 3.], and by means 
of other aphorisms, he shows that the individual self cannot 
have the characteristics of the creator, because the natural 
characteristics of willing the truth, &c., belonging to the 
individual self, are all unmanifest there in the samsara state. 
This wonderful creation, created so as to be capable of 
being perceived by certain particular (dreaming) persons, 
altogether proceeds from the Lord. Seeing that the 
scripture says" All the worlds abide in Him." [Kath. Up. 

172. A/dyd here means wonderful creation. 



i88 SRi-BHlSHYA. {Chap. 1. Part. 1. 

V. 8], it is made out that the Supreme Self is Himself the 
creator there (/. e. in dreams). Thus, he (the Sutrakard) 
disproves (the supposition with which he started). To 
him, who, sleeping in a room or in any other place, ex- 
periences a dream, it is possible to go to another country 
with his own body, to be crowned there as a king, to be 
decapitated, and so on. These are the results of his karmic 
merit and demerit, and are possible only in consequence ot 
the creation of another body having the same form and 
configuration as the body that is in the state of sleep. 

But in the (perception of the) yellow conch and other such 
things (by the jaundiced eye), the ocular rays 1 73 combined 
with the bilious substance existing in the eye are brought 
into association with the conch and other such things. The 
whiteness belonging to the conch is not apprehended, be- 
cause it is overpowered by the yellow colour belonging to 
the bile. Hence, as in the case of the conch-shell covered 
with gold, there is the perception that the conch is yellow. 
The bilious substance and the yellow colour, belonging to it, 
are veiy subtle, and are not therefore apprehended by the 
standers by. But, by him who is (thus) afflicted with bilious- 
ness, they are, though subtle, apprehended well, because 
they have proceeded from his own eyes and are thus 
in very close proximity (to him). They are also, 
though at a distance, apprehended by means of the 
ocular rays, which possess that peculiar power which 
is due to having apprehended them (in close proxi- 
mity ). A crystal gem lying close to a china rose 
is apprehended to be red, because it is overpowered 
by the brilliant coloration of that (china rose). Al- 
though the (coloured) brilliance of the china rose radi- 

173. Vide supi a. p. 93. n. 59. 



Adhik. L Sffl. /.] SRl-BHlSHYA. 189 

ates in all directions, yet it is apprehended with great 
clearness, only when it is in association with a transpar- 
ent substance (like the crystal gem). Thus, this (redness 
of the crystal gem) is capable of being established by 
perception. Again, the perception of water in a mirage pos- 
sesses the character of reality, because water is (always) 
found in association with both the elements oflcjas and earth, 
and because there is (here,) no apprehension of lejas and 
earth on account of some defect in the sense organs, and 
because also there is the apprehension of water through the 
influence of some unseen agency. Also, in regard to 

the circle of fire produced by the rotation of a fire- 
brand, the perception of that (circle) is right!}' caus- 
ed, in consequence of there being no apprehension 
of the interspaces (between any two successive positions 
of the fire-brand), owing to the very rapid motion 
of the fire-brand and its consequent association with all the 
parts (of the circumference). Even in the perception of this 
circle, there is indeed such apprehension of certain parti- 
cular objects in association with certain particular posi- 
tions, as is attended with the non-apprehension of the 
interspaces. In the case of some positions there is the non- 
apprehension of interspaces, for the reason that the inter- 
spaces are themselves absent. In other positions, there is the 
non-apprehension (of interspaces) on account of the rapid- 
ity of motion. Such is the difference (between them). 
Therefore, this (perception of the circle of fire) is based upon 
reality. The perception of one's own face in the mirr- 

or and in. other such things is also based upon reality. The 
rays proceeding from the eye are stopped and reflected 
in their movement by the mirror and other such things; and 
thus, they first apprehend the mirror and other such things, 
and then apprehend one's own face and other similar 



SRi-J3HisHYA. {Chap. 1. Part. L 

objects. In this case also, on account of the rapidity of 
movement (of the ocular aura), there is no apprehension 
of the interspace (between the mirror and the image), 
and consequently there is such a perception. Also in 

regard to the illusion relating to direction in space, since 
any other region of space may be actually found to 
exist in this (region of space), that other region of space is, 
through the influence of some unseen agency, apprehend- 
ed as if unassociated with this region of space. There- 
fore the apprehension of one region of space as another 
is also based upon reality itself. liven in the 

case of the perception of two moons and other such 
perceptions, there is a division caused in the movement 
of the aura proceeding from the eye, owing to timira, l 1 * 
pressure with the fingers, &c., and hence there arises a 
variety in the means intended to help (the apprehension 
of the moon,). Thus a duality of the means which are in- 
dependent of each other forms the cause of the two ap- 
prehensions of the (one) moon. Of this (duality), one means 
apprehends the moon in its own place. But the second 
one, being somewhat crooked in its movement, first 
apprehends the region near to the moon and then appre- 
hends the moon there as dissociated from its own place. 
Therefore, in the apprehension of the moon in association 
with two regions at the same time, there arises, on account 
of the variety in the apprehension, a variety in the form 
of the thing apprehended; and there is also the absence of 
the apprehension of unity. Thus there is this particular per- 
ception to the effect that there are two moons. The asso- 
ciation of that (moon which is perceived in a place other 
than its own), with that place which is other than 

174. Vide supra p. 104. n. 69. 



Adkik. I. SnL /.] SRl-Bii.\siiYA. IQI 

its own, is due to the incessant apprehension of (that) 
other place and of the moon as unassociated with its own 
place. Therefore, the two apprehensions of the moon 
which are associated with two regions are also real. On 
account of there being a duality in the apprehension, the 
duality of the form which is apprehended in relation to the 
moon is also real. However, it may be held (here) 
that of the two apprehensions of the moon which are cha- 
racterised by two different qualifications, only one moon 
has to be the object. But, in such an apprehension, there 
is no power possessed by the eye itself (to reduce it to 
only one apprehension), as (there is) in the case of the 
recognitive cognition ; and so the ocular perception 
(of two moons) continues to remain as such. Although 
both the eyes form (only) one means intended to help (the 
apprehension of things), nevertheless, we have to assume 
from the effect produced (in this case of double vision) 
that the aura proceeding from the eye becomes changed into 
two means intended to help (the apprehension of things), 
for the reason that it (viz. that aura) is split up by timira and 
other such misguiding causes. But when the misguiding 
cause is removed,the moon, as associated with its own region, 
becomes known by means of only one apprehension. 
Therefore, the belief arises that the moon is only in one 
place. This duality of the means is due to the misguiding 
cause ; the duality of apprehension is due to that (duality 
of the means); the duality in the form of the thing appre- 
hended is due to that (duality of apprehension). According- 
ly, it (viz. this explanation) is faultless. Therefore 
it is a settled conclusion that the totality of all perceptions 
is (altogether) based upon reality. 

Criticisms of the other theories of perception are 
fully given by those who maintain those (various) theories 



192 SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

themselves, and so no attempt is made (here) in the way of 
(discussing) them. Or rather, what is the use (of indul- 
ging) in too many forms of discussion of this kind? To 
those who accept the whole collection of the criteria of truth 
known as perception, inference, and scripture, and who ac- 
knowledge that Highest Brahman who is understood 
by means of the scripture, who is devoid of the least 
taint of all evil, who is possessed of hosts of innumer- 
able auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence, and 
who is omniscient and wills the truth (to them), 
what is there that cannot be proved and what is there that 
cannot be accomplished ? Indeed, the Divine Lord, who is 
the Highest Brahman, creates the whole of this world to 
suit the merit and demerit of the individual souls, so that it 
may be enjoyed (and endured by them). Accordingly, by 
Him there are created certain things which form the common 
objects of experience to all, and are capable of being 
experienced as the experience of (harm ic) results in the form 
of pleasures, pains, and states of indifference to pleasures 
and pains; and (by Him are also created) certain other things 
which are the objects of the experience of certain particular 
persons only, and which last only for a certain length of 
time, and are to be experienced as subject to various specific 
conditions. It being so, the relation of the stultified and 
the stultifier (between these two sets of things) is due to 
the one constituting the object of the exprience common to 
all, and the other not constituting such an object. 
Thus the whole (argument) is perfectly appropriate. 

Then again what has been urged 1 7 ' to the effect that 
(the a;<id\'a) t which is unlit to be defined either as 
an entity or as a non-entity, is established by revelation, 

175. Vide supra pp. 30 & 31. 



Adhik. I. SM. /.] SRi-BHlSHYA. 193 

that is not right ; because in the following scriptural 
passage Anritena hi pralyndhafr t * and in others, the 

word anrita does not denote what is indescribable. Indeed, 



the word anrita denotes what is not rita. The word rita 
expresses karma' 11 ' 1 (or the fruits of action), because it is 
stated 178 in the scripture that "there are the two enjoy- 
ing rita (or the fruits of action)." Rita is that karma 
which is free from attachment to fruits, which consists in the 
worship of the Highest Person, and the fruit of which is the 
attainment of that Person. Here (in the passage under 
discussion), anrita is the karma which is different from this 
(rita), and (therefore) has samsara^ 1 * for its result, and is 
(thus) opposed to the attainment of tlie Brahman. This (we 
learn) from the scriptural passage 1 8 "They (/. e. the crea- 
tures) do not obtain this world of the Brahman, being 
drawn away by anrita" Also in the passage 181 

" Then there was neither existence (sat) nor non-existence 
(asat)" the words sal and asat refer to intelligent and non- 
intelligent objects as produced by the secondary particular 
creation ; J 8 2 because this passage is intended to establish 
that the two things, which, as found at the time of creation, 
are denoted by the words sat and /ya/ 183 and form the 

176. Vide supra pp. 31 & 157. This is 180. Vide Chhdna. Up. VIII. 3. 2. 

apparently a quotation from Cjihdnd. 181. Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. & R. V. 

Up. VIII. 3. 2. "For they (/'. e. the X. 129. I & 3. Vide supra p. 31. 
creatures) are drawn away (from the 182. This is the creation of form- 

BraAman) by means of anrita." possessing conscious and unconscious 

177. Rita may also mean religious bodies taking place after the creation 
duties or works performed in this of undifferentiated primordial matter, 
life, truth, law, &c. 183. Vide Taitt. Up. II. 6. I., where 

178. Vide Kath. Up. III. I. the individual self which is intelli- 

179. The word samsara means the gent and the non-intelligent Prakriti^ 
ever-recurring succession of births or nature in its undifferentiated pri- 
and deaths and the consequent cotHi- mordial state, are respectively called 
nuance of the bondage of the soul. Sat and Tyat, for the reason that the 



194 SRI-BHISHYA. \Chap. I. Part. I. 

differentiated intelligent and non-intelligent objects pro- 
duced by the secondary particular creation, are, at the 
time of universal dissolution, absorbed into the thing which 
is denoted by the word tamcis^ 8 4 and constitutes the undif- 
ferentiated primordial non-intelligent matter. In this 
(passage), there is no mention made of anything which 
is said to possess the character of being indescribable either 
as an entity or as a non-entity ; because only the absence, 
at a particular time, of the things denoted by the words sat 
and asat is (herein) mentioned. What is denoted by the 
word tamas here is made out to mean undifferentiated 
primordial non-intelligent matter from another scriptural 
passage (also) which is to the effect "The avyakta ' 8 3 
is absorbed into the akshara ; the akshara is absorb- 
ed into the tamas." [Sub. Up. II.]. By the word 
tamas is denoted the subtle state of that prakriti which 
is made up of undifferentiated primordial non -intelligent 
matter ; this is indeed true. But if it be said that this 
(prakriti} is denoted by the word may a, as in the passage 

individual self is incapable of under- erentiated state, it is called the 

going, any transformation, and the Avibhakta-tamas ; in its first differen- 

non-intelligent Prakviti is capable of tiated state, it is called the Vibhakta- 

undergoing transformations at all tamas; in its next state, it is called 

times. the Akshara in which even the quali- 

184. Tamas is one of the names of iies ot Sattva,Rajas and Ta mas are not 
the Pradhana or the Prakriti in its seen to be differentiated and in which 
undifferentiated primordial state. Vide it is also said to be promiscuously 
Sub. 6^.11. In this state, it is said mixed up with the individual self; in its 
to be very subtle, so that it cannot be last state, it is called the Avyakta in 
easily distinguished from the indivi- which the differentiation of the three 
dual self with which it is invariably Gunas has begun to take place. From 
associated. this Avyakta proceeds the principle 

185. Four different states of the known as the Mahal, from this again 
Prakriti or nature are mentioned in proceeds the principle called Ahah- 
Sub. Up. II. In its primary undiff- kqra or egoity ; and so on. 



Adhik. L Si'tt. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 195 

" Know then that prakriti is mdyd." [Svct. Up. IV. 
10.], and that it is therefore indescribable; it is replied that 
it is not so, because the word mdyd is not known to ex- 
press what is indescribable. If it be said (again) that 
the word mdyd, being synonymous with unreality (/. c. 
ignorance or avidya}, expresses what is indescribable, it 
is replied that this (also) is not right. Indeed, the word 
maya does not, in all cases, denote unreality (/. e. ignorance 
or avidya) ; because the word may a is used to denote the 
weapons of Rdkshasas and A suras which, surely, are real- 
ly existent things. Accordingly, there is this passage : 
" The thousand may as (or wonderfully created weapons) of 
Sambara were destroyed one after another by that quickly 
moving (discus of the Lord) in guarding from injury the 
body of the boy (Prahlada)." [V. P. I. 19. 20.]. Hence the 
word maya denotes the creation of wonderful things. 
Prakriti also is called by the name of maya, because it 
certainly possesses the power of creating wonderful things. 
The scriptural passage " Out of this (prakriti ), He, 
who is the owner of the mdya (i. e. the Lord), creates 
this world wherein another being (viz. the individual self) 
is bound down by mdyd'' \Svet. LTp. IV. 9.] also points 
out that the prakriti, which is denoted by the word mdya, 
possesses the power of causing the creation of wonder- 
ful things. The Highest Person is called the May in, simply 
because He is the owner of that (mdya),* 86 but not because 
He is characterised by ignorance (or avidya). Indeed, it 
is stated in the scriptural passage " And in that (world) 
another being (viz. the individual soul) is bound down by 
mdyd" \Svet Up. IV. 9.], as also in the passage "When 
the individual soul, that has beetf asleep under the influence 

186. The word miya means either lion. It also means skill, knowledge, 
wonderful powers or wonderful creu- &c. 



ig6 SRi-BHiSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 1. 

of the beginningless mdyd, wakes up, (then he knows the 
Unborn One)." \_Md\id. Up. II. 21.], that the individual 
soul is bound down by mdyd (i. e. by nature). In the (follow- 
ing) scriptural passage also " Indra (i.e. the Highest Lord) 
is known to assume many forms through mdyds (or His 
wonderful powers of creating things)" \Brih. Up. II. 5. 
I 9-]> 1 87 the wonderful powers (of the Lord) are denoted (by 
the word mdyd}. Indeed, it is only for this reason that it is 
said " He (/. e. the Lord) shines very much like tvashtn 
(L e. the creator)." [R. V. VI. 47. 19.]. Indeed nothing 
shines forth that is overpowered by unreality (viz. ignor- 
ance or avidya}. Even in the passage " My mdyd 
is difficult to transcend." [B. G. VII. 14.], it is stated 
that it (viz. mdyd) consists of qualities ; therefore, what 
is denoted (by mdyd} is that prakriti itself which is 
made up of the three qualities (of sattva or goodness, 
rajas or passion, and tamas or darkness). Thus, by means 
of the scriptures, there is no establishment of that ig- 
norance (or avidya) which cannot be described either as 
an entity or as a non-entity. 

Nor (is that ignorance or avidya established) by means 
of the inappropriateness (which, in the absence of ignorance 
or avidya, would result) in relation to the teaching of 
unity (between the individual self and the Supreme Self). 
For, in the passage 1 88 "That thou art," there is the teach- 
ing of unity between the individual self and the Supreme 
Self; yet we do not see here any such inappropriateness as. 
forms the cause for assuming that ignorance (or avidya) 
which is contrary to (the nature of) the Brahman who is 
referred to in the context, who is known here by the word 

187. Vide also R. V. VI. 47. 18. 7. & also n. 142 supra. 

188. Vide QhhdnJ. Up. VI. 8. 



Adhik. I. Sut. i.] SRi-BHlSHYA. 197 

' That ', who is omniscient, and who wills the truth, and is 
the cause of the creation, preservation, and destruction of 
all the worlds. The teaching of unity (here,) is very ap- 
propriate, because by the word ' thou ' also, fas by the 
word 'That'), is denoted the Brahman whose body is the 
individual soul. By the scriptural passage " Entering in 
along with this individual self which is (also) the same as 
Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms."- 
(CTihdnd. Up. VI. 3. 2.] it is stated that all things pos- 
sess names and forms only to the extent that they include 
the Highest Self. Hence, there need be no assumption of 
ignorance (or avidyd) in relation to the Brahman. 

In the Itihdsas and the Puranas* 8 * also, the discus- 
sion regarding any avidyd that is related to the Brahman is 
nowhere to be found. Nevertheless, it may be said as 
follows: The passage 1 9 beginning with "The Lights are 
Vishnu" [V. P. II. 12. 38.] lays down the proposition 
that the Brahman is the only reality ; then the passage 
beginning with 191 "Because the Lord has the nature 
of Intelligence, therefore, He (has the All for His 
form)" explains that the world which is differentiated by 
the distinctions of mountains, oceans, lands, &c., 
is the result of the display of avidyd in relation 

189. Vide supra p. 136. n. 191. Vide supra p. 31. where the 
140. Adwaitins are made to quote this 

190. The whole of this passage passage thus : " Because the Lord 
is as follows : " The Lights are is of the nature of Intelligence, 
Vishnu, the worlds are Vishnu, the therefore He has the All for His 
forests are Vishnu, the mountains form. But He is no material thing, 
and the regions of space, the rivers Know then that the distinctions, of 
and the seas, all that is existent mountain, ocean, land, &c., are indeed 
and all that is non-existent, are all born out of Him and are the outcome 
He alone, O thou, the best of Brah- of illusion in Intelligence." V, 
manas !" P. II. 12. 39. 



198 



SRI-BHASHYA. '[Chap. I. Part. L 



to the Brahman whose essential nature is altogether In- 
telligence ; afterwards the passage 192 beginning with 

"But when (there remains Intelligence alone) in its 

own form, and pure, (then indeed cease to exist the fruits 
of the tree of illusion)" confirms that it (viz. the world) 
is the result of the display of ignorance, by means of the 
fact that, at the time when the Brahman, whose true 
nature is Intelligence, exists in His own natural state, there 
is to be found no distinction whatever between things ; 
thereafter by means of the two stanzas, one beginning 
with 1 93 " Is there any (external) object " and the other 
beginning with 194 Mahl ghatatvam (which means "the 
mud, the formation of a pot out of it,") the unreality of 
the distinctions between things is stated even from the 
stand-point of the perception 193 of the world ; then the 



192. This again has been quoted 
according to the Adwaitins on pp. 31 
& 32 supra, thus : '' But when, 
after all the effects of works are de- 
stroyed, there remains Intelligence 
alone in Its own true form, pure and 
devoid of evil, then indeed cease 
to exist those fruits of the tree of 
illusion, which form the distinc- 
tions of things in things." V. P. 
II. 12. 40. 

193. The whole of this pas- 
sage is to the following 
effect : " Is there anywhere any 
(external) object which is with- 
out beginning, middle and end, 
which is always uniform, and which, 
moreover, undergoes changes of state, 
and which frequently is not what it 
was. If such a thing there be, how 
can it indeed be the reality ?" 'V. P, 
II. 12,41. 



194. This passage may be translat- 
ed thus : Those who, through the 
influence of their own Karmas, are pre- 
vented from having correct notions 
regarding (the nature of) the self 
by them are seen (those various 
states of matter such as) the mud, the 
formation of a pot (out of it), the 
breaking (up of that pot) into two 
halves, its turning into particles, their 
turning into dust, and this again into 

atoms. (This being so), tell me 
whether this (matter) can be the (un- 
changeable) reality. V. P. II. 12. 42. 

195. According to the Ad-wai- 
tins, the true nature of perception is 
to apprehend the one Reality which 
exists at all times, but not to appre- 
hend those distinctions which make 
up the world and are all super-impos- 
ed on the Reality by Ignorance or 
Avidyd. Vide supra pp. 42 & 43. 



Adhik. 7. Sal. i.] SRI-BHISHYA. 199 

stanza beginning with 1 9C "Therefore, (there can be) noth- 
ing other than Intelligence" sums up the already enunciat- 
ed unreality of whatever is different from the Brahman; then 
by means of the passage 1 97 beginning with "The one In- 
telligence... (is apprehended in many ways)" it is made 
clear that one's own karma alone is the basis of ignorance 
(or avidya} which is the cause of the perception of differ- 
ence in relation to the Brahman whose true nature is In- 
telligence ; then, by means of the passage J 9 8 beginning 

with "The Intelligence which is pure (is one)." 

the true nature of the Brahman, who has the character 
of Intelligence, is examined; and (lastly) by means of the 
passage 1 " "(Thus) have I told you of what is real, &c." 
the truth has been taught to you to the effect that the 
Brahman whose true nature is Intelligence is alone real and 
nothing else (is real); that everything else is certainly unreal; 
and that the reality of the world and all other things is 
merely phenomenal. And such, indeed, is seen to be the 
teaching (given in the Vishnu-Purdna in the portion 



196. This passage is found which is pure, devoid of evil, devoid of 

quoted on p. 32. supra as follows : sorrow, and is free from contact with 

Therefore, at no time and in no all greed, &c., is one and always one, is 

place, can there be any group of the Highest and the Highest Lord ; 

things other than Intelligence, O He is Vasudeva, other than whom 

thou, the twice-born one. V. P. II. there is nothing. V.P. II. 12.44. 

12. 43. 199. This again is quoted on p. 

197 This is the second half 32. supra as follows : Thus have 

of the passage V. P. II. 12. 43: I told you of what is real ex- 

The One Intelligence is apprehended istence, and how Intelligence is real 

in many ways by those whose minds and all else is unreal ; and 1 have 

are variously constituted on account told you also that this which is phe- 

of the variety of their own Karmas. nomenally realised well for practical 

198. This passage runs thus on purposes is that on which the world 

p. 32. supra : The Intelligence is dependent. V. P. II. 12. 45. 



200 SRT-BHISHYA. \Chap. I. Part, L 

named Bhuvanakosa).* 

All this is not right. Here, after explaining in extenso the 
nature of the world which is conceived to be an unopened 
flower-bud, another form of it that was not mentioned 
before is set forth briefly, beginning with 201 "Listen." In 
the world which is made up of the intelligent and the non- 
intelligent things, that intelligent part, the individual pecu- 
liarity of which is beyond the sphere of speech and mind 
and which is known to itself, and which, being entirely of 
the nature of intelligence, is untouched by any modifica- 
tions of matter, (that part) is expressed by the word 'exist- 
ence', for the reason that it is indestructible. But the non-in- 
telligent part undergoes a variety of modifications caused by 
the karma of the intelligent part, and is destructible; and it is 
(therefore) expressed by the word 'non-existence'. And both 
form the body of Vasudeva, the Highest Brahman, and have 
Him for their Self. Therefore, this form (of the Lord) is 
(thus) briefly described here. Accordingly, in the passage 
" That water 202 which is the body of Vishnu, from that, O 

200. Bhuvanako'sa is the name which live in them (has also been 

given to chapters I to 12. of the described), Listen again to another 

second Am'sa of the Vishitu-Puratia, description which is brief, 

because in these chapters the world 202. Here wafer is used so as to 

is described under the conception mean the primordial substratum of 

of a lotus-bud. Vide V. P. II. 2. 10. the whole universe known as the 

201. Vide V. P. II. 12. 36. This Brahmanda; because water has been 

stanza and the stanza preceding held to be the first created thing, and 

it are as follow : Thus, then, in it the Self-existent Lord is said to 

the situation of the earth and of have placed the seed which became a 

the Lights, of the divisions of the golden egg. Out of which was born 

terrestrial world, and of the oceans the four-faced Brahma, the creating 

and of the mountains, has all been deity. Hence primordial matter and 

described at length, as also of the all its evolved modifications are 

lowlands between the principal denoted by the word water here. Cf. 

mountains, and of the rivers. also Manu I. 8 & 9, et seq. 
Moreover, the nature of the beings 



Adhik. I. Sill. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 201 

Brahmana, sprang the earth, lotus-shaped, together with its 
mountains, oceans, and all other such things." \V. P. II. 
12. 37.] it is said that, because water forms the body of 
Vishnu, the world also, being a modification of water, forms 
the body of Vishnu, and that Vishnu is the Self of that 
(world). Hence, he (Parasara) says that, of the grammatical 
equation which is itself an explanation of the teaching of 
identity (between the individual self and the Supreme 
Self) as found in all scriptures, and which is also dealt 
with in the passage 203 beginning with " The Lights are 
Vishnu" (of that equation) the foundation is nothing 
other than the relation of the soul and the body (be- 
tween the Brahman and the universe). In this sastraic work 
(viz. the Vishnu-Pur and) itself, even earlier (than in this 
context^, this very thing is mentioned more than once 
thus : "They are all His body" 2 4 "The whole of that is 
the body of the Lord."- 2 5 " Being indestructible, He alone is 
the Self of all beings, and has the form of the universe." 206 
This identity (between the individual self and the Supreme 
Self), as consisting of the relation of the body and the soul, 
is taught by the equation stated in the passage beginning 
with" The Lights are Vishnu." Here, the thing 
which has the nature of existence and (the thing) which 
has the nature of non-existence, both of which are found 
in the world, are spoken of as forming the body of 

203. Fide supra p. 197, n. 190. which contains this statement and is 

204. Vide 'V. P. I. 22. 86. to the following effect : Whatever 
The whole passage containing this forms the instrumental cause of any 
statement runs thus : " Here, there, created thing which is created by 
or anywhere else, whatever things any living being, the whole of that, 
exist embodied and unembodied, they O Brahmana, is the body of the 
are all His body." Lord. 

205. Fide V. P. I. 22. 38. 206. Vide r. P. I. 2. 69. 

26 



202 SRI-BHISHYA. \_Chap.I.Part.I. 

Vishnu, and as having that Vishnu for their Self. This (viz. 
the individual soul) is of the nature of existence; that (viz. 
praknti or matter) has the nature of non-existence. The 
reason for this (viz. prakriti) having the nature of non- 
existence is given thus: "Because the Lord is of the 
nature of Intelligence, therefore, He (has the All for His 
form)". 2 7 The natural form of the Lord, who is established 
as the Self of all the individual souls, is Intelligence alone ; 
but it is not the form of things such as gods, men, and other 
embodied objects; and because this is so, therefore, the forms 
of non-intelligent matter such asgods,men,ocean,land, and 
other such things are the result of the display of His intelli- 
gence, and are based upon the continuous apprehension of 
the self-differentiations of that (self) which is known as 
existence, and which has altogether the nature of intelli- 
gence ; they (viz. those differentiations) are in .the form of 
gods and other material embodiments ; that is, they are 
based upon karma which (in its turn) is based upon the 
continuous apprehension of the forms of gods and other 
material embodiments (in association with the self). This 
is the meaning (of the stanza under discussion). From this, 
it is implied that, because the non-intelligent thing is the seat 
of transformations according to the karma of the individual 
soul, therefore it is expressed by the word 'non-existence', 
and that all else is expressed by the word 'existence'. He 
(Parasara) explains this same thing in the passage 208 be- 
ginning with "But when (there remains intelligence) 

in its own true form, and pure, (then, indeed, cease 

to exist the fruits of the tree of illusion,)." When, after 
the destruction of all the karmas which form the basis for 
the continuous apprehension of the self-differentiations (of 

2O7- Vide supra p. 31, & also n. 191, also n. 192. 
308. Vide sttf-a pp. 31 & 32, & 



Adhik. I. Sfit. i.] SRI-BHISHYA. 203 

the self) in the form of gods, &c., the thing which is called 
the self, and the nature of which is pure intelligence, 
becomes free from evil and perfectly pure and assumes 
its own natural form, then, among things, there will 
not be those distinctions of things which are intended 
for the ' enjoyment ' of the (self), and which are them- 
selves the results of the karma that is at the root 
of the supposition that the self is identically the same with 
material forms, such as those of gods, &c. Those modifi- 
cations of the material entity, which are in the form of 
gods, men, mountains, oceans, lands, &c., and which form 
the objects of enjoyment among those things known as 
gods, &c., and which are wrongly taken to be the same as 
the self, they cease to exist when the karma which forms 
their basis is destroyed. Therefore, the meaning is that 
the non-intelligent thing, which is capable of being found in 
certain particular states which last only for a time, has to be 
denoted by the word 'non-existence', and that all else has to 
be denoted by the word 'existence'; because this (latter) is, at 
all times, altogether of the form of self-evident intelligence. 
Accordingly, in the passage beginning with " Is there (any- 
where) any (external) object," 209 he (Parasara) says that 
the non -intelligent thing is to be denoted by the word 
' non-existence' alone ; because, every moment, it becomes 
altered in form and is, in consequence, found in conditions 
which last only for a time. Indeed, that thing which is 
always uniform and which is without beginning, middle 
and end, is that which is denoted by the word 'existence'; 
because it is not proper to think of it as non-existent at 
any time. Nothing that is non-intelligent is seen any- 
where to be of that description. In the passage beginn- 

2og. This is the fiibl half of V. P. 11, 12, 41. Vide supra p. 198. 11.193. 



SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. 1. 

ing with 210 "(Is there anywhere any external object) 
which, moreover, (undergoes) changes of state" he 
(Parasara) says what it then (really) is. That thing which 
undergoes changes of state every moment, that gives up 
its former states one after another, as it passes into 
latter states one after another ; and so, when it is in any 
one of its former states, it can not be in simultaneous as- 
sociation with any one of its latter states. Hence, at all 
times, it is to be denoted by the word ' non-existence ' 
alone. That it has, indeed, to be so made out, is declared in 
the passage 211 beginning with Mahl ghatatvam. Those 
who, through their own karmas, are found in the form of 
gods, men, &c., and are, in consequence, prevented from 
having correct ideas regarding the (nature of the) self, by 
them, the non-intelligent thing which is the object of their 
' enjoyment ' is perceived to undergo transformations every 
moment. The meaning is that it is actually experienced 
(to be of such a nature). This being the case, is there 
any non-intelligent thing which is seen to be always in 
the same state and to be without beginning, middle and 
end, and thus deserves to be denoted by the word ' exist- 
ence ' ? The intended conclusion is that there is no such 
thing. Because this is so, therefore, the non-intelligent 
thing, which is different from the self the true nature of 
which is intelligence, is never and nowhere fit to be 
denoted by the word 'existence'. Accordingly, he (Parasara) 
gives the passage 21 2 beginning with "Therefore, (at no 
time and in no place can there be any collection of 

210. This is the latter half of the P. 11.12.42. 

passage V. P. II. 12. 41. Vide supra 212. This is the first half of stanza 

P- J 9 8 - n - '93- F. P. II. 12. 43. Vide supra p. 

2X1. Vide supra p. 198. n. 194. V. 199. n. 196, 



Adhik. L Sut. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 205 

things) other than intelligence." But the self has every- 
where the uniform nature of intelligence, and is, in con- 
sequence, essentially opposed to the distinctions known as 
gods, &c. Nevertheless, those who think of the self itself 
as being differentiated by those distinctions known as 
gods, &c., which are based upon the various kinds of 
karma performed by themselves and form the cause of 
their entering into the bodies known as gods, &c., (they) 
imagine (the self) to be so varied in nature as to 
correspond to each of those particular forms. Accord- 
ingly, he (Parasara) says in the passage 2 ' 8 beginning with- 
"The one intelligence is apprehended in many ways" that 
the conception of those distinctions is not due to anything 
in the essential nature of the self (itself). Indeed, the essen- 
tial nature of the self is free from karma ; and for that 
very reason, it is untouched by prakriti (or nature) which 
acts as a taint. Therefore again, it is dissociated from all 
evil qualities such as sorrow, ignorance, greed, and the like. 
It is one, because it is not capable of increase and de- 
crease ; for that very same reason, it is always in the 
same state ; and forming the body of Vasudeva, it has 
Him for its Self, because there is nothing which has not 
Him for its Self. Accordingly, he (Parasara) gives the 
passage " The intelligence, which is pure,... (is one)." 21 * 
The intelligent thing, being always in the same state, is 
denoted by the word 'existence'. But the non-intelligent 
thing is every moment subject to modifications, and is thus 
always subject to destruction ; therefore it is always fit to 
be denoted by the word 'non-existence'. The world, which 
is thus made up of these intelligent and non-intelligent 

213. This is the second half of 214. V, /. u. I2 ., 
stanza V- P. II. 12. 43. Vide supra supra p, 199, n. 198, 
p. 199. n. 197. 



5o6 SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 7. 

things, forms the body of Vasudeva, and has Him for 
its Self. Thus the reality of the world is very well 
explained. For this same purpose, (Parasara) gives the pas- 
sage 2 ' 3 beginning with "Thus (have I told you) of what is 
real." Here, (this explanation of what is) real (sal- 
yam) and unreal (asatyaui) concludes the topic the con- 
sideration of which was begun in the passage 216 "All 
that is existent and all that is non-existent (are Vishnu)." 
This thing (viz. the self) is altogether of the nature of in- 
telligence, and is thus similar throughout ; and its essen- 
tial distinction (from other selves) is inexpressible by means 
of words. And it is this thing alone which, when mixed 
up with non-intelligent matter and thus brought within 
the material world, acquires those distinctions in the 
form of gods, men, &c., as required for the proper practi- 
cal realisation of things. Of these (distinctions) which 
so exist, the cause is stated to be nothing other than 
karma. Accordingly, he (Parasara) gives the passage 
" And (I have told you also) that this is that." 2 ' 7 He ex- 
plains this very same thing in the passage beginning 

215. This passage V. P. II. 12. 45. era sarvatn yadasti yanndsti cha 
is as follows in the original : Sad- vipravarya || Here, the expression 
bhdra evam bhavato mayoJcto jild- yadasti means all that is existent and 
nam yathd satyam asatyam anyat \ the expression yanndsti means all 
Its meaning is : Thus have I told that is non-existent. 

you of what is real existence and 217. Vide V. P. II. 45. This 

how intelligence is real and all else passage is as follows in the original : 

is unreal. Vide supra p. 32. & n. 199. Etattu yal samvyavaharabhutani 

2 16. These expressions occur in V. tatrdpichpktatn bhuvanasritam te\\ 
P. II. 12. 38. Vide supra p. 197. n. 190, According to the Advaaitim, the 
where it has been already quoted in meaning of this passage has been al- 
full. This sloka is as follows in the ready given(vide supra p.32,& n.i99,)as 
original : -Jyotimshi vishnur bhu- follows : " And I have told you also 
vandni vishnur vandni vishnur girayo that this which is phenomenally re- 
aisarc/iii \ nadyas samuiirdscja sa alised well for practical purposes is 



Adhik. I. Sfit. /.] SRi-BnlSHYA. 



207 



with 2 ' 8 "(The karmas which are made up of) the sacrifice, 
the sacrificial animal, &c." He says in the passage beginning 
with 2 ' 9 "And this which (I have described to you to be the 
world, to this indeed goes he who is altogether under the 
influence of karma )," that the object of the know- 
ledge that the world is real is to induce the effort to 
secure the means for the attainment of beatific release. 

Here (/. e . even in this context),there is not seen any one 
appropriate word used to denote that Highest Brahman 
who is devoid of attributes, or (to denote) that ignorance (or 
avidyd] which is resident in that (Brahman] and is 
incapable of being defined either as an entity or as a non- 
entity, or (to denote that) the world is manufactured by 
that (avidya). The karma of the individual selves is 
opposed to the knowledge of the truth of things, and is 



that on which the world is depend- 
ent." This interpretation is here cri- 
ticised by Ramanuja. According to 
him, the meaning of this passage, as 
made out from the context in which 
it occurs, is to the following effect : 
And I have told you also that this 
individual self, the nature of which 
is pure intelligence, when mixed up 
with non-intelligent matter, and 
thus brought within the world, is 
that which causes those distinc- 
tions which are required for the 
proper realisation of things in the 
form of gods, men, &c. 

218, The whole of this pas- 
sage is as follows :-The ~f\armas which 
are made up of the sacrifice, the sacri- 
ficial animal, the sacrificial fire, all 
the officiating priests, the Soma juice, 



the gods, and the heavenly world of 
pleasure,form the (commonly adopted) 
path, and in it are seen (the forms of 
gods, &c.), and the results of these 
format are the enjoyments of the 
earthly world and of the other parts 
of the universe. F. P. II. 12. 46, 

2ig. This sloka V. p. \\. T2 . 
47., runs thus: "And this which 
I have described to you to be 
the world, to this, indeed, goes 
he who is altogether under the 
influence of Karma. Knowing the 
impermanent character of the fruits 
of Karma, one has to aim at that 
which is firm, unchangeable and 
always uniform, so that one may 
thereby surely enter into Vasu- 
deva." 



208 SRi-BnlSHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

declared to be thus the cause that makes the self, the 
nature of which is pure intelligence, experience such varied 
conditions as those of gods, &c. ; and it is also declared to 
be the cause that makes non-intelligent (inert) matter 
undergo (all its) transformations ; moreover, the words 
existence, non-existence, reality and unreality are (all) in- 
capable of denoting that thing which cannot be defined 
either as an entity or as a non-entity : for these reasons, 
the whole world which is expressible by the words existence 
and non-existence, and is made up of intelligent and non- 
intelligent things, constitutes the .body of the Most High, 
the Highest Lord, the Supreme Brahman, namely, Vishnu. 
The words non-existence and unreality are the opposites of 
existence and reality, therefore, by means of them, only 
unreality or non-existence is made out, but not indescrib- 
ability. The words non-existence and unreality which have 
been applied to the non-intelligent thing are not here used 
to denote what is a mere nothing or what is false, but are 
used to denote destructibility. It is only this destructibil- 
ity which is set forth in the passages beginning with 220 
" Is there any (external) object" and also with 221 Mahl 
ghatatvam. (In regard to our view), there is neither want 
of proof nor stultification by means of right knowledge; 
because what is experienced in one form at one time 
is perceived to be otherwise at another time by reason 
of a certain transformation (thereof), and it is, in consequ- 
ence, spoken of as non-existent. Indeed, to be a mere 
nothing is to be unworthy of any association with any 
means of proof. And if a thing, which is experienced as 
existent in relation to a particular place and time, is also 
perceived as non-existent in relation to that same place and 

22O. Vide suprq. p. 198. n. 193. 221. Vide5/rap. 198. n. 194. 



Adhik. I. Silt, i.] SRl-BHISHYA. 209 

time, then there is stultification; but not when a thing 
experienced at one time is, through transformation and 
other such causes, made out to be non-existent at another 
time ; because (in this latter case) there is (really) no con- 
tradiction owing to there being a difference in the time (of 
the two opposite experiences). Therefore there is no fal- 
sity (here at all). 

What is said is this : The thing known as the self is 
essentially of the nature of intelligence ; it is without be- 
ginning, middle and end, and is always in one and the same 
natural condition ; therefore, it is always and of itself ex- 
pressible by the word existence. But the non-intelligent 
thing, which forms the object of the ' enjoyment ' of the in- 
dividual selves, is subject to transformation and destruction? 
in accordance with the karma of those (selves), and so is 
always full of the import of the word non-existence ; there- 
fore it is expressible by the words non-existence and unreality. 

This same thing is also stated in the following pass- 
ages :-"Whatever, even by a change of time, does not undergo 
such a change of name as arises out of transformations and 
other similar causes, what is that object, O king, what is it?'' 
[V. P. II. 13. ioo.]; "The wise acknowledge that what is 
indestructible forms the reality ; and that, no doubt, is non- 
existent, which is produced by destructible things." [ V. P. 
II. 14. 24]. Unreality has been declared to be the realisa- 
tion of the conception of pure existence in relation to a thing 
which is found to be existent or non-existent in accord- 
ance with particular conditions of place, time, and activity. 
The realisation under the conception of pure existence be- 
longs (rightly) only to the self, and so it is declared to be real- 
Further, from the listener Maitreya's repetition (of the 
teaching listened to by him) in the sloka which says "It 
has been taught to me how all the three worlds exist sup- 



210 SRi-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

ported by Vishnu, and how intelligence is, by pre-eminence, 
the reality." \V. P. II. 13. 2.], it is made out that the 
foundation of the grammatical equation, contained in the 
passage 222 beginning with "The Lights are Vishnu", 
is the relation of the soul and the body (between the 
Brahman and the universe), that the intelligent and non- 
intelligent things are denoted, as a rule, by the use of the 
words existence and non-existence, that intelligence has a 
natural condition uncaused by karma and is thus pre-emi- 
nent, and that the non-intelligent thing is not pre-eminent 
for the reason that it undergoes transformations which 
are due to the karma of that (intelligent self). 

What has been urged 223 by the Pnrvapakshins to the 
effect that the scriptures speak of the cessation of ignorance 
(or avidya) as taking place by means of the knowledge of 
the attributeless Brahman alone, that is not right; for, 
(in such a case) there would be the contradiction of the 
following and many other scriptural passages : " I know 
this great Person of sun-like lustre who is beyond darkness. 
He who thus knows Him becomes immortal here; there is 
no other path for the attainment of final release." [ Taitt. 
Ar. III. 12. 7-]; 224 "All the nimeshas*** were born out 
of the Person who has the lustre of lightning." \M. Ndr. 
1.8.]; "There is no ruler over Him; His glory is 

222, Vide supra p. 197. n. 190, 1/18 kashtha=- 1/540 kald= 1/16200 

223, Vide supra p. 32. kshana=i\i 94400 muh 27^/0=1/5832000 

224. Vide also \aj. Sam/i. XXX. day =7/i35th of a second, a day being 
1 8. Cf. Taitt. 2r. III. 13. I ; B. G. equal to 24 hours. According to 
VIII, 9; Swtf. Up, III. 8. & VI, 15. V. P. I. 3. 8, 9 & 10, a nimesha is= 

225. A nimesha is a twinkling of 1/15 A&&Af=I/45O kala= 1/1350 
the eye considered as a measure of mukurtallifi^txa day=l6/75th of a 
time. According to some, it is= second. 



Adhik. I. Sfit. i.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 211 

indeed great." [M. Ndr. I. 10.]; "Those who know 
this Person, they become immortal." \M. Ndr.l.n.']. 
It i.s only because the Brahman is possessed of attri- 
butes, that all the scriptural passages declare that final 
release results solely from the knowledge of the Brahman 
as possessed of attributes. It has been already stated that 
the probative 220 passages also prove only that Brahman 
who is qualified. 

The grammatical equation, found in the passage 227 
" That thou art" and in other similar passages, has no re- 
ference to the oneness of any attributeless thing, because 
the words 'That' and 'thou' have the power of denoting 
the Brahman as qualified. Indeed, the word ' That ' points 
to the Brahman who is omniscient, who wills the truth, 
and who is the cause of the world ; because in the pas- 
sage "That thought 'May I become many'" [Qfehdnd. 
Up. VI. 2. 3.], and in other similar passages, it is He who 
forms the subject. The word ' thou ' which is equated 
with ' That ' sets forth the Brahman whose body is that in- 
dividual self which is associated with non-intelligent matter; 
because a grammatical equation has to denote only one 
thing which exists in two forms. If these two forms are 
given up, then the equation will have also to be given up ; 
because, (when those two forms are given up), there will be 
no difference in the significations (of the words ' thou ' and 
'That'), and because also there will then have to be a^ figura- 
tive (or secondary) signification in relation to both these 
words. 228 And when it is said 'This is that Devadatta', 

226. Such as "The "Brahman is Ex- grammatical equation to be right, it is 
istence, Knowledge, Infinity." Taitt, necessary that it should not be a mere 
Up. 11. 1. 1. Vide supra pp. m.et seq. identity, and also that the words equat- 

227. Vide Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7, & ed in the, equation should not all have 
n. 142. supra. figurative or secondary significations. 

228. For a Samaiiadliikaranva or a 



212 SRI-BHA.SHYA. \_Chap. I. Part. I. 

there is no secondary signification (in relation to all the equa- 
ted words); because there is no contradiction in perceiv- 
ing identity (in relation to Devadatta) as associated 
with a past and a present time. The contradiction arising 
from the same thing being found in different places is re- 
moved by the difference in time. (If, in the equation 'That 
thou art', the two forms of the one thing referred to in it 
be given up), there would then be a contradiction of the 
beginning of that context wherein it is said "That 
thought, 'May I become many' "; 229 the proposition 
that, by knowing one thing, all things become known, 
would also thus become inappropriate ; and He whose 
true nature is intelligence, who is devoid of all evil, 
who is omniscient, and whose nature is characterised by 
all the auspicious qualities, would thereby acquire ignorance 
(or avidyd) and (would become) the object of all the innu- 
merable wrong aims of life which are produced by that 
(ignorance or avidya}. If the equation (here) implies the 
stultification (of a previously existing wrong conception), 
then the two words 'That' and 'thou' have to figuratively 
signify a basis (for the super-imposition of that wrong con- 
ception) and the removal (of that super-imposition). These 
figurative significations, &c., constitute those defects (which 
have been referred to above). There is, however, this 
much of peculiarity. Here, there is the unavoidable forced 
assumption of a stultification which is not realised in the 
same way in which it is realised in the cognition " This 
Cmother-of-pearl) is no silver"; and there is also the impossi- 
bility of a stultification (arising), because the word ' That ' 
does not, beyond expressing merely a basis (for the super- 
imposition of a wrong conception), denote any attribute (of 
that basis, so as to contradict such a super-imposition). If it 

229. Vide Chhdnd. Up. VI. 2. 3. 



Adhik. L Sfti. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 213 

be said that the word ' That ' denotes the unveiled nature 
of what was formerly veiled, (it is replied that it is) not 
CSQ) ; because when first the basis itself is unknown, illu- 
sion and its stultification which are dependent thereon are 
impossible. If it be said (again) that the basis which forms 
the seat of illusion is itself unconcealed, then that very 
nature of the basis would be contradictory to illusion ; and 
therefore when that, (basis) becomes clearly known (by means 
of the import of the equation under reference), then there can 
absolutely be no illusion and no stultification, as both of them 
are dependent on that (basis). Consequently it is difficult to 
establish an illusion and its stultification (in relation to the 
grammatical equation 'That thou art '), when a really exist- 
ing attribute and its concealment are not admitted (to be 
denoted by the word 'That') over and above (its denoting) 
the basis (for that attribute and its concealment). Indeed, 
when a basis which is merely of the fonn of a person, for 
instance, is being perceived, and when the really existing at- 
tribute of royalty (which belongs to that person) and which 
is other than that (basis) is concealed, it is only then 
that there can be the illusion of (that person) being, (say), a 
wild hunter ; and there will be the cessation of that (illu- 
sion) on explaining that the attribute of royalty (belongs 
to that person), but not on merely explaining that basis 
(to be a person) ; because that (basis), being (itself) plainly 
visible, does not stand in need of being explained; and 
because also, there can be no destruction of illusion (when 
merely the basis is thus explained). The two words ('That' 
and 'thou') mainly signify the Brahman who is the 
cause of the world, and who has the individual soul for His 
body. It has been (thus) established that the grammatical 
equation (here) is due to the fact of there being the denota- 
tion of one and the same thing as existing in association with 



1 14 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. L Part. /. 

two (different) modes (or forms). (By means of this gram- 
matical equation) another peculiar characteristic in relation 
to the Brahman, who is devoid of all evil, and whose nature 
is characterised by all the auspicious qualities, is established 
in the form of His being the internal ruler of all individual 
souls; and (this conclusion) is completely in harmony with 
the beginning of the context (in which this grammatical 
equation occurs). Thus also there results the demons- 
tration of the proposition 230 that, by knowing one thing, all 
things become known; because the Brahman, who owns the 
intelligent and the non-intelligent things in the subtle state 
as His body, is Himself an effect (in the form of the Brah- 
man] who possesses the intelligent and the non-intelligent 
things in the gross state as His body. (According to our in- 
terpretation) there is also no contradiction of other scriptu- 
ral passages such as the following : " (May we know) Him 
who is the highest and greatest Lord of lords." [Svet. Up. 
VI. 7.] ; " His supreme power is revealed indeed as 
varied." \Svet. Up. VI. 8.]; " He (/.f.lthe Lord; is devoid 
of sins, He desires the truth and wills the truth." \_Qhhand. 
Up. VIII. 1.5. & VIII. 7. i.]. 

If it be asked in what manner the subject and the 
predicate in the sentence ' That thou art ' are particularised, 
it is replied that there is (really) nothing predicated here 
of anything; because,fin the (earlier) statement 231 itself 
" All this has that (Brahman) for its Self" [khdnd. Up. 
VI. 8. 7.], it (viz. the predication of oneness) has been al- 
ready arrived at. Indeed the sdstra has a meaning only 

230. Vide Chhdnd. Up. VI. I. 3. Chhatid. Up. VI. 8. 7. where we read 

wherein this proposition is given. "All this has That for its Self. 

231, This statement occurs in the That is Existence, That is the Self, 

context earlier than the grammati- That thou art, O Svelaketu." 
cal equation 'That Thou art', in 



Adhik. I. Sftt. /.] SRi-BHlSHYA. 215 

in so for as it relates to what has not been already arrived 
at. 2 s * Here, (/. c. in this statement), by means of the 
expression ' all this', the world with the individual souls 
is first pointed out ; it is then declared, by means of the 
expression ' has this (Brahman) for its Self, that 
this (Brahman) is the Self of that (world) ; and the 
reason for it is given in the passage which says "All 
these things which are born, my dear one, have their 
origin in the sat (i. e. in the Existent One), have their 
abode in the sat, and are established in the sat." \Qihanti. 
Up. VI. 8. 4 & 6.], as (it is also given) in the passage which 
says " Let a man (meditate), being tranquilled in mind 
by the knowledge that all this, indeed, is the Brahman, 
that all this is born in Him, is absorbed into Him, and 
lives in Him." \Chhand. Up. III. 14. i.]. Similarly, 
other scriptural passages also speak of the identity of 
the Brahman with the intelligent and the non-intelligent 
things, which are different from Him, as being nothing 
other than the relation of the soul and the body (between 
them). Among others, they are as follow : " He, who has 
entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born and 
is the Self of all." \Taitt. Ar. III. 24.]; "He who, 
dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, whom the 
earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who inter- 
nally rules the earth, He is thy internal ruler and immor- 
tal Self." \Brih. Up. III. 7. 3.]; " He who, dwelling in 
the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, 
whose bod} 7 is the self, and who internally rules the self, 
He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self." \Mddh. 
Brih. Up. III. 7. 22.]; "He who is moving within the 
earth, whose body is matter (mrityu or prakriti], 

232. Cf. Pur. Mim. III. 4. 15. & X. 4, 22, 



216 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

whom matter (prakriti} does not know, He is the internal 
Self of all beings, He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine 
Lord, He is the one Nlrayana." [Sub. Up. VII. i.]; 
" Having created that (viz. the world), He entered into 
that same (world); having entered into that same (world), 
He became the sat and the tyat" - 3 3 [Taitt. Up. II. 6. 
i.]. In this context also by the statement "Entering 
in along with this individual self which (also) is the 
same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name 
and form." \Qhhand. Up. VI. 3. 2.], it is declared 
that all things acquire the character of being things, and of 
being expressible by means of words, only by reason of 
their having been entered into by the individual selves 
which, (in their turn), have the Brahman for their Self 
Because the statement" Having entered into that (world) } 
He became the sat and the tyat" has to possess 
the same meaning as this (statement above viz. that all 
this has that Brahman for its Self), it follows that the 
individual self also has the Brahman for its Self wholly 
owing to the fact of the Brahman having entered into 
it. Hence, it is concluded that the whole totality of beings 
which is made up of the intelligent and the non-intelli- 
gent things is identical with the Brahman, only because 
of the relation of the body and the soul (existing between 
them). Hence all that is different from the Brahman be- 
comes an entity only through constituting His body ; and 
accordingly, the word also which denotes that (entity or 
thing) imports its (full) meaning only when it includes 
that (Brahman"). Therefore it is a demonstrated conclu- 
sion, that all words have severally the power of denoting 
the Brahman, as in association with the thing denoted re- 

233. Vide supra p. 193. n. 183. ing to Jacob's Concordance to the 
The reference given above is accord- Upanishads. 



Adhik. I. Sat. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 



217. 



spectively by every one of them, in accordance with that im- 
port of theirs which is made out by popular usage. Thus 
the import of the proposition, enunciated to the effect that 
" All this has that (Brahman) for its Self", is specially 
summed up by means of the grammatical equation "That 
thou art." 

Hence it is, that, in the case of those who 234 maintain 
that there is only one attributeless tiling, and in the case 
of those who 23 -" maintain that there is difference and non- 
difference (between the individual soul and the Brahman), 
and also in the case of those who 236 maintain that there is 
absolute difference (between the individual soul and the 
Brahman), all such teachings regarding the identity be- 
tween the Brahman and the individual soul, as are given by 
means of grammatical inequalities 2 3 7 and by means of gram- 



234. These are the Adiuaitins who 
are of opinion that the Brahman 
who is devoid of all characterising 
attributes is alone real, and that all 
else is unreal. 

235. These are the Bhdskartyas 
and Yadavaprakaslyas. The former 
of these maintain that the difference 
between the individual self and the 
Brahman is due to limiting condi- 
tions, and that, on the removal of 
those conditions, the individual self 
becomes one with the "Brahman. For 
instance, the spatial ether in its origi- 
nal state is unconditioned, but it 
may get conditioned by the material 
outline of a pot or any other such 
thing. The ether within the pot is 
compared to the individual self. On 
the destruction of the pot, the ether 
in the pot becomes one with the 

28 



spatial ether which is compared to 
the Brahman. 

The latter, viz. the Yadavapraltdl'i- 
ras, hold that just as one portion of 
a lump of clay may be converted in- 
to pots and dishes, while another 
portion remains as clay pure and 
simple, so also the Brahman evolves 
the individual selves out of a portion 
of Himself, the other portion remain- 
ing undifferentiated, so that He is 
both distinct from the individual selves 
and also non-distinct from them. 

236. These are the Vaiseshikas 
who hold that the Brahman is entire- 
ly distinct from the individual selves. 

237. A grammatical inequality may 
be exemplified by Tasya esha evi 
sdrlra dtmd which means "The em- 
bodied Self of that is He Himself." 

Taitt. U/>. II. 3. i. Here the won! 



2i8 SRT-BH.ISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

matical equations, will amount to having been completely 
thrown away. When there is only one thing in existence, 
in relation to what (other thing) can there be the teaching 
of its identity ? If it be replied that that (identity) is 
only in relation to that same (thing), it is rejoined that 
that (identity of the one existent thing with itself) has 
been already made out from the scriptural text 238 relied 
upon by yourselves ( i. e. the Adwaitins), and that there is 
thus nothing which remains to be learnt from (a fresh 
statement of) identity. If it be said again that it is the 
destruction of the superimposed differences (which forms 
the purpose of the teaching of this identity), it is replied 
that it has been already pointed out that that (purpose) 
cannot be accomplished at all by means of the identity 
found in the equation ' That thou art'. Moreover, (this) 
grammatical equation indicates two (different) modes (or 
forms) in relation to the Brahman, and thus proves what 
is altogether unfavourable (to this monistic position). 
And according to the opinion of those who maintain that 
there is both difference and non-difference (between the 
individual self and the Brahman), the Brahman Himself 



tasya (meaning of tha') stands in the II. I. i., "The Brahman is Exist- 

genitive case /'. e. in a different gram- ence, Knowledge, Infinity." The idea 

matical case from that of the words is that, since this text itself declares 

esha (He), x.irtra (the embodied), that the one existing thing is identi- 

dtman (the Sell), all of which stand in cal with itself, no more teaching as 

the nominative case. However, in to identity is necessary and conse- 

a sentence forming a grammatical quently the grammatical equation 

equation, all the words have to bs in li Tji-.it thou art," is meaningless, 

the same grammatical case as in Sat- The text referred to here may also he 

vam jflanam anantam lii-a/ima. AilaJatmyant idam sarvam, which 

238. This text is, among others, means that all this has Him for its 

stated hy the Sriitaprakd'sikachdiya, Self, in as much as the equation 

to be nothing other than Tail/. Uf>. ' That thou art ' comes after this, 



Adkik. I. Sul. /.] SRI-!BHA.SHYA. 219 

has to be in association with limiting conditions; and conse- 
quently all the blemishes, which are found in individual 
souls and are due to those (limiting conditions), will tend 
to taint the Brahman Himself. Therefore, all the teach- 
ings which teach the identity of the individual soul . with 
the Brahman, who is characterised by the utter absence 
of all blemishes and possesses all the auspicious qualities, 
will, solely owing to self-contradiction, amount to having 
been wholly thrown away. And again, according to the 
opinion of those who maintain that the difference and 
non-difference, (between the individual soul and the Brah- 
man), are both natural (/. c. uncaused by any limiting con- 
ditions whatsoever), it has to be admitted that the Brahman 
Himself acquires (quite naturally) the condition of the 
individual soul, and thus all the blemishes (belonging to the 
individual self) will become as natural (to Him) as (His 
own) auspicious qualities. Consequently, to teach the 
identity Cof the individual soul) with that Brahman, who 
is devoid of all blemishes, is certainly inconsistent. Fur- 
ther, according to the opinion of those who maintain that 
there is absolute difference (between the individual soul 
and the Brahman], it is impossible to have any kind of 
identity between things which are so altogether different; 
and it is for this very reason that the teachings which teach 
the identity of the Brahman and the individual soul 
become inappropriate. Thus (in this case) the whole of the 
Vedanla will have to be given up as meaningless. 

However, according to those who- a9 maintain that, as 
proclaimed in all the Upanishads, the whole world forms 
the body of the Brahman, all those teachings which teach 

239. These are the Vi'sishtaduiaitins intelligent individual selves as well as 
who hold that the Bra/iinan has the tlje non-intelligent matter a> His body. 



220 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

that the Brahman Himself form* the whole world become 
appropriate explanations (of the truth). A grammatical 
equation which expresses that, through the influence of 
karmas, an individual self has become an ox, a horse, a 
man, or a god, is generally seen, in popular usage as well 
as in the scriptures, to possess a real and natural signifi- 
cance; because, like generic characterisations and qualities, 
substances also may become the attributes (of things) when 
they constitute the bodies (of those things). Moreover, 
the fact that generic characterisations and qualities are 
merely the modes of substances forms the basis of gramma- 
tical equations like 'The ox is broken-horned', and 'The 
cloth is white'. Seeing that the material masses, which are 
characterised by the attributes of man and of other forms of 
physical embodiment, become intelligible things only when 
they constitute the modes of the individual self, the gram- 
matical equation which says that the individual self has 
become a human being, a male, a eunuch, or a female, is, 
in all cases, equally appropriate. Therefore, the basis of 
grammatical equations is altogether this (kind of) modality, 
but does not consist of generic characterisations and other 
such things all of which exclude each other. Indeed, when 
such substances as are capable of existing in themselves 
form the attributes of (other) substances occasionally and 
in special cases, then there is seen the use of an affix 
having the force of matitp,-* as in the instances of dandin 
(one who possesses a danda or a stick) and kuniialin (one 
who possesses a kwidala or an ear-ring). Such is not the 
case with substances which are incapable of existing in a 
condition in which they may be separately perceived. The 

240. When one who possesses a is nini, which signifies the possession 
stick (dani^a) is called a danfyn, the of a thing, 
affix having the force of via/up here 



Adhik. I. Sut. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 221 

attributive character of those (substances) is to be conclu- 
sively made out only by means of grammatical equations. 

Here, however, it may be said thus : In the case 
where, through the influence of karmas, an indivi- 
dual self has become an ox, a horse, a man, a god, a male, 
a female, or a eunuch, the material embodiment known as 
man and the other (material embodiments) are all held to be 
the modes of that individual self; in the same way in which j 
when it is said 'The ox is broken-horned and hornless', 'The 
cloth is white', 'The cloth is black', generic characteristics 
and (other) qualities (form the modes of the substances 
they qualify). If it be so held, then, as in the case of the 
genus and the individuals (belonging to it), so in the case 
of the body and the individual self also, there must be, as 
a general rule, the simultaneous perception of the mode 
and the possessor of the mode. But it is not seen to take 
place thus. Indeed, as (they do perceive) the generic 
characteristics (of the ox and of other beings), simultaneously 
and in inseparable association with what those characteris- 
tics qualify, so, people do not, as a general rule,perceive the 
material embodiments like those of man, &c., simultane- 
ously and in association with the individual self, so as to 
make out that they are entirely dependent upon the 
individual self. Hence, the grammatical equation which 
says that a man is an individual self has a merely figurative 
signification. 

But this is not right. The material embodiments like 
those of man, &c., possess, equally with generic and other 
qualifications, the character of being entirely dependent on 
the individual self, the character of being serviceable only 
to that (self), and the character of being the mode of that 
(self). The character of their being altogether dependent 
upon the individual self alone is made out from the destruc- 



222 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. fart. L 

tion of the body (taking place) on the separation of the indi- 
vidual self (from it). The character of their.being service- 
able to the individual self alone (is made out) from the fact of 
their existing merely to enjoy the fruits of the karma of that 
(self). Also, the character of their being the modes of that 
(self is made out) from the knowledge that they constitute 
the attributes of the individual self, as in the instances of 
a god and a man. This is, indeed, the reason why 
(genetically significant) words like ox, c., have their 
meanings so as to include the individuals (belonging to their 
respective genera). Being devoid of this aforesaid nature, 
such (words) as danda (stick), kundala fear-ring) and others, 
have an affix possessing the force of matup (attached 
to them) when they form attributes, as in the instances of 
dandin (the possessor of a stick) and kundalin (the possessor 
of an ear-ring). The material embodiments like those of 
gods, men, &c., possess, of their own nature, the charac- 
ter of being dependent upon the individual self alone, the 
character of being serviceable to that (self) alone, and 
the character of being the mode of that (self) alone; 
it is therefore that the grammatical equation, which says 
that-an individual self is a god or a man, is freely current 
in popular usage as well as in the scriptures. There 

is, as a general rule, the simultaneous perception of the 
genus and the individual (belonging to it), because both of 
them are capable of being apprehended by the eye ; but 
the individual self is not apprehended at the time of the 
ocular apprehension of the body, because the individual 
self is not capable of being apprehended by the eye. Do 
not say that a thing, which is capable of being appre- 
hended as existing separately, cannot have mere modality 
to constitute its own nature : because, it is made out that, 
like generic and other qualifications, the body also 



Adhik. I. S/lt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 223 

possesses altogether the nature of being a mode of that 
(self), owing to its being solely dependent upon that (self), 
and owing to its being solely serviceable to that (self), and 
owing also to its being an attribute of that (self). And 
it has been stated that the law of simultaneous perception 
is dependent upon the knowability (of the mode and of the 
possessor of the mode) by means of one and the same 
perceiving apparatus. Thus the eye cannot apprehend 
the possession, by the earth and other substances, of 
smell, taste, and other qualities, although these (qualities) 
naturally belong to them. Similarly, although the body, 
which is capable of being apprehended by the eye, possesses 
fully the nature of being a mode of the individual self, yet, 
it is not so apprehended, because the eye does not possess 
the power of apprehending the individual self. Merely on 
account of this much, the body cannot be destitute of the 
character of being a mode of that (self). The basis of the 
grammatical equation (between the body and the indivi- 
dual self) is nothing other than (the body) possessing the 
character of being altogether a mode of that (self). 

Moreover, that word, which is ca'pable of denoting (the 
body) as a mode of the individual self, denotes that body 
to be the mode of the individual self at the same time that it 
denotes the individual self also. It may, however, be said 
that, solely in accordance with the practical usage of words, 
it is only the body that is apprehended by means of the 
word ' body', and that therefore the word ' body ' does not 
possess the power of including the individual self also in 
its meaning. To this it is replied that it is not so ; 
because, (here, /. c. in the case where the word ' body ' 
denotes merely the body), that body, which is nothing 
other than a mode of the individual self, is specifically 
mentioned with the object of pointing out its distin- 



224 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

guishing feature as a thing. Therefore, the word ' body ' 
is a definitively determinative word, like the words 
1 ox-ness ' (/. c. gotva], ' whiteness', ( quality', ' form', &c. 
Consequently, like the words ' ox ', &c., the words, ' god', 
1 man', &c., include the individual self in their import. 
Similarly, the individual selves, which are associated with 
material forms like those of god, man, &c., form the 
body of the Highest Self, and hence possess the char- 
acter of being His modes. Therefore all the words 
which denote the individual self include the Highest 
Self also in their import. Consequently, all the intel- 
ligent and the non-intelligent things possess the character 
of being things, solely because they are the modes of the 
Highest Brahman ; and that is why they are so spoken of 
in practice as to be grammatically equated with that (Brah- 
man}. This matter is fully proved in the Vedartha-san- 
graha. a 4 ' He (viz. the Sutra kara) speaks of this very iden- 
tity, which has the character of the relation between the 
soul and the body, in the aphorism " But they (viz. the 
Jabalas) worship the Lord as the self, and they (viz. the 
scriptural texts) make us comprehend (it as such)." 
[Ved. Siit. IV. i. 3]. And the Vakyakara also says, 2 * 2 
" The Lord is to be comprehended as nothing other than 
the self." 

The truth here is this. Some of the scriptural 
passages, such as the following among others, speak of the 
distinction in nature between the non-intelligent thing 
(prakriti), the intelligent thing (or the individual sell), and 
the Highest Brahman, as consisting in their possessing, 
(respectively) ,the character of being the object of enjoyment, 

241. Vide Veddrtha-sahgraka pp. 20 charya and A, K. Vijayaraghava- 
to 60, edited at Madras in Telugu charya. 
characters by Messrs. }. Tirtimala- 242. Vide supra p, 33. 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 225 

the character of being the enjoyer, and the character of 
being the Supreme Ruler : "Out of t\\\z(praknti or nature), 
He who is the owner of the mdya (i. e. the Lord) creates this 
world wherein another being(viz.the individual self) is bound 
down by mdya." [Svet. Up. IV. 9.]; "Know then that 
prakritiis mdya, and the great Lord the May in (i. e. the pos- 
sessor of the mdya)." [Svet. Up. IV. 10.]; "The destructi- 
ble is the prakriti ; the immortal and the indestructible is 
the hara (i. e. the individual self); and the Lord alone rules 
over the destructible (prakriti} and the individual self."- 
\Svet. Up. i. io.]; here, by the expression that 'the 
immortal and the indestructible is the hara,' the enjoyer 
is pointed out ; he (viz. the individual self) is (called) the 
hara because the individual self utilises the prakriti as 
an object of his own enjoyment; " He is the cause, He is 
the Lord of what is the lord of the senses (/. e. of the jiva 
or the individual soul); He has no progenitor and no su- 
perior." [Svet. //!>. VI. 9.];" He is the Lord of the prakriti 
(nature) and of the individual soul and is the regulator of the 
qualities." 2 * ^[Svet. Up. VI. 16.]; " He is the Lord of the 
universe, He is the Lord of the individual souls, and is eter- 
nal, auspicious and inexhaustible." [M. Ndr. XI. 3.] ; "The 
two unborn, the Intelligent and the non-intelligent (are) 
the Lord and the non-lord." [Svet. Up. i. 9.] ; "The 
Eternal among the eternals, the Intelligent among the 
intelligent, who, though One, fulfils the desires of the 
many." \Kath. Up.V. i$.& Svet. Up. VI. 13.]; "Knowing 
the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the Impeller,"- 
[Svet, Up. I. 12.]; "One of them eats the sweet pippala 
fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at 

243. These qualities are the well- primordial prakriti becomes differenti- 
knovvn Sattva, goodness, Rajas, pas- ated. 
sion and Tamas, darkness, by which 

29 



226 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. I. 

all." [Svet. Up. IV. 6. & Mund. Up. III. i. i.]; "Knowing 
the individual self and the Impeller to be different, and being 
therefore blessed by Him, he attains immortality." [Svet 
Up. I. 6.]; " There is one unborn female being (aja) which 
is red, white and black, and which produces numerous 
offspring of the same kind as herself; there is another male 
being (aja) who loves her and is close to her; there is still 
another male being (aja) who, after having enjoyed her, 
gives her up." [Svet. Up. IV. 5-]; 244 "On the same tree, the 
purusha (i. e. the individual self) sits immersed in grief, and, 
being ignorant and powerless, he feels sorry. When he sees 
another, the Lord, to be fully satisfied, then he (also), reliev- 
ed from grief, attains His greatness." [Svet. Up. IV. 7.]. 
(To the same effect are) the following passages in the 
Smriti also : "This prakriti of Mine is divided into eight 2 4 5 
parts in the form of the ahafikara, &c. This is My 
lower prakriti. Know that to be My higher prakriti which 
is other than this (lower one), and which consists of individu- 
al selves. By it, this world is supported, O thou, mighty-arm- 
ed one!" [B. G. VII. 4 & 5.]; "All created beings, O son of 
Kunti, enter into My prakriti at the end of each kalpa, z * Q 
and at the beginning of each kalpa I again send them forth. 

244. The female being referred to in fire,air and ether (or aka'sa)\ the mind; 
this passage is the Prakriti or primor- the principle known as the Mahat or 
dial nature; the first male being is the "Buddhi, and the Ahahkdra, 
individual soul in the samsdra state; 246. A Kalpa is a period of time 
the second male being is the indivi- equal to 4,320,000,000 solar years. It 
dual soul in the released state. The is a day of the creating Brahma and 
three colours red, white, and black, his night also is equal to the day. 
are explained as signifying the three At the beginning of each Kalpa, the 
Gunas or qualities, viz. Rajas, Sattva, creation of the world is said to begin 
and Tanas, respectively. and at the end of each Kalpa happens 

245. These eight parts are the five the destruction of the whole world, 
elements, viz. the earth, water 



Adhik. /. Sfit. i.] SRI-BHASHVA. 227 

Transforming My ownprafoiti, I send forth again and again, 
the whole of this collection of beings, which is itself not free, 
in as much as it is under the influence of praknti." [B. G. 
IX. 7 & 8.] ; " Presided over by Me, prakriti gives 
birth to all this movable and immovable creation. Indeed, 
for this reason it is, O son of Kunti, that the world goes on 
undergoing transformation." [B. G. IX. 10.]; "And 
know that the praknti and the purusha are both beginning- 
less." [B. G.XIII. 19.]; "My womb is the great brahman. 
(or prakriti) ; in it I place the embryo ; .he origin of all 
beings proceeds from that, O Bharata." [.?. G. XIV. 3.]. 
That great brahman of Mine which is the source of this 
world and is called the praknti, and which is a subtle and 
non-intelligent entity, in it, I place the embryo known 
as the intelligent thing. From thence, that is, from the 
connection between the intelligent and the non-intelligent 
things which is caused by Me, there results the origin of 
all these beings which begin with the gods and end with the 
immovable things, and which are all thus mixed up with 
the non-intelligent thing. This is the meaning (of the last 
quoted sloka). 

Similarly, several other scriptural passages declare that the 
Highest Person forms the Self (of all), and that the intelligent 
and the non-intelligent things have no separate existence 
from Him; because those intelligent and non-intelligent 
things, which exist in the form of the enjoyer and the thing 
enjoyed, and which exist also in all conditions, constitute the 
body of the Highest Person, and are, in consequence, subject 
to His control. They are those which begin with "He who, 
dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth 
does not know, whose body is the earth, and who internally 
rules the earth (He is thy internal ruler and immortal 
Sell)"; and conclude with "He who, dwelling in the self, 



228 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose 
body is the self and who internally rules the self, He is thy 
internal ruler and immortal Self." \Madh. Brih. Up. III. 
7. 3 to 22.]. To the same effect is the passage beginning 
with " He who is moving within the earth, whose body 
is the earth, whom the earth does not know" and (end- 
ing with) " He who is moving within the akshara, whose 
body is the akshara, whom the akshara does not know ; 
He who is moving within the mrityu for prakritf) whose 
body is mrityu, whom mrityu does not know ; He is the 
internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of sins, He is the 
Divine Lord, He is the One Narayana." [Sub. Up. VII. 
i.]. Here, the word mrityu means that subtle non-intelli- 
gent thing which is expressed by the word lamas?*" 1 be- 
cause in this very Upanishad it is stated "The avyakta 
is absorbed into the akshara and the akshara is absorbed 
into the lamas." [Sub. Up. II.], and (because) it is stated 
also (elsewhere) "He, who has entered within, is the 
ruler of things that are born and is the Self of all." [Taitt. 
Ar. III. 24.]. Thus the Highest Person Himself, who, 

by having the intelligent and the non-intelligent things 
existing in all conditions as His body, owns them as His 
modes, exists in the form of the world in its condition 
as cause as well as in its condition as effect. Accordingly, 
with the object of making this very thing known, some 
scriptural passages say that the world in its condition as 
cause and also in its condition as effect is He Himself. 
They are tho^e which begin with "Existence alone, my 
dear child, this was in the beginning, one only without a 
second. It thought 'May I become manifold and be born.' 
It created tejas." [Qihand. Up. VI. 2. 3.], and (end with) 

247. Vide supra, p. 194. n. 184. 



Adhik. I. Sftt. i.] SRI-BHISHYA. 229 

"All these things which are born, my dear one, have their 
origin in the sat (i. e. in the Existent One), have their abode 
in the sat, and are established in the sat....A\\ this has 
That (Brahman] for its Self. That (Brahman] is existence. 
He is the Self. That thou art, O Svetaketu." \Qhh and. 
Up. VI. 8. 4, 6 & 7.]. To this effect, there is, among others, 
the following scriptural passage which begins with " He 
willed -'May I become manifold and be born.' He perfor- 
med tapas. Having performed tapas, He created all 
this" ; and concludes with "While being the unchangeable 
individual self (satyd) and the changeable matter (anritd) 
He has remained true to His own nature." [ Taitt. Up. 
II. 6. i.]. That distinction in nature which exists 

between the intelligent and the non-intelligent things (on 
the one hand), and the Highest Person (on the other 
hand), and which is learnt from other scriptural passages 
as well, is brought to mind here also, (/. e. in the following 
passage) "Entering into these three deities 248 along 
with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, 
I evolve the differentiations of name and form." [Qihand. 
Up. VI. 3. 2.], and also in the passage "Having creat- 
ed that, He entered into that same (world). Having 
entered into that (world), He became the sat and the 
tyat He became the intelligent thing and the non- 
intelligent thing. While thus being the unchangeable 
individual self and the changeable matter, He has re- 
mained true to His own nature." \Taiti. Up. II. 6. 
i.]. The idea that the individual soul has the Brah- 
man for its Self, as made out from the expression 
" Entering along with this individual self which is (also) 

248. These are the elements tejas, the very first things created by the 
water and earth. They are called presiding Deity of the universe, 
deities because they are said to be 



230 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. /. 

the same as Myself [Qihand. Up. VI. 3. 2.], that 
is understood to be dependent upon the relation of the 
soul and the body (existing between the Brahman 
and the individual self); because that expression has to 
import the same meaning as this expression "Having 
entered into that (world), He became the sat and the tyat, 
(He became) the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent 
thing." [Taitt. Up. II. 6. i.]. That differentiation of names 
and forms which is exactly of this very kind is mentioned in 
this passage also, namely, " Indeed, this was then undiffer- 
entiated. It has been now differentiated by means of 
names and forms." \_Brih. Up. I. 4. 7.]. Thus He who 
exists in the condition of effect, and who exists in the 
condition of cause, and who owns the intelligent and the 
non-intelligent things in their gross and subtle states as His 
body, He is the Highest Person alone. Therefore, for 
the reason that the effect is nothing other than the cause 
^modified), and that, in consequence, the effect becomes 
known when the cause is known, the desired knowledge 
of all things as resulting from the knowledge of one thing 
is possible and very appropriate. In the passage "Enter- 
ing into these three deities along with this individual self 
which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentia- 
tions of name and form "all the non-intelligent things 
are referred to by the expression 'the three deities'; 
and then the differentiation of names and forms is said 
to result from the fact of the individual souls, which have 
Him for their Self, entering into those things. Thus, all 
significant words signify only that Highest Self who is 
associated with the individual selves which are themselves 
associated with non-intelligent matter. Therefore the 
equating of the word which denotes an effect, with the word 
which denotes the Highest Self in the condition of cause, 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 231 

has a real and natural significance. Thus that Brahman, 
who owns the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in 
their gross and subtle states as His modes, (He) is Himself 
the effect and the cause ; and accordingly the world has 
the Brahman for its material cause. The Brahman 

Himself forms the material cause of the world, for the 
reason that that Brahman, who owns the intelligent and 
the non-intelligent things in their subtle state as His body, 
constitutes the cause (of all) ; nevertheless, by virtue of the 
material cause (of the world) being a composite thing 
(made up of the individual souls, the prakriti and the 
Brahman} the non-mixing-up of the natures of the Brah- 
man and of the intelligent as well as of the non-intelligent 
things is perfectly possible and appropriate. Thus, for 
instance, although a variegatedly woven cloth has for 
its material cause a mixture of white, black and red threads, 
the association of whiteness, &c., is to be found con- 
fined only to the region where a particular kind of thread 
exists ; and accordingly, in the condition of effect also, there 
is no fusion of the colours in all the parts (of the cloth). 
Similarly, although the world has for its material cause the 
mixture of the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing 
and the Lord, nevertheless, in its condition as an effect also, 
there is no fusion of the characteristics of the enjoyer, of 
the thing enjoyed, and of the controller, &c. These threads 
which are capable of existing independently, when they are 
occasionally brought together by the will of man, acquire 
the character of a cause and (also) the character of an effect. 
But here (/. e. in the case of the world) there is this much 
peculiarity, namely, that the intelligent and the non-intelli- 
gent things existing in all conditions acquire their character 
of being things, only because they form the modes of the 
Highest Person through constituting His body, and that 



232 SRi-BHlSHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

therefore the Highest Person who has those things as His 
modes is always denoted by all words. The existence 
of distinctions in nature and their non-mixing-up are both 
alike here (/. e. in the case of the production of the world) 
as well as there (i. e. in the case of the production of the 
variegatedly woven cloth). This being the case, although 
the Highest Brahman enters into the production of an 
effect, there being no transformation of His own nature, 
the immodifiability (of the Highest Brahman] is well est- 
ablished. The condition of an effect is also very appropriate 
(in relation to the Brahman], for the reason that He is 
the Self of the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in 
their gross state, when they are differentiated by the divi- 
sions of names and forms. Indeed, to become an effect is 
nothing other than passing into another condition. The 
scriptural statements regarding the attributelessness (of the 
Brahman} are also appropriate because the Highest Per- 
son is not in association with evil qualities. This scrip- 
tural passage a 4 9 which, in the portion " He (/. e. the 
Self) is devoid of sins, is free from old age, free from death, 
free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst,"- 
negatives all evil qualities (in relation to the Brahman), 
and then lays down in the portion" He (the Self) desires 
the truth and wills the truth " the auspicious qualities (of 
the Brahman}-, (this scriptural passage) alone settles that 
the negation of qualities, which is declared elsewhere in 
the scriptures and is understood to be applicable in a 
general sense, relates (only) to evil qualities. The 

statement that 250 the Brahman possesses the nature of 
intelligence is quite appropriate, because it amounts to say- 
ing that the true nature of the Brahman who is omnisci- 

249. Vide Cti/iand. Up. VIII, I. 5. 250. Vide F. P. I. 2. 6. & also 

& VIII. 7. I & 3. Balnmchppanishad. 



Adhik. I. Siit. /.] SRi-BHlSHYA. 233 

ent and omnipotent, who is opposed to all that is evil, and 
who is the mine of all auspicious qualities,, is capable of 
being described only as Intelligence, and that He has the 
nature of intelligence for the reason that He possesses self- 
luminousness. The following and other scriptural passages, 
namely, " He who understands all and who knows all"- 
[Mund. Up. I. i. 9.], " His supreme power is revealed, in- 
deed, as varied and natural and as consisting of knowledge, 
strength, and action." [Svet. Up. VI. 8.], " My dear one, 
by what means has one to know the knower." [Brih. Up. 
II. 4. 14.], teach that the Brahman is the knower; and 
this passage, " (The Brahman is) Existence, Knowledge, 
(Infinity)." [Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1.], and others (teach that the 
Brahman] has the essential nature of intelligence, because 
He can be described only as Intelligence, and because also 
He is self-luminous. In the passages" He willed 

'May I become many. 1 " [Taitt. Up. II. 6. i.]," It thought 
'May I become many.'" [Gkhand. Up. VI. 2. 3.], " It is 
differentiated by means of names and forms." \_Brih. Up. 
I. 4. 7.], (it is declared) that the Brahman Himself 
exists, of His own free will, in various modes by reason 
of His possessing the wonderful unchangeable things and 
changeable things as His body ; and that, in consequence, 
the manifold nature of such things, as are opposed to 
Him and as have not the Brahman for their Self, is 
unreal. Therefore it is this (unreal manifoldness of things) 
that is negatived in the following and other passages : 
" He, who sees this world as though it were manifold (or 
varied), obtains death from death. There is nothing here 
that is many and varied." [Brih. Up. IV. 4. 19. & Kath. 
Up. IV. 10.]; "But where there is duality, as it were, 
there one sees another ; but where to one all this becomes 
30 



SRl-BHISHYA. [Chap. /. Part. I. 

the Self, there who shall see whom by what, and who 
shall know which by what ?" [Bnh. Up. II. 4. 14. & 
IV.5. 15.]. On the contrary, it is not also that manifold 
modality of the Brahman which is due to His assumption 
of various names and forms, which is established in scrip- 
tural passages such as " May I become manifold and be 
born" \_Taitt. Up. II. 6. i. & C&hand. Up. VI. 2. 3.], 
and in others, and which (again) is due to His own free will, 
(it is not this manifold modality) that is negatived. This 
(manifold modality) is proved to be existent in the com- 
mencement of even that passage which negatives (mani- 
foldness) by saying "But where to one all this becomes 
the Self, &c." \_Brih. Up. II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.]; and (it 
is also established to be existent) by means of the follow- 
ing and other passages : "He who knows all things to be 
apart from Him, him will all things abandon." \Brih. 
Up. II. 4. 6. & IV. 5. 7.]; "That which is this Rig-Veda 
is the breath of Him /. e. of this great Being." [Sub. 
Up. II.]. 231 Thus there is no contradiction whatsoever 
in relation to all those scriptural passages which speak of 
such distinctions in essence and in nature as exist between 
the intelligent thing (or the individual soul), the non-intelli- 
gent thing (or praknti) and the Lord; and (there is no 
contradiction also) in regard to: those scriptural passages 
which speak of the relation of cause and effect (as exist- 
ing between the Brahman and the universe) and (also 
in regard to those which speak) of the identity of the 
effect with the cause. The relation of the body and the 
soul exists at all times between the intelligent thing (or 
the individual soul) and the non-intelligent thing (or 
praknti, on the one hand), and the Highest Self (on the 

251. Cf. Bnh. Up. II. 4. 10. 



Adhik. 1. Sui. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 235 

other). This is made out by means of the scriptural pass- 
ages which declare that those things which form the body 
(of the Lord) acquire, when in the condition of cause, that 
subtle state which is incapable of being differentiated by 
means of names and forms, and acquire (again), when in 
the condition of effect, such a gross state as is capable of that 
(differentiation by names and forms). Therefore there is 
to be seen no room whatsoever for maintaining the view 2 5 '-' 
which imposes ajildna (or ignorance) on the Brahman. 
And the view 253 which brings about distinctions in the 
Brahman Himself by means of limiting conditions, and 
all those other views, which are based upon fallacious 
reasoning and are contradictory to (the teaching of) all the 
scriptures, (are also untenable). The intelligent thing (or 
the individual soul), the non-intelligent thing (or matter), 
and the Lord, are all proved by means of special scriptural 
texts to be possessed of independent characteristics; and they 
are also proved by the scriptures themselves to constitute 
respectively the modes (of the Brahmaii) and the possessor 
of those modes, for the reason that there is (between the 
intelligent and the non-intelligent things on the one hand 
and the Lord on the other hand) the relation of the body 
and the soul. In regard to these, other scriptural pass- 
ages prove (the consequent) relation of effect and cause, 
and also prove (the resulting) identity of the effect with 
the cause. Indeed, there is no contradiction in this. 
For instance, the mandatory passage, 234 which says " (Let 
him perform) the new-moon sacrifice and the full-moon 
sacrifice," lays down in one commandment that, on the 
part of him who is desirous (of Swarga)?** it is obligatory 

252, This view is held by the Aitwailins. 254. Vide Taitt. Sani/i. 11.2.5. 
2 53- This is the view of the B/ias- 255. Swarga is the celestial world 
karlyax. of enjoyments. 



[Chap. I. Part. L 

to perform the six sacrifices beginning with the Agneya 
which have all separately come into existence from the 
various scriptural passages 2 5 <5 relating to their origin, and 
which, nevertheless, have fallen into two groups in accord- 
ance with the two 237 passages that refer to their grouping. 



256. The names of the six sacrifices 
are Agneya, Agnishomiya^ the two 
Aindras, Aindrdgna, and Updm'su. 
The passage relating to the origin 
of the Agneya sacrifice is given in 
Taitt. Samh. II. 6. 3. 3. to the effect 
Yadagneyoshtiikapalomdvdsydydm ch_a 
paurnamttsydin chlehyuto bhavati. 
This means that the sacrifice .known 
as the Zgaeya, in which eight clay 
cups are used for the purpose of 
making offerings to the god Agni, 
and which is to be performed on the 
days of new-moon and full-moon, 
never fails to be successful in produ- 
cing the desired results. The pass- 
age relating to the AgnlshomTya 
sacrifice is as follows : Tdbhydmeta- 
magnlshomlyamekdda'sakapdlam pur- 
ttamdse prdvachchhat. Taitt, Sam/i. 
II. 5. 2, 3. That is to say, he, 
I ndra, gave to Agni and Soma, on 
the full-moon day, that portion of the 
sacrificial offering which is known as 
Agtiishomiya wherein eleven clay cups 
are used to make offerings to the 
deities. The two sacrifices known as 
the Aindras are mentioned in the 
passages : A ittdram dadhyamdvasyd- 
ydm. Taitt, Samh, II. 5. 4. I.; Am- 
dram payotndvdsydydw. These mean 
respectively that the A indra saci i- 
ficc, consisting in the offering of 



curds, is to be performed on the new- 
moon day, and that the other A indra 
sacrifice consisting in the offering of 
milk is also to be performed on the 
new-moon day. The sacrifice known 
as Aindrdgna is given in Taitt. Samh, 
II. 5. to the effect that the Amdrd- 
gna sacrifice which consists in the 
offering of curds in eight clay 
cups is to be performed on the new- 
moon day. The Updmlu sacrifice is 
given in the passage Tdvabrutdvag- 
nlshomdvdjyasyaiva ndvupdnt'sii pur- 
namdsydm ya/att. Both Agni and 
Sotna said " Perform for us on the 
full-moon day the sacrifice known 
as Upam'su andVonsisting in the offer- 
ing of ghee." All these six passages 
enjoin in six separate commandments 
the performance of all the six sacri- 
fices mentioned above. 

257. The performance of all these 
six sacrifices is again enjoined in two 
commandments, viz, Ya mam vidvdn 
purnamdslm yajate\ Ya evam vidvdn 
amdtdsydm yajate. Taitt. Samh, 
I. 6, 9, I & 2. " He who knows 
thus performs the full-moon sacri- 
fice, he who knows thus performs 
the new-moon sacrifice." Thus the 
six sacrifices become reduced, as it 
were, to two. 



Adhik. L Sut. /.] SRI-6HA.SHYA. 237 

Similarly, the following and other scriptural passages declare 
separately that the intelligent thing (viz. the individual self), 
the non-intelligent thing (viz. matter or prakriti}, and the 
Lord are distinct in essence and in nature : "The destruct- 
ible is the prakriti, the immortal and the indestructible is 
the hara (i. c. the individual self), and the Lord alone rules 
over the destructible {prakriti} and the individual self."- 
[Svct. Up. I. 10.]; " He is the Lord of the prakriti and of 
the individual souls, and is the regulator of the qualities." 238 
[Svet. Up. VI. 1 6.]; " He is the Lord of the world, the 
Lord of the individual souls. The Highest Self is Nara- 
yana." [M. Ndr. XI. 3.]. Then the following and other 
scriptural passages declare that the intelligent thing and the 
non-intelligent thing, existing in all conditions, form the body 
of the Highest Self and that that Highest Self constitutes 
the Self of those things : "(He) whose body is the earth," 
\Sub. Up. VII. i.]; "(He) whose body is the individual 
se\f,"[MadJi. Brili. Up. III. 7. 22.]; " (He) whose body 

is the avyakta,... whose body is the akshara,*** He is 

the internal Self of all beings ; He is devoid of all sins, 
He is the Divine Lord, He is the one Narayana." \Sub. 
Up. VII. i.]. Then again the following and other scriptur- 
al passages" Existence (or Sat} alone, my dear child, 
this was in the beginning" [Qihdnd. Up. VI. 2. i.]; 
" All this has that (Brahman} for its Self (or Atman}" 
[Chhdnd. //.' VI. 8. 7.] ; " All this, indeed, is the Brah- 
man'' [Qihdnd. Up. III. 14. i.]; declare, by means of 
words like Sat, Brahman , Atman, &c., which denote the 
Highest Self who is the Embodied Being, that the Highest 

258. The ' qualities ' are the well darkness. 

known three qualities of Saliva, good- 259. Vide sup fa p, 194. n, 185. 

ness, Rajas, passion, and Tamas, 



238 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

Self who is one only, who is in the condition of cause, and 
who is also in the condition of effect, is Himself all the 
three 260 (kinds of real) entities which are separately made 
out. There is, indeed, nothing wrong in denoting that 
Highest Self, who owns the intelligent and the non-intelli- 
gent things as His body, by the word Paramdtman ; in the 
same way in which (there is nothing wrong) in denoting a 
particular individual self, that has the figure of man for his 
body, by the word dtman, as when it is said (in relation to 
a man)" This individual self is happy." Therefore let 
this overlong discussion come to an end. 

Again what has been further stated 2 c ' (by the Puroapak- 
shins) to the effect that it is right to hold that the cessation 
of ignorance (or avidya) takes place solely by means of 
the knowledge of the oneness of the self and the Brahman, 
that is not right ; because the bondage (of ignorance) 
is real and is thus incapable of being removed by knowledge. 
How is it possible to predicate unreality in relation to this 
bondage which consists in the (individual self) entering into 
bodies such as those of gods, &c., owing to its meritorious 
and unmeritorious karmas and is of the nature of the ex- 
perience of the pleasures and pains that arise out of that 
(embodiment) ? It has been already 262 explained that the 
cessation of the bondage which is of this nature is attain- 
able by that grace of the Highest Person which is conse- 
quent on His being pleased with the worship that is offer- 
ed in the form of loving devotion (by the worshipper). 
As that knowledge, which is accepted by you, and (ac- 
cording to you), relates to what is different from things as 

260. These are : the Pralrili or 261, Vide supra pp, 32 & 33. 
matter, the individual self, -and the 262, Vide supra pp. 2o, 21 & 22. 
Supreme Self. 



Adhik. 1. Sut. i.} SRI-BHISHYA. 

they are, is of an unreal nature, the consequence (thereof) 
is only the intensification of the bondage; because the 
sastra- 03 says "It is false, because an object which is 
different from another cannot, indeed, acquire the character 
of that other object." and because also, in the following 
passages - " Different from these is the Highest Per- 
son."- -[B. G. XV. 17.] ; " Knowing the individual self and 
the Impeller to be different" [Svet. Up. I. 6.], it is 
taught that the knowledge relating to the Brahman, 
who is different from the individual self, and who is the 
internal ruler thereof, is the means of obtaining 
the final release which possesses the characteristics of the 
highest object of human pursuit. Moreover, that know- 
ledge which is capable of removing (ignorance or 
avidya), and which is accepted by you, is itself unreal. 
Therefore, (to remove it), some other remover has to be 
sought and found. If it be said that this knowledge, which 
removes (ignorance or avidya), removes that whole totality 
of distinctions which is opposed to itself, and then, being 
itself momentary, perishes of itself, it is replied that it is 
not so. As its essence, its origin and destruction are all 
false, some other (knowledge), which is capable of removing 
that avidyd (or ignorance) by which (its) destruction and 
the hypothesis in relation to it are (both) falsely assumed, 
has to be sought and found. If it be said (again) that the 
destruction 2c4 of that (knowledge which removes avidyd) is 
nothing other than the manifestation of the true nature of 
the Brahman Himself, it is replied that, in that case, there 

263. Vide supra p, 148. where this ent from another cannot, indeed, ac- 

stanza is quoted as follows : quire the character of that other ob- 

" If it be held that the identity of the ject," V. P. II. 14. 27, 

Highest Self with the individual self 264. This is the non-existence 

is the highest truth, it is false, be- consequent on the destruction of a 

cause an object which is differ- thing. Vide supra p. 49, n, 37, 



240 SRi-BniSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. /. 

will be no origination of that knowledge which removes 
(ignorance or avidya); for, as long as what constitutes the 
destruction of a thing continues in existence, so long there 
is no possibility of the origination of that thing. Moreover, 
it is asked who it is that is the knower of this knowledge, 
which relates to the negation of all that is different from 
the Brahman, who is Himself pure intelligence. If it be 
replied that that (knower) is merely a superimposition, 
then it is replied that it cannot be so ; because that 
(knower) forms the object of the knowledge which is 
calculated to remove (avidya), and consequently deserves 
to be negated ; thus there is no possibility of that 
(knower) being (also) the agent (in the removal of ignorance 
by means) of that (knowledge which is calculated to 
remove ignorance). If it be said (again) that that (knower) 
is of the nature of the Brahman Himself, it is asked 
whether the knowership of the Brahman is, so far as it 
relates to that knowledge which removes (ignorance), 
natural or superimposed. If superimposed, then this 
(superimposition) and the other avidya on which that 
(superimposition) is based cannot form the objects of that 
knowledge which is calculated to remove ignorance ; and 
therefore it (viz. this superimposed knowership) certainly 
continues to persist. If some other knowledge that is 
calculated to remove (ignorance or avidya) be admitted, 
then, since that (knowledge) also is subject to the three- 
fold differentiation (of the knower, the thing known,andthe 
knowledge), there would result a regressus in inJinitum- G5 

265. Because this knowledge ledge has to be assumed to remove it, 

that is calculated to remove the avidya and again another to remove each such 

or ignorance, which superimposes knowledge so assumed in succession, 

knower-ship, is itself based upon Thus there will result an infinite 

another ai<idya\ and so, another know- series leading to no end. 



Adhik. I. Sfit. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 241 

in relation to the knower. If this (knowership) be- 
longs, by nature, to the Brahman Himself, then our 
view must find acceptance (with you). The statement, 
that the knowledge which removes (ignorance or avidya) 
and the knower of that (knowledge) are (both) different 
from the Brahman, and are therefore included among those 
things that deserve to be removed by that (knowledge) 
itself, is as ludicrous as the statement which makes out 
that, in saying that Devadatta has cut off all that is above 
the surface of the earth, the cutter and the process of cutting 
relating to this very same cutting action (of Devadatta) are 
also to be included among the things cut off (by Devadatta). 
That knower who is superimposed cannot himself become 
the agent in the act of producing the knowledge which is cal- 
culated to remove (ignorance or avidya), and which (again) 
forms the cause of his own destruction; because one's own 
destruction is not an object of human pursuit. If, more- 
over, the destruction of that (superimposed knowership) is 
admitted to be the same as the (manifestation of the) true 
nature of the Brahman, then, there will be no room at all 
for the assumption of the avidya and the other such things 
and (also for the assumption) of the perception of distinc- 
tions as consequent thereon. Therefore, let us have done 
with this (criticism) ; it amounts to beating with a club him 
who has been already killed by fate. 

Therefore, as the bondage (of samsdra) is based upon 
that ajttana (or ignorance) which is of the nature of a 
stream of beginningless karma, the destruction of that 
(ajnana} results only from that knowledge 2 66 which possess- 
es the characteristics already mentioned (by us). The 

266. Vide supra pp. 17 to 22. 

3 1 



242 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

production of that (knowledge) is the result of the per- 
formance of those duties which are appropriate to the 
various stages and conditions of life, and are characterised 
by the (spiritual) refinement due to that peculiar know- 
ledge of the real nature of the individual self, which mani- 
fests itself in the form of the daily practised worship of 
the Highest Person. 

This being so, mere (ritualistic) works yield (only) 
small and transitory results. On the other hand, such 
works as constitute the worship of the Highest Person, and 
are performed without attachment to results, yield an infi- 
nite and ever enduring result in the form of that experience 
of the real nature of the Brahman which is caused by the 
origination of the knowledge which is the same as steady 
meditation (or worship). Both (these) cannot become 
known without a knowledge of the true nature of works. 
(Without such knowledge), there can be no rejection of (mere 
ritualistic) works as they ordinarily are, and no subsequent 
adoption of them in the form pointed out above. Therefore, 
for this very reason, the enquiry into the Brahman has 
necessarily to be conducted immediately after the enquiry 
into works ; and hence it has been stated (by the Sutra- 
kdrd) "Then therefore, &c." [Ved. Sut. I. I. I.]. 267 



Under these circumstances, another pfirvapakshin 268 
may hold the following opinion : 

It is not possible to determine the power of a word to 
signify a meaning, except by means of the use it is put to 



267. This sutra is in full as follows:- 268. These Piirvapakshins are the 

' Then therefore the enquiry into Mlmdmsakas known as the Prabha- 
the Brahtnan" karas. Vide5/fa p. 41. n, 34. 



Adhik. L Sut. i.'\ SRI-BHASHYA. 243 

by such (speakers and responsive listeners) as are well ac- 
quainted with the significations of words. And accordingly, 
the true signification of a word is only to denote an action; 
because it is with the object of denoting actions that words 
are actually made use of. Consequently the import of the 
Vedas is merely in the form of actions. Therefore, the 
Veddnta is not capable of occupying the position of autho- 
rity in relation to the Highest Brahman whose meaning is 
already established (otherwise than as an inference from 
actions). 

Moreover, in regard to those sentences which relate 
to things that have an already established signification, as 
when they speak of the birth of a son 269 and other such 
happy incidents, it is not possible to determine that, through 
the joyous expansion of the face resulting from the attain- 
ment of a desired object, and through other such indi- 
cations (alone), they (viz. those sentences) form the means 
of importing a special meaning ; because the things which 
are productive of joy are existent in all the three (different) 
times (viz. past, present, and future), and are (indeed) end- 
less in number ; and because also (in the present case of 
the birth of a son) there is the possibility of its association 
with other joy-giving things such as an auspicious and 
lucky moment (of birth), an easy and happy delivery, and 
so on. 

Further, 270 that a word has the power of denoting a 
thing which has an already established import, (this) it is 
not possible to determine by means of the fact that the 
meanings of ununderstood words and terminations are 

269. The Mlmamsakas mentioned Bhatta. 

above criticise thus this example of 270. Here again, the same Mtnidm- 

the birth of a son, which is cited by the sakas criticise this example cited by 

or the followers of Rumania- the Naiyyayikas. 



244 SRI-BHASHYA. {Chap. 1. Part. L 

made out either by ascertaining their etymological signific- 
ance, or by ascertaining the meaning of the other (re- 
lated) words fin a sentence); because that (ascertainment 
of the etymological significance of ununderstood words and 
terminations, as well as that ascertainment of the meaning 
of the other words), relates to a number of words known 
to denote actions, and is (therefore) the same as determin- 
ing a particular variety of those (actions). 

And again, 271 it cannot be maintained that, in the 
case of the person who is afraid of an (illusorily perceived) 
serpent, the fear of the serpent is seen to disappear immedi- 
ately after he hears the words 'This is no serpent, this is a 
rope', and that therefore this (statement 'This is no serpent, 
this is a rope') forms the means of knowing the absence of 
the (illusorily perceived) serpent; because, in this case also 
there are many causes for the cessation of the fear, such as 
those which give rise to the knowledge that this thing (viz. 
the illusorily perceived serpent) is devoid of motion, devoid 
of poison, is inanimate, and so on; and it is not thus pos- 
sible (for that statement alone) to produce this special con- 
viction in particular (viz. that the illusorily perceived ser- 
pent is a mere rope). 

It may again be said as follows : 27 2 On the strength 
of the universal concomitance of volition with voluntary 
activity, it is made out that words give rise to that know- 
ledge which induces volitional activity. Thus every word 
relates to an action, and so all the words (in a sentence) 
denote only a conjointly determined action. Consequently, 
it is not possible to conclude with certainty that the signi- 
ficant power of a word consists only in denoting its own 

271. The example which is cited here cite and criticise the position of 

by the Adwaitins is here criticised by Vachaspati who is, in all probability, 

the MTmamsakas above mentioned. the Mimdmsaka known as VSchas- 

372. The very same Mltndmsakas pati Misra. 



Adhik. L Sftt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. 245 

meaning in association with that of the other (words in the 
sentence). The desire to accomplish one's own wishes forms 
the cause of voluntary activity through giving rise to voli- 
tion, but not by itself ; for, (otherwise), there would be no 
possibility of voluntary activity in regard to the desire to 
accomplish such wishes as relate to the past, to the future 
and (even) to the present. For, as long as the belief which 
is to the effect "Without my own effort, it is not possible 
for me to accomplish the fulfilment of my desires ; there- 
fore it has to be accomplished by my own actions " is not 
produced in one, so long one does not put forth voluntary 
activity. Consequently, volition alone is the cause of vol- 
untary activity. And accordingly, that which induces 
voluntary activity is itself the thing which is expressed by 
words; therefore action alone constitutes the thing that is 
to be learnt from the Vedas. Thus indeed there can be no 
acquisition of the infinite and eternal results which are of 
the nature of the attainment of the Brahman (whose 
significance is) already naturally established ; and it is 
declared in the following passage among others, namely, 
" Those meritorious results of works which accrue to 
him who performs the ch&turmdsya 2 7 3 sacrifice are indeed 
indestructible." \_Ap. Sr. VIII. i. i.], that works 
alone are capable of producing permanent results; for all 



273. Chaturmdsya is the name moon of slshdd/iafo) and the Sdkante- 

given to three seasonal or four-month- dha which is performed on that same 

ly sacrifices which are performed day of Kartifta. The sacrifice known 

at the Pan'ans or commencement of as the Sundsirtya is considered by 

the three seasons, the spring, the rainy some to be a fourth Qhaturmasya^ 

season and the autumn. These sacri- but the exact time of its performance 

ficesare: (i) The Vai'svadeva which is not known. All these sacrifices 

is generally performed on the full- belong to the larger subdivision call- 

moon of Phdlguna, (2)the Varunafra- ed Haviryajila. Vide Sat, Br. II, 

gh&sa which is performed on the full- 5. 



246 SRI-BHA.SHYA. {Chap. I. Part. 1. 

these reasons it is improper to undertake that enquiry into 
the Brahman which gives rise to the knowledge of the 
inconsiderable and impermanent character of the fruits of 
works, (and gives rise also to the knowledge) of the infinite 
and ever enduring character of the fruits that result from 
'knowing' the Brahman. 

To all this, the following is the reply : Those who 
are guided by the accepted criteria of truth do not highly 
value that opinion according to which that manner of ap- 
prehending the relation between words and their meanings, 
which is known all the world over, is discarded, so as to 
give rise to the belief that words have the power of pro- 
ducing the knowledge of only such significations as are not 
commonly current in the world. Indeed, children under- 
stand the relation between words and their meanings in 
the following manner. Mothers, fathers, and others frequent- 
ly indicate with (their) fingers (to children their) manias, 
papas, maternal uncles and others, as well as the moon, 
(domesticated) animals, men, beasts, birds, serpents, &c., 
with the object of telling (the children that they should) 
know a particular person (to be such and such), and know 
a particular thing (to be such and such); then, by means of 
the particular words used, they (viz. the children) largely 
learn those particular meanings ; and then they perceive 
that the knowledge which associates every one of those 
particular words with their particular meanings very 
gradually arises in themselves. Afterwards they come to 
the conclusion that the use of those words with those 
significations forms the foundation-principle according to 
which words acquire their character of being signific- 
ant ; because no other relation is seen to exist between 
words and their meanings, and because also there is no 



Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRi-BHlSHYA. 247 

knowledge of any person who fixes by convention (the 
relation between words and their meanings). And when, 
in regard to words other than those the meanings of 
which are already known, they (/. e. the childern) are, in 
addition, taught by speakers (who are well acquainted 
with the meanings of words) that a particular word has 
a particular meaning, only then do they come to know 
the meanings of all the words ; and afterwards, for the 
purpose of imparting their ideas to others, they make use 
of a number of sentences which give expression to those 
ideas. 

In another way also it is very easy to understand the 
relation between words and their meanings. (For instance), 
a certain person, by means of the movements of his hands 
and other gesticulations asks another to go and tell 
Devadatta that his father is doing well. Then this (other) 
person, when engaged in so informing (Devadatta) makes 
use of the words " Your father is doing well." A (third) 
person who is standing near and is desirous of learning the 
meanings of words, and who, like a dumb man, is well 
conversant with the details of gesticulation, learns that this 
person is called upon so to inform (Devadatta), follows (him), 
and then listens to the words which are made use of in 
giving that information ; and at last he thus arrives at the 
conclusion that a particular word signifies a particular 
meaning. Therefore the rule that the meaning of words 
is only to denote actions is not binding. Accordingly, the 
Vcdanta signifies the Highest Brahman (the import of the 
words signifying whom is) naturally established, and (it) 
also (signifies) that worship which relates to Him and yields 
unlimited results. Consequently, that enquiry about the 
Brahman, the aim of which is to find out that (Brahman 
and that worship relating to Him), has necessarily to be 



248 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

conducted. 

Even if the Vedas are denotative of actions, the en^ 
<|uiry into the Brahman has indeed necessarily to be 
conducted. How is that ? Because they (viz. the Vcdas) 
yield results which flow from the actions that relate to 
such worship as is taught in the following and other scrip- 
tural passages : " Verily, my dear one, the Self has to be 
seen, has to be heard, has to be reflected upon, has to be 
steadily meditated upon." [Brih. Up. IV. 5.6.]; "He 
has to be sought after, He has to be specially desired and 
known." [C&hand. Up. VIII. 7. i.]; " Having discovered 
Him, let him practise knowledge." [Brih. Up. IV. 4. 21.]; 
" There is in it the small etherial space. What exists with- 
in that (small etherial space), that has to be sought after, 
that has to be well understood." [C&hand. Up. VIII. 1. 1.] ; 
" There also is the blissful small etherial space. What- 
ever is within it, that has to be meditated upon." 
[M. Nar. X. 7.] : and because also, it is declared in the 
following scriptural passage " He who knows the Brah- 
man attains the Highest." [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], as well as 
in other similar scriptural passages, that the Brahman is 
attained as a consequence (of those results of worship). 
Therefore the true nature of the Brahman and His attri- 
butes are made out only as being helpful to actions, in the 
same way in which (the knowledge of the nature of the 
thing to be attained is helpful to action) in the analogous 
case of Swarga* 1 * which is in itself a particular place of 

274. The Vedas give the in- agreeableness" is helpful in producing 

junction " He, who desires to attain the desire for the attainment of Swar- 

Swarga, shall perform the Jyotishtoma ga and is, in consequence, helpful in 

sacrifice"; and the statement given causing the performance oltiiQjyotish- 

elsewhere describing the nature of toma sacrifice in obedience to the in- 

Sivarga as that world "in which junction relating to it. 
Vhere is no heat, no cold and no dis- 



Adhik. I. Sfd. /.] SRI-BHISHYA. 249 

such pleasure as is unmixed with pain, and also in other 
similar cases; (it is found to be so helpful) in the case of 
the pre-eminence 27 * which is to be derived from the per- 
formance of the nocturnal salras- 76 and (also) in the case 
of that relation of cause and effect which exists between the 
reviling and beating 277 (of the Brahmanas) and the fine 
of a hundred gold coins (prescribed therefor). 

Even in sentences like " Bring the ox", the signific- 
ance of words does not relate to actions, because the 'action' 
thought of by you is difficult of definition. Indeed, your 
( action ' comes into existence after the volition (in relation 
to it), and is (simply)that which is aimed at by that volition. 
To be that, which is aimed at by volition, is to be the object 
of volition. And to be the object 27 8 of volition is to be that 
which (that) volition most desires to attain. And that 
which is most desired to be attained is pleasure, or the 
avoidance of existing pain by its means. This being so, if 

275. Again, the Vedas give, in also mentioned in Vedic literature, 
one place, the injunction " He shall 277. And again, the Vedas prohi- 
perform the nocturnal sacrifices." bit the reviling and the beating of a 
Elsewhere, the result of the perfor- Brahmana by means of the injunction- 
mance of nocturnal sacrifices is stat- " Therefore, let him not revile and 
ed to be the attainment of eminence, beat a Brahmana.'' Taitt. Sam/i. II. 
as, for instance, in the passage 6. 10. 2. The effect of violating this 
"Those, indeed, who perform these injunction is given in the following 
nocturnal sacrifices, they attain emi- passage : " He who reviles and 
nence." This passage is helpful to beats (a Brahmana), let him be punish- 
action in as much as it stimulates the ed by the fine of a hundred gold 
desire to attain eminence, and thus coins." Taitt. Samh. II. 6. IO. 2. 
leads to the performance of those noc- This passage mentions the result 
turnal sacrifices. Vide Pur, Mini. IV. flowing from disobeying the injunc- 
3. 17 to 19. tion, and thus is helpful in producing 

276. A Satra is a long sacrifice the desire to act in accordance with 
or sacrificial session lasting, accord- the above prohibition. 

ing to some, from 13 to 100 days. 278. Vide Panini I. 4. 49., for 

Satras of many years' duration are this definition of karma or object. 

32 



250 SRI-BHISHYA. \Cliap. I. Part. L 

a person, who desires to have pleasure, &c., perceives that 
these things cannot be acquired -without any effort on 
his own part, then, that person is seen to act voluntarily 
like one who is desirous of putting forth effort. Thus, 
regarding that which is the object of desire, it is nowhere 
seen that to possess the characteristics of the thing aimed 
at by volition is anything other than to have its (own) ac- 
complishment dependent on (that) volition. And an object 
of desire possesses the character of what stimulates (the 
accomplishment of that desire), only in so far as the 
accomplishment (of that object of desire) is dependent upon 
effort ; because (all) activity proceeds only from this 
(dependence of accomplishment on effort). 

Moreover, to be aimed at by volition is not to be that 
which is agreeable to men; because pleasure itself (which 
is no action) is that which is agreeable to men. Further, 
the cessation of pain does not possess the (positive) 
character of being what is agreeable to men. Indeed, the 
discrimination between the true nature of pleasure and pain 
is to the effect that what is agreeable to men is pleasure, 
and that what is disagreeable to them is pain. Pain is 
that which is disagreeable; and hence, its cessation becomes 
a desirable thing, but not because that (cessation) is (in a 
positive way) agreeable. Indeed, the existence of a thing 
in accordance with its own true nature, in a condition 
which is free from the association of what is agreeable as 
well as of what is disagreeable, constitutes the cessation 
of pain. Therefore action and (all) other similar things, 
which are different from pleasure, cannot possess the 
character of what is agreeable. Moreover, it (viz. action) 
also cannot be what is agreeable, even on account of its 
aiming at pleasure ; because it is itself of the nature of pain. 
Even when it aims at pleasure, there is only the mere 



Adhik. I. Sut. /.] SR!-BHISHYA. 251 

desire to appropriate that (pleasure). Further, to be 
what is aimed at by volition is not to be that prin- 
cipal thing which has (that) volition subordinate to 
itself; because, on your side, the character of being 
(such) a principal thing has not been defined. And 
since the character of being so subordinate (to a principal 
thing) is the same as to be capable of being invariably 
influenced by the volition which is set in motion in 
obedience to the purposes of another, it is not thereby 
made out that the character of being (such) a prin- 
cipal thing is to be that which is oppositely correlated 
to that (subordinate thing). For, if it were so, the volition 
would not possess the character of what is so subordinate ; 
and that which is to be accomplished by it would not, in 
consequence, have the character of a principal thing. And 
again, for the reason that the character of being a subordi- 
nate thing is (simply) to be capable of producing that prac- 
tical activity which is intended to serve the purposes of 
another, it cannot be said that that another forms the princi- 
pal thing ; because the character of being what is aimed at 
(by volition) is all that is to be defined (here), and because 
also the master too is seen to be capable of producing the 
activity which is intended to serve the purposes of the ser- 
vant. But if it be said that the master, in accordance with 
his own desire,puts forth voluntary activity even in the mat- 
ter of feeding the servant, it is replied that this is not right ; 
because the servant also, out of his own desire, puts forth 
voluntary activity in the matter of feeding the master. 
Thus the true nature of 'action' itself has not been defined; 
and it is improper (to hold) that what is correlated to 
'action', (as the thing to be accomplished -by it), is the sub- 1 
ordinate thing, and that what is correlated to this (subor- 
dinate thing as the owner thereof) is the principal thing. 



252 SRl-BH&SHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

Also, to be what is aimed at by volition is not the .same 
as to constitute the utility of volition. The utility of the 
volition of a person is indeed nothing other than that 
utility which leads to the origination of his volition ; and 
he is himself actuated by desire. Therefore, the thing 
aimed at by volition has not been definitely shown to be 
other than the thing desired. Consequently, it is cer- 
tainly difficult to demonstrate that ' action ' consists in 
being that which is accomplished by volition as well as in 
being the principal object of volition. 

Moreover, a commandment also is different from 
pleasure and the cessation of ; pain, both of which are 
immediate objects of desire; therefore its desirability and the 
possibility of its being accomplished by volition are both due 
wholly to its forming a means of attaining those (objects 
of desire which are in the form of pleasure and the cessation 
of pain). It is for this very reason that it (viz. the command- 
ment) is other than the verb (denoting action). Otherwise, 
(the action denoted by) the verb itself would form the object 
to be accomplished. The object of accomplishment ex- 
pressed by the litl-"* 9 and other verbal forms, in harmony 
with their use along with the word swargakdma (in the 
Vedic commandment Jyotishtomena sivargakdmo yajetd), 
is nothing other than the attainment of Swarga ; therefore 
the object of accomplishment here is that new and invisi- 
ble something itself (known as apfirva)," which is other 
than the ephemeral action (of sacrificing), and which 
causes the enduring attainment of Swarga. Accordingly, 
the import of this new and invisible something (apurva)\\a.* 
indeed to be made out by imagining it to be the means of 
attaining Swarga. Thus it is said here that that object 

379. Vide sifra p. 41. n. 35. 280. Vide supra p. 41. n. 36. 



Adhik. L Sut. /.] 

which is to be accomplished is, at first, arrived at independ- 
ently of all other things; and then, for the purpose of up- 
holding this independent character (of that object of 
accomplishment), it is said that it is only ilieapftrva which 
later on becomes the means of causing the attainment of 
Swarga. Surely this is ludicrous ; because that word 
(viz. yajetd) which denotes, while in association with the 
word swargakdma, the object of accomplishment, cannot 
at first denote the independent character (of that object of 
accomplishment); and because also that independent thing, 
which is different from pleasure, from the cessation of 
pain, and from the means of attaining them, is not seen to 
be capable of being accomplished by means of volition. 

And again, what is this usefulness of the command- 
ment ? If it be said that, like pleasure, commandment 
(also) possesses the character of being agreeable, (it is 
asked) whether commandment constitutes pleasure ; for 
pleasure alone is what is agreeable. If it be said (again) that, 
like some particular kind of pleasure or other, it is also a 
peculiar pleasure that is synonymous with commandment, 
it has to be explained what means of proof there is to 
establish this. If it be said that one's own experience is 
the means of proof, it is seen not to be so ; because even, 
you do not experience in any definite manner any pleasure 
arising out of the experience of a commandment, in the 
same way in which (you experience) the pleasure arising 
out of the experience of (pleasurable) external objects. 
If it be said that a commandment is declared by an autho- 
ritative regulation to be an object of human pursuit, and 
that it is, therefore, carried into effect subsequently, it is . 
asked what that authoritative regulation is which says 
that a commandment is an object of human pursuit. 
It is not the (law-imposing) voice of the people ; 



254 SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

because that (voice of the people which imposes 
a commandment) relates to work which is identical 
with pain ; and because also it merely declares (the com- 
mandment) to be worthy of being carried into effect by 
volition, only in so far as it forms a means for the attain- 
ment of pleasure and other such things. Nor is it the 
voice of the Vedas, for that also enjoins the duty to be per- 
formed only as a means for the attainment of Swarga and 
other such things. It is neither the daily obligatory nor 
the occasionally obligatory injunction (of the Smritis} ; be- 
cause that also possesses its power of importing it (/. c. a 
commandment), only through the knowledge of (that) new 
and invisible something (or apiirvd) which is found in the 
sentence 2 8 J containing (the word) swargakdma. Therefore, 
as now stated, it is unavoidable that that (injunction of the 
Smritis} also implies the performance of works, (only) for the 
attainment of pleasure and other such things. Those 
works, the results of which are systematically temporal, 
bear fruit, as soon as they are performed, in the form of 
plenty of food, healthiness, and such other things which 
are enjoyed then (and there) ; and consequently there is no 
knowledge of the experience of that pleasure which- in 
contradistinction to them has the nature of (the working 
out of) a commandment. Thus we have no means 
whatsoever to prove that a commandment is a pleasure. 

Even in the explanatory and eulogistic allegories and 
fables found in the Vedas, 282 you do not generally sec the 



281. This sentence isJyotish- and prayers, &c. Vidlns are injunctions 
totnena swargakdMio yajeta. i. e, rules laying down the performance 

282. The 'Veda consists, according of particular rites. Arthai'daas are 
to the opifiion of the Allwainsakas, of explanatory remarks on the meaning 
three parts, viz. Mantras, ViJ/iis and of Mantras and the purpose of rites, 
Arthavcidas. Mantras are sacred hymns and consist of Ninda or censure i, ( 



Adhik. I. Silt. /.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 255 

description of the various modes of that pleasure which has 
the nature of a commandment, in the same way in 
which (you there see) the description of the various 
modes of the pleasure which relates to Swarga and 
such other things. Therefore, it is finally con- 

cluded that, even in those passages which give out 
only injunctions, the lift and the other inflectional 
forms of the verb denote, as established by the science of 
grammar itself, the fact that the meaning of a root relates 
to nothing other than what is to be accomplished by the 
activity of the agent. Under the aphorism " From 

Him (comes) the fruit (of our works), because (such a thing) 
is appropriate." [ Ved. Sut. III. 2. 37.], it will be est- 
ablished that sacrifices and other such things, which are 
denoted by the verbal roots (used in scriptural command- 
ments), possess the character of constituting the worship of 
the Highest Person who is the internal ruler of gods like 
Agni (Fire), &c.; and that the accomplishment of the re- 
sults aimed at (by such works) comes from that Highest 
Person (who is so) worshipped. 

Therefore it is conclusively proved that the Veddnta 
teaches the Highest Brahman (the import of the words 
denoting whom is) naturally established. Accordingly, the 
endlessness and the eternity of the fruits resulting from 

controversial remarks ; Samsci i. e. manas, &c. Under the head of 

eulogium or 'recommendation'; Purd- Purakalpa come the numerous stories 

kalpa or the account of sacrificial of the fight between the Devas and 

rites in former times; Parakriti i. e. the Asuras, as also the legends con- 

the ac hievement or the feat of another. cerning the sacrifices performed by 

This last comprises the stories about the gods. Thus Arthavdda includes 

certain performances of renowned all the explanatory and eulogistic 

Srotriyas or sacrificial priests, about allegories, fables, c. 
gifts presented by kings to Brah- 



256 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

the worship of the Brahman are also proved. In the case 
of the chzturmasya' 1 8 s sacrifice and other such (ritualistic) 
works also, it is taught that mere works yield unenduring re- 
sults ; and therefore it has to be understood that the teach- 
ing regarding (their) indestructible results is meant to be 
indicative of (their) relative superiority, as in the follow- 
ing among other passages where the scripture says, 
" This vayu (air) and (this) antariksha (ether) are immor- 
tal." \_Brih. Up. II. 3. 3.]. 284 Thus, mere works yield 
inconsiderable and unenduring results, and the knowledge 
of the Brahman yields infinite and ever enduring results. 
Consequently, it is maintained that it is proper to com- 
mence that enquiry into the Brahman the fruit of which is 
the determination of that (knowledge of the Brahman}. 

283. Vide supra p. 245. n. 273 its results last longer than those of 

284, The idea intended to be con- any other kind of 'work'. Similarly, 
veyed here is this : There are expli- the immortality of air and ether 
cit statements in the scriptures to implies that they are less mortal than 
the effect that the results derived other things. For the general state- 
from the performance of ritualistic ment regarding the impermanence of 
works are impermanent. This gene- the results of 'works', vide Chhand, 
ral proposition allows no room for Up. VIII. I. 6., where it is said 
exceptions, and the ChdturmSsya "Just as the world obtained by works 
sacrifice is no exception to the rule. perishes here, so also, there, the 
Therefore the statement that it yields world obtained by m2rit perishes." 
permanent results can only mean that 



Adhik. II. Sftt. 2.} SRi-BHlSHVA. 257 

ADHIKARANA. II. 

Janmddyadhikarana. 

To point out what that Brahman really is which is 
stated to be the object of the enquiry here, he (the Sfttra- 
kara] says 

Sutra 2. Janmadyasya yatah. 

(The Brahman is that) from whom (proceed) the 
creation, <c., of this (universe). 

The word janniadi means creation, preservation, and 
destruction. The attributive compound 285 (here) denotes 
that (collection of things) which is characterised (as 
having 'creation' at its beginning). The word asya 
denotes the world which is constituted in an unthinkably 
varied and wonderful fashion, and which is mixed up with 
(all) the individual souls, beginning with Brahma and 
ending with a clump of grass, each of which has its own 
particularly assigned enjoyment of the fruits (of karmas) 
limited to particular times and places. The word yatah 
denotes that that Highest Person who is the Lord of all, 
who possesses a nature which is hostile to all that is evil, 
who wills the truth, who possesses innumerable auspicious 
qualities, such as knowledge, bliss, &c., who is omniscient, 
omnipotent, and merciful in the highest degree, and from 
whom proceed creation, preservation, and destruction, 
(it denotes .that that Highest Person) is the Brahman. 
This is the meaning of this sfttra. 

There is the scriptural passage which begins with "The 
celebrated Bhrigu, son of Varuna,. approached his father, 
saying ' Reverend sir, teach me the Brahman '", and con- 

385. Vide Patanjali's Maha-Bhashya on Panini \. \, 27 ; II. 2. 24 ; VI. I. I. 

33 



258 SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

eludes with" From whom all these beings are born, by 
whom, when born, they are all preserved, and to whom they 
go when they perish, do thou desire to know that well ; 
that is the Brahman" \Taitt. Up. III. i. i.]. Here there 
arises the doubt whether or not it is possible to know the 
Brahman definitely by means of this passage. It is perhaps 
held that it is not possible. The words creation, &c., do not, 
indeed, define the Brahman by constituting His charac- 
terising attributes ; for, (if they did), there would result 
the predication of non-unity in relation to the Brahman, in 
consequence of His being characterised by many attributes. 
Indeed to be the characterising attribute (of a thing) is to 
be that which distinguishes it (from other things). It may 
be urged that in the instance, "Devadatta is brown, youth- 
ful, red-eyed, and symmetrical in form", there is seen only 
one Devadatta, although there are many characterising 
attributes (in relation to him); and that, similarly, in the 
case here also there is only one Brahman. It can not 
be so. In that case, all the characterising attributes meet 
in only one individual, because the oneness (which relates to 
Devadatta) is made out through other means of proof. 
Otherwise, even in that case, the predication of non-unity 
would be unavoidable on account of this distinguishing 
character (of those attributes). But here, (in the case 
under discussion), it is intended to 'define the Brahman by 
means of this same (collectively given) attribute (of creation, 
&c.,); accordingly, that predication of plurality in relation to 
the Brahman, which results from a variety of distinguishing 
attributes, is unavoidable for the reason that the oneness of 
the Brahman is not made out by other means of proof. 
If it be said that that oneness is made out here also, because 
the word -Brahman {in the scriptural passage under 
discussion) is only one, it is replied that it cannot be so 



Adhik. It. Sut. 2.] SRI-BHASHYA* 259 

made out. If, to a person who does not know any indivi- 
dual ox, and who is desirous to know (the ox), it is given 
out " An ox is that which is broken-horned, hornless and 
fully horned", there will then be the apprehension (by 
him) of a plurality of individual oxen, owing to there being 
a variety of distinguishing attributes, such as the posses- 
sion of broken horns and so on, although the word ox 
is used only once; accordingly, there must be many indivi- 
dual Brahmans. For this very reason it is not possible 
for these characteristics (of creation, &c.,) . to constitute 
even collectively the definition of the thing which it is 
intended to define. Nor can (these attributes of creation, 
&c.,) point out (the Brahman} by constituting (His) 
accidental characteristics, because there is no apprehension 
(of the Bra hman] in any other form. Indeed, all acci- 
dental characteristics are seen to be the means of appre- 
hending, under a different form, a thing already known in 
some one particular form; as in the following among other 
instances, namely, " Where there is that crane, that is 
Devadatta's field." And it may be said that the creation, 
&c., of the world form accidental characterisations in rela- 
tion to Him who has already been made out by means of 
(the passage) "The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, 
Infinity." \Taitt. Up. II. i. i.]. But it is not right, for the 
reason that, in relation to these two passages which define 
the Brahman, there results the fallacy of reciprocal depend- 
ence ; in as much as the form (of the thing to be defined) 
denoted by either (of those passages) is dep-endent upon 
that which is denoted by the other. Therefore it is 

not possible to know the Brahman by means of any 
definition. 

To this it is said in reply as follows : It is possible 
to know the Brahman by means of the creation, preserv- 



26o SRi-feHASHYA. \Chap. L Part. L 



ation, and destruction of the world, which (together) 
constitute (His) accidental characteristics. Moreover, 
there can be (here) no non-apprehension of the Brahman 
due to the non-apprehension of a form (in relation to Him), 
other than the form which is characterised by these 
accidental characteristics. Indeed, that which is charac- 
terised (here) by means of accidental characteristics is 
Greatness unsurpassed in excellence; and it is Growth 
also, because the root 286 brih (to grow) is capable of that 
meaning. And the creation, preservation, and destruction 
of the world constitute the accidental characteristics of 
that (Brahman thus made out to be Greatness and Growth). 
By the expressions ' from whom', ' by whom ' and ' (to) 
whom', the cause of the creation, &c., (of the world) is 
pointed out (in this passage) as though it is a well known 
thing ; and it is, accordingly, restated here in conformity 
with that well known knowledge. And the fact of (that 
cause) being thus well known is due to the only one 
thing, which is expressed by the word ' Existence' (or sat), 
forming the instrumental and the material cause (of the 
world), as it is given in the passage " Existence alone, 
my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, 
without a second ....... It thought 'May I become 

many and be born'. It created tejas." [Cfrhdnd. Up. 
VI. 2. i & 3.]. And this (fact of the Brah man forming 
the instrumental and the material cause of the world) 
results thus : from the statement that this 'Existence ' 
was one only in the beginning, there is the predication of 
the character of a material cause (in relation to that only 
one thing) ; and from the expression ' without a second', 
there is the negation of any other presiding deity; and 

8.86. SeeAt.i. Up. 4. & also V. P. III. 3. 22. 



Adkik. 12. Silt. 2.] SRi-^HASHYA. 261 

again from the statement" It thought, 'May I become 
many and be born'; It created tcjas " there is the 
declaration of only one (Being as constituting the deity 
presiding over creation). Hence that is the Brahman 
from whom proceed the creation, preservation, and destruc- 
tion of the world ; consequently, the attributes of creation, 
preservation and destruction define the Brahman to be 
that thing which is their own instrumental and material 
cause. The Brahman is understood to be that Greatness 
which consists in possessing omniscience, the quality of will- 
ing the truth, and wonderful powers and so on, which are all 
implied in His being the instrumental and the material 
cause of the world ; and for this reason also there does not 
arise the inappropriateness which is due to the non-realisa- 
tion of another form (in relation to the Brahman}, because 
creation, &c., constitute the characteristics (of the Brah- 
man) so realised. 

There is nothing wrong in creation, &c., forming even 
the defining characteristics (of the Brahman), in as much 
as they are (His) attributes. Even those attributes which 
form the defining characteristics (of a thing) denote that 
thing which is contrary to what is characterised by their 
opposites. Even when the [thing, which it is desired to 
define, happens to be (only) one and has its essential 
nature unknown, (even then for that one thing) to be 
characterised by many attributes, which do not conflict 
with each other, does not imply any differentiation (in 
relation to it) ; because all the characterising attributes are 
seen to relate to one and the same thing, and are thus 
applied together to one and the same thing. But the 
attributes of being broken-horned, &c., (mentioned before 
in relation to the ox), indicate different individual oxen, 
solely by reason of the contradiction (existing between 



262 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. L 

the attributes themselves). But here (i.e. in the case of 
the Brahman] the attributes of creation, &c., do not con- 
tradict (each other) owing to the difference in the time (of 
their occurrence). The Brahman, who is the cause of the 
creation, c., of the world, is apprehended from the passage 
which begins with " From whom all these beings are 
born " \TaitL Up. III. i. i.], and deals with the cause of 
the universe ; and the scriptural passage " The Brahman 
is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." \_Taitl. Up. II. i. i.], 
denotes that essential nature of His which is different 
from all other things. Here the word ' Existence ' denotes 
the Brahman as possessing the state of the unconditioned 
being. By this (word) the non-intelligent thing (or matter) 
which is subject to modifications, and the intelligent thing 
(or the individual soul) which is associated with it are 
(both) excluded ; because these two (things) are not cap- 
able of unconditioned existence, owing to the fact that they 
are capable of existing in various states so as to assume 
various names. The word ' Knowledge ' denotes (in rela- 
tion to Him) the eternal and uncontracted condition of 
pure intelligence. By this (word) the released souls are ex- 
cluded (from the definition of the Brahmaii), owing to the 
fact that their intelligence must have been at one time in a 
contracted state. The word ' Infinity ' denotes that essen- 
tial nature (of His) which is free from the limitations of 
space, of time, and of being some one particular thing 
(among others). This essential nature (of the Brahman) 
is possessed of attributes, and therefore (His) infinity is the 
consequence of (His) nature as well as qualities. By this 
(word) are excluded (all) those freed individual souls whose 
nature and qualities are not unsurpassed (in excellence), 
and who are distinct from the two classes of things 
already excluded (from the definition of the Brahman) by 



Adluk. II. Sftt. 2.] SRI-BHISHYA. 263 

means of the first two words (Existence and Knowledge) ; 
because characterising attributes possess the power of ex- 
clusively defining things. Therefore, by means of this 
passage, namely, 2 8 7 "The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, 
Infinity", that Brahman, whose true nature is made out 
from the creation, &c., of the world, is defined as being 
different from all other things; and thus there is (here) no 
fallacy of reciprocal dependence. Consequently, it is a 
settled conclusion that the Brahman who is the cause of 
the creation, &c., of all the worlds, who is untainted, who 
is omniscient, who wills the truth, and who is omnipotent, 
is capable of being understood by means of a definition. 

Those again who say that the object of the enquiry 
(here) is the attributeless thing, according to their view, 
the aphorisms 288 " (Then therefore) the enquiry into the 
Brahman" ', and "(That is the Brahman} from whom (pro- 
ceed) the creation, &c., of this (universe)." would be inap- 
propriate ; because there is (here) the etymological expla- 
nation 289 that the Brahman is unsurpassed Greatness and 
Growth ; and also because that same Brahman is declared 
(herein) to be the cause of the creation, &c., of the world. 
Similarly, in the groups of succeeding aphorisms, as well as 
in the groups of scriptural passages quoted under those 
aphorisms, it may be observed that the association of the 
powers of 'seeing', &c., is predicated (in relation to the 
Brahman}. Hence the sfitras (or aphorisms) and the 
scriptural passages quoted under those aphorisms do not 
constitute any authority for that (/. c. for holding the view 
that the object of the enquiry here is the attributeless 
thing). Logic also is no means of proving that thing 



287. Tatit. Up. II. I. I. 289. Vide supra n. 286. 

288. Vide Ved. Sit'. 1. I. I & 2. 



264 SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

which is devoid of characterising attributes ; because it 290 
deals with such a thing as is associated with the character- 
istics of that which forms the basis of logical inference, and 
which is invariably concomitant with the characteristics of 
the thing to be proved. The thing which is devoid of 
characterising attributes is not established even according 
to your own imaginary position that the Brahman is that 
from whom proceeds the illusion regarding the creation, 
&c., of the world ; because thereby it will have to be 
admitted that ignorance (or avidya) is the source of this 
illusion, and that the Brahman is the witness of this 
ignorance. Indeed, (He) is said to be a witness simply 
because (He) has the character of homogeneous luminosity. 
And luminosity is a characteristic which distinguishes (the 
possessor thereof) from what is non-intelligence, and it has 
the nature of what makes itself and other things fit to be 
realised (by the mind). If this be so (admitted), then there 
results (to the Brahman] the condition of being qualified 
by characterising attributes. If this be not (so admitted), 
there would be no luminosity at all, and there would be 
only nothingness. 

ADHIKARANA. III. 

Sdslrayon itwddh ika rana . 

It has been stated that the Brahman, who is the 
cause of the creation, &c., of the world, is capable of being 
made out from the Veddnta. This is improper. Indeed, 

290. The meaning is this: In a mountain is fiery,because it smokes", 

syllogism, the minor term is found the minor term ' mountain ' is asso- 

associated with the characteristics of ciated with the characteristics of the 

the middle term which is associated middle term ' smoke ' which again is 

with the characteristics of the major associated with the characteristics of 

term. Thus in the syllogism, " The the major term ' fire'. 



Adhik. III. Sul. j.] SRI-BHISHYA. 265 

that (Brahman) is not established by ( Veddntd) passages, 
because He is established by means of logical inference. 
To such a supposition, he (the Sfitrakara) says in reply 

Sutra 3. Sastrayonitwat. 

(That the Brahman is the cause of the creation, &c., 
of the universe, follows altogether from the scripture), 
because the scripture forms the source (of the 
knowledge relating to Him). 

He, in relation to whom the scripture forms the source, 
or the instrument (of knowledge), or the means of proof, 
He is trie scripture-sourced one. And the state of His 
being so scripture-sourced is His scripture-sourcedness. 
From that, (that is), from the sastra having the character 
of being the means of acquiring the knowledge relating to 
the Brahman, the Brahman has that (sastra) for (His) 
source. The Brahman is altogether beyond the senses, and 
so does not form the object of any means of proof, such as 
perception, &c.; and the sastra alone forms the means to 
prove Him. Consequently, the scriptural passage beginning 
with "From whom all these beings are bom" \_Taitt. 
Up. III. i. i.], certainly teaches that Brahman who is 
of the nature already described. This is the meaning (of 
this sfitra). 

It may, however, be said here thus : Indeed, it is 
not possible for the Brahman to be that which has the 
sastra as the means of proving Him; because the Brahman 
is capable of being made out by other means of proof. 
And the sastra* 9 * has a meaning only in so far as it relates 
to what has not been already arrived at. 

What 292 then is the means of proving that (Brah- 

291. Cf. Pur. Mlm. III. 4. 12, & 292. Here, the objector is the 
HI. 5. 21. Vide supra n. 232. Mlmcinnaka, 

34 



266 SRT-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. /. 

man),! Surely, it is not perception. It (viz. perception) 
is of two kinds; that which is born of the senses, and that 
which is born of yoga (or introspective realisation through 
mental concentration). The (perception) which is bora of 
the senses is of two kinds, namely, outside-born (or exter- 
nal) and inside-born (or internal). The external senses 
give rise to the knowledge of such of their own objects as 
are fit to be brought into contact (with them) in the usual 
way; and accordingly they do not produce the knowledge 
which relates to that particular Person who is capable of 
directly perceiving all things, and is (also) capable of 
bringing them into existence. Nor does the internal 
(perception prove the Brahman}; because, in relation to 
external objects (naturally) distinct from pain, pleasure, 
&c., which are (all)internal, it cannot operate independent- 
ly of the external senses. Even yogic perception 298 does 
not (prove the Brahman}. It (viz. yogic perception) results 
from the utmost intensification of mental conception, and 
although it has the character of a clear presentation before 
consciousness, it is nothing other than the mere remem- 
brance of previously experienced things; and it is, therefore, 
no (separate) means of proof. Under these circumstances, 
how can it have the character of direct perception, seeing 
that there is no cause to make it deal with things other 
than those (to which that remembrance and that concep- 
tion relate) ? If it did deal with such things, it would 
acquire the character of an illusion. Inference also, 
whether arrived at through the particular waj r of deduction 
or arrived at through the generic way of induction, is not 
(the means of proving the Brahmaii). (Inference) arrived 
at through the particular way of deduction is not (the 

293, Vide supra p.6g. n. 46, 



Adhik. III. Sut. j.] SRI-BHISHYA. 267 

means of proof here), because there is no knowledge of its 
relating to anything which is beyond the senses. There 
is also no such basis of inductive inference as is seen to give 
rise to a generalisation and as is invariably associated with 
that particular Person who is capable of directly perceiving 
all things and of actually bringing those (things) into 
existence. 

It may, however, be again objected thus : 294 (The 
idea of) the world being a produced effect is invariably 
associated with (the idea of) there being, (in relation to 
it), an agent, who knows thoroughly its material cause, its 
auxiliary implements of production, its disposal and its 
purpose. The idea also that the world is produced by 
the non-intelligent thing (or matter) is invariably associated 
with the idea of its being subject to the control of a single 
intelligent being. Indeed, all produced effects such as 
pots, &c., are seen to be associated with a producing agent 
who knows their material cause, their auxiliary implements 
of production, their disposal and their purpose. (For 
example), one's own body, which is produced out of 
non-intelligent matter and is free from disease, is indeed 
subject to the control of a single intelligent being. The 
world is a produced effect, because it is made up of compo- 
nent parts. 

It is replied (to this) as follows : What is it (for a 
thing) to be subject to the control of a single intelligent 
being ? It is, surely, not to have the origin and the exist- 
ence (of that thing) subject to the control of that (being) ; 
for, then, the illustrative example (given above) will be 
found to be defective in regard to that which is to be 
proved. Indeed, one's own body, which is free from 

^94. The objector here is one who NaiyyUyikcu and believes in the value 
partly accepts the doctrines of the ot the ' design argument*. 



26S SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. /. 

disease, has not its origin and existence subject to the 
control of a single intelligent being ; because, to all (those) 
intelligent beings, such as the wife, c., who are the 
enjoyers of that body, the origin and the existence of that 
(body) appear to be due to something that is unknown. 
Moreover, the body which is organically made up of con- 
stituent parts does not, for the purpose of existing in the 
form of a complete whole the constituent parts of which 
are inherently associated together, stand in need of an 
intelligent being over and above the peculiar putting 
together of its constituent parts. And that (kind of) 
existence, which is characterised by life, can not possibly 
be predicated in relation to the earth, the ocean, the 
mountain, &c., which are all admitted to fall into the same 
class fas the body) ; and hence, we find that there is no 
(kind of) existence that is of a uniform nature and is found 
to be alike in the case under consideration as well as in 
other parallel cases. If it be said that (for a thing) to be 
subject to the control of a (single intelligent) being, is the 
same as to have its movements determined by that (single 
being), then, this (lawj is seen to be transgressed in the case 
of heavy chariots and stones and trees and other such 
objects, which are all capable of being moved only by 
many intelligent beings, (although they are all produced 
out of non-intelligent matter and have thus to be under- 
stood in accordance with the above hypothesis to be 
subject to the control of a single intelligent being). If it 
be said that it (viz. the fact of being produced out of non- 
intelligent matter) is the same as to be simply dependent 
upon intelligent beings, then, there arises the fallacy of prov- 
ing the proved. Moreover, it is proper to admit that the in- 
dividual souls alone, which are accepted by both parties, 
do possess the quality of being agents ; because there is 



dhik. lL Sui. j."| SRI-BHA.SHYA. 269 

(the support of) simplicity (in favour of such an admis- 
sion). And it is not right to hold that it is impossible 
for the quality of being an agent to exist in relation to 
the individual souls, since they do not know the material 
cause, &c., (in regard to the production of things) ; for, all 
the individual souls are in possession of the power of direct- 
ly perceiving the material cause (of things) such as the (ele- 
ment) earth, &c., and (also) the auxiliary means (of produc- 
ing them), such as sacrifices, &c. Accordingly, the (element) 
earth, &c., and sacrifices, &c., are directly perceived by them 
now. In relation to the intelligent beings (viz. the individual 
souls), there is (indeed) no impossibility of the quality of 
being an agent, even in the absence of the direct perception 
of that unseen something 293 which is expressed by the 
word apfirva and by other words, and has the nature of the 
power which results from sacrifices, &c., that form the auxi- 
liary means (of producing things) ; because the production of 
a thing, does not stand in need of such direct perception. In- 
deed, the direct perception of that which has power is alone 
useful in causing the production of anything. It is the know- 
ledge alone, but not the direct perception, of power that is 
(here) useful. As a matter of fact, potters and others do not 
begin their work of making jars, water-pots, and such 
other things, only after having directly perceived the 
power of those things (which form the auxiliary imple- 
ments of production) ; in the same way in which (they 
perceive) the rod, the wheel, and the other things that 
form the auxiliary means to the performance of their work. 
And, in the case of those intelligent beings (or the indivi- 
dual souls) who are, in accordance with the sdstras, under- 
stood to possess the particular kind of power which results 

295. Vide supra p. 41, n. 36, Vide also Piir. Mini. 11. I. I 104. 



270 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

from sacrifices, &c., it is not (at all) inappropriate here 
that they do the work (of producing things). Moreover, 
that thing the making of which is possible and the know- 
ledge relating to the material cause, &c., of which is also 
possible, that thing alone is seen to have (been produced 
by) an agent who knows those (possibilities). But the 
earth, the mountain, the great ocean, &c., are things 
the making of which is impossible (to individual 
.souls), and the knowledge of the material cause, &c., 
in relation to them is also impossible (to individual souls); 
therefore they are not made by intelligent beings (or the 
individual souls). Hence, it is only such a quality of being 
a produced effect as is found in association with a thing 
which is like jars, water-pots, and other objects resembling 
them, which is itself capable of being made (by individual 
souls), and the material cause, &c., relating to which are 
(all) capable of being known (by them), (it is only this 
quality of being a produced effect) that is competent to 
establish that an intelligent maker (or agent) must have 
necessarily preceded (the production of that thing). Fur- 
ther, such a produced effect as a pot or any other similar 
object is seen to have been caused by one who is not the 
lord of all, whose knowledge and power are very limited, 
who has a body, who is provided with auxiliary imple- 
ments of production, and whose desires are unfulfilled ; 
accordingly, this means of proving an intelligent agent (in 
relation to the world), from the fact of the world possess- 
ing the . characteristics of a produced thing, establishes an 
intelligent agent who is altogether of the above-mentioned 
nature ; and thus it proves unfavourable, for the reason 
that it establishes in relation to the Person intended to be 
proved here (as the agent in the act of creation) the 
opposites of omniscience, the lordship of all, and other 



Adhik. III. Snt. j.] SRI-BHASHYA. 271 

such qualities. Moreover, owing to this much alone, it 
cannot be said that all logical inferences have to be given 
up (in this matter). If a thing which has to be proved 
by logical reasoning falls (also) within the scope of some 
other means of proof, then all such mistaken characteristics 
(in relation to that thing), as are arrived at on the strength of 
the bases of logical inference, are contradicted by that (other) 
means of proof ; and hence those (characteristics) cease to 
be. 296 But here, in the case of Him who is the thing to be 
proved, who is incapable of being dealt with by all other 
means of proof (than the sastras), and who is skilled in the 
creation of all the worlds, all the attributes, which are, as a 
rule, invariably associated with Him and are made out by 
means of direct and converse processes of logical inference, 
are, without exception, rightly found to be relevant and 
admissible ; and they continue to remain as such, because 
there is no other means of proving (Him) by which these 
attributes may become stultified. Therefore, how is the 
Lord to be established without the dgamas (or sastras) ? 

Here (again), they (viz. the purvapakshinsY* 7 say as 
follows : It is not possible to deny the fact that the 
world is a produced effect; simply because it is made up 
of constituent parts. And the following are the syllo- 



296. For example, a traveller who capable of being made out by means 
has missed his way, and is overtaken of logical inference as well as by 
by darkness, happens to see at a dis- means of direct perception ; and the 
tance the ignis fatuus ; and mistaking infeired existence of the habitation is 
it to be some kind of light lit up by contradicted by means of the per- 
man, he draws the inference that a ceived non-existence thereof. Only 
human habitation must be found thus can the conclusions of logic be- 
near the light. He moves on in the come stultified. 

direction of the light, and at last per- 297. The Pnrvapakshins here are 

ceives no such habitation. Here, the the Vai'stshikits, 
existence of the human habitation is 



SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

gistic statements (in regard to this position): (i) The 
earth, the mountain, &c., which are (all) the subject of 
discussion (here), are produced effects, because they are 
made up of constituent parts ; as is the case with pots, &c. 

(2) Similarly, the earth, the ocean, the mountain, &c., which 
are (all) the subject of discussion (here), are produced 
effects, because, being themselves gross, they possess the 
power of being set in motion ; as is the case with a pot. 

(3) The body and the world, &c., are produced effects, 
because, being themselves gross, they have a definite form; 
as is the case with a pot. In the case of such substances 
as are made up of constituent parts, we do not find any 
characteristic, other than the fact of their being made up 
of constituent parts, which uniformly defines the state of a 
produced effect so as to point out what is (really so) pro- 
duced and what is not. If it be said that the possibility 
of (such things) being made, and the possibility of knowing 
their material cause, &c., are found invariably associated 
with the fact of things being produced effects, it is replied 
that to hold so is not right. Even in the case of things 
which are accepted to be produced effects, the knowledge 
and the power (relating to the maker of the produced 
thing) are inferred from the product itself. Elsewhere also, 
the fact of a thing being a produced effect is made out 
through its being made up of constituent parts and through 
such other (causes). Hence, those two things (viz. the 
knowledge and the power of the producer of an effect) are 
certainly capable of being established (by inference). 
There is, thus, no peculiarity here. Accordingly, in the 
case of jars, water-pots and other made things, a person, 
after knowing that they are produced effects, makes out, 
by means of inference, the knowledge and the power which 
are found in the producing agent and are needed for the 



Adhik. III. Silt, j.] SRI-BHISHYA. 273 

making of those things. And (such a person) sees the 
palace of a king which he had never before seen, and 
which is wonderfully planned. Then, by means of the 
peculiarity in the arrangement of its parts, he arrives at 
the conclusion that it is a produced effect ; and immediate- 
ly afterwards he learns by inference the wonderful nature 
of the knowledge and the power possessed by the producer 
(of that palace) for (the purpose of producing) it. There- 
fore, if the character of being a produced effect is established 
in the case of the body, of the world and such other things, 
then, a particular Person, who is capable of directly per- 
ceiving and of creating all things as well as of performing 
other actions in relation to them, is certainly proved. 
Moreover, in the case of intelligent beings (?'. e. the indivi- 
dual souls), the enjoyment of pleasure and pain is based 
upon merit and demerit (respectively) ; however, these two 
things (viz. merit and demerit) are not themselves intelli- 
gent, and are not presided over by any intelligent being ; 
hence they are not themselves capable of being the means 
of yielding the fruits (of karma). Accordingly, some 
particular Person, who is capable of skilfully awarding all 
fruits in accordance with all the (various) karmas, has to 
be postulated ; because hatchets and other instruments, 
which are themselves not intelligent, are not, for instance, 
seen to be the means of producing the sacrificial pole and 
such other things, when not presided over by a carpenter, 
even though the proper place, the proper time, and the 
numerous other accessories (for making them) are all 
available and at hand. The case of the seed becoming the 
sprout and all other similar cases (also) fall within the 
scope of this case under discussion ; therefore to maintain 
any variation in logic in relation to them is to display that 
ignorance which belongs to demons learned in the scriptures. 

35 



274 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

For the very same reason, the statement which main- 
tains that the above logic has to vary in the case of pleasure 
and other such things is (also) quite similar in character. 298 
Further, it is not proper to assume, for the sake of simplici- 
ty, that this kind of presidentship belongs to the indivi- 
dual souls themselves, which are admitted by both parties ; 
because, in their case, it is conclusively established that 
they do not possess the power of perceiving what is 
subtle, what is hidden, and what is far away. Indeed, in 
all cases, the hypothesis has to be altogether in accordance 
with the perception. And, in the case of the Lord of all, 
there can be no demonstration of powerlessness, as (there 
is) in the case of the individual soul. Therefore, it is 
not impossible to prove Him by other means of proof (than 
the scripture). He (the Lord) is proved to be arrived at as 
the cause of a produced effect which is invariably associat- 
ed with an efficient producing agent ; and hence He is 
surely made out as naturally possessing the power 
of directly perceiving and controlling all things. What 
has been already stated 299 to the effect that, by 
postulating the absence of lordship, &c., (in relation 
to the agent of creation), there results the fact of prov- 
ing, (in relation to that agent), the opposites of certain 

298. Pleasure and other sensa- As the hatchet has to be handled by 
lions and emotions give rise to their the carpenter, so also these sensations 
corresponding physical expressions. and emotions have to be felt by an 
These expressions are therefore pro- intelligent being ; otherwise, there 
dnced effects having those sensations can be no physical expression corres- 
and emotions for their cause. And ponding to them. Consequently, 
the sensations and emotions are not even here the predication of the 
themselves intelligent agents. ~ f It may intelligent agent cannot be avoid- 
therefore be argued that all produced cd. 

effects need not have an intelligent 299, Vide supra p. 270. 
agent engaged in (producing them. 



Adhik. IH. Sat. j.] SRi-&HisHYA. 275 

(desired) attributes, that is due to the ignorance 
of the various processes of logical inference ; because 
all the attributes which are found to exist together in ana- 
logous and parallel cases, but do not themselves form the 
cause of producing the effect (in question), are not found to 
exist in the thing to be proved. What is said is this : 
Anything which has to be produced (or made) by any one 
requires, for its production, that its producer should have 
the power of producing it, and have also the knowledge of 
its material cause and of the auxiliary means (needed for 
producing it). It does not require, (on his part), the incap- 
ability of producing other things and the ignorance in re- 
gard to other (causes and means); because they (viz. this 
powerlessness and this ignorance) do not form the cause 
(of what he has to produce). When, indeed, the production 
of a thing is possible by means of the power of producing 
it and by means of the knowledge of its material cause and 
of the accessories (needed for producing it), the ignorance, 
&c., of other things do not in any way affect (the produc- 
tion of it) ; and hence they do not deserve to form the cause 
of its production, merely on the score that they are seen to 
be in some way related (to that cause). Moreover, 

do (that) ignorance and that other thing (viz. powerless- 
ness) which, relating to objects other than the thing to be 
produced, are, (according to you), capable of affecting the 
production of a thing (do they) relate to all (such pro- 
ducible) things, or do they relate to only a few (such) 
things ? Surely, they cannot relate to all (such) things, 
for it is not right to say that potters and others do not 
know anything other than what has to be produced by 
them. Nor do they relate only to a few (such) things ; 
because there is no definite rule to settle, in the case of 
every one of all the agents, \vhat particular kind of ignorance 



276 SRI-BHISHYA. {Chap. I. Part. L 

and powerlessness he is to have, and there result*, in 
consequence, a straying away from the hypothesis to 
postulate ignorance, &c., in relation to all things. There- 
fore, the fact that non-lordship and other such attributes, 
which do not affect the producibility of things, are not 
found in association with what is to be proved (/. e. with 
the Creator), does not (indeed) prove the contrary (of what 
is to be proved). It may be said that, since potters 

and others are seen to possess the power of controlling the 
use of rods, wheels, &c., only with the help of their bodies, 
it is therefore impossible for the Lord who has no body to 
become the controller of the material cause of the world 
and of the auxiliary means (needed for producing it). 
In such a case, it is replied that it is not right to hold so, 
because the expulsion and destruction of ghosts, demons, 
poisons, &c., found in the bodies of others are seen to re- 
sult solely with the help of the will (of the magician,) 
If it be asked, how the Lord who has no body can Himself 
have that will which makes others act, it is replied that 
the will is not dependent upon the body, in as much as the 
body does not form the cause of the will. The mind alone 
is the cause of the will, and that is admitted to be found in 
the Lord also; because, from the very same fact of (the 
world's) being a produced effect, His mind also is arrived 
at (by us through inference), in the same way in which His 
knowledge and power are. If it be said that, since he alone 
has the mind who has the body, the will born of the mind 
belongs only to him who has the body, it is replied that it 
cannot be so; because the mind is eternal, and the mind 
continues to exist even after the destruction of the body, and 
is not, in consequence, invariably associated with it. Thus, 
the individual soul who is under the influence of merit and 
demerit, and who is possessed of power and knowledge, is 



Adhik. III. Sffl. j.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 277 

not competent to produce such effects as the creation of 
the body, the world, &c., which are all characterised by 
a peculiarly wonderful arrangement of (their) constituent 
parts. Consequently, that particular Person, namely, the 
Lord, who is clever in the creation of all the worlds, 
whose knowledge, power, and lordship are unthinkable and 
immeasurable, who is without a body, who, merely by 
means of the instrument of volition, has established this 
infinite and wide world of wonderful arrangements, (such 
a Lord) is established solely by means of the logical process 
of inference. Therefore, in as much as the Brahman is 
capable of being conclusively made out by a means of proof 
(other than the scriptures), this scriptural passage (viz. 
"From whom, all these beings are born, &c.",) does not 
establish the Brahman. Moreover, it is seen that only 
two very extremely different things, namely, the mud and 
the potter, constitute the material and the instrumental 
causes (of a pot). It is not further proper to suppose that 
the spatial ether and such other things, which have no 
constituent parts, possess the character of a produced effect. 
Consequently it is not possible to establish that the only 
one Brahman constitutes (both) the material and the 
instrumental causes of the whole world. 

If it be thus argued, we make the following repty : 
The scriptural passage 300 relating to the origin, &c., 
(of the world) certainly gives rise to the knowledge of the 
Brahman as possessing the above-mentioned characteristics. 
Why ? Because the Brahman is to be proved solely by 
means of the sastras. What has been stated to the effect 
that the whole world is a produced effect, in as much as it is 
made up of constituent parts and (possesses) other allied 

300. Vide Taitt. Up. III. i. I. 



2/3 SRi-BnisHYA. [Chap. /. Part. 1. 

(characteristics); that a produced effect is seen to be invari- 
ably associated with a special agent suited to the production 
thereof ; and that, therefore, some one who is clever in the 
creation of all the worlds, and in knowing their material 
cause and the auxiliary means of producing them, has to be 
inferred; this is improper: because, though the earth, and 
the great ocean, &c., are produced effects, there is no proof 
to show that they -were created by one (agent) at only one 
particular time. Again, all the things (in the world) do 
not possess the character of constituting a single produced 
effect, in the same way in which a pot does (possess 
such a character), so that there may be one agent (to 
produce them all) at one and the same time ; because, in 
the case of produced things, which are quite distinct from 
one another, there is the perception of difference in 
time and of difference in agents ; and there is, in conse- 
quence, no apprehension of any rule laying down only one 
particular agent and one particular time (in regard to the 
production of things). Again, in as much as the individual 
souls are incapable of creating the wonderful world, and 
in as much as it is inappropriate to assume many (individual 
souls to be the creators of the world), when, on the strength 
of the world being a produced effect, an agent differ- 
ent from those (individual souls) has to be assumed (as 
the creator of the world)/ merely on this score it is not 
right to hold that there must be only one agent (in the matter 
of creating the world) : because, owing to the fact that those 
individual souls themselves who have increased their special 
merits are seen to possess wonderful powers, and owing also 
to the fact that to them alone there is the possibility of the 
fruition of that highly increased influence (of the karmas) 
which is known as adrlshta,* 01 it is appropriate for each 

301, Vide supra p, 41. n. 36. 



Adhik. III. Sat. j.] SRI-BHISHYA, 279 

of those (individual souls) to form the cause of producing 
particular and distinct created effects; and it is not, in con- 
sequence, proper to assume (as the agent in the act of 
creation) a person who is distinct from them and is quite 
unseen. Again, the (conceptions of the) simultaneous origin- 
ation of all things and the simultaneous, destruction of all 
things do not deserve to occupy the position of proved 
truth ; because such a thing is not seen (to occur), 
and because creation and destruction are seen to take 
place only one after another in order, and because also, 
even when the simultaneous origination and destruction 
of all things have to be assumed owing to the fact 
of their being produced effects, there is nothing wrong 
in supposing that those acts (of creation and destruction) 
take place in accordance with what is ordinarily perceived 
(to be the case). Therefore, if it is the agency of one 
intelligent being (in regard to the production of all things) 
that is to be established, then, there is no invariable asso- 
ciation of the produced character of things (with such a 
single producing agent). Moreover, the subject of the dis- 
cussion (vi/. such an intelligent being) will (then) have to 
possess attributes generally unknown to be possessed 
by him, and the given example (of the pot) will be 
defective in illustrating the thing to be proved ; because 
such a single person as is capable of creating all things 
is not known to exist. I fit is only an intelligent agency 
that is to be established, then there results the fallacy of 
proving the admittedly proved. Is this character of being 
a produced effect, which is intended to prove some one 
being who is possessed of omniscience and omnipotence, 
(is this) found in relation to all such things as are pro- 
duced at one and the same time ? Or is it found in rela- 
tion to all such things as are produced one after another 



280 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 1. 

in order ? If it be found in relation to all things which 
are held to be produced at one and the same time, then 
(owing to the hypothesis being untrue) the character of 
being a produced effect would itself remain unproved (in 
relation to the world) ; and if it be found in relation to 
all things which are held to be produced one after another 
in order, then, it would be established that they must be 
produced by many agents, and there would be the conse- 
quent contradiction (of what is to be proved here). Under 
these circumstances, in proving the agency of (only) one 
being (in relation to all produced things in the world), there 
is not only the contradiction of perception and inference, 
but (there is) also the contradiction of the scriptures ; for, 
we see it mentioned (separately) in the scriptures that the 
maker of the pot is born, and also that the maker of the 
chariot is born. 302 

Moreover, all produced effects such as bodies, &c., are 
seen to be associated with pleasures, &c., which are them- 
selves the produced effects of the qualities of goodness, 
&c. 3 3 Therefore, it has necessarily to be admitted that 
all produced effects result from the qualities of goodness, 
&c. The qualities of goodness, &c., which form the source 
of the wonderful variety of produced effects, are indeed the 
special characteristics found in the (producing) cause. It 
is (only) in consequence of the modification of the internal 
organ (or manas) of the person who is possessed of those 
(qualities) that it becomes appropriate to declare that those 

302. The idea is that, if all things scriptures contradict the idea that all 
are produced only by one agent, the produced things have only one pro- 
maker of the pot cannot be different ducing agent. 

from the maker of the chariot. The 303. These are the three well known 

scripture mentions these separately qualities of Sattva, goodness, Rajas, 

so as to imply that the}' are different passion & Tamas, darkness, 
from each other. Accordingly, the 



Adhik. III. Snt. j.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 281 

produced effects result from those (qualities). And, in the 
case of such a person, the possession of those (qualities; is 
due to karma. s 4 Therefore, for the very commencement 
of any particular work, as the producing agent's knowledge 
and power, his association with karma (also) has necessari- 
ly to be admitted to form, indeed, the cause of a produc- 
ed effect. (It has necessarily to be so admitted), for 
the reason that the wonderful nature of (the agent's) 
knowledge and power is (itself) due to karma. Even 
when it is held that desire is the cause of the commence- 
ment of work, it is not possible to give up the (agent's) 
association with karma, for the reason that that (desire), 
which is specially characterised by its relation to some 
particular object or other, is itself due to the qualities of 
goodness, &c. Therefore the individual souls alone be- 
come the agents, and some one else who is distinct from 
them cannot be established (as agent) by means of logic- 
al inference. And the syllogistic statements (in this 
connection) are as follow : (i) The body, the world, &c., 
have the individual souls for their (producing) agents ; 
because they possess the character of being produced 
effects, (even) as a pot does : (2) The Lord is no agent 
(in the act of creation) ; because He has no purpose (in 
creation), just as released souls (have not): (3) The Lord 
is no agent (in the act of creation) ; because He has no 
body, just as those same (released souls have not). And 
this (last reasoning) is not fallacious in being too widely 
applicable to the case of individual souls getting to preside 
over their own bodies, because, in such a case also, there 
is the (previous) existence of the beginningless subtle 
body (in association with those souls) : (4) Time, about 

304. The word karma here means the effects of those actions, 
actions done in previous births and 

36 



282 SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 1. 

which there is difference of opinion, can never have been 
devoid of (created) worlds ; because it possesses the 
character of being time, (even) like the present time. 

And again, does the Lord perform work with a body, 
or (does He do so) without a body ? Surely, (He does) 
not (do so) without a body ; because it is not possible for 
him who has no body to be an agent. Even mental 
actions are possible for him alone who has a body ; be- 
cause, although the mind is eternal, the released souls are 
not known to be characterised by those (mental) actions. 
Nor indeed (does He perform actions) while possessing a 
body ; because it (viz. the embodied condition of the Lord) 
does not admit any of the possible alternative views (in 
regard to it). Is that body (of the Lord) eternal or non- 
eternal ? Surely, it is not eternal ; for, if that (body) 
which is made up of constituent parts be eternal, there 
would be nothing wrong in the world also being eternal ; 
and consequently, there would be no proving of the Lord. 
Nor also is that (body) non-eternal ; because that which is 
different from it and forms (in its own turn) the cause of that 
body can not then be existent. If it be said that He, (the 
Lord,) is alone the cause (of His own body), it is replied 
that it cannot be so ; because it is impossible for him who 
has no body to be the cause of that (viz. his own body). 
If it be said that, (at the time of creation), He acquires a 
body by taking unto Himself some body other than His 
own, it is replied that it cannot be so ; because this will 
lead to the fallacy of regressus in infinitum. Is He 
full of activity or is He devoid of all activity ? He is 
not full of activity, because He has no body at all. Nei- 
ther does He who is, like a released soul, devoid of all 
activity, perform any work. If it be maintained that the 
world which is a produced thing has for its (producing) 



Adhik. 111. Sat. j.] SRI-BHASHYA. 283 

agent one whose activity is only to desire, then the sub- 
ject of the discussion (viz. the creating agent) will have to 
possess attributes generally unknown (to be possessed by 
such as he) ; and the given example will be defective in 
illustrating the thing to be proved. Therefore, the pro- 

cess of logically inferring the Lord, in accordance with 
what we perceive, is itself stultified by having to accord 
with what we actually see. Consequently, the Highest 
Person who is the Lord of all, and is the Highest Brah- 
man, is proved only by the sastras. And the sdstras 
declare Him to be entirely distinct- from all the things 
which are cognised by all the other means of proof, to be 
an ocean of such unsurpassingly great and noble qualities 
as are made up of omniscience, the quality of willing the 
truth, and numerous other similar qualities, and to be 
possessed of a nature which is in itself hostile to all that 
is evil; and hence there cannot result, (in relation to Him), 
even a tittle of that defect which is due to any similarity 
with those things that are established to be existent with 
the help of the other means of proof. 

It has been stated already by the pftrvapakshin 
that the identity of the material and the instrumental 
causes (of produced things ) is not actually perceived, and 
that the character of being produced effects cannot be 
established in relation to spatial ether and such other things 
as are not made up of (various) constituent parts. Even 
this is not opposed to reason ; and it will be proved so 
under the aphorisms" (The Brahman is) also the mate- 
rial cause of the world, because (His being so) does not 
disagree with the example given to illustrate the proposi- 
tion." [Ved. Snt. 1.4. 23.]; and "The spatial ether is 
not (a produced thing) on account of the absence of 
scriptural statements to that effect." \Ved. Snt. II. 3. i.]. 



284 SRI-BHISHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

Therefore, it is a demonstrated conclusion that the 
scriptural passage, which begins with " From whom all 
these beings (are born)" [Tailt. Up. III. i. i .], proves the 
Brahman to be possessed of the above-mentioned charac- 
teristics; for the reason that He is not cognisable by any 
other means of proof, and is, in consequence, to be dealt 
with solely by the sdstras". 

ADH1KARANA. IV. 

Samanvayddhikarana. 

Although the Brahman is not cognised by any 
means of proof (other than the sdstras), nevertheless, the 
sdstras may not prove the Brahman, the idea correspond- 
ing to whom is ,naturally established in as much as 
He does not import any activity or cessation from activity. 
In answer to such a doubt, he (the Sfitrakdra] says : 

Sutra 4. Tattu samanvayat. 

That (viz. the fact that the scripture forms altogether 
the source of the knowledge relating to the Brahman) 
results, however, from (His constituting) the true purport 
(of the scripture). 

The word however is intended to remove the doubt 
raised. The word that denotes the fact that the sdstras 
form indeed the means of proving the Brahman. How? 
From (His constituting) the true purport (of the scripturej. 

(His constituting) the true purport (of the scripture) is (the 
same as His being) the highest object of human pursuit; 
because, the Brahman who is the highest object of human 
pursuit is alone intended to be denoted (by the sdstras}. 
All the Upanishadic passages such as the following and 
others have to be interpreted to mean this very same 



Adhik. IV.. Snt. ./.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 2^5 

thing : " From whom all these beings are born" \Taitt. 
Up. III. i. i.]; /'Existence alone, my dear child, this was 
in the beginning, one only, without a second" \Qhhand. 
Up.VI. 2. i.]; "It thought 'May I become manifold and 
be born'. It created tejas." [C/ihdnd. Up. VI. 2. 3.]; 
"The Brahman, indeed, this one alone was in the beginn- 
ing" \Brih. Up. I. 4. ii.]; "The Self, indeed, this one 
alone was in the beginning"-- \Brih. Up. I. 4. 17.]; 
" From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came into 
existence." \_Taitt. Up. II. i. i.]; "Indeed Narayana 
alone then \vas" \_Mah. Up. I.]; "The Brahman is Exist- 
ence, Knowledge, Infinity." \Taitt. Up. II. i. i.]; "The 
Brahman is bliss." \Taitt. Up. III. 6. i.]. 

Moreover, those collections of words (that make up 
the scriptural passages) are capable of denoting such well 
established things as are made out in accordance with the 
natural process of deriving the meanings of words, and the 
true purport of those (passages) is the Brahman who is 
the cause of the creation, preservation, and destruction of 
all the worlds, who is hostile to all that is evil, and who is 
an ocean of innumerable noble qualities, and has the nature 
of unsurpassed bliss ; and it cannot be that they (viz. such 
scriptural passages) deal with things other (than the Brah- 
man}, seeing that they are (while so denoting the Brahman] 
devoid of utility either in the way of inducing activity or 
cessation from activity ; for, every one of all the means of 
proof has its finality in giving rise to the knowledge of that 
which forms its own particular object. Again, the operation 
of a means of proof is not determined by utility. Utility, 
indeed, is determined by the means of proof. Further, that 
(viz. the scriptural passage) which is free from all concern 
with inducing activity or cessation from activity can not be 
said to be devoid of utility; because it is seen to be related 



286 SRI-BHASHYA. {Chap. L Part. 1. 

to one of the objects of human pursuit. For instance, 
in passages like "A son is born to you", "This is no 
serpent", which deal with matters of fact (without import- 
ing any activity or cessation from activity), it is seen that 
they are (also) possessed of utility in the way of ('produ- 
cing) joy and (causing) the removal of fear (respectively). 
Here, he (viz. a Mlmdmsaka Purvapakshin] says : 
The Veddnta passages do not establish the Brahman, 
because the sdstra, which is incapable of importing any 
activity or cessation from activity, is (thus) purposeless. No 
doubt perception and the other means of proof have their 
finality in giving rise to the knowledge of the truth of things. 
Nevertheless the sdstra (or the scripture) must have 
its finality in utility. Neither in popular usage nor in the 
Vcdas do we see the use of any sentence that is purpose- 
less. It is not possible for a sentence to be made use of, 
or to be listened to, without there being some utility or other 
in view. And that utility is made out to have the nature 
of the acquisition of what is desirable and of the getting 
rid of what is undesirable by means of voluntary activity 
or cessation from activity, as is seen in the following 
and other instances : ' One who is desirous of wealth 
should go to the palace of a king ' ; ' One whose digestion 
is weak should not drink (too much) water'; 'One who 
is desirous of Swarga should perform (the Jyotishtoma] 
sacrifice'; 'One should not eat onions'. 

Moreover, it has been already stated to the effect that, 
even in the case of the statements "A son is born to 
you", "This is no serpent, but a rope", and in other 
similar (statements), all of which deal with things, the ideas 
corresponding to which are already naturally established, 
there is seen the association of utility (with those state- 
ments) in the form of (the production of) joy and the removal 



Adhik. IV. Snt. ./.] SRi-BHISHYA. 287 

of fear, &c. Here, it lias to be discriminated whether the 
attainment of utility results from the fact of the birth of a 
son, and so on, or from the (mere) knowledge thereof. If it 
be said that a thing, although existing, is of no utility when 
unknown, and that therefore it (viz. the attainment of uti- 
lity) results from the knowledge thereof; then, even 
when the thing itself is non-existing, utility must result 
merely from the knowledge (regarding that thing). Thus, 
although the sdstra has its finality in utility, nevertheless, 
it (Viz. the sdstra} is no means of proving the existence 
of things in as much as it does not relate to things (but 
relates to knowledge merely). Therefore, all sentences 
have their finality in some utility or other, either as re- 
lating to voluntary activity or cessation from activity, or 
as relating to knowledge. Hence, no sentence is capable 
of importing things, the ideas corresponding to which are 
already naturally established. Consequently the Veddnta 
passages do not establish the Brahman, the idea corres- 
ponding to whom is already naturally established. 

Here another (p&rvapakskin)*** may say : The Ved- 
dnta passages also are the means of proving the Brahman 
solely by reason of their relating to actions. How ? Be- 
cause the Brahman becomes the object of a command- 
ment, which relates to the destruction of the phenomenal 
world, and is to the effect that the Brahman who is (in 
Himself) non-phenomenal, who has no second and is uni- 
form intelligence, and who, nevertheless, appears to be 
in association with the phenomenal world owing to the 
influence of the beginninglessly old ignorance, should be 
realised as non-phenomenal. What is that commandment, 

305. Namely, the NishprapancJiikarananiyogavcidin. 



288 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

which relates to the Brahman who is uniform intelligence, 
and is to be realised by means of the destruction of the 
phenomenal world that is found to exist in the (differentiat- 
ed) condition of the knower and the known ? (That com- 
mandment is to be found in the following and other 
passages) : " Thou shalt not see the seer of the sight, nor 
think the thinker of the thought". \Brih. Up. III. 4. 2.]. 
The meaning is that the Brahman should be realised as 
pure and simple experience which is devoid of the distinc- 
tion of the knower and the known. Even if the Brahman 
is self-evident, there is nothing wrong in (His) being 
made the object of an action so as to realise (Him) 
in the non-phenomenal form. 

It is wrong to hold so (says the Mlmamsaka)^ 06 He, 
who maintains that the syntactical meaning of sentences 
is a commandment, has surely to point out what the com- 
mandment is, the attribute of the person to whom the com- 
mandment is directed, the special object (of the command- 
ment), the performance thereof, the details of the proce- 
dure to be adopted, and the performer (of the command- 
ment). Among these, the attribute of the person to whom 
the commandment is directed is, indeed, incapable of being 
postulated fin regard to this commandment of realising the 
Brahman as non-phenomenal). And that (attribute) is of 
two kinds as causal and as resultant. It has to be discrimi- 
nated here what the attribute of the person is to whom 
this commandment is directed, and whether it is causal or 
resultant. If the experience of the truth regarding the 

306. The Mimamsaka is the main holds that the Upanishads give us the 

objector against the Veddntin in this commandment to non-phenomenalise 

Adhikarana. The Mimamsaka re- the "Brahman. Then the Mimamsaka 

futes from his own stand-point the is himself refuted by the Veddntin. 
Nishprapa nchikarqnaniyogavqdin who 



Adhik. IV. Sul. ./.] SRl-BH.lSHYA. 289 

essential nature of the Brahman constitutes the attribute 
of the person to whom the commandment is directed, then, 
this (attribute) cannot be causal ; because it has not already 
become available (to him), unlike life, &c., (which have 
so become available, and form the necessary conditions 
preceding, for instance, the performance of the agnihotra 
sacrifice as long as life lasts, in accordance with the Vcdic 
injunction-" One should perform the agnihotra sacrifice 
as long as life lasts"). 807 However, if that (attribute) be 
causal, then, owing to its being eternal, there would be 
room for the performance of what constitutes the special 
object of that ever obligatory (commandment) even after 
the attainment of final release, in the same way in which 
the agnihotra sacrifice, &c., which are dependent upon 
life (are to be performed as long as that life lasts). Nor 
also is that (attribute which has the character of the 
experience of the real nature of the Brahmati) resultant ; 
because, by being the result of the working out of a 
commandment, it has, like Swarga, &c., to become 
non-eternal. Again what is the special object of the 
commandment here ? If it be said that it is the Brah- 
man Himself, it is replied that it cannot be so ; because 
He, being eternal, cannot be produced anew, and because 
also He is not imported by any verbal form signifying an 
action. If it be said that the non-phenomenal Brahman 
is the thing to be worked out (under the commandment), 
then, although He is (thus) the thing to be (immediately) 
accomplished (under the injunction), He forms the final 
result itself (of the injunction). He cannot form the 
special object of the commandment, because He is not 
imported by any verbal forms signifying an action. More- 



soy. Vide 

37 



290 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

over, what is it that has to be accomplished (under the 
injunction) ? Is it the Brahman, or (is it) the destruction of 
the phenomenal world ? It is not the Brahman\ because 
He is ever-accomplished, and because also there would 
result non-eternity (in relation to the Brahman if he had 
to be accomplished). Nor is it the destruction of the 
phenomenal world (that has to be accomplished under the 
injunction). Then, indeed, the Brahman would not be the 
thing to be accomplished (under the injunction). If it be 
said that the destruction of the phenomenal world itself 
forms the special object of the commandment, it is replied 
that it cannot be so ; because that (destruction) is the final 
result (to be achieved under the commandment) and cannot 
hence form the immediate object of the commandment. 
Indeed, the destruction of the phenomenal world is itself 
the beatific release (of the bound soul) ; and that is the 
final fruit (of the injunction). And if this, (however), 
form (also) the immediate object of the commandment, 
then the destruction of the phenomenal world would be 
due to the carrying out of the commandment, and the 
commandment would be carried out -by the destruction 
of the phenomenal world. There would, in consequence, 
be the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence. 

Further, is the phenomenal world, which has to be 
put an end to, false or real ? If it be of a false nature, then 
it has to be put an end to by right knowledge alone, and 
consequently the injunction (to do something) would be 
of no use whatsoever. If it be said that the injunction, 
after producing the knowledge which puts an end (to the 
phenomenal world), thereby puts an end to the pheno- 
menal world, (then, it is replied that) this (knowledge) 
results from the scriptural texts 31 ' 8 on which you yourself 

308. Such as Erik. Up. III. 4. 2; Chhand. Up. VI. 2, i; Brih. Up. IV. 



Adhik. IV. Sut. 4."] SRi-l3HisHYA. 291 

rely, and that there is therefore no use for this .com- 
mandment. Moreover, the whole phenomenal world 
which is false, and is distinct from the Brahman, is stultified 
by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of 
scriptural sentences. Consequently, the commandment, 
with all its accessories, is itself non est. If the phenome- 
nal world happens to be the thing which is to be destroyed, 
then, does the commandment, which is intended to bring 
about the destruction of the phenomenal world, relate to that 
which is the same in nature as the B 'rah man ? Or (does it) 
relate to that which is different from Him ? If it relate to 
that which is the same in nature as the Brahman Himself, 
then, (He being eternal), the very existence of the phenome- 
nal world that is to be destroyed would indeed be impossi- 
ble, for the reason that the destroyer thereof is eternal; again 
in such a case (that) commandment would become eternal, 
and it would not be possible for it to be accomplished by 
working out its immediate object. Or (the commandment 
may relate to) that which is different in nature from the true 
nature of the Brahman. Since that (commandment) is to 
be fulfilled by working out its immediate object which 
consists in the destruction of the whole phenomenal world, 
the person who has to carry out (the commandment) is 
also destroyed thereby. Consequently, there is no estab- 
lishment (of the injunction) for want of a (personal) found- 
ation (for it) to rest upon. Since, by merely working out 
that immediate object (of the commandment) which con- 
sists in the destruction of the phenomenal world, all that 
is different from the essential nature of the Brahman be- 
comes destroyed, what is known as moksha or beatific 
release cannot be the final fruit obtained by (obeying) 

.j. 19; &c,, which are quoted by you rddin to show that the "Brahman 
i, c, the Nishprapaiithikarananiyoga- alone is real and the world unreal, 



292 SRi-B'HisHYA. [Chap. L Part. L 

the commandment. 309 

Moreover, in regard to such a performance of the 
commandment as leads to the destruction of the phenome- 
nal world, there are to be found no details of the pro- 
cedure to be adopted ; and whatever (commandment) is 
(thus) unassisted (by the details of procedure), that cannot 
be carried out. Consequently, there can be no perfor- 
mability (in relation to the commandment under consi- 
deration). If it be asked how there is (here) the absence 
of the details of procedure, it is pointed out that it is thus: 
The details of procedure in regard to this (commandment) 
are either of a positive character or of a negative character. 
Such (details of procedure) as are of a positive character 
are divided into the different classes of those that bring 
about the corpus of the performance and those that (merely) 
render help to the performance. And both these kinds are 
not admissible (in this case). Indeed, like the stroke 
of a heavy club, &c., (which destroy a pot or some 
such thing), there is not seen (here) anything that is (by 
its operation) capable of putting an end to the whole 
phenomenal world. Therefore, these (details of procedure) 
are not (of a positive character and) thus perceivable. Nor 
also is it possible for a completed performance to stand in 
need of any accessory help for the production of the thing 
to be accomplished (by that performance) ; because (in such 
a case), owing to there being the (associated) existence 
of the thing which helps (the performance), it is not 

309. The distinction between what desirous o.f obtaining Suarga shall 
is called the immediate object of a perform the Jyotishtoma sacrifice. 
commandment and what constitutes Here the Jyolishtoma sacrifice is the 
its final 'fruit may well be illustrated immediate object of the command- 
in connection with the Vedic com- inent, and Siuarga is its final fruit, 
uuindment which says that he who is 



Adhik. IV. $fit. 4.] SRi-BHis.HYA. 293 

possible to (distinctly) realise the essential nature of such 
a performance (of the commandment) as consists in the 
destruction of the whole phenomenal world. If it be 
said that to know the Brahman to be without a second 
produces the corpus of the performance, which consists 
in the destruction of the phenomenal world, then, by that 
same (knowledge), final release which is in the form 
of the destruction of the phenomenal world is attained ; 
accordingly, it has been already stated that, (in conse- 
quence), there remains nothing to be accomplished by 
the performance, &c. If (the details of procedure 
are) of a negative character, then solely owing to their 
being non-existent, they do not produce the corpus 
of the performance ; nor do they help it. Therefore, it 

is not possible (to hold) that this injunction 310 relates to 
the non-phenomenal Brahman. 

Again, another (purvapakshin}** 1 may say as fol- 
lows: 

No doubt, the Vcddnta passages are of no authority 
as relating to the true nature of the Brahman, the idea 
corresponding to whom is already naturally established. 
Nevertheless, the true nature of the Brahman is cer- 
tainly proved (by means of them). How ? On the 
strength of the commandment enjoining meditation. 
Thus, indeed, do the scriptures declare : " Verily, 

my dear one, the Self has to be seen, has 

to be steadily meditated upon," \Brih. Up.lL^. 5-]; 312 
" The Self who is devoid of sins;... He has to be sought 
after,He has to be specially desired and known". [Gfahand. 

310. Brih. Up. III. 4. 2. &c. ni\of>ar&lin. 

311. This objector is the Dhyana- 312. Vide also ttri/i. Up. IV. $ 6. 



294 SRI-13HA.SHYA. \Chap. L Part. L 

Up. VIII. 7. i.]; "Meditate on Him as the self itself." 
[Bnh. Up. I. 4. 7.]; "Let him meditate upon the Self 
alone as the object to be attained." \_Brih. Up. I. 4. 15.]. 
Here the commandment which certainly relates to medi- 
tation implies the thing to be meditated upon ; because 
the meditation which forms the special object of that ( com- 
mandment) is itself capable of being defined solely by 
means of the thing to be meditated upon. And that 
thing to be meditated upon is the Self, as it is shown by the 
scriptural passages 3 ' 3 relied upon by yourselves. If it be 
asked of what nature He (/. e. the Self) is, then (it is replied 
that), by way of stating the peculiarity of His true nature, 
the following .and other similar passages become authori- 
tative, as being complementary to the injunction relat- 
ing to meditation, and that, therefore, those (passages) 
do, indeed, denote by implication the true nature of 
the Brahman who is included within the body of the 
meditation which forms the special object of the in- 
junction (here): "The Brahman is Existence, Know- 
ledge, Infinity." \_Taitt. Up. II. i. i.]; "Existence 
alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning."- 
\Qihand. Up. VI. 2. i.]. Therefore, by means of the 
following passages, namely, "One only without a second" 
\Chhdnd. Up. VI. 2. i.]; "That is Existence, He is the 
Self, That thou art, O Svetaketu." \Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.]; 
"There is nothing here that is many and varied." \_Brih. 
Up. IV. 4. 19.]; as well as by means of other passages, 
it is made out that only the essential nature of the Brah- 
man is undoubtedly real, and that all else that is different 
from Him is unreal. Distinction is apprehended by 

313. See BfiA. Up. III. 4, 2 11.4. karananiyogavCidin who has quoted 
5. & IV. 5. 6. The Dhydnaniyoga- Brih. Up, III. 4- 2, wherein the Self 
vadin criticises the Nishprapailchi- is mentioned. 



Adhik. IV. Sfit. ,/.] SRI-BHISHYA. 295 

perception and the other means of proof, as well as by 
means of the sastra which relates to works and rests upon 
distinctions. When there is mutual contradiction between 
distinction and non-distinction, then, since it is also possible 
for the perception of distinctions to be based upon 
the beginninglessly old ignorance (or avidya), it is decided 
that the absence of distinctions alone is the reality. It 
being so, by means of the injunction relating to such a 
meditation of the Brahman as gives rise to the direct 
perception of Him, that final release is obtained which is 
the same as becoming the Brahman, who is devoid of all 
the manifold distinctions due to ignorance, who is without 
a second and is uniform intelligence. Moreover, it cannot 
be proved with the help of Vcddnta passages that it is 
possible (for us) to become the Brahman merely by means 
of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural 
sentences ; because such a thing is not known to take place, 
and because also the (actual) perception of a variety of dis- 
tinctions continues to persist (even after the acquisition 
of such a knowledge). Under these circumstances, the in- 
junction 314 regarding' hearing', &c., 315 becomes purpose- 
less. 

(Here), again, it may be said 3 ' G thus: It is seen that 
the fear which is due to the (falsely perceived) snake ceases 
by means of the teaching " This is a rope, (but) not a 

314. This injunction is "Brih. Up. that the ISrahman alone is real and 
If. 4. 5 or IV. 5. 6 wherein it is all else unreal ; in the same way in 
declared that " The Self has to be which the snake falsely perceived in 
heard, to be reflected upon, and to a rope is unreal while the rope alone 
be steadily meditated upon." is real. The Dhyananiyogaradin here 

315. ' Hearing', &c., 1\ e. 'hearing ', states in anticipation the objection 
reflection, and steady meditation. from the stand-point of the Adwaitin 

316. This is the well known exam- before refuting it. 
pie of the Adwaihn who is of opinion 



296 RI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

snake." And like the snake (falsely perceived) in the 
rope, the bondage of the world also is of a false nature. 
Consequently, it must be capable of being stultified by 
knowledge. Therefore, it is proper (to hold) that freedom 
from such (bondage) results wholly from the knowledge 
derived from scriptural passages, but not from (working out) 
any commandment. If final release be capable of being 
accomplished under an injunction, then there would be non- 
eternity in relation to it also, as (there is) in the case of 
Swarga, &c. But the eternal character of final release is, in- 
deed, acknowledged by all the disputants. 

Moreover, the merit and the demerit (of works) have 
the power of giving rise to their effects only in the 
way of producing such bodies as are fit for the enjoyment 
of those particular effects. Therefore, they (viz. merit and 
demerit) must inevitably possess the character of giv- 
ing rise to samsara, 3 * 7 the nature of which consists 
in an association (of the individual souls) with the four 3 ' 8 
kinds of bodies commencing with Brahma and ending with 
the immovable things. Therefore, final release is not 
capable of being accomplished by merit. To the same 
effect is the following scriptural passage : " To him who 
is and has a body, there is no destruction of the pleasing 
and the unpleasing ; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch 
not him who is and has no body." [C/}hdnd. Up. VIII. 
12. i.]. Thus, regarding final release the nature of which 
is to be without a body, it is declared that there are no 
pleasing or unpleasing effects produced by merit and de- 
merit. Therefore, it is made out that the unembodied 

317. Samsara is the circuit of mun- 318. The four kinds of bodies are 

dane existence. In other words, it is those of gods, men, lower animals 

the ever-recurring succession of births and of immovable things (Sthdvarj). 

and deaths, and the consequent con- Vide supra p. 154. Cf. also V. Dh, 

tinuance of the bondage of the soul. C. 20. 



Adhik. IV. Sat. ./.] SRI-BHISHYA. 297 

condition cannot be accomplished by merit. And in the 
way in which a particular result is to be accomplished 
by means of a particular commandment, the unembodied 
condition cannot be accomplished by means of the injunc- 
tion relating to meditation ; because the unembodied condi- 
tion constitutes the essential nature (of the self) and 
is not, therefore, a thing which is to be accomplished. The 
following and other scriptural texts declare the same thing 
thus : " Knowing Him to be the unembodied One who 
exists in non-eternal bodies, (knowing Him) to be the Self 
which is great and omnipresent, the wise man does not 
grieve." \Kath. Up. II. 22.]; " Indeed He is pure, with- 
out life, without mind." \Mund. Up. II. i. 2.]; "Indeed 
this Person is devoid of attachment," \Brih. Up. IV. 3. 15.]. 
Therefore, final release which is the same as the unembo- 
died condition is eternal, and is, in consequence, incapable 
of being produced by .merit. To the same effect is the 
following scriptural passage : " That which is other than 
merit and demerit, that which is other than this effect and 
cause, that which is other than the past and the future, 
say, if thou seest that." [Kath. Up. II. 14.]. 

Again, it is surely impossible to predicate in regard to 
final release that capability of being accomplished (anew), 
which (accomplishing) is four-fold in the forms of origina- 
tion, attainment, modification, and refinement. It is not 
capable of being originated; because final release, being of 
the nature of the Brahman, is itself characterised by eter- 
nity. Nor is it capable of being attained (anew) ; because 
the Brahman Himself is of the nature of the self, and 
hence it (viz. final release) has the character of being ever 
attained. Nor also is it capable of being modified ; be- 
cause non-eternity would result to it thereby, as (there 
is) in the case of curds, &c. Nor again is it capable of 
38 



[Chap. I. Part. /. 

being refined. Refinement, indeed, is accomplished either 
by the removal of defects or by the addition of excellence. 
Surely it (viz. refinement) cannot be (produced here) by 
the removal of defects, on account of the eternal purity 
of the Brahman. Nor is it (viz. refinement) to be (ac- 
complished here) by the addition of excellence, because 
(the Brahman is) of the nature of such excellence as cannot 
be added to. By reason of its being eternally immodifia- 
ble, it cannot form the object of any action which takes 
place either in itself or takes place in others; thus no refine- 
ment can be effected (in relation to it), as (it is effected) in 
the case of mirrors, &c., by the action of rubbing ; and the 
self is not purified by the act of bathing, &c., which relate 
to the body ; but (what is so purified is) that egoistic agent 
which is caught hold of by ignorance (or avidya) and 
is in association with that (body) : and to him (/. c. to that 
agent) alone belongs the enjoyment of the result of that 
(act of bathing). But the egoistic agent himself is not the 
self, because he has that fself) for his witness. Similarly, 
the words of the scriptural hymn also declare : " One of 
them eats the sweet pippala fruit, while the other shines in 
splendour without eating at all." [Mund. Up. III. 1. 1.]. 319 
Moreover, the essential nature of the self is distinctly made 
out to be different from the egoistic agent who is caught 
hold of by ignorance (or avidya), (it is made out) to 
possess such excellence as cannot be added to, to be 
eternally pure and to be immodifiable, from the fol- 
lowing scriptural passages : "The wise say that what 
is associated with the body, the senses, and the mind, 
forms the enjoyer." \_Kath. Up. III. 4.]; "The one 
Lord is hidden in all beings, pervades all, and is the inter- 

319. See also Svet. Up. IV. 6, 



Adhik. IV. Sut. ./.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 299 

nal Self of all beings ; He is the presiding deity over ac- 
tions, and lives in all beings ; He is the witness, the intel- 
ligent one, who is absolute and devoid of qualities." [Svet. 
Up. VI. ii. & Brah. Up. III.]; "He understood Him to 
be bright, bodiless, scatheless, without sinews, pure, and 
untouched by evil." [7r. Up. VIII.]. Hence, owing to 
its being of the nature of the Self, final release is not a 
thing that can (thus) be accomplished (anew). 

It may be asked If so, what is it that is accomplished 
by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of 
sentences? We say (in reply) that it is merely the removal 
of the obstruction to final release (that is so accomplished). 
To the same effect are the following and other scriptural 
passages : " Thou art our Father who enablest us to cross 
to the other shore which is far away from Ignorance." \Pr 
Up. VI. 8.]; " I have, indeed, learnt the Sastras thus. He 
who knows the Self crosses the ocean of misery, only with 
the help of venerable teachers like yourself. Venerable 
sir, I who am so (destitute of the knowledge of the Self) 
feel very grieved. May you, venerable sir, enable me, who 
am so, to cross over to the other shore (of the ocean of 
misery)." \Qhhand. Up. VII. i. 3.]; "To him whose sins 
have been destroyed, the venerable Sanatkumara shows 
the other shore of darkness." \_CJj,hand. Up. VII. 26. 2.]. 
Therefore, the removal of the obstructions to that final re- 
lease, which is certainly eternal, is accomplished by means, 
of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural 
sentences. But (such) removal, although capable of being 
accomplished anew, has itself the nature of that non-exist- 
ence 320 which follows destruction ; and hence it cunnot 
have an end. The following and other scriptural 

3-!O. Vide snfifit |>. 49. n, 37. 



3otf SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

statements, namely, " He who knows the Brahman be- 
comes the Brahman indeed." \Mund. Up. III. 2. 9.], 
" He who thus knows Him transcends death." [Svet. Up. 
III. 8. & VI. 15.], declare that final release follows imme- 
diately after the knowledge (of the Brahman), and (so') 
oppose the interposition of any injunction (bearing 
upon meditation). Moreover, it (viz. final release or 
the attainment of the Brahman) does not acquire the 
character of a produced effect, either by being the object 
of the act of knowing, or by -being the object of the act 
of meditation ; because such a character of being the 
object of both (these acts) is negatived in the following 
and in other scriptural passages: " It is certainly different 
from the known, and is also different from the knower."- 
[Kcn. Up. I. 3.]; " By Whom one knows all this, by what 
is He to be known?" \Brih. Up. II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.]; 
" Know thou That alone to be the Brahman, not this 
which they worship." \Ken. Up.l. 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8.]. By 
this much, it does not also follow that the sdstras have 
no object whatsoever; because the sdstras relate to 
the removal of distinctions manufactured by ignorance. 
Indeed, the sdstras do not deal with the Brahman as 
possessing definitely discernible characteristics ; but, while 
declaring the true nature of the internal (subjective) self 
which is no (exterral) object, they put an end to the distinc- 
tions which are in the form of the knowledge, the knower, 
and the object of knowledge, and which are all manufactur- 
ed by ignorance (or avidyd). To the same effect, there is, 
among others, the following sdstraic injunction : " Thou 
shalt not see the seer of the sight, &c." [J3rih. Up. III. 
4. 2.]. Further, it should not be (supposed) that the 
cessation of bondage results wholly from knowledge, 
and that consequently the injunction relating to 'hear- 



Adhik. IV. Sut. ./.] SRI-BHASHYA. 30! 

ing ', &c., is purposeless ; because they (viz. 'hear- 
ing ', reflection and steady meditation) form the means 
of understanding the syntactical meaning of scriptural sen- 
tences, by causing us to turn away from all such distrac- 
tions as relate to things other than the Brahman and 
are (all) due to our own nature. 

Again it should not be urged that the cessation of bond- 
age is not seen to take place by means of knowledge alone ; 
because bondage is of a false nature, and it is not hence 
possible for it to remain (even) subsequently to (the birth of) 
knowledge. For this same reason it is not right to say that 
the cessation of bondage takes place only after the falling 
off of the body. Indeed, the cessation of the fear due to 
the falsely perceived serpent does not require any destrug- 
tion of a serpent beyond the (mere) knowledge of the real- 
ity of the rope. If the association of the body (with the self) 
were of the nature of a reality, then there would be the 
necessity for its destruction. But that (association), being 
distinct from the Brahman, is not of the nature of a real- 
ity. It is known that, to him whose bondage has not ceas- 
ed, knowledge is not born ; because the effect of know- 
ledge is not seen (in relation to him). Therefore, whether 
the body exists or not, immediately after knowing the 
syntactical meaning of sentences, one is undoubtedly releas- 
ed (from bondage). 

Consequently, final release is not capable of being 
accomplished by the injunction relating to meditation ; and 
hence, the Brahman is not proved to be dependent upon 
the injunction relating to meditation ; but (He is establish- 
ed) by means of the following scriptural passages which 
altogether relate to Him : " The Brahman is Exist- 
ence, Knowledge, Infinity." \Taitt. Up. II. i. i.]; 
"That thou art." \_Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.]; "This self 



302 SRI-BHISHYA. \Chap. I. Part. I. 

is the Brahman'.' \Brih. Up. II. 5. 19. & IV. 4. 5.].a 21 

This (position) 8 2 2 is not right ; because it is not possible 
for the cessation of bondage to take place merely by means 
of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences. 
No doubt, the bondage which is of a false nature is cap- 
able of being stultified by knowledge. Nevertheless, as 
that bondage is directly perceived, it cannot be stultified 
by that knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences 
which is of an indirect (abstract) nature ; because, when 
the direct perception of a snake is existent in relation 
to the rope and other such things, it is not seen that the 
removal of fear takes place merely by that indirect (ab- 
stract) knowledge, which is contradictory of the serpent 
and is produced by the teaching of trustworthy persons 
to the effect " This is no serpent, this is a rope." And 
the teaching of trustworthy persons becomes the cause 
of the removal of fear, only by happening to be the cause 
of such activity as results from the direct perception of 
the reality of things. Accordingly, a person who has 
fled away, taking fright at the sight of the serpent 
falsely perceived in a rope, begins to see the reality of 
things by means of the teaching of trustworthy persons to 
the effect "This is no serpent, this is a rope"; then 
he sees that (rope) itself directly, and then becomes free 
from fear. Moreover, it is not right to say that verbal 
testimony of itself produces such knowledge as has the 
nature of direct perception ; because it (viz. verbal testi- 
mony) does not possess the character of an organ of sense. 
Among the apparatuses of knowledge, the senses alone form 

321. Vide also Mand. Up. I. 2. tion against his views raised above 

322. Here begins the Dhydnani- by the Adwailin, 
yogaviidin 's refutation of the objcc- 



Adhik. IV. Sr/t. y.] SRI-BHISHYA. 303 

the means of direct perception. And in the case of that 
person whose sins have not been destroyed by the perfor- 
mance of works without attachment to their fruits, and 
who has not turned away from external objects by ' hear- 
ing', reflection, and steady meditation, the Vedic text 
alone cannot produce direct knowledge. Even when 
(that) person has the obstructions fin the way of his ac- 
quiring knowledge) removed, and is devoted to those things 
(viz. 'hearing', reflection, and steady meditation), it is not 
possible (for him) to have that (direct knowledge from 
verbal testimony alone) ; because the senses, which (alone) 
form the special apparatus of (direct) knowledge, are not 
seen to transgress their limitations in regard to what con- 
stitutes their object. 

Moreover, meditation is no means of knowing the 
syntactical meaning of sentences; because, (in such a case), 
there will arise the fallacy of reciprocal dependence, in as 
much as the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sen- 
tences must be born before there can be the meditation of 
its object, and meditation must be completed before there 
can be the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sen- 
tences. And it should not be ("urged) that meditation and 
the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences re- 
late to different things. If they did so, then meditation 
would be no means of producing the knowledge of the 
syntactical meaning of sentences. Indeed, the medita- 
tion of one thing cannot lead to the fruition of another 
thing. It is unavoidable (to hold) that meditation, which 
is the same as an unbroken flow of memory relating to 
a thing that is known, has invariably to be preceded by 
the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences ; 
because there is no other means by which the knowledge 
relating to the Brahman, who is the object of medi- 



304 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chop. I. Part. I. 

tation, can be produced. Further it is not right 

to say that the knowledge which is at the root of medita- 
tion is derived from a different set of passages, while the 
knowledge which relates to the removal (of ignorance) is 
derived from passages like " That thou art." \_Chhand. Up. 
VI. 8. 7.]. Does this knowledge which is at the root of 
meditation, and is derived from a different set of passages, 
relate to the same thing as that to which the knowledge 
derived from passages like " That thou art", &c., relates ? 
Or does it relate to a different thing ? If that (knowledge) 
relates to the same thing (as this), there results the already 
stated fallacy of reciprocal dependence. If that knowledge 
relates to a different thing (from what this knowledge 
relates to), then it is not possible to prove that by means 
of meditation there arises the fruition of what this (latter 
knowledge) relates to. Further, meditation pre-supposes 
many phenomenal entities like the object of medita- 
tion, and the agent of meditation, &c. Consequent- 
ly it is of no use, so far as we see, in producing that 
knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences which 
relates to the oneness of the self with the non-phenomenal 
Brahman. Therefore, the commandments enjoining ' hear- 
ing', reflection, and steady meditation are certainly useless 
to him who maintains (the view) that the destruction of 
ignorance (or avidya) takes place merely by means of the 
knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences. 

For whatsoever reason, direct (perceptual) knowledge 
(of things) is not produced by means of scriptural passages, 
and ignorance (or avidya) remains, in consequence, unde- 
stroyed by means of the knowledge of the syntactical 
meaning of scriptural sentences, for that very same rea- 
son, the idea -that (the self s) release from the bondage (of 
samsfira) takes place even while in this life is also driven 



Adhik. IV. Sitt. ./.] SRI-BHISHYA. 305 

away (as untrue). And what is this release from bondage 
even while in this life ? It may be said that it is release 
resulting (to the self) even in the embodied condition ; but 
then such a statement will be self-contradictory in meaning 
like the statement " My mother is barren"; because it 
has been declared by yourself, with the help of scriptural 
passages, that to be embodied is to be in bondage, and that 
to become unembodied is to obtain release. And again it is 
not (right to say) that, when the appearance of the associ- 
ation (of the self) with the body is in existence, then, who- 
ever has the belief that (such an) appearance is false, to 
him there is the destruction of (this) association with the 
body. If (his) association with the body is destroyed by 
the belief that it is false, how can there be release to him 
even when he has the body ? That release (from embodi- 
ment) which results to one after death is also undeniably 
the destruction of the false appearance of one's being asso- 
ciated with a bod} r . Then what is the peculiarity about 
this release which takes place even while in this life ? 
Moreover, it may be said that, in whomsoever this false 
appearance of his (self) having a body persists even after 
the stultification (of that falsity), just like the false percep- 
tion of two moons (persisting even when one knows that 
there is only one moon), (it may be said that) such a per- 
son is he who is released even while in this life : if so, it is 
replied that it cannot be so ; because this stultifying know- 
ledge relates to all things other than the Brahman. To- 
gether with the false appearance of (the self) having a body, 
the blemishes resulting from ignorance (or avidya) and from 
' work ' (or karma) and from other such things, which are all 
the causes (of the false appearance of the self s embodiment 
itself), are all stultified by that (stultifying knowledge) 
alone ; and thus, it is not possible to say that (any) 
39 



$of> SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

stultified thing does persist. But in the case of (the percep- 
tion of) two moons (when there is in reality only one 
moon), that defect, which is the cause of such a false 
appearance, is no object of the stultifying knowledge which 
is to the effect that the moon is only one ; and hence it is 
not thereby stultified. Consequently the persistence of the 
false appearance of two moons is proper. Moreover, this 
scriptural text, which says " So long as he is not freed 
(from the body), so long there is delay ; then he will be 
blessed." [Clihdnd. Up. VI. 14. 2.], declares that, in the 
case of him who observes the form of worship known as 
the Sadvidya, 3 - 3 final release stands in need of only the 
falling off of (his) body; and thus it prohibits the (occurrence 
of) release even while in this life. This aforesaid release 
even while in this life has been discarded by Apastamba 
also in the following aphorisms : " Giving up the Vedas, 
this world, and the other, one should seek the Self. It may 
be said that, on knowledge arising, there is the attainment 
of bliss; but that is negatived by the scriptures. If the at- 
tainment of bliss were possible on knowledge arising, then, 
even here, one should not have miser) r . By this, the other 
(also) has been explained." [Ap. Dh. II. 21. 13 to 17.]. 
By these (aphorisms), (the opinion that) final release 
(occurs) by means of mere knowledge alone is also discard- 
ed. Therefore that release, which has the nature of the 
removal of all distinctions, does not result to one who 
is alive. Consequently, bondage comes to an end only 
by means of that injunction which relates to meditation, 
and which produces the direct knowledge of the Brah- 

323 This is a form of worship meditated upon so that He may be 

taught to Svetaketu by his father. realised as the self-existent Soul of 

Vide Chhdnd. Up. VI., wherein it is the whole universe, 
given that the Supreme Self is to be 



Adhik. IV. Sut. 4.] SRI-BHASHYA. 307 

man. No non-eternal character can result to final 

release simply on the score that it is accomplished 
in accordance with an injunction ; because what is (so) ac- 
complished is merely the removal of the obstructions fto fin- 
al release). Further, the cessation of bondage is not caused 
directly by the injunction (itself) ; but (it is caused) by 
the direct knowledge of the Brahman who is non-pheno- 
menal, and who is homogeneous intelligence. And the 
injunction produces this direct knowledge. If it be asked 
how an injunction ma}' be the cause of producing know- 
ledge, it is asked in reply, how do your 'works' performed 
without attachment to results form the cause of the pro- 
duction of knowledge ? Tf you say, (that they do so), 
through the purification of the mind, I say that it is the 
same in my case also. It may be said again (by you) 
that, in your case, knowledge is produced, by means of 
the sdsiras, in the mind which is (already) pure, but that, 
in my case, that thing has (indeed) to be pointed out which 
forms the apparatus for producing knowledge in the mind 
which is purified by the injunction. If so, we say in reply 
that that mind, which is purified by the injunction 
relating to meditation, is itself the means for the pro- 
duction of knowledge. If it be asked how this is made 
out, we ask in reply, how is it made out in your case 
that the mind becomes pure by means of 'works' and that 
by means of ' hearing ', reflection, and steady meditation, 
the sastras produce that knowledge, which is stultifica- 
tory (of ignorance), in the pure mind of him alone who 
has turned away from all other tilings than the Brahman ? 
You may answer that it is (so) made out by means of the 
following and other scriptural passages : " They desire to 
know (the Brahman] by sacrifices, by giving gifts, by reli- 
gious austerities associated with fasting." [/>/'///. L 7 h. 



308 SRi-BtilSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

IV. 4. 22.]; "(The Self) has to be heard, has to be 

reflected upon, has to be steadily meditated upon."- 
[Brih. Up. IV. 5. 6.]; " He who knows the Brahman 
becomes the Brahman indeed." [Mund. Up. III. 2. 9.]. 
If so, I reply that, in my case also, in accordance with the 
following among other scriptural passages, namely " (The 
Self) has to be... heard, has to be reflected upon, has to be 
steadily meditated upon." [Brih. Up. II. 4. 5. &IV. 5.6.]; 
" He who knows the Brahman attains the Highest." 
\_Tailt. Up. II. i. i.] ; " He (/. <?. the Lord) is not apprehend- 
ed by the eye nor even by speech." [Mund. Up. III. i. 
8.] ; " But He (the Lord) is apprehended by the pure mind." 
[ ? ]; "He (the Lord) is apprehended- by the 
heart, by steady wisdom, and by the mind." \Kath. Up. 
VI. p.]; 324 it is made out that the mind becomes pure 
by means of the injunction relating to meditation, and 
that the mind (so) purified gives rise to the direct know- 
ledge of the Brahman. Thus it (viz. the whole argument) 
is faultless. 

If you say that by means of the scriptural passage 
" Not this which' they worship!" [Ken. Up. 1. 4. et seq], 
the character of being the object of meditation is denied 
(in relation to the Brahman], it is replied that it cannot be 
so. The fact of the Brahman being the object of medita- 
tion is not denied (herein), but the fact that the Brahman 
is distinct from the world is declared in this passage. The 
meaning of this passage 325 is this: "This world which 
people 3 '- 6 here worship, that is not the Brahman. Know 

324. Vide also Suet, Up. III. 13. & brought into existence ; but not this 
M.Ndr. I. ii. which they worship." Vide Ken, Up, 

325. The whole of this passage runs I. 4. et seq. 

as follows : " Know thou Him alone 326. Literally, living beings (prani- 

to be the Brahman who is not made nak), 
out by speech and by whom speech U 



Adhik. IV. Sru. 4.} SRI-BHISHYA. 

thou Him alone to be the Brahman who is not made out 
by speech, and by whom speech is brought into existence." 
Otherwise, the statement 'Know thou Him alone to be 
the Brahman would be contradicted, and the injunction 
enjoining meditation would become purposeless. 

Therefore the whole of the bondage, which is made up 
of unreality and is of the nature of the phenomenal world 
consisting of the knower, the known, &c., comes to an end 
by means of that very injunction which enjoins medi- 
tation, and the result of which is the direct realisation of 
the Brahman. 

It is also asserted by some 3 97 that there is no contra- 
diction between distinction and non-distinction. This is 
improper ; for distinction and non-distinction cannot meet 
together in one and the same thing, as heat and cold, light 
and darkness, &c., (can not so meet). (To this) it may be 
said again as follows : 

The whole of the totality of things is indeed estab- 
lished by perception and all things are apprehended as 
distinct and non-distinct. There is non-distinction (when 
they are looked upon) as constituting causes and as consti- 
tuting genera (and species), and there is distinction (when 
they are looked upon) as constituting effects and as consti- 
tuting particular individuals. The contradiction existing 
between sunlight and shadow, &c., is characterised by 
their not being found together, and by their having a divers- 
ity of abodes. But in the case of causes and effects, as 
well as in the case of genera and (their) individual mem- 
bers, both those (characteristics) are not found ; but, on 

327. This position is maintained by plained in full before it is contradict- 
the BhdstarTyas and it is here ex- ed. Vide $/** p. 217. n. 235. 



310 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. L Part. I. 

the contrary, one and the same thing appears in two forms 
as (when it is said) ' This pot is clay', ' This ox is brok- 
en-horned', ' This ox is hornless'. And in this world 
there is nothing that is generally seen to have only one 
form. Nor is non-distinction seen to be that which 
destroys distinction, as when fire and such other things 
(consume and destroy the distinction) of grass and such 
other things; accordingly, there is no substantial contra- 
diction (between distinction and non-distinction) ; for, that 
object which exists in the form of clay, gold, ox, or an 
equine animal, &c., may itself exist (also) in the shape of 
a pot, a crown, a broken-horned (ox), or a mare, &c. 
There is no fiat of the Lord to the effect that non-distinc- 
tion and distinction should (respectively) constitute the 
singular characteristics of the thing (genus) which is non- 
distinct, and of the thing (individual) which is distinct. If 
it be said that there is oneness of form (in relation to those 
things), because it is so perceived ; then let it be admitt- 
ed that there are also the two forms of distinction and 
of non-distinction for the same reason that they are 
also perceived. Indeed, when things such as pots, dishes, 
broken-horned (oxen), and horn-less (oxen), &c., are 
perceived, a person who has his eyes wide open is not able 
to discern (any) distinction (in each of his perceptions) to 
the effect ' This is clay, that is pot', and ' This is the 
general property of the species ox, but this is the indi- 
vidual ox'. On the other hand, his perceptions are 
only to the effect ' This pot is clay', ' The ox is broken- 
horned'. If it be said that he does discern distinction 
(in each of his perceptions), on the score that the cause and 
the class are made out from the knowledge of their 
persistence, while the effect and the individual are made 
out by. means of the knowledge of their power of logical 



Adhik. IV. Silt. ./.] SRI-BHASHYA. 311 

exclusion, it is replied that it cannot be so ; because (such) 
a distinction in character is not perceived. Indeed, even 
those who observe very minutely do not perceive, in rela- 
tion to the thing placed before them, any distinction in 
character to the effect ' This is what persists ' and 'This is 
what excludes'. Just as, in the case of an effect and of an 
individual, (both of) whose oneness (with the correspond- 
ing cause and the corresponding genus respectively) is 
well perceived, the idea of oneness is born (in the mind); 
so also, in the case of what has a cause and belongs 
to a genus, that idea of oneness is born without any differ- 
ence whatsoever. It is exactly similarly that the recogni- 
tive cognition, which is to the effect ' This is that same 
thing', is born even in regard to all such objects as are ex- 
tremely different from one another owing to (differences 
in) space, time, and the characteristic form. Therefore, in 
as much as (all) things appear as having certainly two na- 
tures, the enunciation of any extreme difference between 
the cause and the effect as well as between the genus and 
the individual is contradicted by perception. 

It may be again said that, as in the instances ' This 
pot is clay', ' This ox is broken-horned', (so also) in the 
instances' I am a god', ' I am a man', there is the per- 
ception of oneness owing to there being a grammatical 
equation ; that in consequence there is distinction and non- 
distinction between the self and the body also ; and that, 
accordingly, this declaration of distinction and non-distinc- 
tion acts like the flame of fire set to (consume) one's own 
house. This statement (we, the Bhdskarlyas, say) is 
the outcome of undeveloped wisdom regarding grammatical 
equations which establish distinction and non-distinction, 
and regarding (also) the knowledge of the real meaning of 
those (same grammatical equations). Thus, for instance, 



3i2 SRI-BHISHYA. \jChap. I. Part. L 

it is the unstultified idea alone which everywhere proves 
things. But the imposed idea of the self, existing in (inti- 
mate) association with gods and other (material embodi- 
ments), is contradicted by all the means of proof which 
establish the reality of the self ; and that (idea) does not 
prove, (in consequence), the non-distinction between the 
self and the body ; in the same way in which the idea of 
the serpent (falsely perceived) in a rope, &c., (does not 
prove any non-distinction as existing between the serpent 
and the rope). And the grammatical equations, which are 
to the effect' The ox is broken-horned', ' The ox is 
hornless', are not seen to be stultified anywhere by any- 
thing ; hence there is no exaggeration in (our) statement. 
For these same reasons, the self also is not totally dis- 
tinct from the Brahman. On the other hand, as being 
a part of the Brahman, it is (both) distinct and non- 
distinct (from Him). It being so, non-distinction alone 
is natural, and distinction is due to limiting conditions. 
If it be asked how this is made out, it is replied (that it is 
made out) by means of the following and other scriptural 
texts: "That thou art." \Chhand. Up. VI. 8. 7.]; 
" There is no other seer than He." -[/fr///. Up. III. 7. 23.]; 
"This self is the Brahman" '[Brih. Up. II. 5. 19. & 
IV. 4. 5. & Mand. Up. I. 2.]. Non-distinction (between 
the self and the Brahman} is declared in the hymn which 
relates to the Brahman and forms the Samhitopanishad 
of the Atharvanikas ; and it says, after introducing the 
subject-matter of the topic by mentioning the Brahman to 
be these two, namely, the Earth and the Heaven, that " The 
fishermen are the Brahman, the slaves are the Brahman, 
and these gamblers are also the Brahman, man and 
woman are born out of the Brahman ; women are the 
Brahman, and man also (is the Brahman}." And distinction 



Adhik. IV. Silt. 4.] SRI-BHASHYA. 313 

(between the self and the Brahman] is also declared in 
the following and other scriptural passages : "The Eter- 
nal among the eternals, the Intelligent among the in- 
telligent, who, though One, fulfils the desires of the 
many." [Kath. Up. V. 13. & Svet. Up. VI. 13.]; "The 
two unborn, the intelligent and the non-intelligent (are) 
the Lord and the non-Lord." [Svet. Up. I. 9.]; "An- 
other (viz. the Lord) also is seen to be the cause of 
their association with the qualities of the 'works' (which 
lead to samsdrd) and the qualities of the self (which 
lead to beatific release)." [Svet. Up. V. 12.]; "He is 
the Lord of the praknti and of the individual soul, and 
is the regulator of the qualities ; He is the cause of sam- 
sdra, of final release, of existence, and of bondage."- 
[Svet. Up. VI. 1 6.]; "He is the cause, the Lord of what 
is the lord of the senses (/. e. of the jiva or the indi- 
vidual soul)." [Svet. Up. VI. 9.]; "One of them eats 
the sweet pippala fruit, while the other shines in splen- 
dour without eating at all." [Mund. Up. III. i. i. & 
Svet. Up. IV. 6.]; " He who, dwelling in the self, &c." 
\Mddh. Brih. Up. III. 7. 22.]; " He is embraced by the 
omniscient Self and knows nothing that is external."- 
[Brih. Up. IV. 3. 21.]; " He is ridden upon by the omni- 
scient Self and goes away giving 328 up his body." [Brih. 
Up. IV. 3. 35.]; " Knowing Him alone, one transcends 
death." [Svet. Up. III. 8.]. Therefore, (both) distinction 
and non-distinction have necessarily to be admitted be- 
tween the individual self and the Supreme Self. It being so, 
non-distinction is, however, made out to be natural, because 
the scriptural passage " He who knows the Brahman 
becomes the Brahman indeed." [Mund. Up. III. 2. 9.], 

328. The word used in the original S.iiikara to mean groaning along. 
is utsarjan which is interpreted by 

4 



314 SRI-BHISHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

and others like it declare that, in the condition of final 
release, the individual self acquires the nature of the 
Brahman ; and because also the passage " But where 
to one all this becomes the Self, there who shall see whom 
by what ?" \Brih. (7p.ll. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.], negatives 
the apprehension of the Lord then as being different (from 
the individual self). 

However, it may be said that even then distinction 
is perceived in accordance with the scriptural passage 
which speaks of the association (of the individual self with 
the Brahman), and is to this effect" He attains with the 
omniscient Brahman all the auspicious qualities." {Taitt. 
U'p. II. i. i.]; and that he (the Sutrakard) also says the 
same thing in these aphorisms " Except in the matter of 
the activity relating to (the creation, &c., of) the world, 
(the released souls possess all the powers belonging to the 
Lord); because (the Lord Himself forms) the topic of the 
contexts (wherein the above-mentioned activity is referred 
to), and because also (the individual souls) are not mention- 
ed (therein)." [Ved. Sut. IV. 4. 17.]; "And on account 
of the characteristic of equality (between the individual 
self and the Supreme Self) being solely confined to (the 
matter of) enjoyment." {Vcd. Si'tt. IV. 4. 21.].. (But) 
this is not so ; because the distinction of the individual self 
(from the Brahman) is denied by hundreds of scriptural 
passages such as " There is no other seer than He."- 
{Brih. Up. III. 7. 23.], and others. By means of the 
passage " He attains with the omniscient Brahman all 
the auspicious qualities." [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], what is 
said is that he enjoys the Brahman along with all (His) 
desirable qualities that is, he enjoys the Brahman posses- 
sed of all those qualities. Otherwise, the phrase " with the 
(omniscient) Brahman" would lead to the Brahman be- 



Adhik. IV. Sftl. ./.] SRI-BHISHYA. 315 

coming unimportant. If, by means of the aphorism 
" Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the 
creation, &c., of) the world, &c.", the released souls are 
made out to have a distinct existence (from the Brahman), 
then it is the same as stating (that these individual souls 
have a) deficiency of lordship. For, otherwise, there will 
be the contradiction of this aphorism among others, name- 
ly, " (Only) after attaining the Highest Light, is there 
the manifestation (of the individual self's own nature ; as 
may be inferred) from (the use of) the word ' own '." 
[Ved. Silt. IV. 4. i.]. 329 Therefore, non-distinction 
(between the self and the Brahman) is alone na- 
tural. 

But the distinction of the individual selves from the 
Brahman as well as from each other is due to limiting 
conditions, such as the intellect, the senses and the body. 
Although the Brahman is not made up of constituent parts 
and is found everywhere, yet there certainly results dis- 
tinction even in relation to the Brahman by means of the 
limiting conditions, such as the intellect, &c., just as (dis- 
tinction results) in the case of the spatial 8 3 ether by means 
of (limiting conditions like) pots, &c. And there is (here) 
no fallacy of reciprocal dependence to the effect that there 
is the association of limiting conditions like the intellect, 
&c., with the Brahman who is already differentiated, and 

329. The passage which is the basis 330. The ether which exists within 

of this aphorism and contains the word a pot (jghatakdsa} is said to be comli- 

own (or sva) runs thus :Pai-ail- tioned by the pot. On the destruction 

jyotii'iipasampadya svina riipen.ilrinn/i- of the pot, the ether which was with- 

padhyatel^jkhdnd. Up. VIII. 12. 2.]. in it becomes one with the spatial 

"After attaining the Highest Light(/>. ether outside (in,ihjkii'.n), which, in 

the Bra/iiiian), lie (the individual self) itself, is unconditioned, 
becomes manifest in his on'it nature." 



316 SRI-13HISHYA. \Chap. L Part. I. 

that there is differentiation in relation to the Brahman by 
means of His association with limiting 'conditions like 
the intellect, &c. ; because the limiting condition and 
its association (with the Brahman] are (both) due to 
karma ; 331 and because also the stream of that (karma] 
is beginningless. What is said is this : By means 

of the individual self which is held in bondage by its 
past karma, there is produced that limiting condition 
which is found in association with that (self) itself; and 
karma (is produced) by the (self s) being associated with 
that (limiting condition) : thus there is nothing wrong 
(here), in as much as the relation between karma and 
(these) limiting conditions is beginningless in accordance 
with the argument 332 derived from the seed and the 
sprout. Therefore, it is the non-distinction of the indivi- 
dual selves from each other as well as from the Brahman 
that is certainly natural. 

But distinction arises, however, from limiting condi- 
tions. The distinction also of these limiting conditions from 
each other as well as from the Brahman is natural, like 
(their) non-distinction; because these limiting conditions are 
not subject to other limiting conditions, and because also, if 
these (latter) be admitted, there would result a regrcssus 
in infinitum. Consequently, according to the karma 
of the individual selves, such limiting conditions are 
produced (in relation to the Brahman} as have, indeed, 

331. Here karma means the effects this condition produces another 
of past works, karma, this karma another limiting 

332. A seed produces a sprout condition, and so on. Thus there 
this sprout produces another seed, can be no beginning to the relation 
this seed another sprout, this again which exists between karma and 
another seed, and so on. Similarly a limiting conditions. 

karma produces a limiting condition. 



Adhik. IV. Sut. 4.] SRi-BnlsHYA. 317 

a nature which is (both) distinct and non-distinct from the 
Brahman. 

(In reply to this), it is said here*3 thus : 
It has been stated that the whole collection of Vcd- 
dntic passages relate to the injunction regarding the medi- 
tation of the Brahman who is without a second, and is 
existence, knowledge and bliss ; that consequently it is 
non-distinction which is made out by means of Vcddntic 
passages; and that distinction is made out by means of the 
sastras relating to 'works', as well as by means of percep- 
tion, &c., which are all dependent upon distinctions ; and 
that, (under these circumstances), non-distinction is alone 
the reality, because, there is mutual contradiction between 
distinction and non-distinction, and because also the per- 
ception of distinctions may result even from the beginning- 
lessly old ignorance (or avidya) as its source. But what 
has been stated there (in that context) to the effect 
that there is contradiction between distinction and non- 
distinction, for the reason that both of them are estab- 
lished by perception, that is improper. Indeed, for a 
thing to be distinct from another thing is the same as that 
thing having characteristics which are different from 
those of the other thing ; and non-distinction is the con . 
dition opposite to this. Who is there that is in his senses, 
and will speak of the existence in one and the same 
place of those two things (viz. distinction and non-dis- 
tinction) which have (respectively) the nature of a parti- 
cular condition and of the opposite of that particular 
condition ? If it be said that non-distinction exists in 
the form of the cause as well as in the form of 

333. Hercunder, the Dhyanaiiiyoga- B/iiiskarTyas stated above, 
vddin refutes the position of the 



318 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. L Part. I. 

the genus, and that distinction exists in the form of the 
effect as well as in the form of the individual, and that, 
owing to there being (such) a difference between their 
forms there is no contradiction (between them), it is repli- 
ed that it is not (right to say so); because such (a position) 
does not admit of any one of the possible alternative views 
(in relation to it). Does he who says that there is no con- 
tradiction (between distinction and non-distinction) owing 
to the difference in the form of their appearance, (does 
he) hold that distinction exists in one particular form, 
while non-distinction exists in another paiticular form ? 
Or (does he hold) that both of them are to be found 
in one thing which is capable of adopting both those 
forms ? In the first alternative, distinction belongs to the 
individual and non-distinction belongs to the genus, and 
hence, no one thing has both these forms (of distinction and 
non-distinction). If it be said that the genus and the 
individual are both one and the same thing, then (the 
contention), that there is no contradiction (between them), 
in as much as there is a difference in the form of their 
appearance, will amount to have been given up. It has 
been already stated that it is contrary to reason for one 
and the same thing to have its own peculiar charac- 
teristics and (also) their opposites. And, in the second 
alternative, there are two forms which are mutually con- 
tradictory, and the thing with which they are associated is 
unknown. Hence, even if a third form (other than the 
jdti or genus, and the vyakti or the individual) be admitt- 
ed, there would be only the proving of the mutual distinc- 
tion between (all) the three forms, but no (proving of the) 
absence of distinction (between them). If it be said that 
that non-contradiction (between distinction and non-dis- 
tinction), which it is sought to maintain by the 



Adhik. IV. Silt. ./.] SRI-BHISHYA. 319 

(supposition of) two forms, is the same as being (both) 
distinct and non-distinct from the thing which forms 
the abode of those (two forms), it is asked in reply 
how the two forms, which abide in a thing and are 
themselves (thus) different from (that) thing, can be 
capable of introducing into that thing hostile attribut- 
es (at the same time). Of what nature is non-dis- 
tinction then ? If the two forms (on the one hand) 
and the thing, (on the other hand), which possesses 
them are admitted to be (distinctly) two in nature, 
then, there would be the necessity for another form that is 
capable of holding them together. Consequently, there 
would be the fallacy of regrcssus in infinitum. . Moreover, 
there is the apprehension of an admitted oneness in 
relation to the perception of individuals ; similarly, how- 
ever, in regard to that thing also which has (its) similars, 
there arises no such perception as is characterised by 
oneness ; because all perception arises only as relating 
to the characteristic modes (of things) and to the 
things characterised by those modes, to the effect that 
a particular thing is of a particular nature. In such 
(a perception), the thing which characterises is the 
genus, and the thing which is characterised is the indivi- 
dual (belonging to that genus); and therefore perception 
has not (only) one form. For this same reason, the 
quality of being (both) distinct and non-distinct from 
the Brahman is not possible in relation to the indivi- 
dual self also. Accordingly, the perception of distinction 
is solely based upon the beginninglessly old ignorance 
(or avidya), in as much as non-distinction is based 
on the sdstras (the logical result of which is) arrived at in- 
dependently (of all other means of knowledge). 

It may be said that, if such be the case, the Brah- 



320 SRI-BHISHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

man Himself would possess ignorance, and that conse- 
quently the evils of birth, old age, death, &c., resulting 
from that (ignorance) would taint (Him); and that for 
the same reason the following and other scriptural texts, 
namely, "He who understands all and who knows 
z\\"[Mimd. Up. I. i. 9. II. 2. 7.]; "This Self is 
devoid of sin." [Qterf. Up. VIII. i. 5. & VIII. 7. 
i & 3.], would also be contradicted. But this is not 
right ; because the evils of ignorance, &c., are not 
real. But, in as much as you 334 do not admit (the 
existence of) things other than the limiting conditions 
and the Brahman, the association of those limiting 
conditions with the Brahman Himself and the evils of 
(His) constituting the individual self, of (His) being 
(thus) ignorant, &c., (all of) which result from that 
(association), would all occur (according to you) in reality. 
Indeed, these limiting conditions,which are associated 
with the Brahman who is without constituent parts 
and indivisible, do not get into association (with Him) 
either after cutting Him or after dividing Him. But, 
on the contrary, they are associated with His essential na- 
ture, and hence they work out their effects within Himself. 
You may, however, hold that the Brahman limited 
by conditions is the individual self; and that that 
(individual self) is atomic (in size); that its atomic 
character is due to the atomic (or non-pervasive) nature 
of the manas which is one of the limiting conditions ; 
that this limiting condition is beginninglessly old ; 
and that, therefore, the evils, which are associated 
with the thing that is limited by conditions, 

334. You means the Bhaskariyas these, they do not admit the existence 
who admit only the "Brahman and of anything- else, 
the conditions limiting Him. Beyond 



Adhik. IV. Suf. 4.] SRI-BHISHYA. 321 

are not associated with the Highest unconditioned Brah- 
man. If so, it has to be asked whether the individual self 
which is atomic in size is a bit of the Brahman cut off 
(from Him) by limiting conditions ; or whether it (viz. 
the individual self) is any such special part of the Brah- 
man as is not at all divided from the Brahman and is 
(nevertheless) associated with that limiting condition which 
is characterised by the atomic size ; or whether it is, in 
essence, the Brahman Himself in association with limiting 
conditions ; or whether it is some other intelligent being 
associated with limiting conditions ; or whether it is the 
limiting condition itself. As the Brahman is incapable of 
being divided, the first alternative cannot be assumed; and 
(if it be assumed), there would be a beginning (in time) to 
the individual self ; indeed cutting off means the splitting 
of an already existing thing into two. In accordance with 
the second alternative, a particular part of the Brahman 
Himself is associated with limiting conditions, and hence 
all the evils arising out of limiting conditions accrue 
to Him alone ; and when a limiting condition is detached 
and transferred (from one part of the Brahman to another), 
then, owing to the fact that it is not possible for the limit- 
ing condition to carry with itself that part of the Brahman 
which was associated with itself (before), and owing also 
to the fact that the part of the Brahman which is associat- 
ed with limiting conditions varies from moment to 
moment, both bondage and final release have to be 
taking place every moment. If it were possible (for the 
limiting condition) to carry with itself (that part of the 
Brahman with which it is associated), then, since the 
Brahman is indivisible, the whole (of the Brahman)\\o\\\A 
have to be so carried. If it be said that a thing which has no 
constituent parts and is all-pervading cannot be (so) carried, 



322 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

then the statement already made to the effect that the 
limiting condition is detached and transferred must itself be- 
come an error. When all the limiting conditions are asso- 
ciated with the (various) parts of the (one) undivided Brah- 
man, then, since all the individual selves form such parts 
of the (one undivided) Brahman, they will have all to be 
put together and realised as one. If, owing to their form- 
ing (His) various parts, there can be no putting them to- 
gether (so as to cause their coalescence), then, even after 
the limiting conditions are detached and transferred, there 
can be no coalescence of even a single part (freed from 
limiting conditions with the unconditioned whole). In ac- 
cordance with the third alternative, the essential nature of 
the Brahman Himself assumes the state of the individual 
sell", through association with limiting conditions ; and 
hence there can be no establishment of the unconditioned 
Brahman as apart from that (individual self), and there will 
have to be only one individual self in all bodies. In ac- 
cordance with the fourth alternative, the individual self 
is (by nature) altogether different from the Brahman, and 
therefore the idea that the differentiation of the individual 
self (from the Brahman] is due to limiting conditions will 
amount to have been given up. In accordance with the 
last alternative, the view of the Charvakas 383 themselves 
will come to have been accepted. Therefore, on the 
strength of the sastras declaring that there is non-disinc- 

: 335. The Charvakas are the mate- regarded as atheists by the orthodox 

rialists of Hindu philosophy. Their in matters of Vedic faith. The 

sceptical doctrines were handed down Charvakas believe only in one crite- 

to Charvaka and his followers by rion of truth, namely, perception. 

one Vachaspati or Brihaspati. Their According to them non-intelligent 

opinions are embodied in what are matter itself is the cause of crea^- 

called Bqrhaspatyz-sutras. They are tion. 



Adhik. tV. Silt. 4.] SRI-BHISHYA. 323 

tion (between things), it has to be accepted that all distinc- 
tions are based upon ignorance (or avidya) alone. 

Accordingly, although the sastras are authoritative 
only in so far as they relate to utility either in the form 
of activity or of cessation from activity, it is established 
that Vcdantic passages are authoritative in relation to the 
essential nature of the Brahman (also), in as much as 
they are needed as a complement to the injunction relat- 
ing to meditation. 

This (view) also is improper. 830 Even though it be 
granted that they are needed as a complement to the 
injunction relating to meditation, there is no authoritative 
proof that Vcdantic passages import anything that is real. 
What is said is this : Do the passages relating to the 
essential nature of the Brahman possess authoritativeness 
in relation to that essential nature of the Brahman, by im- 
porting the same thing as the injunction relating to medi- 
tation (does) ? Or (do they do .so) independently and of 
their own accord ? If they have (such) oneness of import, 
then they must refer mainly to the injunction relating to 
meditation ; and thus it is not possible for them to aim at 
denoting the essential nature of the Brahman. If the}' 
import a different thing (from the injunction relating to 
meditation), then, since they are devoid of utility in the 
form of inducing either activity or cessation from activity, 
they certainly cannot have any (real) meaning at all. 
Moreover, it should not be urged that meditation has the 
nature of a flow of memory, and is capable of being 

336, Hereunder the Mimamsaka* by the Sutrak&ra. in \ 7 ed. 6V/A I. I. 
who is the main objector against the 4., refutes the position of the D/iyana- 
views intended to be propounded nyogavaJin. 



$24 SRI-BHASHYA. \Ciiap. L Part. L 

definitely described only by means of what constitutes the 
thing that is to be remembered ; and that, if it be asked 
what the particular object of remembrance in connection 
with this injunction bearing upon meditation is, then, 
the following passages "All this is that Self." \_Brih. 
Up. II. 4. 6. & IV. 5. 7.]; "The Brahman is omnisci- 
ent." \Brih. Up.ll.$. 19.]; "The Brahman is Exist- 
ence, Knowledge, Infinity." \Taitt. Up. II. i. i.J, and 
other such passages point out the essential nature and the 
peculiar characteristics of that (object of remembrance), and 
thus acquire the sameness of import with that (injunction 
relating to meditation), and become authoritative in estab- 
lishing the reality of the thing (imported) : because, al- 
though the injunction relating to meditation is necessarily 
dependent upon what forms the object of remembrance, 
yet the reality of the thing to be meditated upon is not 
absolutely needed, for the reason that the completion of 
meditation becomes possible even with the help of a cer- 
tain thing which is unreal, as in the case of the injunc- 
tion 337 enjoining the realisation of the Brahman as a 
Name. Thus it is arrived at that the Brahman is not 
proved by means of the scriptures ; because Veddniic 
passages are devoid of utility in the form of inducing either 
activity or cessation from activity ; and because, even 
when needed as a complement to the injunction relating to 
meditation, they have their finality only in denoting the 
essential nature of the particular object of meditation ; 
again because, even when they are capable of having an 
independent import, there is to be found in merely know- 
ing (their meaning) the whole range of their utility, as 
is the case with sentences (uttered) to gratify children, 

337. Vide Chhdnd. Up. VII. 1, J, where this injunction is given, 



Adhik. 'lit. Sat. ./.] SRI-BHISHYA. $2$ 

sickly persons, and other such people ; and because also 
they (viz. Vcdantic passages) cannot point out the real- 
ity of those things the ideas corresponding to which have 
been already naturally established. 

In this connection, it is laid down (by the Sntrakdra ) 
- -" That (viz. the fact that the scripture forms altoge- 
ther the source of the knowledge relating to the Brahman] 
results, however, from (His constituting) the true pur- 
port (of the scriptures). "3 as The word samanvaya means 
the proper purport, that is, such a purport as constitutes an 
object of human pursuit. The meaning is that, owing to 
the fact that the Brahman who is the highest object of 
human pursuit and whose very nature is unsurpassed bliss 
forms the purport (of the scriptures) by constituting the 
thing that is to be denoted (by them), that, namely, 
the fact that the scripture forms the means of proving 
(the Brahman}, is undoubtedly established. 

The whole collection of Vcdantic passages teaches 
the Brahman who is the highest object of attainment, in 
as much as His essential nature is devoid of all evil and 
consists of unsurpassed bliss ; and whoever says that, never- 
theless, it (vix. that collection) has not its finality in uti- 
lity, because it does not lead to either activity or cessation 
from activity, (he) says, (as it were), that a person who 
dwells in a palace is destitute of all usefulness in as 
much as he does not get into a dog-kennel. 

What is said is this : Individual souls have the know- 
ledge of their own nature as well as of the reality of the 
higher and the lower truths that are concealed by the veil of 
that ignorance which is the same in nature as the beginning- 
lessly old karma ; they exist in the form of gods, Asuras, 

338, This is \ed. Sut, I. I. 4. and is us follows : Tatlu samamnyat. 



326 SRi-BnlSHYA. [Chap. L Part. L 

Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyddharas, Kinnaras, Kimpuru- 
shas, Yakshas, Rdkshasas, Pisdchas, men, beasts, birds, 
reptiles, trees, shrubs, creepers, grass, and other (material 
embodiments); they are differentiated by the distinctions 
of the male sex, of the female sex, and of sexlessness, and 
have their own specially appointed supporters, protectors 
and special objects of enjoyment : and (under these cir- 
cumstances) that passage alone has its finality in utility 
which teaches that there exists the Highest Brahman 
who, by means of His own essential nature, character 
and qualities, greatness and activity, causes to these 
(individual souls) unlimited and unsurpassed joy at the 
time when there happens to be no difference between the 
(personal) experience of (the Brahman] Himself and 
the experience which these (souls) have in their released 
state (of beatitude). But that (other kind of) passage, 
which relates to activity and cessation from activity, has 
not its finality in utility, in as much as it gives rise to that 
knowledge which can be utilised only so long as there are 
(desirable) objects to be attained. When it is desired to 
know how the Brahman who is of this nature is to be at- 
tained, then, worship (or npdsand) is enjoined, as the 
means of attaining the Brahmanfty the words vcdana, &c., 
(meaning knowledge, &c.,) in the following passages : 
" He who knows the Brahman attains the Highest."- 
\Taitt. Up. II. i. i.]; " Let him worship the Self alone as 
the object to be attained." \Brih. Up. I. 4. 15.]. This 
(utility of the teaching given by Veddntd) is analogous to 
the case of a person who, on hearing the statement that 
there is hidden treasure in his house, comes to know of the 
existence of (such a) hidden treasure, (thereby) becomes 
pleased, and then tries to get at it. It is also analogous 
to this other case : A young prince, while engaged in play 



Adhik. IV. SfiL y.] SRI-BHISHYA. 327 

with (other) lads, gets out of the palace, and, straying from 
the right road, is lost, and is taken by the king (to be so 
lost). (The prince) himself does not know his (own) father, 
is brought up by a Brahmana of merit, and is made to learn 
(all) the Vedic scriptures. When he is sixteen years of 
age and is the possessor^ 9 of all auspicious qualities, he 
hears a statement made by a very worthy person to this 
effect : " Your father is the lord of the whole World, and 
is blessed with the qualities of dignity, liberality, affection, 
excellent behaviour, heroism, bravery and overwhelming 
strength, c. He is waiting in the best of cities solely 
with the desire to see you, (his) lost son." When (the 
prince hears this statement), he becomes then and there 
full of unsurpassed joy by realising (within himself) " I 
am indeed the son of a person who is alive, and my father 
is abundantly blessed with all kinds of wealth." The king 
also, on hearing that his own son is alive, is healthy, is 
beautiful to look at, and is conversant with all that has to 
be known, becomes like one who has attained all the ob- 
jects of human pursuit; and thereafter he tries to get him 
(/. c. the son) back. And at last they both meet together. 
Such also is (this utility). 

Again what has been stated by the purvapakshin to 
the effect that Vedantic passages relate to things, the ideas 
corresponding to which have been already naturally estab- 
lished, and are hence no means of proving the real exist- 
ence of the things imported (by them), but are ;like the 
sentences which are uttered for the gratification of children, 
sickly persons and other (such people), in as much as their 
utility has its finality only in (producing) the mere (men- 
tal) knowledge of that (to which they relate); that is 

339. The word used in the text is metaphorically used to signify an 
akara, which means a mine. It is inexhaustible source of anything. 



328 SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

wrong. When the absence of the reality of the thing 
imported (by a sentence) is definitely determined, then, 
even if that (thing) be (mentally) known, it cannot serve 
any useful purpose. In the case of children, sickly people 
&c., joy &c., are produced by the illusion that the thing 
(imported by the sentences uttered for their gratification) 
is really existent. If, at the time when such (illusory) 
knowledge is existent, the conviction should arise that 
the thing imported is really non-existent, then joy, &c., 
would, (in consequence), disappear that very moment. If, 
in the case of the Upanishadic passages also, it be deter- 
mined that they do not denote the real existence of the 
Brahman, then, although they give rise to the (conceptual) 
knowledge of the Brahman, there would be (to those 
passages) no finality in utility. 

Therefore, it is a demonstrated conclusion that the 
scriptural passage, which begins with " From whom 
all these beings are born" [Taitt. Up. III. i. i.], de- 
clares that that Brahman who is the only cause of all 
the worlds, who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all 
that is evil, who is the abode 340 of innumerable auspicious 
qualities, such as omniscience, the quality of willing the 
truth, &c., and who is bliss unsurpassed in excellence, 
is really existent. 

ADH1KARANA. V. 

Ikshatyadhikarana. 
Sutra 5. Ikshaternasabdam. 

Because the activity imported by the root Jksh (to 
see /. e. to think) is predicated (in relation to what con- 
stitutes the cause of the world) that which is not reveal- 

340. Here again the word used in the text is akara. Vide supra n, 339. 



Adhik. V. Sftt. 5.] SRI-BHISHYA. 329 

ed solely by the scripture, (viz. the pradhana) 3 4 1 is not 
(the Sat or the Existence which is referred to in the scrip- 
tural passage relating to the cause of the world). 

It has been already stated that that Brahman, who is 
taught in the scriptural passage which relates to the cause 
of the world and which begins with " From whom all 
these (beings are born)" \Taitt. Up. III. i. i.], (that 
Brahman] who is omniscient, who is omnipotent, who is 
hostile to all that is evil and forms the only seat of all the 
auspicious qualities, has to be enquired into. Now, 
by means of this aphorism " Because the activity im- 
ported by the root tksh (to see i. e. to think), is predicat- 
ed (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the world), 
that which is not revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the 
pradhana) is not (the Sat or the Existence which is refer- 
red to in the scriptural passage relating to the cause of the 
world)", and by means of other aphorisms, it is declared 
that the scriptural passages 342 which mention the cause 
of the world do not possess the power of denoting the 
pradhana and other similar things which are cap- 
able of being established by the process of logical in- 
ference. This is what is revealed in the Qtfiandogya : 
" Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the begin- 
ning, one only, without a second It thought 'May 

I become manifold and be born'. It created tejas, 
&c." [Chhand. Up. VI. 2. i, 2, et seq.]. Here the 
doubt arises whether that, which is the cause of the world 
and is denoted by the word Existence (or Sat), is the 

341. The Pradhana of the Sah- universe. 

khyas is what is otherwise known as 342. The passages forming the 

the Prakriti, It is Nature, or the self- basis of this Adhikarana are contain- 

evolving material substratum of the ed in Chhdnd. Up. VI. 

4 2 



. 330 SRf-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

pradhana which has been mentioned by others and is cap- 
able of being established by logical inference, or whether it 
is the Brahman who possesses the characteristics already 
stated? It is perhaps held* * a that it is the pradhana. 
Why ? The passage "Existence alone, my dear child, this 
was in the beginning, one only, &c." speaks of the causal 
condition of that thing which is denoted by the word 'this', 
which constitutes the thing to be enjoyed (or endured) by 
intelligent beings (viz. the individual souls), and which is 
made up (of the qualities) of sattva (goodness), rajas (pas- 
sion), and tamas (darkness), and which (again) exists in 
variously modified forms such as the ether, &c. Indeed, a 
thing which exists in the condition of a cause acquires the 
character of an effect merely by getting into another con- 
dition. Whatever thing and whatever (general) nature 
(thereof) exist in the condition of a cause, that same thing 
and that same nature (thereof) exist also in the condition 
of an effect. Moreover, a produced effect is made up (of 
the qualities) of sattva, &c. Therefore that pradhana in 
which these qualities are held in a state of equilibrium 344 is 

343. The Sahkhya is the f-Hrra- Rajas represents the condition of act- 
pcikshin, or the objector here. ive up-building heterogeneity, the 

344. According to the Sahkhyas, want of equilibrium in which is the 
the evolutionary processes of creation cause of the progress of evolution, 
are possible only when there is he- And Tamas represents that other con- 
terogeneity in the constitution of the dition which causes the evolved uni- 
Prakriti. This heterogeneity is the verse to tend towards dissolution, 
result of the differentiation of the These three terms aie also used with 
Pratriti into the three Gunrts of a psychological significance, which is 
Sattva , fiafas, and 'lamas. When partly figurative but is more largely 
this differentiation ceases, or when due to the belief that the material of 
there is homogeneity in the constitu- the body of the incarnating soul de- 
tion of the Pra(riti, there can be no termines largely the nature of the 
creation and no evolution. Sattta re- mental and moral qualities possessed 
presents the condition of completed by it in the embodied condition, and 
development and perfect equilibrium. that this material itself is so chosen 



Adhik. V. Sat. 5.] SRi-BniiSHYA. 33! 

alone the cause (of the universe). That same (pradhdna) 
is, in the passage" Existence alone, my dear child, this 
was in the beginning, one only, without a second ", de- 
clared to be that undifferentiated existence which has ab- 
sorbed into itself all differentiating peculiarities. It is for 
this reason that a cause and its effect have no (essential) 
difference between them. Only thus can this proposition 
become appropriate (which says) that, by knowing one 
thing, all things become known. Otherwise, there would 
further be a complete difference between the thing intend- 
ed to be illustrated and the example of the lump of clay 
and of the produced effects thereof, which are (all) given 
as an illustration in the scriptural passage that begins 
with -"Just as, my dear child, by one lump of clay, 
&c." [Ulihdnd. Up.\\. 1.4.]. Therefore, in the scriptural 
passage which relates to the cause of the world, nothing 
other than the pradhdna taught by the great sage 
Kapila is mentioned. Moreover, this passage (now under 
discussion) contains a proposition and an illustration, and 
thus it has surely the form of a logical inference. 
Consequently, what is denoted by the word Existence 
(or Sat) is nothing other than that (pradhdna) which is 
capable of being proved by -inference (to be the cause 
of the world). 

If it be so held, it is stated (in reply) thus : "Because the 
activity imported by the root iksh (to sec i. e. to think), is 
predicated (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the 
world), that which is not revealed solely by the scripture 
(viz. the pradhdna) is not (the Sat or the Existence which 
is referred to in the scriptural passage relating to that 
cause of the world)." That which is not revealed solely 

;ih to suit the Karma, ul the incarnating i>uul. 



332 ^Ri-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

by the scripture is that in relation to which the scripture 
alone does not form the means of proof. It is that which 
is capable of being established by the process of logical 
inference. The meaning is that it is the pradhana. That 
(pr ad hand) is not denoted by the scriptural passages relat- 
ing to the cause of the world. Why ? Because the act- 
ivity imported by the root Iksh (to see i. e. to think) is 
predicated. That is, because the root iksh is used, in the 
scriptural passage " It thought May I become manifold 
and be born." [Qihdnd. Up. VI. 2. 3.], to denote a parti- 
cular kind of activity in relation to what is imported by the 
word Existence (or Sat). And it is not possible for the non- 
intelligent pradhana to be associated with the activity of 
seeing (i. e. of thinking). Therefore, what forms the import 
of the word Existence (or Sat) is that Highest Person who 
is capable of so ( seeing ', and who is a particular intelligent 
Being that is omniscient and omnipotent. Accordingly, in 
all contexts which relate to creation, the act of creation is 
invariably preceded by the act of ' seeing' (/. e. of thinking), 
as in the following and other scriptural passages : " He 
thought' May I create the worlds'. He created these 

worlds." [Ait. Up. I. i & 2.]; " He thought He created 

the prdnas." [Pr. Up. VI. 3 & 4.]. 

It may, however, be said here that the cause has 
necessarily to be !in natural conformity with the effect. 
That is true ; and the Highest Person who is omniscient 
and omnipotent, who wills the truth, and who owns the 
intelligent as well as the non-intelligent things in their 
subtle state as His body, is certainly in natural conform- 
ity with all produced effects. For example, the follow- 
ing scriptural passages say the same thing: " His supreme 
power is revealed, indeed, as varied, natural, and as 
consisting of knowledge, strength, and action." [Svct. Up. 



Adhik. V. Sift. 5.] SRI-BHASHYA. 333 

VI. 8.J ; " He who understands all and who knows all 
and whose tapas** 5 consists of knowledge" \Mund. Up. 
I.i. 9.]; "He whose body is the avyakta*^ whose 

body is the akshara whose body is mriiyu, He is the 

internal Self of all beings." [Sub. Up. VII.]. And this 
will be fully explained under the aphorism " (The Brah- 
man is) not (the cause of the world), because (He is) 
different (from this world)" [Ved. Sftt. II. i. 4.], 
and also under other aphorisms. Here, (however), it is 
maintained that the scriptural passages relating to the 
creation of the world are not capable of importing the 
pradhana. The logical objections in regard to what actu- 
ally forms the import (of those passages) will be invalidat- 
ed in that same context (in which this above-mentioned 
aphorism occurs). 

What has been stated to the effect that this passage 
(viz. Clihand. Up. VI. i & 2.) is decidedly in the form 
of a logical inference, on account of its containing a propo- 
sition and an illustration, that is not right; because there 
is not given in it any basis of logical inference ( /. c. the 
middle term). When, by means of the passage " (Did 
you ask for that teaching) by which what is not heard be- 
comes heard" [Qthand. Up. VI. i. 3.], it is desired to 
teach how by knowing (a certain) one thing all things 
become known, then, the example (of the clay, &c.,) is 
indeed made use of merely to show the possibility of such 
a thing to him who is of opinion that such a thing is 

345. The word tapas ordinarily not mean penance or austerities, and 

denotes penance and religious aus- it is generally interpreted to mean 

terities. It is frequently said in His inner mental effort of thinking 

Vedic and Vedantic literature that be- and willing which has been at the root 

fore creation the Creator per- of all creation, 

formed tapas. Surely this tapas can- 346, Vide supra un. 184 & 185. 



334 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. 1. 

altogether impossible. As a matter of fact, solely for the 
reason that the activity imported by the root iksh (to sec 
i. e. to think), is declared (in relation to what forms the 
cause of the world), it is made out that there is not even 
the remotest mention of any logical inference (here). 

It may again be said thus : It is not that main and 
natural significance of ' seeing ', which is found to exist in 
intelligent beings, that is mentioned here ; but, on the 
other hand, it is a figurative significance of 'seeing' 
(that is implied here); because, in the following scriptural 
passages " That fire saw " {Qihand. Up. VI. 2. 3.], 
"Those waters saw " [Qihand. Up. 1.2.4.], there is 
the association of a figurative 'seeing' (with the pradhana). 
Moreover, it is common to apply figuratively the attributes 
of intelligent beings to non-intelligent things, as in the 
instances, " The paddy crops are expecting the rains ", 
" By means of the rains the (sown) seed became exceed- 
ingly gladdened." 

Therefore, after stating the supposition that the 
' seeing ' (here mentioned) may be figurative, he (the 
Sfttrakard) disproves it (thus). 

Sutra 6. Gaifi.asihennatmasabdat. 

If it be said that it (viz. the import of the root Iksh, to 
see) is (here) figurative, (it is maintained that) it cannot 
be so; because there is the word Atman (or Self mentioned 
in the context).347 

What has been stated (above) to the effect that, since 
there is the association of a figurative ' seeing ' (with the 

347. The Upmushodte context re- the sixth Prapcithaka of the (._hhand- 
luting to this section is the whole ol ogya-Upanishad, 



Adhik. V. Sut. 6.] SRI-BHASHYA. 335 

pradhana), this predication of 'seeing' in relation to Exist- 
ence (or Sat) also is figurative, and is intended to denote 
that condition (of the pradhana) which invariably pre- 
cedes creation, this is not right; because, in the following 
passage (occurring in that context) " All this has That 
for its Self; That is Existence; That is the Atman (or the 
Self)." [Qihand. Up. VI. 8. 7.], that which is denoted by 
the word Existence (or Sat) is (also) denoted by the word 
Atman (or Self). What is said is this: That teaching, which 

is found in the passage "All this has That for its Self. 

That is the Self." [Qihand. Up. VI. 8. 7.], has in view 
the world which is made up of intelligent and non-intelli- 
gent things, and points out that the Sat (or the Exist- 
ence) is the Self thereof ; and it (viz. such a teaching) can- 
not be appropriately given in relation to the (purely) non- 
intelligent thing pradhana. Thus the elements of fire 
(tejas), water, and earth have also the Highest Self for their 
Self. Therefore the words tejas, &c., are also significant 
of the Highest Self alone. Accordingly there is the fol- 
lowing scriptural passage : " Indeed entering into these 
three deities along with this individual self which is (also) 
the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names 
and forms." [JJihand. Up. VI. 3. 2.]. And from this it 
follows that tejas and the other elements acquire the 
character of being things and also the capability of assum- 
ing their own particular names wholly as a consequence 
of the Supreme Self entering into them. Therefore in 
these statements also, namely, " That fire saw"; "Those 
waters saw" -\3ihand. Up. VI. 2. 3 & 4.], the predica- 
tion of ' seeing ' has its primary and natural significance. 
Consequently, in the statement " It saw " [Qihand. Up. 
VI. 2. 3.], the supposition, which gives a figurative signi- 
ficance (to ' seeing ') even a* a consequence of the associa- 



336 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chop. I. Part. I. 

tion (of that ' seeing ' with the pradhdna), is altogether 
dispelled (as wrong). Such is the meaning of this 
aphorism. 

What is denoted by the word Existence (or Sat] is not 
the pradhdna, for the following reason also : 

Sutra 7. Tannishthasya mokshopadesat. 

Because (also) it is taught (in the context) that he 
who is firmly devoted to That (viz. the Sat) obtains final 
release. 



After the scriptural sentence " That thou art"- 
[CJihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.], teaches Svetaketu, who is desir- 
ous of attaining final release, that the Sat is to be continu- 
ously meditated upon as the Atman (or the Self), this 
(other) sentence " As long as he is not freed (from the 
body), so long there is delay ; then he will be blessed."- 
\Qihand. Up. VI. 14. 2.] tells him that in the case of 
the person, who is firmly devoted to that (Sat or One Exist- 
ence), final release, the nature of which is the attainment of 
the Brahman, is delayed only till the falling off of the body. 
And if the non-intelligent pradhdna had been taught to be 
the cause of the world, then it would not have been appro- 
priate to teach that the continuous meditation of it as the 
Self forms the means of attaining final release. And accord- 
ing to the passage " Of whatever nature a man's 
worship is in this world, of that nature he becomes after 
death." \Qihdnd. Up. III. 14. i.], there must result 
to him, who is firmly devoted to that (pradhdna), 
nothing other than the attainment of that (same) non-in- 
telligent thing (or the pradhdna). Moreover, the sastra 



Adhik. V. Sut. 8.~\ SRI-BHISHYA. 337 

(or the scripture), which is much more affectionate (to- 
wards us) than even thousands of mothers and fathers, 
cannot teach (us) to attain that non-intelligent thing (or 
pradhdna) which forms the' Cause of (our) being attacked 
by (our) well-known three miseries. 3 48 Indeed those who 
maintain that the pradhdna forms the cause of the world 
do not acknowledge that final release results to him who 
is firmly devoted to (that) pradhdna. 

Again the pradhdna is not (what is denoted by the 
word Sal or Existence] for the following reason also : 

Sutra 8. Heyatvavazkanachcha. 

Because also it is not declared (in the context) that 
it (viz. what is denoted by the word Sat or Existence) 
deserves to be discarded. 

. If the pradhdna alone were that cause (of crea- 
tion) which is denoted by the word Sat (or Existence}, 
then (the idea of) Svetaketu, who was desirous of attain- 
ing final release, being the same as that (Sat) would 
be opposed to (his; final release, and should therefore have 
been taught (to him) to be only such (an idea) as altogether 
deserved to be discarded. And that is not done. On the 
contrary, in the following passages, namely, "That thou 
art," \_Chhdnd. Up. VI. 8.7.]; "So long as he is not 
(freed from the body), &c."[C&Iiand. Up. VI. 14. 2.],- 
it is taught that that (idea of his being the same as the 
Sat} is necessarily such as deserves to be adopted (by 
him). 

348, Vide supra p. 4. n. 12. 

43 



SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

The pradhdna is not (what is denoted by the word 
Sat or Existence) for the following reason also: 

Sutra 9. Pratljnavlrodhat. 3 * 9 

Because (also) there would then be the contradiction 
of the proposition 3 30 (enunciated in the context). 

If the pradhdna were taken to be the cause of the 
world, there would also be the contradiction of the propo- 
sition (enunciated in the context). Indeed, in the very 
beginning of the scriptural passage (under reference), the 
proposition is enunciated that, by knowing a (certain) 
single thing, all things become known. And that (propo- 
sition,) has to be justified solely by means of the fact that, 
from the knowledge of the causal Sal (or Existence), the 
world, which is its produced effect and is made up of 
the intelligent and the non-intelligent things, becomes 
known ; and the reason (for this) is that a cause and its 
effect are not different from each other. But the whole 
collection of intelligent beings (viz. the individual selv- 
es) cannot be the effects produced out of the pradhdna ; 
and consequently, by knowing the pradhana, the know- 
ledge relating to the whole collection of intelligent beings 
cannot result ; thus this (proposition itself) would be con- 
tradicted if the pradhdna be taken to be the cause of 
the world. 



349. This Sutra is not commented is to the effect " Did you ask for 
tipon by Sankara and by Anandattrtha that teaching by which what is not 
in their commentaries on the Vedanta- heard becomes heard, what is not 
Sutras. thought becomes thought, what is 

350. This proposition is contain- not known becomes known, ' 
ed in Chhand. Up. VI. i. 3. and 



Adhik. V. Srit. /o.J SRI-BHA.SHYA, 339 

The pradhana is not (what is denoted by the word 
Sat or Existence in the scriptural passage under discussion) 
for the following reason also : 

Sutra 10. Svapyayat. 

Because (also), there is (mentioned in the context), 
the withdrawal (of the individual self) into its own cause, 
(/. e. into the Safr. 

This scriptural passage, namely, "Know from me, my 
dear child, what deep sleep is. When any person is 
known to be asleep, he is then in union with the Sat. He 
withdraws into his own cause. Therefore they say, lie 
sleeps, because he is absorbed into his own cause (i.e. into the 
Brahman}:' [Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. i.] relates to that 
very subject which is denoted by the word Sat. It 
declares that the individual soul, who is asleep and is in 
union with the Sat, has withdrawn (himself) into his 
own cause ; that is, that he has been absorbed into his own 
cause. And (the) dissolution (of a thing) is (its) absorption 
into (its) own cause. Moreover the non-intelligent pra- 
dhdna does not deserve to become the cause of the individual 
soul. The meaning of the scriptural statement " He with- 
draws into his own cause," \Chhdnd. Up. VI. 8. i.], is 
that the individual soul goes back only unto the Supreme 
Self. It is declared in the scriptural passage 351 relat- 
ing to the differentiation of names and forms that that 
Brahman Himself, who has the intelligent thing (or the 
individual soul) for His body and forms its Self, is denoted 
by the word jlva (which ordinarily means the individual 
soul). By means of the statement" He is then in union 
with the Sal; He withdraws into his own cause." [Chhcind. 

351. Vide (J.hdnd. U/>. VI 3. 2. 



340 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

Up. VI. 8. i.] it is taught that that Brahman who 
is denoted by the word jlva is free from (any) asso- 
ciation with names and forms at the time of deep 
sleep also, as (He is) at the time of universal dissolu- 
tion ; and (He) is hence to be denoted merely by the word 
Sat (or Existence). To the same effect it is stated in 
similar contexts (elsewhere) that, owing to his (/. e. the in- 
dividual self's) not being associated with names and forms, 
he is embraced by Him who is omniscient; and consequently 
it is said that, " When he is embraced by the omniscient 
Self, he does not know anything that is external nor any- 
thing that is internal." \_Bnh. Up. IV. 3. 21.]. Indeed, un- 
til final release takes place, the individual self is associated 
with names and forms ; and it is, therefore, that there is 
born (in him) the knowledge of objects other than him- 
self. At the time of deep sleep he certainly gives up 
names and forms, and is embraced by the Sat (i. e. by the 
Brahman] : and again, in the wakeful state, he becomes 
associated with names and forms and assumes (for himself) 
a particular name and a particular form. This is clearly 
stated in other scriptural passages, namely, " When he 
(/. e. the individual self) is asleep, he sees no dreams 
whatsoever; and he becomes one wholly with that Prdna 

(or Brahman] From that Self, 

the prdnas proceed each towards its (own,) place."- 
[Kaush. Up. IV. 19.]. To the same effect is the following 
scriptural passage also "Whatever these beings are here, 
(/. c. in the state of separation from their cause), whether a 

tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, 332 or a 

fly, or a mosquito, that they become again and again." 

' 352, The quotation here is not " or an insect or a moth." 
Tomplete, the portion omitted being 



Adhik. V. Sut. //.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 341 

\Qihand. Up. VI. 9. 2. & VI. 10. 2.]. And a similar 
scriptural text also says that the individual soul who is so 
in deep sleep " is embraced by the omniscient Self." \Brih. 
Up. IV. 3. 21.]. Therefore, He who is denoted by the 
word Sat (in the scriptural passage under discussion), 
is that Highest Person alone who is the Highest Brah- 
man, who is omniscient and is the Highest Lord. The 
Vrittikdra (Bodhayana) says the same thing thus : 
" In the scriptural text ' Then he is in union with 
the Sal.' this (viz. the fact that the Sat is the Brahman 
who is the cause of the world) is conclusively made out 
by means of (the creatures) withdrawing (into the Sal) 
and returning (from the Sat); and the scripture also says 
that ' He (the individual self) is embraced by the omnisci- 
ent Self.'" 

The pradhdna is not (what is denoted by the word 
Sat) for the following reason also : 

Sutra 11. Gatisamanyat. 

Because there has to be a similarity of import 
(between the passage under reference and the other 
passages relating to the cause of the creation, &c., of the 
world). 

Whatever is the import of the following among other 
passages relating to the creation of the world, namely, 
"The Self, indeed, this one only was in the beginning. No- 
thing else lived. 333 He thought 'May I create the 
worlds.' He created these worlds." [Ait. Up. I. i & 
2.]; " From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came 

353. Literally, winked or opened Us eyes. 



34 2 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 1. 

into existence, from the spatial ether the air (came into 
existence) ; from the air, the fire ; from the fire, the 
waters; and from the waters, the earth." \_Taitt. Up. 
II. i. i.] ; "That which is this Rigveda is the breath 
of Him, that is, of this Great Being." [Sub. Up. II.] a 54 
(whatever) is (their) signification, from the similarity 
(of import) with that, that is, from the sameness of meaning 
(which) this (passage under reference) is to have with 
that (signification) (it has to be inferred that the pra- 
dhdna is not the Sal). In all these (above passages) 
also, the Lord of all is made out to be the cause (of 
the world). Therefore here (/. c. in this passage) also it 
is definitely determined that the Lord of all is alone the 
cause (of the world). 

The pradhdna is not (what is denoted by the word 
Sat} for the following reason also : 

Sutra 12. Srutatva ^h^a. 

Because also it is revealed (in the very Upanishad in 
which the passage under discussion occurs, and in other 
Upanlshads, that the Supreme 5elf is the cause of the 
universe). 

Indeed, in this very Upanishad (viz. the Chhdndogya}, 
in the following passages, namely, " Entering in along 
with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, 
I evolve the differentiation of names and forms." \Qihdud, 
Up. VI. 3. 2.], " All these things which are born, my 
dear one, have their origin in the Sat (i. e. in the One 
Existence), have their abode in the Sat, and are established 
in the Sat." \Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 4 & 6.], "All this has 
this (Brahman} for its Self. That (Brahman} is Existence. 

354. Vide supra n. 251. 



Adhik. V. Sut. 12.] SRI-BHISHYA. 343 

He is the Self." [Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.], " Whatever there 
is here as existent and whatever there is as non-existent in 
relation to him, all that is contained in Him." [Qihdnd. 
Up. VIII. i. 3.], "In Him, all desires are contained." 
\Qihand. Up. VIII. i. 5.], " This Self is devoid of sin, is 
free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, 
free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth, 
and wills the truth."-- -\Chhand. Up. VIII.i. 5. & VIII. 
7. i & 3.] it is declared that that, which is denoted 
by the word Sat, is, in consequence of its possessing 
the same character as the Self, capable of causing the 
differentiation of names and forms and possesses (the qua- 
lity of) omniscience, (the quality of) omnipotence, the 
quality of being the support of all, the quality of being 
devoid of sin, &c., the quality of desiring the truth, and 
also the quality of willing the truth. To the same effect 
are the following and other scriptural passages found else- 
where also : " He has none as His lord and (none) as 
His ruler in the world ; and He has no characteristic body 
whatsoever. He is the cause and is the Lord of what is' 
the lord of the senses (/. e. of the jlva or the individual 
soul); He has no progenitor and no superior." [Svct. Up. 
VI. 9.]; "The omniscient Lord who creates all beings 
gives them names, and, calling them (by those names), He 
ever continues to be." \Taitt. Ar. III. 12. 7.]; "He, 
who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that 
are born, and is the Self of all." \Taitt. Ar. III. 24.]; 
" He is the Self of the whole universe and is the best 
refuge ; He is the Lord of the world, the Lord of the indi- 
vidual souls ; whatever thing there is in this world, either 
seen or heard, Narayana pervades all that within and 
without and so remains for ever". \M. Nar. XI. 3 5.]; 
" He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of all 



344 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the one Narayana.' 
[Sub. Up. VII. i.]. Therefore the scriptural passage 

which mentions the cause of the world is not capable of 
importing (as such) the pradhdna and other similar things. 
Consequently it is settled that that Narayana alone who 
is omniscient and omnipotent, who is the Lord of all 
lords, who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that 
is evil, who is the great ocean that receives the flood of 
all the collections of (all) the innumerable auspicious qua- 
lities which are unsurpassed in excellence, who is the 
Highest Person, He alone forms the one cause of the 
universe and is the Brahman that has to be enquired into. 
For the same reason it has to be understood that the 
contention, which maintains that the Brahman is pure in- 
telligence devoid of characterising attributes, has also been 
set at naught by the Sutrakara with the help of these 
(above quoted) scriptural passages ; because it is establish- 
ed (by him) that that Brahman, who is to be enquired 
into, is associated with the real attribute of 'seeing', &c., 
which forms the main and natural significance of the root 
iksh, (to 'see'). Indeed, according to the contention which 
maintains that that (which is the cause of the world) 
is devoid of characterising attributes, even the character of 
a witness (/. e: of one who 'sees') has to be unreal (as 
applied to that cause). That the Brahman, who is to be 
made out from the Vcdanta, has been enunciated to be 
the object of the enquiry (here), and that He is intelligent, 
are (both) declared by means of this aphorism among 
others ; namely, "Because the activity imported by the 
root zksh (to see i.e. to think] is predicated (in relation to 
what constitutes the cause of the world), that which is 
not revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the pradhana}, 
is not (the Sat or the Existence which is referred to in 



Adhik. V. SuL 12.] SRI-BHISHYA. 345 

the scriptural passage relating to that cause of the world)." 
Vcd. Sftt. I. i. 5.]. To possess the character of an intel- 
ligent being is known to.be the same as to possess the 
quality of intelligence. And accordingly that which is 
devoid of the attribute of 'seeing' (or thinking) has exact- 
ly the same nature as \hzpradhana. 

Moreover, according to the position which maintains 
that the Brahman is pure luminosity devoid of charac- 
terising attributes, it is difficult even to establish that He is 
(such) luminosity. Luminosity (or intelligence) is indeed 
known to be that particular thing which is capable of mak- 
ing itself and other things fit to be realised (by the mind). 
The thing which is devoid of attributes does not possess both 
these characteristics, and it certainly has in consequence 
the character of a non-intelligent thing like a pot or any 
other similar object. If it be said that, even though it does 
not possess both these characteristics, it is as good as if it 
had them, it is replied that it cannot be so. To be as good 
as if it had them is indeed nothing other than (for it) to be 
able to do what they are capable of doing. On admitting 
the possession (by the Brahman} of the quality correspond- 
ing to this capability, the position which maintains the 
attributelessness (of the Brahman) will indeed amount to 
have been given up. Again, if it be urged that, on the autho- 
rity of the scripture, this one particular characteristic 
quality (of capability) has to be admitted, then indeed, for 
that same reason, omniscience, omnipotence, the quality of 
being the Lord of all lords, the quality of being the abode 
of all auspicious attributes, the quality of being hostile to 
all that is evil, and all other similar qualities will have to 
be admitted. Again, to possess a capability is the same 
as to be able to produce a particular effect ; and that 
(possession of the capability) has to be definitely determined 

44 



346 SRf-BittSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

solely by means of (its) produced effect. When (such) a 
particular produced effect is incapable of being proved, 
then the possession of that capability, which has to be defi- 
nitely determined solely by means of that (effect), becomes 
also incapable of proof. 

Further, according to him who maintains (the Brah- 
man to be) an attributeless entity, it is impossible to prove 
(that the Brahman possesses) the-character of being a thing 
at all ; for, it has been already 335 pointed out that percep- 
tion, inference, revelation, and one's own experience deal 
with things which are possessed of attributes. 

Therefore, it is conclusively established that that 
Highest Person alone, who is capable of ' seeing ' and of 
willing to the effect 3 3 6 -'May I become manifold in the form 
of the world which is made up of wonderful intelligent 
and non-intelligent things', that (Highest Person alone) is 
He who has to be enquired into. 

ADHIKARAXA. VI. 

Anandamayddhikarana. 

It has thus been pointed out how the Brahman, who 
is to be enquired into, is distinct from the pradhdna which 
is (merely) an object to be enjoyed (or endured) by intelli- 
gent being* (/>. by individual souls), which is non-intelligent 
in its own nature, and which consists of the qualities of 
saliva (goodness), rajas (passion), and tamas (darkness). 
Now, it will be declared that the Brahman, who is hostile 
to all that is evil and who is unsurpassed bliss itself, is 
distinct (both) from the subjective self who is pure, and 

355. Vide supra pp. 54 to 60. Chhana Up. VI .2. 3. 

356. Vide Taitt. Up. II. 6. I. & 



Adhik. VI. SnL /j.] SRi-BHisHYA. 347 

also (from the subjective self) who is under the influence 
.pf&z/v/zaaud is (thus) impure, owing to his being immersed 
in the ocean of varied and endless miseries resulting from 
his association with the prakriti which is made up of the 
three qualities (of saliva, &c.). 

Sutra 13. Anandamayobhyasat. 

That which is denoted by the word Anandamaya (is 
the Brahman); because there is, (in the context), 3 8 Uhe 
repetition of various grades (of bliss which culminate in 
the Anandamaya or the Highest Bliss). 

Starting (the exposition of) the subject-matter of the 
context in the passage "This purusha a 38 is thus a 
modification of the essence of food ", \Taitt. Up. 
II. i. i.j, the Taittinyas recite "Different from this 
which consists of understanding (or knowledge) is the 
(still) inner Self, the Anandamaya (or That which con- 
sists of Bliss)." \Taitt_. Up. II. 5. i.]. Here the doubt 
arises whether this Anandamaya is the Highest Self, 
who is different from the individual self that is subject to 
bondage and release, and is generally denoted by the word 
jlva; or whether (the Anandamaya is) that (individual 
self) himself. It is perhaps thought right to hold 3 3 9 that 
it is the individual self. Why ? Because, in the passage 
" This itself is the embodied Self of that (which consists 
of understanding or knowledge)." [Taitl. Up. II. 5. i.] 
it is declared that the Anandamaya is associated with an 
embodiment. Indeed the embodied one is that individual 

357. The context here is Taitt.L'p\\. 359. The Purvafaks/iin or the ub- 

358. The word Purusha is here jector here is the Sdfitftya. 
intci^reted to mean the body. 



34$ SRi-feHisHYA. [Chap. /. Part. I. 

self who is in association with the bod}*. It may how- 

ever be said that the scripture has (here) the aim of show- 
ing what that happiness is which is enjoyed by the 
Brahman, who is declared to be ' the cause of the world; 
and that, (with that object in view), it refers in the 
beginning to what consists of food, &c.; and that, going 
on step by step, it finally teaches that that same cause 
of the world is what consists of Bliss. And that which 
is the cause of the world has been stated to be the 
omniscient Lord of all, because it is revealed in the scrip- 
tural sentence " It saw " [Qihdnd Up. VI. 2. 3.] 
that that (cause) is capable of the activity of ' seeing ' 
(/. e. of thinking). True, it has been (so) stated ; but that 
(cause of the world) is nothing other than \\\Q jiva (or 
the individual self); because, in the passages " Entering 
in along with this individual self which is (also) the same 
as Myself, &c."[&hdnd. Up. VI. 3. 2.]; "That thou 
art, O Svetaketu." [Chhdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.], that 
which is pointed out to be the cause of the world is 
seen to be grammatically equated with the individual 
self. A grammatical equation is indeed intended to 
give the teaching of oneness (about the things equated 
therein); as in the instance" This is that Deva- 
datta", and in other (such instances). And that act of 
creation which is invariably preceded by ' seeing ' (/. e. by 
thinking) is certainly appropriate to the intelligent indivi- 
dual self (also). Therefore, by means of the passage "-He 
who knows the Brahman attains the Highest." [Taitt. Up. 
II. i. i.], that essential nature of the individual self, which 
is (altogether) free from association with the non-intelli- 
gent thing (viz. matter), is taught to be the (final) 
object of attainment. The definition of that essential 
nature, which is free from association with the non- 



Adhik. VI. Sat. 13."] SRi- 



intelligent thing (matter), is said to be this, namely, " The 
Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." [Taitt. 
Up. II. i. i.]. Indeed final release is nothing other 
than the attainment of this nature (by the individual self); 
because " To him who is and has a body, there is 
no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing; the 
pleasing and the unpleasing touch not .him who is and has 
no body." \Qihdnd. Up. VIII. 12. i.]. Hence, that essen- 
tial nature of the individual self, which is free from igno- 
rance (or avidyd) and is referred to in the very beginning (of 
the context under reference), (that) is" taught to be the 
Anandamaya (or that which consists of bliss). According- 
ly, with a view to indicate the essential 'nature of the indi- 
vidual self, the body is, in accordance with the manner 
of pointing out the moon with the help of (an apparently 
contiguous) branch of a tree, first of all pointed out in the 
statement that the purusha is made up of food \Taitt. 
Up. H.i. i.]; and then the five-fold prana existing within 
that (body) and forming its support, then the mind existing 
even in the interior of that (prana} and then the intellect 
existing within that (mind), are all mentioned, each in its 
particular place, in an order helpful to ready apprehension, 
by means of the expressions (that the purusha is) 
prdnamaya for that which consists of prana), is manonmya 
(or that which consists of mind), and is vijildnamaya (or that 
which consists of understanding or knowledge); afterwards, 
the individual self which exists in the interior of all these 
things is taught in the passage" Different (from the vi- 
jndnamayd) is the inner self, the anandamaya'.' [Taitt. 
Up. II. 5. i.]; and then it (i.e. the context under reference) 
brings to a close the series leading to the internal self. 
Consequently, it is definitely determined that what is (here) 
taught is-^that the essential nature of the individual self 



350 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

itself is that Brahman which is referred to in the very 
beginning of the context in the passage " He who 
knows the Brahman attains (the Highest)." \_Taitt. Up. 
II. i. i.], and that that same (essential nature of the 
individual self) is the dnandamaya (or what consists of 
bliss). It may also be said 3C that, in accordance with 

the scriptural statement " The Brahman is the tail and 
the support." \_Taitt. Up. II. 5. i.],the Brahman is made 
out to be other than the Anandamaya (or that which consists 
of bliss). But it can not be so(made out). TheBrahman Him- 
self who is (here) conceived to have the form of an embodied 
person (or purushd) is, in harmony with His own peculiar 
nature, represented to be possessed of the head, the 
arm and the tail. Just as, in the scriptural statement 
beginning with "This is its head" [7a///. Up. II. i. i.], 
the body, which is a modification of food and is an organic 
whole made up of constituent parts, is described as possess- 
ing the-head, the arm and the tail which are (all) its own 
constituent parts and are not different from itself; so 
also, the Brahman too, who consists of bliss, is described by 
means of joy, &c., which are [not different from Him- 
self. It being so, on account of His being the seat of joy, 
pleasure, satisfaction and bliss, which are (all) described 
to be (His) constituent parts, the Anandamaya who is an 
indivisible whole is spoken of as "the Brahman who is the 
tail and the support." And if anything other than the Ananda- 
maya (or what consists of Bliss) had been the Brahman, 
then it would have also been described to the effect that 
" Different from this, indeed, which consists of Bliss, is the 
(still) inner Self, the Brahman." And it is not so described. 
.What is said is this: The Brahman, who is referred to in 

360. This objecti'oiv against the Sdhkhya proceeds from the A du -ailm* 



Adhik. VL Snt, /j.] SRI-BHISHYA. 351 

the very beginning (of the present context) in the passage 
" He who knows the Brahman attains the Highest ". 
[Taill. Up. II. i. i.], is by means of the definition given 
in the passage^ 01 " The Brahman is Existence, Know- 
ledge, Infinity " declared to possess such a nature as distin- 
guishes Him from all other things; and then that same 
Brahman is mentioned by the word Atman (or Self) 
in the passage " From that same Self, indeed, (the 
spatial ether came into existence)", \Taitt. Up. II. 
i. i.]; and then the scriptural passage, which explains 
self-hood to consist in being the innermost (essence) 
of all, gradually passes in review the pranamaya and 
other such things which, owing to each of them being more 
and more within, are, one after another, represented to be 
the self of those things which are denoted as the annamaya 
and so on ; and then (lastly) what is pointed out by the 
word Atman (or Self), in the scriptural statement "Differ- 
ent (from the vijnanamaya} is the inner Self, the Ananda- 
maya" \Taitt. Up. 11.5.1.], is made to have its final 
meaning in (denoting) the Anandamaya (or what consists 
of Bliss). Therefore, by means of (the use of) the word 
At man (or Self), it is definitely determined that the Brah- 
man who is referred to in the very beginning (of this 
context) is the Anandamaya (or what consists of Bliss) 
It may again be said as follows : After stating that 
"the Brahman is the tail and the support" \Taitt. Up. II. 
5. i.], it (viz. the context here) points out, by means of this 
(j/0fl)-"Whoever knows the Brahman as non-existent, he 
becomes non-existent indeed; whoever knows the Brah- 
man as existent, him, therefore, they know as existing." 
\Taitt. Up. II. 6. i.], that the existence and non-existence 

361. Tatti. Up. II. i. i. 



352 SRl-BniSHYA. [Chap. 7. Part. L 

of the self result (respectively) from the knowledge and the 
ignorance relating to the Brahman, but not from the 
knowledge and the ignorance relating to the dnandamava 
(or what consists of bliss). Further it is not appropriate 
to have any doubt in relation to the knowledge of the exist- 
ence and non-existence of such an dnandamava as is 
known all the world over to consist of joy, pleasure, &c. 
Therefore this sloka (mentioned above) is not given in re- 
ference to the Anandamaya (or what consists of Bliss). 
Accordingly the Brahman is other than the Anandama- 
ya (or what consists of bliss). But it is not (right to 
say) so. Just as, after making the statements " This is 
the tail and the support." [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], "The 
earth is the tail and the support." [Taitt. Up. II. 2. i.], 
"The Atharudngirascs (or the hymns revealed by the Athar- 
vas and Angirases) are the tail and the support." [Taitt. 
Up. II. 3. i.], "The ma has (or splendour) is the tail and 
the support.". [Taitt. Up. II. 4. i.], the slokas commenc- 
ing with-" All the creatures are produced from food (anna}" 
[Taitt. Up. II. 2. i.], are all given in their respective 
contexts so as not to denote merely the tail, but so as 
to denote the (whole) body which is made up of food, &c.; so 
also, here too, this sloka which says " He becomes non- 
existent indeed, &c." relates to the Anandamaya, but does 
not relate to the tail which is different from the Ananda- 
maya. Even when the Anandamaya is itself taken to be 
the Brahman, it is certainly appropriate to have the doubt 
regarding the existence and non-existence of that bliss 
which is (in itself) undefinable but is (merely) described as 
consisting of joy, pleasure, &c. The unknowability of that 
Brahman also who is spoken of as the tail is altogether 
due to (His) consisting of undefinable bliss. If it be 
said that the Anandamaya is not the Brahman, because 



Adhik. VI. Sut. 73.] SRI-BHISHYA. 353 

the Brahman does not possess the head and other such 
constituent parts; it is replied that the tail also cannot 
be the Brahman, because the Brahman does not 
possess the nature of being a tail, and (does not also 
possess) the nature of being a support. It may (here) 
be said, however, that the expression 'the tail and the 
support ' is a merely indicatory description of the Brah- 
man, in as much as He forms the basis of that thing which 
is illusorily caused by ignorance (or avidya). Then, 
indeed, to possess joy as the head, and other things as 
other parts (of the body) will (also) form an indicatory 
description of that Brahman who is different from pain and 
consists of bliss. The result is this : In the passage "The 
Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." \_Taitt. Up. 
II. i. i.], He is declared to be different from all things 
which are other than Himself, which are subject to modi- 
fication, and which are non-intelligent and definable ; and 
the statement that He is Anandamaya teaches that He is 
different (also) from pain. And for this reason the affix 
mavat found in (the word) Anandamaya, which relates to 
the Brahman who is indivisible and wholly consists of 
uniform bliss, has to be understood to denote the same thing 
as the word to which it is affixed (viz. the word Ananda), in 
the same way in which (that affix has to be understood) in 
the word prdnamaya. The individual self, who is differen- 
tiated into the varied and wonderful divisions manufactured 
by ignorance (or avidya) and consisting of gods and other 
such (embodied) beings, has such an essential nature as is 
indivisible and homogeneous and forms the only seat of 
pleasure ; and he is accordingly called Anandamaya (or 
that which consists of bliss). Consequently this Ananda- 
may a is the subjective self. 

45 



354 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

If it be so argued, we say in reply "That which 
is denoted by the word Anandamaya (is the Brahman], be- 
cause there is, (in the context), the repetition (of various 
grades of bliss which culminate in the Anandamaya or the 
Highest Bliss)." [Vcd. Silt. I. i. 13.]. The Anandamaya 
(or That which consists of Bliss) is the Highest Self. 
Why ? Because there is a (graded) repetition (of bliss). 
In the passage beginning with " Now this is an in- 
vestigation into bliss." [Taitt. Up. II. 8. i.] and ending 
with '' From Whom speech 'returns, &c. " [Taitt. Up. 
II. 9. i.], bliss is continuously repeated, in an order in 
which each succeeding (bliss) is a hundredfold of the bliss 
(preceding it), so as to reach that (bliss) which forms the 
summit of an unsurpassable condition. This (last bliss) 
is not possible to the individual self who is capable of en- 
joying (only) a small and limited amount of pleasure which 
is mixed with endless miseries; and it (viz. this bliss), in 
consequence, denotes, as forming its abode, the Highest 
Self Himself who is hostile to all that is evil, who is 
the only seat of all auspicious qualities and is quite distinct 
from all other things (than Himself). Accordingly, the 
following passage says "Different from this which consists 
of understanding (or the vijAdnamaya) is the (still) inner Self, 
the Anandamaya (or That which consists of Bliss)." 
[Taitt. Up. II. 5. i.]. The vijttanamaya (or that which 
consists of understanding or knowledge) is, indeed, the 
individual self, and not merely the intellect ; because, by 
means of the affix may at, a distinction is implied (between 
vijilana and vijnanamaya}. But, in the case of the word 
prdnamaya, it is accepted as a matter of necessity that that 
(affix mayat) imports the same thing (as the word prdna to 
which it is affixed). Here (in vijflanamayd) however, in 
as much as it is possible for the individual self to possess 



Adhik. VI. Silt, /j.] SRi-BHiSHYA. 355 

it (/. c. v/jflana, or understanding), it is not right to 
make that (affix mayaf) meaningless. We have al- 
ready mentioned that the individual self, in the bound and 
released conditions, is nothing other than the knower. And 
it will be stated presently 362 how, in the case of the (word) 
prdttamaya and others, the affix may at is capable of being 
(fully) significant. It may be asked, how, if such be 
the case, the use of the word vijflana itself (to denote the 
individual self) is appropriate in the sloka which, beginning 
with "The vijiiana performs the sacrifice." [ Taitt. Up. II. 
5. i.], relates to the vijft&namaya (or that which consists 
of understanding). It is nothing wrong to speak ofvijfidna 
(or understanding) as constituting the essential nature of the 
individual self who is none other than the knower; because 
he possesses self-luminosity, and because also the essential 
nature of the knower (too) has to be described only by 
means of (his) knowledge. Indeed those words, which denote 
such attributes as are descriptive of the essential nature of 
things, import, by means of ;(those same) attributes, the 
essential nature also of that thing which is the possessor of 
those attributes ; like ox and other words (which by means 
of the general attributes they denote import also the essen- 
tial nature of the thing to which they belong). Or, in 
accordance with the (grammatical) aphorism " The kntya 
affix 3C3 lyut has more than one significance." \_Pdnini. 
III. 3. 1 1 3.], it has to be accepted that, (in the case of the root 
jtta, to know, associated with the suffix vi), the affix lyut 
denotes the agent. Or, accepting that it (viz. the root jtia 
to know) belongs to the group of roots commencing 
with nand (to please), the affix lyur has to be understood, 

362, See under aphorism 14 infrt. And} may denote the agent or the 

363. The Rntya affix Lyut (i. e. object or impersonal activity, 



356 SRi-BmsHYA. \_Lhap. I. Part. /. 

(in the case of the root jna to know), to denote the agent, 
in accordance with the (grammatical) aphorism, which begins 
with (the group of roots commencing with) nand, (to 
please), and (the group of roots commencing with) grah, (to 
seize), and which prescribes (the affixes) lynr, &c., (to those 
respective groups of roots). \_Panini. III. i. 134.]. 3C4 
And it is for this very reason that it is declared in the 
scriptural passage "The vijfiana performs the sacrifice, 
and it also performs the karmas" \Taitt. Up. II. 5. i.], 
that the vijflana possesses the quality of being the agent in 
performing sacrifices, &c. Indeed it is not possible for the 
mere intellect to possess the quality of -being an agent. 
As a matter of fact, in relation to what is made up of 
food (/. c. the annamaya]y as also in relation to other 
(similar) things which are all non-intelligent, which are 
all serviceable to intelligent beings, and which are all 
mentioned before the vijilanamaya (is mentioned in the 
context), there is no declaration of that quality of agent- 
ship which forms (exclusively) the attribute of intelligent 
beings. For the same reason, the scriptural passage 
"(He /. c. the Supreme Person became) the intelligent 
thing and the non-intelligent thing." [Tailt. Up. II. 6. i.] 
separately points out the intelligent thing (or the in- 
dividual self) and the non-intelligent thing (or matter) 
by means of their characteristic peculiarities of having a 
home and of being homeless (respectively); and accord- 
ingly this (passage) indicates by means of the word 

364. That is to say, the affix applied to the group of roots begin- 

Lynr is to be applied to the group of ning with Pack to cook. By the ap- 

roots beginning with Nand to please; plication' of these several affixes 

the affix nttti is to be applied to the nouns signifying agents are derived 

group of roots beginning with Grali from these several roots. 
U> seize; and the affix AcJi is to be 



Adhik. Vl. Silt. /j.] SRI-BHISHYA. 



(i. c. knowledge or understanding) the intelligent 
being who possesses that (vijHdnd) as his characteristic 
quality. Accordingly, in the Brahmana 363 which relates 
to Him who is the Internal Ruler of all, the Madh- 
yandinas who mention the alternative passage which 
is to the effect "He who, dwelling in the self, &c." 
-\Mddh. Brih. Up. III. 7. 22.], in the place of that 
passage which is stated in other words, in the recension of 
the Kanvas to the effect " He who, dwelling in know- 
ledge (or understanding), &c." \Kan. Brih. Up. III. 7. 
22.], make it clear that what is denoted by the word 
vijndna (or understanding), as contained in the recension of 
the Kanvas, is (nothing other than) the individual self. 
The neuter gender used in the case of the word vijfiana 
denotes that it is intended to point it out as a thing. 
Therefore the Anandamaya (or That which consists of Bliss) 
is accordingly different from the individual self consisting 
of intelligence, and is the Highest Self who exists within 
that (individual self). Although, in the sloka "The 

vijfidna performs the sacrifice, &c." \Taitt. Up. II. 5. i.], 
mere knowledge alone is mentioned but not the knower ; 
nevertheless, by means of the statement " Different (from 
the manomaya) is this inner self, the vijftdnamaya (or -that 
which consists of knowledge)." {Taitt. Up. 11.4.1.], it 
is the knower himself who possesses that (vijndna or 
knowledge) that is taught (to be the individual self). For 
example, although merely the food is mentioned, in the 
following sloka, namely, "All creatures are produced from 
food, &c." {Taitt. Up. II. 2. i.]; nevertheless, in this (other) 
passage, namely, "This same embodied person (purusha) 

365, This is the seventh Bra/i- "Bnhadaninyaka-Upanisliad. 
of the third chapter of the 



35 8 SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

is thus what is made up of the essence of food." [Taitt. 
Up. II. i. i.], it is not merely the 'food that is pointed 
out; but, on the other hand, (what is pointed out) is 
that which is made up of that (food), -that is, what is a 
modification thereof. Bearing all this in mind, the Siitra- 
kdra himself says (almost) immediately afterwards, (that 
the Anandamaya is different from the individual self) 
" Because (also), there is, (in the context), the declaration 
of difference (between the individual self and the Brah- 
mati)." [Ved. Snt. I. 1.18.]. 

It has been stated (by the Ptirvapakskiri) to the effect 
that what forms the cause of the world is also none other 
than what possesses the essential nature of -the individual 
self, on the ground that He who is mentioned to be the 
cause of the world is (again) pointed out by being gramma- 
tically equated with the individual self in the scriptural 
passages " Entering along with this individual self which 
is (also) the same as Myself, &c." \Qthdnd. Up. VI. 3. 2.], 
and "That thou art'{Qi/iand. Up. VI. 8. 7.]; and (it 
has also been stated) that, bearing this in mind, that 
essential nature of the individual self itself, which, at 
starting, is referred to in the passage " He who knows 
the Brahman attains the Highest." [Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1.], 
is taught to be the Anandamaya (or that which consists 
of bliss) owing to its being distinct from pain. This 
is not right ; because, although the individual self 
possesses the nature of an intelligent being, it is not possi- 
ble for it to be associated with that varied and wonderful 
act of creation which is invariably preceded by his own 
volition fas forming the cause thereof), in accordance with 
the passage " It thought 'May I become manifold 
and be born'; It created tefas." \Qhhdnd. Up. VI. 2.3.]. 
Under the aphorisms " Except in the matter of the activ- 



Adhik. VI. Sut. /j.] SRI-BHASHYA. 359 

ity relating to (the creation, &c., of) the world " [ Ved. 
Sut. IV. 4. 17.], and " And on account of the character- 
istic of equality (between the individual self and the 
Supreme Self) being solely confined to (the item of) enjoy- 
ment" [Ved. Sut. IV. 4. 2i.], it will be established that, 
even when he (the individual .self) is in the pure and free 
condition (of release), he cannot have the activity relating 
to (the creation, &c., of) the world. If it be asked, how, 
when the Brahman who is the cause of the world, is not 
admitted to possess the same essential nature as the indi- 
vidual self, the grammatical equation in the statements 
"(Entering along) with this individual self which is (also) 
the same as Myself" \Qhhand. Up. VI. 3. 2.], and 
"That thou art." \_Qihand. Up.VI.\S. 7.], would be 
appropriate ; it is asked in reply, how the Brahman 
who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that is evil, 
who wills the truth, who is omniscient and omnipotent, 
who possesses the whole collection of innumerable auspi- 
cious qualities unsurpassed in excellence, and who is the 
cause of all things, can acquire that essential nature of the 
individual self which is full of thinking and blinking, and 
(full) of all other similar activities resulting from the karma 
which is the abode of endless and varied miseries. If it be 
said that it (viz. the grammatical equation) becomes appro- 
priate when either of the two (equated things) is taken to be 
false, it is asked Pray, to which (does that falsity belong)? 
Does it belong to that (individual self) which is associated 
with evil, or to that (Supreme Self) the essential nature 
whereof is hostile to evil and forms the only abode of all 
auspicious qualities ? If it be said that the Brahman, who is 
hostile to evil and forms the only abode of auspicious qua- 
lities, constitutes the basis of the beginningless ignorance 
(or avidytf), and thus appears falsely to be associated with 



360 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

evil, and that this (apparent association with evil) is false 
in nature; then it amounts to making a self-contradictory 
statement to the effect that the Brahman is hostile to evil 
and forms the only abode of auspicious 'qualities, and be- 
comes, (at the same time), owing to His iforming the basis 
of the beginningless ignorance (or avidya) the abode of 
such false appearances as give rise to endless miseries. 
Indeed to be associated with evil is nothing other than 
to be the basis of ignorance (or avidya), and to be also the 
abode of such false appearances as lead to the miseries 
resulting from that (avidya] . To be associated with them 
(viz. with avidya or ignorance and its effects) and to be 
hostile to them are certainly contradictory of each other. 
In spite of this being so, do not say that there is no contra- 
diction, for the reason .that that (association with avidya 
or ignorance and its results) is of a false nature. Whatever 
is of a false nature, that certainly constitutes a wrong aim 
of life ; and you yourself say that (the study of) the whole 
of the Vedanta is commenced for the destruction of that 
(wrong aim). And the association, with such a wrong aim 
of life as deserves to be set at naught, is undoubtedly 
contradicted by that nature (of the Brahman) which is hostile 
to evil and forms the only abode of (all) auspicious qualities. 
It may be said What shall we do? The proposition that, by 
knowing one thing, all things become known has been en- 
unciated in the passage "(Did you ask for that teaching) 
by which what is 'not heard becomes heard ?" [Chhand. 
Up. VI. i. 3.]; and then, in the passage beginning with 
"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning" 
\Qihand. Up. VI. 2. i .] , it has been declared that the Brah- 
man is the only cause of all the worlds ; and in the passage 
"It thought ' May I become manifold ?" \Cfrliand . 
Up. VI. 2. 3.], (it has been declared) that He possesses 



Adhik. VI. Silt, ij.] SRI-BHASHYA. 361 

the quality of willing the truth ; and afterwards, by means 
of the grammatical equation, contained in the passage 
" That thou art" [Ctotf. Up. VI. 8. 7], it has been pre- 
dicated in relation to that same Brahman that ' That ' is 
one with the individual self who is the abode of endless mise- 
ries : and now, because this (oneness) is incapable of being 
otherwise explained, it has to be assumed that the Brah- 
man Himself is the basis of ignorance (or avidya) and of 
other such things. If it be so said, it is replied that what 
is inappropriate and opposed to reason should not be assum- 
ed even for the purpose of making the scripture appro- 
priate. Then again it may be said that (His) association 
with evil is indeed a reality, but (His) possessing the char- 
acter of being the only abode of (all) auspicious qualities 
is of the nature of an unreality. Then this sastra, which 
has been promulgated with the object of saving such intel- 
ligent beings (or individual souls) as are tormented by the 
three 366 miseries, saves them well enough indeed by 
teaching them that, in relation to Him (viz. the Brahman], 
the torment of the three miseries is alone real while (His) 
character of pure and unmixed auspiciousness is super- 
imposed by illusion ! ! And again with the desire of 
avoiding this erroneous conclusion it may be said, re- 
garding the Brahman, that His possessing the character 
of the individual self and of one who is misery-stricken, 
&c., which are all different from His essential nature of 
pure and attributeless Intelligence, must be assumed to be 
false ; and that similarly His possessing the quality of 
willing the truth, His being the abode of auspicious qua- 
lities, His being the cause of the world, and His other such 
qualities also (have all to be assumed to be false). If you 

366. Vide supra n. 12. 
46 



362 SRI-BHA.SHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

say so, how wonderful must be your skill in thinking out 
the meanings of sentences ! The proposition that, by 
knowing one thing, all tilings become known, cannot at all 
hold good, when all things are taken to be unreal, in 
as much as all the things that have to be known will then 
be non-existent. If, in the way in which the knowledge 
in relation to the one thing is real, the knowledge relating 
to all things also is equally real and is included in that 
(knowledge relating to that one thing), then indeed, it is 
possible to say that, by knowing that (one thing), all 
things become known. As a matter of fact, by knowing 
the really existent mother-of-pearl, the silver that is super- 
imposed upon that (mother-of-pearl) and is unreal does 
not become known. It may be again said that the mean- 
ing of the proposition that, by knowing one thing, all 
things become known is this : that thing which is attri- 
buteless is alone real and all else is unreal. Then 
surely it would not have been declared in the scripture 
thus : " (Did you ask for that teaching) by which what 
is not heard becomes heard, what is not thought be- 
comes thought, what is not known becomes known ?"3?7 
\Qjhand. Up. VI. i. 3.]. The meaning of this passage 
is indeed this : when that one thing is heard, all that 
which was unheard becomes also heard. If the real ex- 
istence of that one thing alone, which is attributeless 
and is defined to be the cause of the world, had been en- 
unciated in the proposition, then the illustrative example 
given to the effect "Just as, my dear child, by one 
lump of clay, all that is made of clay becomes known "- 
(Qhhand. Up. VI. 1.4.), would also have been found to 

367. But it would have been de- are (taught) to be of a false nature, 
clared to the effect " Did you ask or by which all things become stul- 
for that teaching by which all things tifiecl." 



Adhik. VI. Snt. ij.] SRI-BF.A.SHYA. 363 

be inappropriate. Indeed what is illustrated (here) is 
that, by knowing the lump of clay, all the modifications of 
that (clay) become known. It may be said that here (z. e. 
in this illustration) the unreality of the modifications is 
also implied. But then the unreality of these modi- 
fications of clay could not have been such a conclusive- 
ly proved thing to the pupil* 88 (Svetaketu), as the 
(illusorily perceived) snake in the rope and other (such 
falsely perceived) objects (would have been). According- 
ly, to illustrate the import of the proposition enunciated, 
it could not have been -appropriate to introduce,as if they 
had been well known, the examples beginning with 
"Just as, my dear child, &c." \Qtliand. Up. VI. 1.4. 

5 & 6.J.369 

Moreover it cannot be said that, previous to the gene- 
sis of the knowledge produced by the scriptural passage 
"That thou art." [G&terf. Up. VI. 8. 7.] and by other 
similar passages, we have any such criterion of truth, either 
with or without the support of logic, as gives rise to the know- 
ledge of that unreality which is associated with all modifica- 
tions. This subject will be dealt with under the aphorism 
" (The world) is not different from that (Brahman), be- 
cause (it is so made out) from the (group of) passages having 
the word 'beginning' at their commencement." [ Vcd. Sut. 
II. i. 15.]. Accordingly there are the following and other 
similar passages: "Existence alone, my dear child, this was 

368. Literally, one who is desirous all that is made of gold is known ; 
of ' hearing ' i. e. of learning. and just as, by knowing one pair of 

369. These are three illustrations (iron) nail-scissors, all that is made 
given in Chhand. Up.Vl. I. 4 .5 & 6,, of iron is known : exactly similarly' 
and are to the following effect : Just by knowing the One Existence- 
as, by knowing one lump of clay, all namely, the Bra'unan, all that is 
that is made of clay is known ; just evolved out of Him becomes knowi). 
as, by knowing one nugget of gold. 



364 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

in the beginning, one only, without a second." \Qihdnd. 
Up. VI 2. i.]; "It thought 'May I become manifold 
and be born.' It created tej'as." [Qfihand. Up. VI. 2. 
3.]; " Indeed, entering these three deities along with 
this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I 
evolve the differentiations of name and form." [Qlihdnd. 
Up. VI. 3. 2.]; " All these things which are born, my dear 
one, have their origin in the Sat (i. e. in the One Existence), 
have their abode in the Sat, and are established in the Sat." 
-{Qlihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 4 & 6.]; " All this has That for its 
Self." \CIihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.]. And by means of these, 
innumerable characteristic attributes (in relation to the 
Brahman}, such as are capable of being made out solely 
by means of the sdstras, are predicated ; and (those predi- 
cations) are the following and others : This world has the 
Sat (or the Brahman] for its Self ; before the time of crea- 
tion it is destitute of the differentiation of names and forms; 
in the matter of creating the world the Brahman, who 
is denoted by the word Sat (or Existence}, does not stand 
in need of any cause other than Himself ; He is at the 
time of creation possessed of that characteristic volition 
which is peculiar to none other than Himself and is to the 
effect " I will myself become manifold in the form of 
endless immovable and movable things" ; in accordance 
with His volition, creation is characterised by a peculiarly 
well defined arrangement of endless and wonderful entities; 
the differentiation of endless names and forms results from 
the entrance of the individual self, which has (the Brah- 
man] Himself for its Self, into all the non-intelligent 
things ; and all things other than (the Brahman] Himself 
have Himself for their basis, have Himself for their abode, 
are capable of activity through Himself, live by none other 
than Himself, and are established in Himself, In other con- 



Adhik. VI. Sut. 7j.] SRI-BHASHYA. 365 

texts also such qualities as are all incapable of being made 
out by all other means of proof (than the sastras) are in a 
thousand ways declared to be found in association with 
Him ; and they are, among others, the quality of being de- 
void of all that is evil so as to be wholly free from sin and of 
such other evil things, the quality of omniscience, the quali- 
ty of being the Lord of all, the quality of desiring the truth 
and the quality of willing the truth, the quality of possess- 
ing that unsurpassed bliss which forms the cause of the bliss 
that belongs to all (others). (In the passage ' That thou 
art '), the word 'That' points out the Brahman, who forms 
the subject of the context and is characterised by endless 
attributes, which are (all), in this manner, not within the 
province of any other means of proof (than the scripture) ; 
and to say that that (word) is intended to teach only that 
thing which is devoid of attributes is to talk incoherently 
like a mad man ; because it is (so very) inappropriate (to 
say so). And the word ' thou ' denotes the individual self 
who is associated with the condition of being in samsdra 
(or the circuit of mundane existence). If this (word) also 
be intended to denote that (thing) the essential nature of 
which is free from all attributes, then its own real significa- 
tion would have to be given up. Moreover it has been 
already 369 pointed out that concealment by ignorance (or 
avidya) is indeed not possible in relation to that thing 
which is, by nature, attributeless and luminous ; the 
reason is that, (if it were possible), it would lead to the 
destruction of the essential nature (of that thing) itself and 
to other such (inconsistencies). Again in such a case, in re- 
gard to both the words ' That ' and ' thou ' which are found 
in the grammatical equation (' That thou art)', their main 

370. Vide supra p. 161. 



SRi-BHlSHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. L 

and natural significance has to be given up, and in conse- 
quence a figurative significance (in relation to both of 
them) has necessarily to be accepted. 

Further, it may be said thus : The (words) which are 
found in a grammatical equation are not at all capable of 
importing (any) thing which has the character of a special 
attribute, because they are all intended to denote only 
one thing. And solely from this there results the negation 
of attributes which gives rise to the denotation of the one- 
ness of the thing itself. Therefore there is no room for 
any figurative interpretation (here). For example, in the 
instance " The lily is blue" the two words ( blue and 
lily) are intended to point out the oneness of that thing 
which is characterised (by what they denote); and there- 
fore the quality of being a lily and (the quality) of being 
blue are not both meant to be spoken of (here). If they 
were (so) meant to be spoken of, then, indeed, there would 
result the denotation of the oneness of that form which is 
characterised by the quality of being a lily, with that 
(other) form which is characterised by the quality of being 
blue. But this cannot be. Indeed that (one) thing (which 
is imported by the grammatical equation) is not character- 
ised by (what is signified by) the word lily, which is (it- 
self) in the form of what is characterised by blueness ; be- 
cause there would (otherwise) be room for the rela- 
tion of reciprocal inherence 3 7 J between a class and a quality. 
Therefore what is denoted by the grammatical equation 
(here) is merely the oneness of that thing which is (at 
once) characterised by the quality of being blue and the 
quality of being a lily. For example, in the instance, 

371. The class would have to be fart, it is the quality that is inhcr- 
inherent in the quality and the qua- cut in the class, 
lity in the clasa. As a matter ol 



Adhih. VI. Sut. /j.] SRf-BHlSHYA. 367 

1 This is that Devadatta' it is not possible for the gramma- 
tical equation to denote that a person, who was in associa- 
tion with a past time and a far off place, is existing in that 
very same condition in association with a near place 
and the present time ; accordingly, what is denoted by the 
grammatical equation (here) is merely the oneness of that 
essential nature (of the person) which is characterised by 
(its) association with both (those) times and both (those) 
places. Although that quality, which is made out at the 
time of hearing a single word such as ' blue ' or any other, 
is not, on account of contradiction, denoted (by that 
word) at the time when it is grammatically equated (with 
any other word or words); nevertheless, as it denotes a 
main part of the thing which is intended to be denoted (by 
the grammatical equation), there is no figurative signifi- 
cance (in relation to it). On the other hand there is 
merely a desire not to mention (any) thing which constitu- 
tes a quality (of that one thing which forms the import of 
the equation). This indeed is the nature of a gramma- 
tical equation in all cases. Therefore there is nothing 
wrong (here). 

This aforesaid (argument) is of no value. Indeed in 
all sentences what is to be understood is merely those 
particular relations which are found between the things 
imported by the words (in those sentences), and which 
have arisen in accordance with the proper process of mak- 
ing out the meanings of words. Even when they are used 
in a grammatical equation, words like ' blue ', &c., denote 
the thing which is characterised by blueness, &c., as estab- 
lished in accordance with the proper process of making 
out the meanings of words ; and (they denote that thing) 
in its relation with the (other) things denoted by the 
Other words (therein). For instance, when it is saicl 



368 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

1 Bring the blue lily/ what is brought is a thing which 
is characterised by blueness, &c. Again, when it is said 
" A herd of elephants, which is excited with ruttishness 
(madamudita], exists in the Vindhya forest (or Vindh. 
yatavi)" what is pointed out is only that thing which 
is characterised by the attributes denoted by the two 
words (madamudita and Vindhyatavi). In the same man- 
ner, in Ved antic passages also wherein grammatical equa- 
tions are mentioned, what is to be understood is that 
Brahman who is undoubtedly characterised by all (those) 
particular attributes (which are denoted by the various 
words in those grammatical equations). Moreover, 

when it is desired to mention an attribute (as qualifying 
a thing), it is not that a thing, which has a form already 
characterised by some attributes, is (again) to be character- 
ised by some (other) attributes ; but, on the other hand, 
the essential nature (of that one thing itself) is to be 
characterised by all the attributes. Accordingly "A 
grammatical equation (between words) means that words 
having a variety of significations are used so as to 
import only one thing." 372 The function of a gram- 
matical equation is to predicate, (in relation to a thing), 
either affirmatively or negatively, by means of certain 
words that that same thing which has already a particular 
form denoted by some words is also possessed of a cer- 
tain other form : as, in the instance " Devadatta is 
brown, youthful, and red-eyed, without mental weakness, 
without money, and without fault." And where, by 
the words of a grammatical equation, any two attributes 
are mentioned which are not capable of being consistently 
applied to one and the same thing, even there it has 

372. Vide supra n. 75. 



Adhik. VI. Sut. 13.] SRl-BHlSHYA, 369 

necessarily to be accepted that (only) one of the two 
words (signifying those attributes) can not have its main 
and natural significance, but not both of them ; as in the 
instance, " The man of the Valilka country is a go 373 
(or a brute)." In the instance 'The lily is blue' and 
in others like it, there is no contradiction of the co-exist- 
ence of two attributes (in one and the same thing,); and 
hence what is denoted (there) is only one thing as charac- 
terised by two attributes. 

Again you may hold as follows: --What is pointed out 
as being correlated to (any) one particular attribute is 
distinct in nature from what is correlated to some other 
attribute. Accordingly, even though (the words in a gram- 
matical equation) are found in the same grammatical case, 
it is not (thereby) possible for them to import oneness (in 
regard to the thing they denote), as (it is not possible) in 
the case, for instance, of (the words) pot and doth. There- 
fore (the words in a grammatical equation) are not capable 
of denoting (only) one thing as characterised by many 
attributes. On the other hand, it is the essential nature 
(of a certain thing) that is first explained by means of the 
attributes (denoted by the words in the grammatical equa- 
tion); and it is subsequently (to this) that they (viz. those 
words) become capable of denoting the oneness of that 
(thing). 

It may be so, provided (only) that the mere correla- 
tion (of a thing) to two attributes is opposed to the one- 
ness, (of that thing). This, however, is not seen to be the 
case. Indeed, what stands in the way of the oneness (of 

373. The original here is Ganr- What is to be noted in this illustru- 

vahikah, and the word Vdhlka is also lion is that the word go iinsteacl of 

interpreted to mean the person who meaning an ox as usual means a 

is outside the pale of Vedic religion. senseless brute. 

47 



370 SRI-BHA.SHYA. {Chap. 1. Part. I. 

a thing) is only the association (of that thing) with two such 
attributes, as are not capable of meeting together in one 
and the same thing that is to be characterised by (those) 
attributes. And (such) incapability (of meeting together 
in one and the same thing) is, in the case of the character- 
istics of the pot and those of the cloth, established by 
other means of proof. But, in the instance ' The lily is 
blue ' and in others like it, no such contradiction is per- 
ceived ; in the same way in which no contradiction is 
perceived in the case where the attribute of owning a stick 
and the attribute of wearing an ear-ring (are both found in 
association with one and the same person), and also in the 
case where the attribute of having a form, the attribute of 
having a taste, the attribute of possessing a smell, c., 
(are found in association with one and the same thing). It 
is not merely that there is no (such) contradiction whatso- 
ever : but the association (of a thing) with two attributes 
(denoted by two words in a grammatical equation) certain- 
ly proves (also) that a grammatical equation has the power 
of importing a single thing through the difference in the 
significations (of the words used therein). Otherwise, 
there would be no reason to use more than one word to 
indicate merely the oneness of the essential nature (of a 
thing); and thus there would be no grammatical equation 
at all. If, irrespective of their own relation (to themselves 
and to the thing they qualify), the attributes (denoted by 
the words in a grammatical equation) be taken to denote 
only the accidental characteristic of the essential nature 
(of that thing), then, that thing would be sufficiently well 
marked out by only one (such accidental attribute); and, 
in consequence, all other accidental attributes would cer- 
tainly become meaningless. If another form, characterised 
by (these) other accidental attributes, be admitted (in rela- 



Adhik. VI. SuL. 7j.] SRI-BHISHYA. 371 

tion to the essential nature of that thing), then, there 
would be room for saying that it (/. c. that essential nature) 
is a qualified thing. Again in the instance ' This is that 
Devadatta', there is not even the slightest room for (any) 
figurative (or secondary) interpretation ; because there is 
no contradiction (to be thereby got over), in as much as 
that thing, which at a past time was in association with a 
particular far off place, may, without any contradiction, 
exist at the present time in association with a near place. 
Indeed it is by means of this very reason that those who 
maintain 374 the perdurability of external objects prove 
through the recognitive cognition ' This is that person', 
that a thing which has been in association with two differ- 
ent periods (or points) of time is (really) one and the same. 
Otherwise, there would be a contradiction between the 
(same) perceptions (belonging to different times), and all 
things would in consequence acquire the character of be- 
ing transient in existence. And the contradiction result- 
ing from the association (of one and the same thing) with 
t\yo different places is, however, invalidated by the differ- 
ence in time. 

For whatever reason the words used in a grammatical 
equation possess the power of denoting a single thing 
which is characterised by many attributes, for that very 
same- reason, the exchange (in return for the so ma) of the 
heifer, which is one year old and is characterised by 
redness, &c., is enjoined as the thing that has to be done 
under the commandment "With the red, tawney-eyed hei- 
fer, one year old, let him purchase the soma plant." [Taitt. 
Samh. VI. i. 6. 7.]. And it is accordingly stated thus: 

3/4. As against the Saugalas or external things are transitory, 
IkiddhibU who maintain that all 



372 Ski-BHlsHYA. [Chap. L Part. I. 

"Because the substance (heifer) and the quality (redness) 
are associated with one and the same action (of buying in 
the above passage), there is the binding rule that they shall 
together denote one and the same thing." [Pfir. Mlm. Ill 
i. 12.]. The pfirvapaksJiin (or the objector) here is of 

the following opinion: No doubt, the word 'red' denotes 
the quality of redness which is contained in substances, for 
the reason that quality also, like genus (or jdli) possesses 
the singular character of being a mode of substances. 
Nevertheless, in relation to the redness (here), there is no 
rule compelling its invariable association with the one year 
old heifer; because it is not possible, (in one commandment), 
to enjoin two things to the effect " Let him purchase 
' with the one year old heifer, and let that (purchase) be 
made in exchange for a red one." And for this reason, the 
sentence is to be broken up where the word arunayd (i. c. 
red] occurs, so as surely to denote without distinction that 
redness which is contained in all the things mentioned in 
the context as necessary (for the sacrifice). The use of 
the feminine gender in connection with the word 'red' 
is intended to denote (in a general way all) the things 
which are mentioned as necessary in the context and 
which are of all genders. Therefore, in relation to the 
redness (here), there is no rule compelling its invariable 
association with the one year old heifer. In reply 

to this it is stated as follows : " Because the substance 
(heifer) and the quality (redness) are associated with 
one and the same action (of buying), there is the bind- 
ing rule that they shall together denote one and the 
same thing." \Pur. Mlm. III. i. 12.]. By means of the 
grammatical equation (in the passage above quoted), the 
words arunavft and ekahdyanyd, which (respectively) de- 
note the thing that is characterised by redness and the 



Adhik. VI. Sfd. 13.} SRI-BHASHYA. 373 

thing that is only one year old, are made out to import 
one and the same thing ; and this being the case, the thing 
heifer which is one year old and the quality of redness 
are (both) declared by that very word aninayd to be relat- 
ed to each other in the form of the qualified and the qua- 
lifier ; and there is nothing opposed to reason in their be- 
ing (thus) associated together in relation to one and the 
same action of buying; consequently, it is unavoidably 
necessary for redness to be associated with the one year 
old heifer which forms the means for the purchase (of the 
soma plant). If, like the association of the act of buying 
with the one year old heifer, the association of redness 
also (with it) is to be definitely made out by means of the 
(mandatory) sentence itself, then the (one) sentence will 
have to be construed as having two meanings. But this is 
not found to be the case. By means of the word ' red ' 
(arunaya) itself, the thing which is characterised by red- 
ness is expressed ; what is made out by its being gramma- 
tically equated with the word ckahdyanyd (7. c. the one 
year old heifer) is merely the fact that that thing is the 
one year old heifer ; and its association with this quality 
is not (what is so made out). Indeed, a grammatical equa- 
tion imports nothing other than the oneness of that thing 
which is characterised by (many) attributes. The defi- 
nition of a grammatical equation is surely as follows 
"A grammatical equation 373 (between words) means 
that words having a variety of significations are used 
so as to import only one thing." It is certainly thus 
that the statement ' The cloth is red 'and other such 
statements constitute (each) a single sentence owing to 
(the words in them) importing only one thing. Indeed 

37;,. Vide !>upra n. 75. 



374 SRI-BHASHYA. {Chap. L Part. L 

(here) the function of this sentence consists in (denot- 
ing) the association of the cloth with the predication 
expressed by the verb ' to be'. But its association with 
the red colour is expressed merely by the word red. What 
is definitely made out by the grammatical equation is only 
this much, that the cloth is that substance which is asso- 
ciated with the red colour. Thus it is nothing wrong to say 
that, (in any particular sentence forming a grammatical 
equation), a thing which is characterised by one attribute, 
or two attributes, or many attributes is denoted by certain 
particular words used in agreement either with the 
karaka case-affixes 370 or with the nominative case-affix ; 
and that it is made out by means of the granuriatical 
equation that the thing so characterised by all the attri- 
butes is only one; and that this one thing is associated with 
the action denoted by the verb (forming the predicate of 
the sentence). (To illustrate this) there are the following 
instances : " Devadatta is brown, youthful, red-eyed, 
possesses a stick, and wears an ear-ring "- -" Let him 
make the curtain by means of the white cloth " " Bring 

376. The word Karaka expresses instrumental case; (4) Sampradana, 

the relation of a noun to the verb in the recipient of the object of a 

a sentence. There are six such rela- . gift ; this is the idea expressed by 

tions according to Panini, viz. (i). the dative case; (5) Apciddna, abla- 

Karman, the object or the idea ex- tion /. e. the departure or removal of 

pressed by the accusative case; (2). a thing from a fixed point ; this is 

Jfarana, the instrument or the idea the idea expressed by the ablative 

expressed by the instrumental case; case ; and (6) AdhikaraM, location 

(3). A'ar/f/, the agent expressed by or the place of action,; this is the 

the instrumental case ; if not ex- idea expressed by the locative case- 

pressed by the instrumental case, it The genitive or possessive case is 

is not considered a Karaka when ex- not considered a Karaka^ because it 

pressed by the nominative case; the expresses the relation between two 

agent and the instrument are both nouns but not the relation between a 

capable of being expressed by the noun and a verb. 



Adhik. VI. Sill, jj.] SRI-BHASHYA. 375 

the lily which is blue " " Bring the blue lily 
" Bring the cow which is white and which possesses beauti- 
ful eyes " " Let him offer the sacrificial cake of rice (puro- 
dd'sa) in eight clay cups to Agni who shows the way." 
\Taitt. Sam /i. II. 2. 2. i.]. 377 And the same is the case 
with the scriptural passage " With the red, tawney-eyed 
heifer, one year old, let him purchase the soma plant." 
\Taitt. Samh. VI. i. 6. 7.] What is said is this : Just 
as, when it is said " Let him cook the rice in a vessel by 
means of fire-sticks," one single action denoted by the 
verb is made out to be simultaneously associated with 
different words which are in more than one kdraka case, 
so also, at the very time when any particular kdraka 
relation is made out (in a grammatical equation), every 
such kdraka relation as is mentioned in the group of 
words forming the grammatical equation is perceived to be 
characterised by many attributes at once : and thus it is 
that each (such relation) agrees with the verb. In this 
there is nothing opposed to reason, and there are the follow- 
ing and other similar instances (to show it) : " Let the 
clever cook cook the food prepared with milk, in a proper- 
sized vessel, by means of dry fire-sticks got out of the 
khadira tree (Acacia Catechu). 

What has been (by implication) stated to the effect 
that a word, which denotes a quality and is used in a sen- 
tence in which a substance has been already mentioned, 
denotes merely a quality, and that therefore the word 'red' 
(arunayd) in the sentence (given above) denotes nothing 
other than a mere quality, that is not appropriate; because 
it is not anywhere seen, either in popular usage or in 
the VedaSy that a word, which denotes a quality and is 

377, Vide also Ait. /-.VIf. 8, 



376 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 1. 

grammatically equated with (another) word denoting a 
substance, imports merely a quality. It is even wrong 
to say that a word, which denotes a quality and exists in 
a sentence in which a substance has been already mentioned, 
denotes merely a quality ; because, in the instance "The 
cloth is white" and in others like it, although a substance 
is made mention of, what is denoted (by the sentence) is 
nothing other than a substance which is characterised by a 

quality. In the following instance, namely, " The white 

belonging to the cloth", 378 the non-apprehension of the 
cloth which is characterised by whiteness is due to the 
mention of the words in dissimilar grammatical cases; but is 
not at all due to a substance having been already men- 
tioned (in the sentence). Adopting that same instance, 
we may speak of ' The white part belonging to the cloth', 
or some sucli thing. In this case, the words (sukla i. e. 
white and bhaga i. e. part) are (both) used in the same 
grammatical case, and what is therefore apprehended is a 
substance which is characterised by whiteness. 

What has been further stated to the effect that, since 
the purchase (of the soma plant) is completely concluded 
with the exchange of the one year old heifer, (its) redness 
lias no necessary relation whatsoever to this transaction of 
purchase, that also is inappropriate ; because a word, 
which denotes a quality (such as redness) and is found in 
a grammatical equation along with any other word denot- 
ing a substance that is not characterised by any quality op- 
posed (to the quality already referred to), expresses that 

378. The Sanskrit equivalent of in the genitive case, and siiklah is in 

this as given in the original is as the nominative case. Thus there 

follows: Palasva siiklah. Pata- are two dissimilar grammatical cases 

5)' is the genitive of pala and so is here. 



Adhik. VI. Snt. /j.] SRI-BHISHYA. 377 

quality as abiding in that (substance) ; and hence there is 
nothing wrong in such a quality being associated with the 
action denoted by the verb (in the sentence). Moreover, it 
having been established by means of the foregoing argu- 
ment that the quality of redness has, according to gram- 
mar, a certain relation to the substance (/. e. to the one year 
old heifer), the conclusion (of the pftrvapakshiri) was accord- 
ingly given to the effect that, since substance and quality 
are not (separately) capable of serving as the means for 
purchasing (the soma plant), it is proved by implication 
that they are both mutually related to one another : that 
also is inappropriate. Therefore the meaning of this 
(Pftrva-Mlmatnsa aphorism) is nothing other than what 
has been given above (by us). 

Accordingly, in the grammatical equation 'That thou 
art' and in others like it, the teaching of oneness has to 
be brought out without giving up, even in the least, the 
qualifications denoted by both the words ('That' and 'thou'). 
But this is not possible for him who does not admit the 
Highest Self (or the Brahman) to be hostile to all that 
is evil, to form the only abode of all the innumerable 
auspicious qualities, and to be a separate Being from the 
intelligent individual soul, which is capable of existing both 
in the pure and in the impure condition and is subject to 
endless miseries superimposed by the beginningless igno- 
rance (or avidya). Since it has to be accepted that the 
words used in a grammatical equation are intended to 
denote the oneness of that thing which is characterised by 
such attributes as are given (therein), it may be said that, 
even when one admits (the Highest Self as described 
above), the association with all those evils that belong to 
what is denoted by the word ' thou ' will tend to affect 
the Highest Self. But it is replied that it is not (right to 



SRT-BHASHYA. \Chap.LPart.L 

say.) so; because, by means of the word 'thou' also, it is the 
Highest Self alone that is denoted as forming the internal 
ruler of the individual selves. 

What is said is this : The Highest Brahman who is 
denoted by the word Sal (or Existence), who is devoid of 
even the smallest taint of all that is evil, who possesses, 
together with the quality of willing the truth, the whole 
collection of innumerable auspicious qualities unsurpassed 
in excellence, and who forms the cause of all things, willed 
to the effect 'May I become many'; then He created in 
order the whole world consisting of (the elements of) fire, 
water, earth, and of such other things ; then, in that world 
existing in the form of the wonderful material configura- 
tions known as gods, &c., He caused the whole series of 
intelligent individual souls to enter into such material em- 
bodiments as were suited to their own respective karmas 
so that they might (^severally) constitute the self (of those 
embodiments); then He Himself, wholly of His own ac- 
cord, entered into the individual selves so as to form their 
internal Self ; and then He introduced the differentiation 
of names and forms among the material embodiments which 
are known as gods, &c., and which, being of this nature, 
are composite and include Him also within themselves. The 
meaning is that He caused the composite mass, which is 
altogether of this nature, to assume the character of a thing 
and also to become capable of being denoted by words. 
In the passage 379 "(Entering along) with this indivi- 
dual self which is (also) the same as My self, the expression 
' with this individual self which is also the same as My- 
self ', shows that the individual self has the Brahman for 
his Self. And it is made out that the individual self has 

379. Vide Ch/iand, Up,.\1, 3. 2, 



Adhik. VI. Silt. /j.j SRI-BHISHYA. 379 

the Brahman for his Self for the reason that .the Brahman 
has entered into this individual self so. as to constitute his 
Self; because in the context in which the passage 380 "He 
created all this, whatever there is. Having created it, He 
entered into that same thing. Having entered into it, He 
became the sat and the /va/." 381 occurs, the two things, 
namely, the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing, 
which are denoted by the expression ' all this ', are sepa- 
rately pointed out by means of the words sat and tyat, as 
also by means of the words vijilana and avijttdna ; and then 
the Brahman is spoken of as entering even into the 
intelligent thing (viz. the individual self). Therefore it 
has to be understood that, owing to the differentiation 
of names and forms having taken place in this manner, all 
significant words denote the Highest Self as associated 
with the non-intelligent thing (matter) and with the (in- 
telligent) individual self. 

Moreover, by means of the passage "All this has 
That for its Self." \CJihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.], the world which 
is associated with the intelligent things for the individual 
selves) is (first) pointed out as ' all this ', and then it is 
declared that He, (the Lord), is the Self thereof. And 
since the Brahman forms in this manner the Self of 
all the intelligent things and the non-intelligent 
things, the whole world together with all the intelligent 
individual selves forms His body. And to this effect there 
are these other scriptural passages: " He, who has entered 
within, is the ruler of all things that are born, and (He) is 

380. Vide Taitt. Up. II. 6. I home and the Ani/ayana or the .horne- 

.The continuation of this passage is less, the 1'ijtldna or the intelligent 

as follows: "He became the Nirukta thing and the AvijMna or the non- 

or the defined and the Anirukta or the intelligent thing, &c." 

undefined, the Nilayana or what has a 381, Vide supra n. 185. 



380 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

the Self of all." [Taitt. Ar. III. 24.]; " He who, dwelling in 
the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth does not 
know, whose body is the earth, and who internally rules 

the earth, He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self. 

He who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the 
self does not know, whose body is the self, and who inter- 
nally rules the self, He is thy internal ruler and immortal 
Self." \_Madh. Brih. Up. III. 7. 3 to 22.]; "He who is 

moving within the earth, whose body is the earth, He 

who is moving within the waters, whose body is the 

waters He who is moving within the akshara, 

whose body is the aksharq,*** whom the akshara does 

not know He is the internal Self of all beings, He 

is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the one 
Narayana." [Sub. Up. VII. i.]. These and other passag- 
es first point out that the whole world together with 
the intelligent individual selves constitutes His body, and 
then they teach that the Highest Self forms the Self of that 
(world). Therefore those words also, which denote the in- 
telligent things (or the individual selves), denote the High- 
est Self alone who forms the Self also of the intelligent 
things and has these intelligent things for His body ; in 
the same manner in which those words which denote the 
non-intelligent configurated material masses known as gods, 
&c., denote only those individual selves who have those 
particular masses of matter for their bodies. (To illustrate 
this) there are the following and other (examples) " The 
four who perform the sacrifice known as i\\Q pattehadasardtra 
acquire god-hood." 383 The meaning is that they become 
gods. 

In the case of words which denote material embodi- 

382. Vide supra, n. 185. 383. Vide 3r. Sr. XI. 2, 9. 



Adhik. VI. Silt. 13.] SRi-BnlsHYA. 381 

ments, it is right (to say) that they also include in their im- 
port that which is the embodied ; because a material em- 
bodiment possesses, in relation to the embodied, the cha- 
racter of being a mode (thereof); and because also those 
words which denote modes include in their import the 
things which are the possessors of those modes. Indeed 
what is meant by a mode is that aspect, which is made out 
to be of a particular nature, and which is in relation to the 
thing that is denoted, when it is said "This thing is of this 
nature." That (mode) is necessarily dependent upon that 
thing ; hence, the knowledge of that (mode) is necessari- 
ly dependent upon that (thing) ; consequently, it is proper 
(for that mode) to include (within its significance) that very 
thing. Accordingly, even the word which denotes that 
(mode) includes that (thing) in its import. It is for this very 
reason that ox, horse, man, and other such words, as are 
denotative of particular genera and are the modes of 
particular masses of matter, include in their import 
the masses of matter which are (respectively) character- 
ised by (those) modes. And any such mass of matter, 
constituting the body -of an intelligent individual soul, 
forms his mode. Similarly, even those intelligent individu- 
al souls, who have particular masses of matter for their 
bodies, form modes of the Highest Self. Therefore they 
(/. c. those words) finally include in their import the High- 
est Self Himself. Thus the Highest Self Himself is denot- 
ed by all words. And consequently the grammatical 
equation (of the word 'That'), with the word ('thou'), which 
(so) denotes the Highest Self, has certainly a primary and 
natural significance. 

It may, however, be said (here) thus : It is only such 
words as denote genera and qualities that are seen to be 
grammatically equated with words denoting substances ; 



382 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

as, in the instances, ' The ox is broken-horned ', ( The 
candied sugar is white '. And in the case of such substanc- 
es as form the modes of other substances, the affix having 
the force of matup 3 8 4 is seen to be applied to them (when 
they are used in grammatical equations); as in the instances 
ofdapdin (or one who is the possessor of a stick) and kunda- 
lin (or one who is the wearer of an ear-ring). But it is not 
right to say so. Neither the genus, nor the quality, nor 
the substance,nor any single one of these can make a gram- 
matical equation (fully) significant ; because each of them 
may stray into the other. In the case of a thing which can 
exist as the mode of another thing, the existence, persist- 
ence, and realisation (of that thing) are invariably associat- 
ed with this (other) thing. Hence the words which 
denote that (mode) possess the power of denoting the 
substance which is characterised by what is denoted by 
themselves. Consequent!) 7 , it is certainly proper for them 
to be grammatically equated with the word which denot- 
es that substance as characterised by an attribute different 
(from what they themselves denote). Where, on the other 
hand, it is desired that a substance, which is capable of 
being realised separately and exists in itself, should form, 
somewhere and at some time the mode of another sub- 
stance, there, the affix having the force of matup becomes 
applicable. Thus it (/'. c. the position here maintained) 
is faultless. 

Therefore the words T, 'thou', and others, which in 
themselves specially denote the individual self, signify the 
Highest Self Himself, owing to the individual selves also, 
who are associated with the non-intelligent thing (matter), 

384. This affix has the sense of . the same signification. This is the 
possession. The affix nint also has affix used in Dandin and Kund<iltn< 



Adhik. VI. Sr/i. TJ.] SRT-BHA.SHYA. 383 

forming a mode of that (Highest Self); the reason for this 
is that they thus constitute the body of the Highest Self. 
And this (view) is summed up in the grammatical equation 
That thou art'. Such being the case, in consequence of 
the individual self (thus) standing in the relation of the 
body to the Highest Self, those peculiar attributes which 
belong to the individual self do not affect the Highest 
Self; in the same way in which childhood, youth, and 
other such conditions, which are associated with one's own 
body, do not affect the individual self. Therefore, in the 
grammatical equation ' That thou art ', the word ' That ' 
denotes the Highest Self who is the cause of the world, 
who wills the truth, who is the abode of all auspi- 
cious qualities, who is devoid of even the smallest taint 
of all that is evil ; and (the word) 'thou' also denotes 
that same (Supreme Self) as possessing for His body 
that embodied individual self. Accordingly, the gramma- 
tical equation ('That thou art') has a primary and natural 
significance ; there is no contradiction of the context 
(wherein it occurs); there is no contradiction of any one of 
all the scriptural passages ; and even the slightest taint of 
ignorance (or avidyfi) and of other evils does not become 
possible in relation to the Brahman who is free from im- 
purity and forms the only abode of auspicious quali- 
ties. Since the fact of (the Brahman) being gramma- 
tically equated with the individual self also imports in this 
manner that He is different from the individual self who 
forms His attribute, therefore the Anandamaya (or He 
who consists of Bliss), who is the Highest Self, is different 
from the individual self who consists of knowledge (or 
understanding). 

What has been stated above 383 to the effect that, in 

', 385. Vide the objection-statement supra pp. 347 & 348. 



384 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. L Part. I. 

the statement "This itself is the embodied Self of -that 
(which consists of knowledge or understanding)" \Taitt. 
Up. II. 5. i.], the dnandamaya (or he who consists of 
bliss) is declared to be associated with a body, and that 
it is not thus possible for him to be other than the 
individual self; that is not right : because, in this con- 
text, by means of the statement " The embodied Self of 
this is the same as that of the former." \Taitt. Up. II. 
3. i. II. 4. i. & II. 5. i.], it is declared in each case that 
the Highest Self Himself is the embodied Self (of all). 
How ? Because the Highest Brahman who is other than 
the individual self, and who, in accordance with the scrip- 
tural statement" From that same Self, indeed, the spatial 
ether came into existence." \Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], is known 
to be the supreme cause of the whole series of created ob- 
jects such as the spatial ether and other things, is (Himself) 
taught to be the Self ; it is (therefore) made out that the 
spatial ether and other things including the annamaya (or 
what is made up of food), which are all different from Him, 
constitute His body. And by means of the following passage 
belonging to the Subdlopanishad " (He) whose body is 
the earth.... whose body is the waters,.... whose body is 
the fire.... whose body is the air whose body is the spa- 
tial ether.... whose body is the akshara.... whose body is 
mrityu (i.e. prakriti or nature), ....He is the internal Self of 
all beings, He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine Lord, 
He is the One Narayana." [Sub. Up. VII. i.], it is 
clearly stated that all the constituent principles of the 
universe form the body of the Highest Self. There- 
fore, in this very passage, namely, " From that same 
Self, indeed, (the spatial ether came into existence) '- 
[Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], what is made out is that the 
Highest Self Himself forms the embodied Self of the 



Adhik. VI. Sat. /j.] SRI-BHISHYA. 385 

annamaya (or what is made up of food). The context 
speaks of the pranamaya (or what consists of prdnd) in 
the passage " He who is (the embodied Self) of the for- 
mer He Himself is the embodied Self of this." \_Taitt. 
Up. II. 3. i.]. The meaning is that He who is the 
embodied Self of the annamaya mentioned before, and 
who forms the supreme cause (of the universe), as 
established by means of other scriptural passages, -is 
Himself the Highest Self; it is He alone who is the 
embodied Self also of the pranamaya (or what is made 
up of pritna). In this manner it (viz. the context) has to 
be understood in the case of the manomaya (or what con- 
sists of mind) and the vijflanamaya (or what consists of 
knowledge). But in regard to the Anandamaya (or that 
which consists of bliss), the indicative expression 886 " He 
Himself" \Taitt. Up. H.6.I.] is given to show that He 
has none other for His Self. How is that ? In the fore- 
going manner, it has been made out that the Highest Self 
Himself is the embodied Self of ;the vijftdnamaya (or 
what consists of knowledge) also. This being the case, if 
it be said that He who is the embodied Self of the vijfi-a- 
namaya (or what consists of knowledge) is Himself 
the embodied Self of the Anandamaya (or what consists of 
bliss) also: then, the Anandamaya who is made out by the 
repetition (of the word 'bliss '), to be the Supreme Self will 
Himself have to be understood as forming the Self of the 
Supreme Self. Accordingly the whole, collection of intelli- 
gent and non-intelligent things which are different from 
Himself constitute His body. He alone is in consequence 
the unconditioned embodied Self. It is for this very 

386. This expression is contained Himself who is (the embodied Self) 
in the passage " The embodied Self of the former (which consists of un- 
of this (which consists of bliss) is He derstanding)." 

49 



386 SRI-BHA.SHYA. [Chap. /. Part. I. 

reason that this sdstra which is promulgated in relation 
to the Highest Brahman is called by worthy persons 
as the Science of the Embodied. Consequently the 

Anandamaya who is the Highest Self is undoubtedly dis- 
tinct from the individual self who consists of knowledge. 



He (a pfirvapakshhi) might say (here) as follows : 
This Anandamaya is not different from the individual self, 
because the affix mavat which signifies modification is 
found to be used (here). The affix mayat is taught to 
possess the significance of modification in the (grammatical) 
aphorism which (for the first time) introduces (its modifi- 
catory significance) by saying " The affix mayat also 
is used in these two (significations)" \_Pdnini. IV. 3. 
143.]; and (it is) also (taught) in the aphorism which 
is to the effect " It (viz. the affix mayat) is always 
used (in the sense of modification) after the words 
known as the vriddhas 387 and after the group of words 
beginning with sara." [Panini. IV. 3. 144.]. And this 
word Anandamaya is a vriddha. It may (again) be said 
(here) that the affix mayat has also the power of signifying 
abundance, because it is taught (to have that signification) in 
the aphorism " The affix mayat is (to be employed) wher- 
ever the abundance of a thing has to be expressed." \Pdnini. 
V. 4. 21.]; for example, where it is said "The sacrifice is 
abundantly full of food (annamaya)" that (affix mayat) has 
this (signification) alone. It is, (however), not right 

387. The definition of this word is lengthening) is a VridJha, as in the 

given in Pdnini I. I. 73. That word word Ananda where the first vowel is 

the first vowel of which is subjected a lengthened a. 
to the process known as Vridd/ti (/'. e. 



Adhik, VI. Sftt. 7^.] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 387 

to say so. It (viz. the affix mayat} in annamaya is seen 
in the very beginning (of this context) to possess the 
significance of modification. Therefore, according to the 
propriety of interpretation suited to the context, it is 
right for this (affix mayat in the word Anandamaya} also 
to have nothing other than the signification of modifi- 
cation. Moreover, even if it (viz. the affix mayat} have 
the signification of abundance (in Anandamaya}, the 
character of being other than the individual self cannot 
result to that (Anandamaya}. Thus, when it is said that 
one is abundantly full of bliss, it is indeed unavoidable (for 
that one) to be mixed up with misery ; for an abundance 
of bliss implies the possession of a small modicum of misery. 
Indeed to be an individual self is nothing other than to 
be associated with misery. Therefore it is right (for the 
affix mayat} to have only that significance of modification 
which is arrived at in accordance with that propriety of in- 
terpretation which is suited to the context. Furthermore, 
in popular usage as in the instances mrinmaya (or what 
is made up of clay), hiranmaya (or what is made up of 
gold), darnmaya (or what is made up of wood), and in 
other such instances and in the Vcdas as in the instances 
of the semicircular vessel which is made of leaves (parna- 
rnayl}, and of the ladles which are made of the wood 
called saml (samimayyaft), and of the girdle which is 
made of grass (darbhamay'i} and in other such instanc- 
es, the affix mayat is very frequently used in the sense 
of modification ; and consequently that (sense) alone 
comes to the mind at the very outset. And the individual 
self does certainly possess the character of being a modi- 
fication of bliss. To that (individual self) who is in 
himself of the nature of bliss, the condition of being found 
in the state of samsdra is nothing other than becoming 



388 SRI-BHASHYA. {Chap. L Part. L 

a modification of that (bliss). In as much as the affix 
mayat which denotes modification is found to be used (in 
the case of the word dnandamaya}, the dnandamaya (or 
what consists of blissj is accordingly nothing ,other than 
the individual self. After stating this (objection) thus, 
he (the Sutrakdra) invalidates it (as follows) : 

Sutra 14. Vikarasabdanneti^henna pra^huryat. 

It may be said that owing to there being the affix 
(mayat) significant of modification, (the Anandamaya is 
not (the Brahman); but it is not (right to say) so ; be- 
cause that (affix mayat) signifies abundance. 

This (above-stated position of the Pfirvapakshin) is 
not right. Why? Because of there being the significance of 
abundance. That is, because there is an abundance of bliss 
in the Highest Brahman, and because also it is possible 
for the affix mayat to signify abundance. What is said is 
this : This Bliss is resident in the Brahman, because it 
is not possible for the individual self to be the abode of 
that Ananda (or bliss) which is continuously repeated in an 
order in which each succeeding bliss is a hundredfold of the 
bliss (preceding it). It being so determined, the Ananda- 
maya (or That which consists of Bliss) must be the High- 
est Brahman, because there can be no modification in rela- 
tion to that Brahman, and because also it is possible for 
the rule regulating the use of the affix mayat to operate so 
as to signify abundance also. Even on account of the propri- 
ety of interpretation suited to the context, and on ac- 
count of the frequency of its use (in the sense of modi- 
fication), the affix mayat cannot (here) have the signi- 
ficance of modification; because, (if it did), there would be 
the contradiction of the context. Moreover (this) propriety 
of interpretation suited to the context has been given 



Adhik. VL Sut. /./.] SRI-BHASHYA. 389 

up even in relation to the word pranamaya itself; because, 
in the case of that word, it is not possible (for the affix 
may at) to import modification. Thus, in this case, the 
vayu (or vital air), which usually has a five-fold 388 activity, 
becomes capable of being denoted merely by the word/ra- 
namaya, for the reason that it is in possession of the 
activity of the prdna, or for the reason that, among the 
five activities known as the prdna (or the vital activity), 
the apana (or the excretory activity), &c., the activity of 
the prdna is here in abundance. Again, it cannot be said 
that the affix mayat is not largely used in the sense of 
abundance ; because it is so seen in the following and other 
instances " The sacrifice is abundantly full of food (anna- 
may a)"" The journey is abundantly full of carts (sakata- 
mayi). 

What has been stated above to the effect that an abund- 
ance of bliss necessarily implies the existence of a small 
amount of misery, that is not right. Indeed the abund- 
ance of a thing is the same as having an exceedingly large 
amount of it, and this does not necessarily imply the exist- 
ence of another thing. On the other hand, it implies the 
negation of the smallness of that thing itself. The exist- 
ence and non-existence of that other thing have to be made 
out by other means of proof. And in the present case, the 
absence of such other things is made out by this other 
means of proof found in the scriptural passage "He who 
is devoid of sin." \Qihdnd. Up. VIII. 7. i.] and in 
others like it. Under these circumstances, only this 
much can be said, that the exceedingly large amount 
of the bliss belonging to the Brahman necessarily implies 

388. The five activities are of the Samanct or digestive activity, the 
Prdita or the principal vital activity, Vydna or circulatory activity and the 
the Apdnn or excretory activity, the Uddna or respiratory activity. 



390 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. /. Part. /. 

the smallness of the bliss belonging to other*. And in the 
passage beginning with "That is one unit of human bliss." 
\Taitt. Up. II. 8. i.], this (fact) is declared to the effect 
that, in comparison with the bliss belonging to the indi- 
vidual self, the Bliss belonging to the Brahman is in an 
unsurpassable condition and is exceedingly large. 

What has been further stated to the effect that it is 
possible for the individual self to become a modification of 
bliss, that also is not appropriate. That, in the way in 
which clay becomes modified into the form of pots, &c., 
the individual self, whose essential nature consists of know- 
ledge and bliss, becomes modified into some form or other 
is against all scripture, tradition and logic. And it will be 
established hereafter 889 that, in the condition of samsara, 
his knowledge and bliss are (merely) in a contracted condi- 
tion under the influence of karma. Therefore also, the 
Anandamaya (or That which consists of Bliss) is different 
from the individual self and is the Supreme Brahman. 



The Anandamaya (or That which consists of Bliss) is 
different from the individual self for the following reason 
also : 

Sutra 15. Taddhetuvyapadesa^h^ha. 

Because also He (the Anandamaya) is declared (in 
the context) to be the cause of that (which forms the 
bliss of the individual souls). 

" If this Akdsa (i. e. the Brahman] be not Bliss, who 
indeed is there that can live, and who that can enjoy ? 

389. Vide Sri-B6as/iya under Ved. Sut. 111. 2. 3. 



Adhik. VI. Siil. 16.] SRI-BHISHYA. 391 

For He Himself causes bliss," \Taitt.Up. II. 7. i.]. In 
this passage, by means of the statement' He Himself 
causes bliss ' it is declared that He is the cause of bliss to 
the individual selves. Therefore it is to be understood 
that this bliss-giver who is the Anandamaya is that High- 
est Self who is different from the individual self that is to be 
blessed. And it will be stated presently that the Ananda- 
maya Himself is here 390 denoted by the word Ananda .(or 
Bliss.) 

The Anandamaya is different from the individual self 
for the following reason also : 

Sutra 16. Mantravarnikameva ci_a giyate 

(Because) also that same Being, who is denoted by 
the words of the mantra 3 9 1 (in the context), is declared 
(there to be the Anandamaya). 

That same Brahman who is denoted by the words of 
the mantra, which begins with "Tbe Brahman is Exist- 
ence, Knowledge, Infinity." \Taitt. Up. II. i. i ], is spok- 
en of as the Anandamaya. And that (Anandamaya] is the 
Highest Brahman who is different from what constitutes 
the essential nature of the individual self. And according- 
ly, by means of the passage" He who knows the Brah- 
man attains the Highest." \Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], it is 
pointed out that the Brahman is the object that is to be 

390. Vide Sri-Bhashya under J-W. highest ether ; and he who knows 
Sut. I. I. 20. infra. (Him thus) attains along with the 

391. This mantra is to the follow- Omniscient "Brahman all the auspi- 
ing effect : " The "Brahman is Exist- cious qualities." Taill. Up. II. j. I. 
ence, Knowledge, Infinity ; He is The word Mantra means a metrical 
hidden in the cave of the heart, in the composition, 



392 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

attained by the individual self. In (the sentence) " This 
is stated in relation to That." \_Taitt. Up. II. i. i.],(the 
word) ' That ' means the Brahman. Having that (Brah- 
man) in view, that is, accepting Him as the thing to be 
taught, this rik (or verse) is repeated by those who study 
the Vedas. The meaning is that the subject mentioned in 
the brdhmana ag *is clearly explained by means of this man- 
tra. The object to be attained by the individual self who 
is the worshipper is certainly the Brahman who is entirely 
distinct from him. And immediately afterwards (in the 
context), by means of the succeeding brahmanas as well 
as the mantras, beginning with the passage " From that 
same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came into existence ."- 
\Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], this same (thing) is clearly expound- 
ed. Therefore the Anandamaya is different from the indi- 
vidual self. 



Here he (a purvapakshin) might say thus : No 
doubt, He who has to be attained (by the individual self) 
must be different from the individual self who is the 
worshipper. Nevertheless, the Brahman denoted by the 
words of the mantra (above) is not a different thing from 
the individual self ; but, on the other hand, He is that pure 
essential nature of the aforesaid worshipper himself, which 
is devoid of even the smallest taint of all evils, which is 
devoid of attributes, and which is pure undifferentiated 
intelligence. That same (essential nature of the individual 
self) is clearly brought out by means of the mantra begin, 
ning with "The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infini- 

392. A Brafimana is a prose consists also of a miscellaneous collec- 
commentary on a Mantra or a metrical lion of Mantras and Brahmanas like 
composition. The Taittiriyobanishad the Tdittirlya-SQmhitQ itself,, 



Adhik. VI. Sftt. 77.] SRl-BHlSHYA. 393 

ty." \Taitt. Up. II. i. i.]. That same (essential nature of 
the individual self) again is known to be devoid of attri- 
butes owing to its being beyond the province of speech and 
mind, in accordance with the passage " Without being 
able to attain Him, speech returns with the mind." \Taitt. 
Up. II. 9. i.]. Hence, it is that same (essential nature of 
the individual self) which is denoted by the words of the 
mantra (under reference). Consequently the Ananda- 
maya is not other than that (essential nature of the indi- 
vidual self). 

To this he (the Siltrakdra] gives the following reply: 

Sutra 17. Netaronupapatteh. 



He who is other (than the Brahman] is not (that Being 
who is denoted by the words of the mantra], because 
(in such a case) there would be inappropriateness. 

He who is different from the Highest Self and is 
denoted by the word jlva (which means the individual 
self), is not, even in the state of final release, that Being 
who is denoted by the words of the mantra. Why ? 
Because there is inappropriateness; that is, it is not possi- 
ble for such an individual self to have unconditioned omni- 
science (yipasclLittva}. This very same unconditioned 
omniscience is indeed meant to be explained by the reference 
to the quality of willing the truth in the passage " He 
desired ' May I become many and be born'." [ Taitt. 
Up. II. 6. i.]. Omniscience (inpaschittva] is indeed the 
possession of such an intelligence as 'sees' in man}' ways. 
After eliding the syllable vat forming a part of the word 
pasyat, the word vipa'scliit is derived from it ; because it 
(viz. the word vipa'schif) belongs to the group of words 
50 



394 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

beginning with prishodara. s *> s Omniscience is certainly 
possible to a released individual self. Nevertheless, as 
that same individual self has no omniscience in the state of 
samsara, it is not possible for him to possess uncondition- 
ed omniscience. The released individual self, who has at- 
tained the state of pure undirrerentiated intelligence, can- 
not at all possess this omniscience ; because he does not 
'see ' in a variety of ways. Such is (the inappropriateness). 
It has been already 394 pointed out that the thing 
which is devoid of attributes cannot be made out by any 
accepted criteria of truth whatsoever. If the passage 
" (Without being able to attain) Him, speech returns (with 
the mind)." [ Taitt. Up. II. 9. i.] -declare the return of 
speech and mind from the Brahman (without attaining 
Him), it (surely) can not thereby become capable of giving 
rise to the knowledge of the attributelessness of (that) Be- 
ing. But, on the other hand, it will merely tell us that 
speech and mind form no means of proving that (Being). 
And accordingly, He will acquire the character of a 
mere nothing. Beginning with the statement 3 5 "He 
who knows the Brahman attains (the Highest)", it is 
mentioned (in the scripture) that the Brahman is omni- 
scient, that He is the, cause of the world, that He is the 
only abode of knowledge and bliss, that He is the bestow- 
er of bliss on all other*, that He is, of His own free will, 
the creator of the whole world made up of the intelligent 
things and the non-intelligent things, that He forms 
the Self of the whole series of created things by enter- 
ing into them, that He is the cause of fear and of 
fearlessness, that He is the ruler of the wind, the sun, &c., 
that He possesses that bliss which is unsurpassed in the or- 

393. Vide Pdnmi VI. 3. 109. 395. Taitl U/>. II. i, i. 

394. Vide supra pp. 54 to 60. 



Adhik. VL Sul. /;.] SRJ-BHISHYA. 39$ 

cler in which each succeeding bliss is a hundredfold of the 
bliss immediately preceding it, and that He is many other 
such things. And it is the idle talk of a deluded person 
to say that the Brahman is, after all (these are mentioned), 
declared to be incapable of any proof, in as much as speech 
and mind cannot operate (so as to give rise to any know- 
ledge) in relation to the Brahman. By means of the word 
Ananda (or Bliss) in the expression " He who knows the 
Bliss of the Brahman " \Taitl. Up. II. 9. i.], this passage 
refers to the Bliss pointed out by the word yat in the ex- 
pression " (Without being able to attain) that (Bliss) 
speech returns (with the mind)" \_Taitt. Up. 11.9. i.J; 
it then says that that Bliss is related to the Brahman 
by distinctly mentioning that it belongs to the Brahman; 
and if, by saying ' he who knows', it then speaks of the 
knowledge of that same Bliss which is beyond the province 
of speech and mind, it will be, like the bellowing noise of 
an old bull and other such things, (altogether) meaningless, 
and will not at all fall within the class of what are called 
sentences. Accordingly, it (vix. this passage) proceeds to 
give the definite measurement of the excellence of the Bliss 
of the Brahman in that order in which each succeeding 
bliss is a hundredfold of the bliss (immediately preceding 
it); and then speech and mind return from Him (without 
attaining Him) on account of that (Bliss,) being incapable 
of (such) definite measurement. And it is this that is 
stated in the expression ' (Without being able to attain) 
that (Bliss) speech returns (with the mind)'. It is said 
that he who knows that Bliss of the Brahman, which is in 
this manner incapable of definite measurement, need not 
have any fear from anywhere. Moreover it is undoubtedly 
very clear that this omniscient Beingwho is denoted by 
the words of the mantra (under reference), and who is 



596 SRi-fcHisHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

subsequently declared in the passage beginning with "He 
desired, c." \Tailt. Up. II. 6. i.], to have of His own free 
will thought it fit to create and preserve the world, to be 
the internal Self of the world, c., has in consequence 
characteristics other than those which constitute the essen- 
tial nature of the released individual self. 



For the following reason also, the Anandamaya (or 
that which consists of bliss) is different from the individual 
self, who is capable of existing in both the states (of bond- 
age and of final release). 

Sutra 18. Bhedavyapadesachc[a. 

Because also there is (in the context) the declara 
tion of difference (between the individual self and the 
Brahman). 

The scriptural context, which, beginning with the 
statement "From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether 
(came into existence)." \_Toitt. Up. II. i. i.], explains 
the Brahman denoted by the words of the mantra (above 
quoted), teaches, by means of the passage " Different from 
this which consists of understanding (or knowledge) is the 
(still) inner Self, the Anandamaya." [Taitt. Up. 11.5.1.], 
that He is different from the individual self also; in the 
same way in which (He is different) from anna (food), 
prana (principal vital air), and manas (mind). Therefore 
it is made out that, owing to the declaration of (this) 
difference (between the Anandamaya and the individual 
self), this Being, who is denoted by the words of the mantra 
(under reference) and is the Anandamaya, is certainly 



Ad/ilk. VI. Slit. 79.] SRl->HA.SHYA. 397 

different from the individual self. 

For the following reason also, (the Anandamayd) is 
different from the individual self. 

Sutra 19. Kama ^h^ a nanumanapeksha. 

Because also His will (is in itself the cause of crea- 
tion), the pradhana aoc i s not needed (by Him in the 
act of creation just as it is needed by the individual self). 

In connection with the act of creating the world, it is 
impossible for the individual self, who is subject to the influ- 
ence of avidyd (or ignorance), to avoid the necess- 
ity of being associated with that non-intelligent thing 
(viz. matter) which is denoted by the words dnumd- 
nika, pradhana, &c. Indeed, it is only in this man- 
ner that the four-faced Brahma and others form the 
cause of the world. In the present instance, however, 
the creation of wonderful intelligent and non-intelligent 
things is, in the statement " He created all this, what- 
ever there is." \Taitt. Up. II. 6. i.], declared to take 
place solely from that will, which belongs to Him who 
is devoid of any association with the non-intelligent thing 
(pradhana), and which is referred to in the statement-" He 
desired (/. c. willed), 'May I become manifold and be 
born.'" [Taitt. Up. II. 6.1.]. It is accordingly made out that 
the Anandamaya does not, while creating the world, stand 
in need of any association with the non-intelligent thing 
pradhana. 

396. The word ~Anumd,na means cause of the world. Like the word 
literally that which is capable of be- Anumdnika, it denotes the Pradhana 
ing made out by inference to be the of the Sdhk/tyas, 



398 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

The Anandamaya is different from the individual sell 



for the following reason also : 



Sutra 20. Asminnasya cj[a tadyogam sasti. 

(Because) also it (viz. the scripture) declares (that) 
his (/. e. the individual self's) acquisition of that (bliss 
takes place when he is) in (association with) this 
(Anandamaya). 

' In this' means in the Anandamaya. ' His ' means 
of the individual self. ' The acquisition of that ' means the 
acquisition of bliss. * It declares', that is, the scripture de- 
clares. 

It is said " Bliss indeed is He. Having obtained that 
very same Bliss, he (the individual self) becomes blissful." 
\Taitt. Up. II. j. i.]. The meaning is this: When it is de- 
clared that, by attaining the Anandamaya who is denoted 
by the word Bliss, that being, who is apt to be de- 
noted by the word jlva (which means the individual self), 
becomes blissful, then, who but a mad man will say that, 
by attaining whichever (Being) whoever becomes blissful, 
he is himself that same (Being) ? It has been thus deter- 
mined that the Anandamaya is the Highest Brahman, 
and hence it is that that same Anandamaya is denot- 
ed by the word Ananda (or Bliss) in the following and 
other scriptural passages : " If this Akdsa be not Bliss"- 
\Taitt. Up. II. 7. i.]; "The Brahman is Knowledge, Bliss." 
[Brih. Up. III. 9. 28.]; in the same way in which the 
vijilanamaya (or what consists of knowledge) is (denoted) 
by the word vijftana (or knowledge.) It is for this very 
reason (of our having to interpret Ananda as Anandamaya) 
that there is given a distinct indication (to that effect) 



Adhik. VI. Snt. 20.] SRi-BHISHYA. 399 

in the passage "He who knows the Bliss of the Brahman 
(need not have any fear from an) 7 where)." [Taitt. Up. II. 9. 
i.]. And it is for this same reason again that the result (of 
such knowledge of the Bliss of the Brahman] is pointed out 
in the statement "He reaches that Self who is the Ananda- 
maya" -[Taitt. Up. II. 8. i.]. Moreover the annamava 
(or what is made up of food) and the other things, 
which have been mentioned in the earlier 397 annvaka 
are recapitulated in the later 3 9 8 annvaka to the follow- 
ing effect : " Let him know the anna (or food) as the 
Brahman." [Taitt. 6^.111.2.1.]; "Let him know the 
prana (or the principal vital air) as the Brahman." {Taitt. 
Up. III. 3. i.]; "Let him know the manas (or mind) as 
the Brahman." [Taitt. Up. III. 4. i.]; "Let him know 
the vijttana (or knowledge) as the Brahman." \_Taitt. Up. 
III. 5. i.]. Hence it is made out that, in this statement also, 
luimely, " (Let him know) the Ananda (or Bliss) as the 
Brahman." [Taitt. Up. III. 6. i.], it is the Anandamaya 
Himself that is taught (by means of the word Ananda). And 
for that same reason, even that (/. c. the later annvaka) 
is concluded by the statement" He (i.e. the released self) 
having reached that Self which consists of Bliss (Ananda- 
wrtw)...(sits down singing this sfiman //, Vilha, Vf/ha, 
I'//)." [Taitt. Up. III. 10 5.]. 

Therefore, it is a demonstrated conclusion that that 
Highest Brahman, who is a different entity from what is 
apt to be denoted by the word pradhana, is also a different 
entity from that (other) entity, which is capable of being 
signified by the word j'iva (which means the individual 
self). 

397. The eailier Awtrata is the 398. The later Antirdta is the 

"A/iaiidavalli Chapter II of the T^///. B/irigura/.i Chaptei III of the same 
Ut>. Tailt, Up. 



400 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. /. Part. I. 

ADH1KARANA. VII. 

A ntaradhikarana. 

It is certainly not possible for the individual selves 
who possess very little merit to create the world out of 
their own free will, to be associated with unsurpassable 
bliss, to form the cause of fear and of fearlessness, &c. 
Nevertheless, such a thing may surely be possible in the 
case of the Sun, Indra, Prajapati, and other such (individual 
selves) who possess peculiarly valuable merit. 

He (the Sfdrakara} disproves this aforesaid supposi- 
tion thus : 

Sutra 21. Antastaddharmopadesat. 

He (/. e. the Person; who is within (the Sun and the 
eye is the Brahman), because His attributes are de- 
clared (in the context). 3 " 

It is revealed in the Chhdndogyct thus : " This Person 
who is seen within the Sun, He is brilliant like gold, 
has a golden beard, and has golden hairs, and is altogether 
golden even to the very tips of His nails. His two eyes 
are like the lotus just opened by the sun. His name is 
High. This same above-mentioned Person is risen above 
all sins. He who knows (Him) thus rises indeed above all 
sins. The Rik and the Saman are the two psalms in 

praise of Him This is what relates to Him as He is 

in the gods. Now this is what relates to Him as He is in 

399. The context referred to here is Chhandogyaml'panishad. f, 6 & 7. 



Adhik. VII. Sftt. 21.] SRI-BHISHYA. 401 

our selves Again, that Person who is seen within 

the eye, He is that same Rik and that same Saman, He is 
that (Sktha,* OQ that Yajus and that Brahman. The form 
of this above-mentioned Person (in the eye) is the same 
as the form of that (other Person in the Sun). The psalms 
in praise of that other (Person) are (the same as) the psalms 
in praise of this (Person). The name of that (other Person) 
is the name of this (Person) also." [Qihand. Up. I. 6. 6 to 
8. & I. 7. i to 5.]. 

Here the doubt arises whether this Person who exists 
within the eye and the bright orb of the Sun is that 
same individual self who possesses such sovereignties as 
result from an accumulation of the merit of works, and 
who is capable of being denoted by Sun and other such 
words ; or whether He is the Supreme Self who is other 
than that (Sun). It is perhaps thought right to hold that 
He is that same individual self who has accumulated the 
merits of his works. Why ? Because it is declared that 
that (Person) is associated with a body. Indeed it is 
possible only for the individual selves to be associated with 
a body. As a matter of fact, it is for the purpose of 
experiencing pleasure and pain in accordance with the 
results of works that there is the association (of the self) 
with a body. It is surely for this very reason that final 
release, which is free from association with karmas, is 
declared in the following passage to be capable of attainment 
in the bodiless condition: "To him who is and has a body, 
there is no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing ; 
the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who is and 
has no body." [Qthand. Up. VIII. 12. i.]. Moreover it is 

400. An Uktha is a verse be- audibly or inaudibly as opposed lo the 
longing to the subdivision known as Slonias which are sung- 
the Sas/ras which are recited either 

5 1 



402 SRT-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. 1. 

possible for an increase of knowledge as well as an increase 
of strength to take place from the greatness of the merit of 
works. For this same reason the lordship of worlds and 
desires is appropriate only to such (an individual self as 
has so made his own merit great). And for the same reason 
again (it becomes appropriate for him) to be the object of 
worship, to be the giver of the fruits of works, and also to 
be useful in causing the attainment of final release by pro- 
ducing the annihilation of sins. Even among men, those 
who have accumulated merit are seen to be very great in 
consequence of (their) knowledge, power, c. The Siddhas 
and the Gaudharvas are greater than they. Even greater 
than these are the gods. Still greater are Indra and others. 
Accordingly, some one among Brahma and the others 
from him downwards attains in each halpa^^ the above- 
mentioned sovereignty as a consequence of (his own) 
special merit ; and thus performs even the work of the 
creation, &c., of the world. Therefore, the scriptural 
passage, which deals with what forms the cause of 
the world and with what forms the internal self of the 
world, &c., relates only to this being who has specially 
increased his merit and is (thereby) omniscient and omni- 
potent. Hence there is nothing that is called the Supreme 
Self as distinct from the individual self. This being the 
case, the scriptural passage " That which is neither gross, 
nor atomic, nor short, &c." \Brih. U'p. III. 8. 8.] and 
others like it are intended to import the essential nature 
of the individual self. And those scriptures which deal 
with final release are intended to teach the essential nature 
of that (individual self) and also (to teach) the means 
of attaining that (pure essential nature). 

4.01. Vide supra p. 226. n. 246, 



Adhik. VII. Sill. 21.} SRi-BHlSHYA. 40 3 

If it l)e so held, it is stated in reply " He (i.-c. 
the person) who is within (the Sun and the eye is the 
Brahman), because His attributes are declared (in the 
context)." \_Vcd. Silt. I. i. 21.]. That Person who is 
perceived within the Sun and within the eye He is 
the Supreme Self, and is other than the individual self. 
Why ? Because His attributes are declared (in the con- 
text). That attribute which it is impossible for the in- 
dividual self to possess, which belongs only to Him who is 
other than the individual self and is the Highest Self, and 
which imports the quality of being devoid of sin, &c., 
that is taught in the statement beginning with 
" This same above-mentioned Person is risen above all 
sins." [Qihand. Up. I. 6. 7.]. Indeed to be devoid of sin 
is to be free from karma. The meaning is that it is to 
be free from even the smallest amount of subjection to the 
influence of karma. As a matter of fact, individual 
selves are subject to the influence of karmas, in as much as 
they have to experience pleasures and pains in obedience 
to their kannas. Therefore, the quality of being free from 
all sin forms the attribute of the Supreme Self Himself, 
who is other than the individual self. Based upon this 
(quality) and conditioned by His own essential nature are 
the quality which relates to the lordship of worlds and 
desires, the quality of willing the truth, c., the quality of 
being the internal Self of all beings, which are all His own 
attributes. Says the scripture to the same effect "This 
Self is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, 
free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, 
and desires the truth and wills the truth." [Qihand. Up. 
VIII. i. 5. & VIII. 7. i & 3.]. And similarly there is 
the passage " He is the internal Self of all beings, 
He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He 



404 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. L Part. 1. 

is the one Xarayana." \Sub. Up. VII. i.]. To be cap- 
able of creating all the intelligent and non-intelligent 
things, in conformity with the quality of willing the truth 
as stated in the passage " He desired, May I become 
manifold and be born." \_Taitt. Up. II. 6. i.], to form the 
absolute cause of fear and of fearlessness, to possess that 
unsurpassable bliss which is devoid of the limitations due 
to apprehension by speech and mind, these and such 
other attributes, which are natural and are not capable of 
being acquired by means of karmas, are impossible for the 
individual self to possess. 

What has been stated to the effect that, owing 
to there being the mention of the association with a 
body, the Person (referred to in the scriptural text quoted 
above) is not other than the individual self, that is not 
right. Indeed, association with a body does not establish 
(any) subjection to the influence of karmas ; because 
it is possible for Him who wills the truth to have the 
association with a body merely through His own 
will. It may again be said thus : The body is known 
to be that aggregate of the elements which are modifica- 
tions of the prakriti (or matter) made up of the three 402 
qualities. And association with it cannot, in accordance with 
His will, result to that Person who is devoid of sin and 
who wills the truth ; because such (an association) cannot 
be an aim of (His) life. And he who is subject to the 
influence of karmas, and who is totally ignorant of his own 
essential nature, cannot possibly avoid that association 
(with the body), in consequence of his having to enjoy the 
results corresponding to his works, even though he does 
not like it. It would be so, provided (we grant) that His 

402. Vide supra n. 344. 



Adhik. VII. Sul. 21.] SRI-BHASHYA. 405 

body is made up of the three qualities and is a modification 
of the prakriti (or matter). But that (body) is in accord- 
ance with His own desire, and is suited to His own nature, 
and is altogether non-material ; and thus the whole (of our 
argument) is appropriate. What is said is this :* 

There are myriads of innumerable auspicious qualities which 
are natural in themselves, and are unsurpassed in excellence, 
and belong to that Highest Brahman Himself who is 
entirely distinct from all other things (than Himself), by 
reason of His possessing that nature which is wholly made 
up of infinite knowledge and bliss, and which is hostile 
to all that is evil. In the very same manner, there is 
(to Him) a natural and divine form also, which is in accord- 
ance with His own desire and is suited to Himself, which is 
uniform, unthinkable, immaterial, wonderful, eternal and 
faultless, and which is the home of endless collections of 
unsurpassable qualities such' as splendour, beauty, fragrance, 
tenderness, elegance, youthfulness and the like. With the 
object of favouring His worshippers, He (/. c. Narayana) 
causes this same form of His to assume such a configura- 
tion as is suited to the understanding of each of those 
(worshippers) Narayana who is the ocean of bound- 
less mere}', sweet disposition, affection and generosity, 
who is free from even the smallest taint of all that is evil, 
who is free from all sin, who is the Highest Self, the High- 
est Brahman, and the Highest Person. By means 
of these passages,namely, "Existence alone, my dear child, 
this was in the beginning" \Cbhand. Up. VI. 2. i.], 
" The Self, indeed, this one only was in the beginning.". 
[Ait. Up. I. i.], "Indeed, Narayana alone then was, and 
not the (four-faced) Brahma nor Isana", \Mah. Up. I.] 
and by means of others, (the Brahman] is made out to be 
the only cause of all the worlds ; and the essential nature 



406 SRI-BHISHYA. \Chap. L Part. L 

of that Highest Brahman is understood to be of this 
(above-mentioned) character with the help of such passages 
as -" The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." 
\_Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], "The Brahman is knowledge and 
bliss." \_Brih. U'p. III. 9. 28.]. In the following and other 
scriptural passages, namely, " (That which is) without 
attributes, without taint." \_Adh. Up. 68.], "(This Self) 
is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free 
from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires 
the truth and wills the truth." \Qhhdnd. U'p. VIII. 1.5. 
VIII. 7. i & 3.], "He has neither body nor senses, and 
there is seen neither His equal nor His superior ; His 
supreme power is revealed indeed as varied and natural 
and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action." 
\Svet. Up. VI. 8.], "(May we know) that highest and 
greatest Lord of lords, who is the highest Deity of deities." 
[Svet. Up. VI. 7.], " He is the cause, the Lord of what 
is the lord of the senses (/. c. of the jiva or the individual 
soul); He has no progenitor, and no superior." [Svet. Up. 
VI. 9.], "The omniscient Lord who creates all beings, gives 
them names, and, calling them (by those names), ever con- 
tinues to be." \Tailt. Ar. III. 12. 7.], "I know this 
great Person of sun-like lustre who is altogether beyond 
darkness." \Taitt. Ar. III. 12. 7.], "All the nimeshas 
were born out of the Person who has the lustre of light- 
ning." [M. Nar. I. 8.] ; (in these and other passages), they 
(i.e. the scriptures) deny that the Highest Brahman 
possesses such qualities as belong to prakrdi (or nature) 
and as deserve to be discarded ; (they deny) that He is 
associated with a body made up of prakriti and (thus) 
worthy of rejection, and that He has any association with 
the condition of being subject to the influence of karma > 
which has that (association with the body) at its root ; 



Adhik. VIL Snt. 21.} SRI-BHISHYA. 407 

and then they declare that He possesses auspicious quali- 
ties and has a beautiful form. To bless His worshippers, 
the Divine Lord who is all-merciful makes this same afore- 
said natural form of His assume, in accordance with His 
own desire, the configurations of gods, men, &c., so that it 
may have that appearance which is suited to the under- 
standings of those (worshippers). The scripture speaks of 
this same fact thus: "Although He is unborn, He is born 
in various ways." [Taitt. Ar. III. 12. /.]. And the Smriti 
also (says the same tiling) thus : "Although I am unborn, 
and inexhaustible in My own nature, and although I am 
the Lord of all beings, taking up My own prakriti, I am 
then born again and again, by means of My own 

mdyd for the protection of the good and for the 

destruction of evil-doers." [. G. IV. 6 & 8.]. Indeed 
the good (here) are the worshippers. The principal 
object of accomplishment is nothing other than their 
protection. But the destruction of evil-doers is an 
object of secondary importance, because that is possible 
(to Him) even by merely willing it. The expression ' My 
own prakriti means His own peculiar nature. The mean- 
ing is "Taking up His own peculiar nature, but not (taking 
up) the nature of those who are in samsdra, (He is born 
again and again)." The meaning of the expression 'by 
means of My own mdyd' is by means of that mental power 
which is of the nature of His own will. Lexicographers 
read the word mdyd as synonymous also with knowledge 
(or jfidna) as when they say mdyd vayunam jildnam. [Vide 
Nir. III. 9.]. Moreover the venerable Parasara speaks (of 
this form of the Lord) thus : "Wherever, O king, all these 
powers are established, that is another great form of the 
Lord, which is different from His Universal Form. He, out 
of His own playfulness, makes that (form of His), which is 



408 SRl-BHASHYA. {Chap. I. Part. I. 

possessed of all powers, actively manifest under the names 
of gods, animals and men. That (activity) is (intended) 
for the good of the worlds and is not produced by means 
of karma (i. e. by means of the effect of works operating 
upon Him)." [F. P. VI. 7. 70 to 72.]. And in the 
Mahabhxrata it is thus stated that even the incarnated 
form (of the Lord) is not made up ofprakriti (or matter): 
" The body of this Highest Self is not a configuration of 
the collection of material elements." Hence the Highest 
Brahman Himself is the possessor of that form which is 
of this description, and so this (form) also is His own 
attribute. Consequently, He who abides within the 

brilliant orb of the Sun and within the eye is the Highest 
Self Himself who is other than the Sun and other indivi- 
dual selves. 



Sjtra 22. Bhedavyapadesa^Jchanyah. 

And he is different (from the Sun and other indivi- 
dual selves) because also there is the declaration of 
difference ("between the Brahman on the one hand and 
the Sun and other individual selves on the other). 

The difference of this Highest Self from the sun-god 
and other individual selves is declared fin the scriptures). 
The following scriptural passages also, namely, "He who, 
dwelling within the Sun, is within the Sun, whom the Sun 
does not know, whose body is the Sun, who internally 
rules the Sun (He is thy internal ruler and immortal 

Self) He who, dwelling within 

the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, 
whose body is the self, who internally rules the self (He 



Adhik. VIII. Sfd. 2j.] SRI-BHASHYA. 409 

is thy internal ruler and immortal Self)."[J/#(?//. Bnh. Up. 
III. 7. 9 to 22.]; "(He) whose body is the akshara.... whom 
the akshara does not know,... who is moving within the 
mrityu (or pra kriti), whose body is mrityu, whom mrityu 
does not know, He is the internal Self of all beings, He is 
free from all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the one 
Xarayana." \Sub. Up. VII. i.] (these) first point out 
that the individual selves form the body of this Highest Self 
who is free from sin, and then declare that He forms the 
internal Self of them all. Therefore it is an established 
conclusion that the Supreme Self is altogether different 
from all the individual selves from the four-faced Brahma 
downwards. 



ADHIKARANA. VIII. 

Akasddhikarana. 

in the passage " From whom all these beings are 
born" - -[ Taiit. Up.-lll. i. i.],it is made out that the Brah- 
man is the cause of the world. With the object of satisfy- 
ing the desire to know what that cause of the world is, that 
cause of the world has been pointed out in general terms 
(such as Sat, Atman, &c.,) in the following passages : 
''Existence (or Sat) alone, my dear child, this was in the 
beginning." [Qhhdnd. Up.\{. 2. i.]; " It created tcjas'- 
[Qihand. Up. VI. 2. 3.]; "The Self (or Atman), indeed, 

this orte only was in the beginning He created these 

worlds." [A it. Up. I. i & 2.]; "Indeed from that same 
Self (or Atman} the spatial ether came into existence." 
[Taitt. Up. II, i. i.]; and it has the nature of such a 
52 



4io SRJ-BHA.SHYA. {Chap. 1. Part. I. 

special entity as is characterised by the peculiarities indicat- 
ed by the attribute of ' seeing ' and the attribute of bliss : 
consequently that (cause) has been declared to be the 
Brahman who is different from the pradhana (or matter), 
and from the individual self, and from other such things. 
Now, in the aphorism " That which is denoted by the 
word Aka'sa (is the Brahman}, because His peculiar 
characteristics (are mentioned in the context in relation to 
what is denoted by that word)." [Ved. Sut. 1. i. 23.] 
and in other aphorisms (following it), which make up the 
remaining portion of this quarter (of the first chapter), it 
(viz. that cause of the world) is denoted by means of 
(certain) particular terms such as Akd'sa, &c.; and then- 
even in discussions bearing upon what constitutes the cause 
of the world, and upon what possesses the sovereignty of 
the world, and upon such other things, it is the Brahman 
Himself who is declared to be the entity that is different 
from those intelligent and non-intelligent things, which are 
well known to be denoted by akdsa and other words, and 
(it is IJe Himself) who is (also declared to be) possessed 
of the characteristics mentioned already. 

Sutra 23. Akasastalllngat. 

That which is denoted by the word Akasa (is the 
Brahman], because His peculiar characteristics (are 
mentioned in the context 403 in relation to what is denoted 
by that word). 

It is revealed in the Chhdndogya to this effect: "What 
is the goal of this world ? And he (Pravahana) says in 

403. The context referred to here is CjihUnd. Up, I. 9. 



Adhik. VIII . SuL 23.] SKi-l3HASHVA. 411 

reply It is the Aka'sa ; all these beings are, indeed, born 
out of the Akdsa; they go unto the Aka'sa at the end ; as the 
A kdsa is greater than all these beings, the Aka'sa is the best 
refuge." \Chhand. Up. 1. 9. i.]. Here the doubt arises 
whether it is the well known element o^ dkdsa (or 
ether) itself that is denoted by the word Akdsa, or whether 
it is the Brahman Himself as having the above-mentioned 
characteristics. It is perhaps held that it is the well known 
element of dkdsa. Why ? In the case of any thing that 
has to be made out altogether by means of a word, that 
same meaning (of it), which is established in accordance 
with the proper process of deriving the meanings of words 
and which is expressed by that word, that alone has to 
be accepted. Hence, the well known element of dkdsa 
(or ether) is itself the cause of the whole world which is 
made up of the totality of (all the) movable and immov- 
able beings. Therefore the Brahman can not be other than 
that (dkdsa). However, it has been already pointed out 
that the Brahmanis distinct from the non-intelligent thing 
(matter) as well as from the (intelligent) individual self, for 
the reason that He performs such acts of creation, &c., as 
are invariably caused by (His) ' seeing' (/. c. willing). 
True, it was (so) pointed out ; but that (statement) is not 
right. Accordingly, when it is declared that " He from 
whom all these beings are born That is the Brahman" - 
\_TaiU. Up. III. i. i.], then, it may be specially desired 
to know what that particular entity is which is the cause 
of the birth, &c., 4 4 of all those beings that are born; in 
such a case, that special entity is made known by means 
of the passage beginning with "All these beings are 
indeed born out of the dkdsa" [C/ihdnd. Up. I. 9. i.]; 

404. Birth, ere., means birth, subtciilaliou and destruction. 



SRI-^HASHYA. \Chap. L Par I. I. 

thus, the cause of the origin, c., of the world is definitely 
determined to be nothing other than the dkdsa. It being 
so, Sat and other words which possess a general signific- 
ance, and which are mentioned in the following passage 
among other passages also, namely, " Existence (or Sat) 
alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning" [Qihdnd. 
Up. VI. 2. i.], denote that same special entity dkdsa. In 
the passage "The Self (or the Atinan),indeed, this one only 
was in the beginning." [Ait. Up. I. i.] and in others, 
the word Atman is also used , to signify that same thing 
(dkdsa). Indeed that word Atman also is not restricted 
to mean only intelligent beings. For example, there is the 
instance "The pot is mriddtmaka (or made up of clay)." 
Since the word Atman may be derived 403 from the root dp 
to pervade, the word Atman also signifies the dkdsa (or the 
ether) quite absolutely. Hence, when it is thus determined 
that the dkdsa itself is the Brahman that forms the cause of 
the world, then the activity of ' seeing ', &c., have to be 
understood in their figurative , sense so as to suit that 
(element of dkdsa}. If the cause of the world had been, 
as a matter of fact, denoted only by Sat and other such 
general terms, then, in accordance with the import of 
' seeing ', &c., (predicated in relation to it), that cause 
would have been specially made out to be nothing other 
than a particular intelligent being. But by the word dkdsa 
itself a characteristic entity is definitely pointed out ; 
and thus there is nothing else that has to be particularly 
understood (to be its import) as arising from the natural- 
ness of its meaning (in the context). Indeed, it may be 
said (here) that, in the passage " From the Self the dkdsa 
came into existence." [ TaitL Up. II. i. i.], the dkdsa 

405 . See Sjttifr/Vtf- Upanishad. J 1 1 , 



Adtiik.Vltf.SM.2j.'] SRI-&HASHYA. 413 

itself is made out to be a produced effect. True ; in fact, 
vdyn (air) and all other such things exist in two conditions, 
namely, the subtle condition and the gross condition. Of 
these the subtle condition of the element of dkdsa consti- 
tutes the cause; and its gross condition, the effect. The 
meaning of the passage " From the Self the dkasa came 
into existence."- -{Taitt. Up. II. i. i.] is, that from its 
subtle form, it became changed into its own gross form. 
By means of the passage beginning with " All these 
beings are, indeed, born out of the dkdsa." [Qihdnd. Up. 
I. 9. i.], it is declared that the whole world derives its 
existence from, and has its dissolution in, the dkdsa itself ; 
hence it is determined that that same dkdsa is indeed the 
Brahman that forms the cause of the world. .For whatever 
reason the Brahman is not other than the well known 
element of dkdsa, for that same reason the (following scrip- 
tural) statements "If this dkdsa be not bliss, &c." [Taitt. 
Up. II. 7. i.], " The akdsa is, indeed, the evolver of name 
and form." [Clihdnd. Up. VIII. 14.1.] and other such (state- 
ments) are also (seen to be) very appropriate. There- 
fore the Brahman is not other than the well known 
element of dkdsa. 

If it be so held, we reply (thus): "That which is 
denoted by the word Akdsa (is the Brahmati), because 
His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the con- 
text in relation to what is denoted by that word)." [ Ved. 
Sut. I. i. 23.]. That which is denoted by the word Akdsa 
is that Highest Self Himself who has the characteristics 
already mentioned, and who is a different entity from the 
non-intelligent and well known element of dkdsa (or 
ether). Why ? Because His peculiar characteristics (are 
mentioned in the context in relation to what is denoted 
by that word). To be the only cause of all the 



414 SRi-fiuisrivA. [Chap. L Part. L 

worlds, to be greater than all others, to be the best refuge, 
&c., which are all the characteristics of the Highest 
Self, are found mentioned (in the context under reference). 
Indeed, it is not possible for that non-intelligent thing, 
which is usually denoted by the well known word akasa, 
to be the cause of the world ; because it is not possible 
for an intelligent thing to be the produced effect of 
that (non-intelligent thing). And to be the best refuge is to 
be that highest object which is worthy of being attained 
by intelligent beings ; and to be this, it is not possible for 
that non-intelligent thing which deserves to be discarded 
and which is opposed to all the desirable aims of life. And 
to be greater than all is to be unconditioned ; it is to be so 
great by means of all the auspicious qualities as to remain 
unsurpassed by all. To be this also, it is not possible for 
the non-intelligent thing. 

What has been stated to the effect that a specially 
characteristic thing is mentioned by means of the word 
Akdsa, in response to the query to know what that parti- 
cular object is which forms the cause of the world, and 
that, in consequence, every thing else (in the context) has 
to be explained so as to exactly agree with that (akdsa) 
itself, that is improper ; because, in the passage. " All 
these beings are, indeed, born out of the Akdsa" \CMhdnd. 
Up. I. 9. i.], that (Akdsa) is pointed out as if it were (a 
thing) already well known. Indeed, to mention a thing as 
if it were well known implies that there is some other 
means of knowing it. And the other means of knowledge 
(here) are, indeed, the following passage and other similar 
ones : " Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the 
beginning." [Qihdnd. Up. VI. 2. i.]. And they declare 
the Brahman to be altogether the same as has been al- 
ready mentioned. Accordingly, the Brahman established 



Adhik. VIII. Sfit. 2J.] SRI-BHISHYA. 415 

by those (passages) is pointed out by the word Akasa as if 
it were a well known thing. And it is also possible for 
the Highest Brahman to be denoted by the word 
Akdsa,* Q in as much as He possesses the power of 
illuminating things, that is, in as much as He is lumin- 
ous to Himself and also causes other things to shine. 
Further, this word Akasa, even when it is capable of 
importing a particular (well known) entity, denotes that 
particular non-intelligent thing which it is not possible 
to think of as forming the cause of the intelligent thing. 
Such excerpts from scriptural passages as the following 
among others, namely, " It thought " \Qhhand. Up. VI. 
2. 3.] "He desired May I become manifold" \Taitt. 
Up. II. 6. i.], enable us to know that peculiar Being 
who is characterised by the attribute of omniscience and 
the attribute of willing the truth, &c.; and now to 
cause, by means of that (akdsd), the import of those scrip- 
tural passages, which are capable of proving that (Being), 
to be other than what that (import) really is, this is not 
(certainly) within the province of correct reasoning. Simi- 
larly, it is not also possible to make the common import 
of those numerous passages, which are capable of denot- 
ing that peculiar Being thus characterised by peculiar and 
endless attributes, become something other than what 
that (import) really is, through the influence of a single 
passage which is merely a restatement (of something that 
has been already taught). 

It has been stated that the word Atman is not absolute- 
ly restricted to mean intelligent beings, because it is seen 
(to be used otherwise) in the instance " The pot is mrid- 



406. The word ^Aka'sa. is derived luminous to itself and also that which 
from the root Ka's to shine and is causes other things to shine. 
Interpreted to mean that which is 



416 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

atmaka (or made up of clay)." In reply to this it is said 
thus : No doubt, the word Atman is, in some cases, used 
even so as to denote things other than what is intelligent. 
Nevertheless, the word Atman is very largely used so as to 
denote that (intelligent entity) which forms the correlative 
of the body. Consequently, that intelligent entity it- 
self which is correlated to the body is made out to be 
mentioned in the follo.wing and other passages, namely, 
" The Self (or Alman), indeed, this one only was in the be- 
ginning." [Ait. Up. I. i.]; "From the Self, the dkasa (or 
the spatial ether) came into existence." \Taitt. Up. II. i. 
i.]. For example, although the word go (i. e. ox) may ex- 
press many things, that thing alone which has the dewlap 
and other such (characteristics) is naturally and of itself ap- 
prehended thereby, on account of its being largely used (to 
signify that thing): and to apprehend its other meanings, it 
is necessary to have a special mention made of each (of those 
meanings) in particular. Similarly, each of the following 
and other particular scriptural passages, namely, " He 
thought May I create the worlds." \A it. Up. I. i.J, " He 
desired, May I become manifold and be born." [Tailt. 

Up. II. 6. i.] themselves confirm that it (viz. the word 
Atman) signifies nothing other than that intelligent entity, 
which is of itself arrived at (from the common use of that 
word) and forms (also). the correlative of the body. 

Thus the Brahman who forms the only cause of all 
the worlds, and who is characterised by many such wonder- 
ful attributes, as are peculiar to none other than Himself, 
and as are made out by means of excerpts from scriptural 
passages, is Himself established by means of the passage 
beginning with " Existence alone, my dear child, &c." 

\Qihand. Up. VI. 2. i.]. And it is thus a settled con- 
clusion that (that Brahman) Himself is pointed out by 



Adhik. IX. Sftt. 24.] SRi-BiusHYA. 417 

means of the word Akd'sa, in the passage beginning with 
" All these beings are indeed (born out of the Akdsd)"- 
\Qbhdnd. Up. I. 9. i.], as if He were already well known. 



ADH1KARANA. IX. 

Prdnddh ikarana , 
Sutra 24. Ata eva praiah. 

For that same reason (which has been given in the 
case of Akasa), He who is denoted by the word Prana 
(also in the context* or is the Brahman]. 

After commencing the context by means of the state- 
ment" O thou prastotri, that deity which invariably 
attends the prastdva, &c.", 4 8 it is revealed in the 
Qihandogya to this effect : " Which is that deity ? He 
said' Indeed it is the Prana. All these beings certainly 
enter into the Prana (to be absorbed into it) they are 
evolved out of the Prana. This is that deity which invaria- 
bly attends t\\Qprastdva. And if, without knowing that deity, 
you had sung (your) psalms of praise, your head would 
have fallen off':'[Cbhand.Up.I. 10. 9. & I. n._ 4 & 5.]. 
Here the word Prdna also denotes, like the word Akdsa,\\\e 
Highest Self Himself who is other than the ordinarily well 
known prdna (or vital air); because this (prdnd] is described 

407. The context here referred to by the Prastolri who is the assistant 
is Chliand. Up. I. io& if. of the Udgatri or the chanter of the 

408. Prastava is the prelude or the Samaveda. 
introductory words of a Sdinan sung 



418 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

(in the context), as if it were a well known thing, by means 
of the characteristics of the whole world entering into 
it and coming out of it, tS:c., which are not (at all) common 
to it. 

However, there may also be an additional objection 
(here) to the effect that, since the whole of the totality of 
beings is seen to have its existence and activity depend- 
ent upon the pram, the ordinarily well known prana 
(or vital air) itself deserves to be pointed out as the cause 
of the world. And the invalidation (of this objection) 
is to the effect that the statement " All these beings 
certainly enter into the Prana (to be absorbed into 
it), they are evolved out of the Prana'.' \Chhand. 
Up. I. ii. 5.] can not be appropriate in relation 
to stones and sticks, as also in relation to the essen- 
tial nature of the intelligent thing (viz. the individual 
self); because it (viz. that prana} does not exist (in 
them). Therefore the word Prana (here) denotes the 
Highest Brahman Himself for the reason that it is to 
be understood as that which gives life to all beings. 

Consequently, it is a demonstrated conclusion that the 
Highest Brahman Himself who is altogether different 
from the ordinarily well known dkdsa (or ether), prana (or 
vital air), and other such things, who is the only cause 
of all the worlds, who possesses infinite myriads of auspi- 
cious qualities, such as the quality of being free from sin, 
the quality of omniscience, the quality of willing the truth, 
&c., is denoted (here) by such words as Akasa, Prana, 
&c. 



Adhik. X. Sut. 25.] SRI-BHISHYA. 419 

ADH1KARANA. X. 

Jyotiradhikarana. 

Hereafter, by means of the aphorism " That which 
is denoted by the word Jyotis (is the Brahman], because 
there is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context) "- 
\_Ved. Siit. I. i. 25.] and by means of the other aphorisms 
(following it), it is declared that that Jyotis (or Light), 
which is characterised by at least a certain unsurpassa- 
ble quality invariably associated with what constitutes the 
cause of the world, and which is also denoted by 
Indra and other words that are ordinarily well known to 
refer to other things, is the Highest Brahman Himself. 

Sutra 25. Jyotiszttaranabhidhanat. 

That which is denoted by the word Jyotis (is the 
Brahman), because there is the mention of (His) feet (in 
a connected context). 

It is revealed in the Qihdndogya to this effect: " Xow 
that Light which shines beyond this Highest Heaven, be- 
yond all the things in the universe, beyond the whole uni- 
verse, in the highest worlds than which there are no higher 
worlds, that is that same Light indeed which is within 
this person." [Qihdnd. Up. III. 13. 7.]. Here there arises 
the doubt whether that thing which is denoted by the 
word Jyotis (or Light), which is associated with unsurpassa- 
ble brilliance and forms that same well known light which 
belongs to the sun-god and others, (whether that) is the 
Brahman that forms the cause of the world ; or whether 
that (thing) is the Highest Person, who is altogether 



420 SRI-BHA.SHYA. {Chap. I. Part. 1. 

distinct from the aggregate of intelligent and non-intelli- 
gent things, who i.i the highest cause, who has un- 
limited splendour, who is omniscient and wills the 
truth. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the 
ordinarily well known light itself (which is denoted 
by the \vordjyotis). Why ? Because, although it (viz. 
Jy 'otis) is described as if it were an already well known 
thing, there are not found mentioned in the passage in 
which it occurs any such characteristics as are invariably 
associated with the Highest Self, in the same way in which 
(they are seen to be so associated) with (what is denoted 
by) Akdsa, Pram, and other such words ; and it is not, 
in consequence, possible to derive (from that context) any 
knowledge which leads to the recognition of the Highest 
Person (therein) : and because also that (Jyotis itself) is 
taught to be the same as the digestive heat in the 
stomach. The ordinarily well known light itself has 
(thus) to be the Brahman that forms the cause of the 
world ; for, there is associated with it (also) that unsur- 
passable splendour which is invariably concomitant with 
what constitutes the cause (of the world). 

If it be so held, we state in reply " That which is de- 
noted by the word Jyotis (is the Brahman), because there 
is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context)." 
[Vcd. Snt. I. i. 25.]. That ' Light', which is described as 
being related to the Highest Heaven and is associated 
with unsurpassable splendour, is the Highest Person Him- 
self. Why ? Because, in the passage " All beings make 
up His one foot ; His three immortal feet are in the High- 
est Heaven." \_Qhhdnd. Up. III. 12. 6.], all beings are de- 
clared to form the foot of this same entity who is in rela- 
tion with the Highest Heaven. What is said is this : - 
In the passage " That Light which is beyond the Highest 



Adhik. X. Sut. 26."] SRI-BHA.SHYA. 421 

Heaven, &c." [Qihdnd. Up. III. 13. 7.], the peculiar char- 
acteristics of the Highest Person are certainly not mention- 
ed; nevertheless, it is recognised that, since the Highest Per- 
son is mentioned in a former passage (in the same con- 
text) as being related to the Highest Heaven, this Light 
also which is related to that Highest Heaven is that Person 
Himself. And in the teaching that that (Jyotis} is one 
with the digestive heat of the stomach, there is nothing 
wrong ; because it (viz. that teaching) is a command- 
ment enjoining the continued meditation of that (Highest 
Person) in the form of that (digestive heat) for the 
purpose of attaining the fruition of a desired result. 
And that the digestive heat of the stomach has the 
character of that (Highest Person) is declared by the 
Lord Himself in the passage " Becoming the vaisvd- 
nara,* Q * I dwell in the bodies of all living beings." 
[. G. XV. 14.]. 

Sutra 26. Chhandobhidhananneti*tenna tatha^Le- 
torpa.anigamat tathahidarsanam. 

If it be said that, on account of the metre (known as 
the gayatrj] being mentioned (in the context, the Light 
or Jyotis described above is) not (the Brahman), it is not 
(right to say) so ; because the teaching (here) relates to 
the concentration of the mind (on the Brahman) conceiv- 
ed as that same (gayatrlY. indeed the scripture declares 
it accordingly. 

In a former passage (in the same context), the metre 

409. This is an epithet of Agni sage ''This Fire which is within man 

or Fire. Here, this word denotes and by which food is digested that is 

the digestive heat of the stomach in the 1'aih'a nam. " Brih. Up. V. 9.1, 
accordance with the scriptural pas- 



422 SRI-BHASHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

known asthe^-diya/r/is mentioned in the statement "The 
Gdyatri indeed is all this." [C&hand. Up. III. 12. i.]; and 
this Rik verse also, which is then quoted after the 
statement " Therefore this same (Gdyatri known as 
the Brahman] is also declared in a Rik* 10 verse."- 
\Qhhdnd. Up. III. 12. 5.] to the effect" Such is His great- 
ness." [Clihdnd. Up. III. 12. 6.], relates to (that) 
metre : hence, here (/. <?. in the passage under discussion) 
there is no mention of the Highest Person. If it be so 
held, (it is replied that) it cannot be (right to maintain) 
so, "Because the teaching (here) relates to the concen- 
tration of the mind (on the Brahman) conceived as that 
same (gayatri)." Here it is not merely the metre 
(gdyatri} that is denoted by the word Gdyatri ; because 
it is impossible for what is merely a metre to form 
the Self of all. But on the other hand, it is taught 
here that the mind as concentrated on the gay air I is to be 
applied to the Brahman Himself. The meaning is 
that, for the purpose of attaining the fruition of the desir- 
ed result, it is taught in relation to the Brahman that He 
is to be continuously conceived and meditated upon as 
being similar to the gdyatri. And from the passage 
" All beings make up His one foot ; His three immortal 
feet are in the Highest Heaven "*- \j3ihand. Up. III. 12. 
6.], there arises a similarity between the Brahman who 
(thus) has tour feet and the gdyatri which also has four 
feet. And the gdyatri (metre) with four feet is met with 
occasionally, as in the following instance : 

Indrassachipatih \ 
Valenaplditah || 

Duschyavano vrishd \ 

410. Vide A'. V. X. 90. 3. 



Adhik. X. Sut. 27.] SRI-BHASHYA. 423 

Samitsu sdsahih || 41 1 

" Indeed (the scripture declares it) accordingly " that is 
elsewhere also a word which ordinarily denotes a metre is 
used to denote other things, in consequence of its simi- 
larity with them ; for example, in connection with the 
vidyd (or the form of worship) in which the vital air 
is enjoined to be meditated upon and worshipped as 
having the quality of absorbing all things at once into 
itself, it is declared, in the passage beginning with 
"Now these five and the other five make ten.'' 412 
[Chhdnd. Up. IV. 3. 8.], that "this same (ten-syllabled 
metre) virdj (which consists of ten constituent parts) is 
that which eats the food (consisting of ten parts)." 
\Qhhand. Up. IV. 3. 8.]. 



For the following reason also, what is denoted by the 
word Gdyatrl is the Brahman Himself: 

Su tra 27. Bhu tadipada vyapadesopapa tteschaiva m . 

Because also it is appropriate only thus to declare 
that (intelligent) beings and other objects form the feet 
(of the Gayatrj}. 

411. Halayudhabhatta quotes these Indrcillacfripatih \ 

lines almost as they are given above Valena vllitah || 

in his commentary under the following Du'sckyavano vrisha \ 

aphorism of Pingala in his work on Lamatsu sasahih || 

Sanskrit prosody: "Adyam cjiatushpat 412. The first five are Vayn, 

ritubhih. Here the metre known as air, Agnr, fire, %ditya, sun, Chanara, 

Gdyatrl is said to consist of four moon, and Ap, water; the second five 

parts of six syllables each. And in are Pran.i, breath, Viik, speech, Cha- 

illustration of this the following kshus, sight, Srotra, hearing, and J/<r- 

example is given ; was, mind- 



424 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. 1. Part. 1. 

After pointing out the (intelligent) beings, the earth, 
the body, and the heart (to form the feet of the Gayatrl), 
there is this teaching which is given to the effect " This 
above-mentioned (Gayatrl} has four feet." \Chhdnd. Up. 
III. 12. 5.]; and such (a teaching) can be highly appropriate 
only in relation to the Brahman Himself, who is (here) 
denoted bv the word Gdvatri. 



Sutra 28. Upadesabhedannetiehennobhayasminnapy' 
avirodhat. 

If it be said that, on account of there being a differ- 
ence between the (two) teachings f given in the context, 
what is denoted by the word Jyotis or Light) is not (the 
Brahman), it cannot be (right to say) so ; because even 
in both those ('teachings) there is nothing that is contra- 
dictory (of each other). 

In a former passage (in the same context), namely, 
" His three immortal feet are in the Highest Heaven 
(divi)."\Chhand. Up. III. 12. 6.], the Highest Heaven 
(dyii) is pointed out as the position of location ; and here 
(/. e. in the passage under reference), viz." Beyond the 
Highest Heaven, (divak}" \Chhand. Up. III. 13.7.], it 
(viz. that Highest Heaven) is indicated to be a boundary ; 
and thus the teaching has different forms. Consequently 
that Brahman who is declared in the previous pas- 
sage cannot be recognised in the subsequent one. 
If it be so held, (it is replied that) it cannot be so ; 
because even in (regard to) both those teachings there is 
a similarity in the nature of their import, and there 
is thus nothing to hinder such a recognition. For an 
(analogous) example, there is this instance "The hawk 



Adhik. XL Silt. 29.] SRI-BHISHYA. 425 

is on the top of the tree," and" The hawk is above 
the top of the tree." Therefore, the Highest Person 
Himself, who is possessed of unsurpassable splendour, is 
declared to be that Jyotis (or Light) which is resplend- 
ent beyond the Highest Heaven. And the Highest 
Person is declared to have four feet in this passage, " Such 
is His greatness. Greater than that is the Purusha. All 
beings make up His one foot. His three immortal feet 
are in the Highest Heaven." [R. V. X. 90. 3. & Qt/iand. 
Up. III. 12. 6.]: and He is also declared to have an im- 
material form in the passage " I know this great Person 
of sunlike lustre who is beyond darkness." [Taitt. Ar. 
III. 12. 7.]; and the splendour belonging to such (a 
Person) is also non-material. Consequently, it is 

faultless to say that, owing to His possessing that (splen- 
dour), He Himself is denoted by the word^vo//s (or Light 
here). 



ADH1KARANA. XL 

Indrapranddhikarana . 

It has been stated that that which is associated with 
unsurpassable splendour, which is denoted by the \\ordjyo- 
tis (or Light), and which is pointed out as if it were a well- 
known thing, is the Highest Person Himself. Now, he (the 
Sfitraktira] say si that what are denoted also by Indra, 
Prdna and other such words, and are declared in the scrip- 
tures to constitute objects of worship, owing to their forming 
the means of attaining that immortality which is invariably 
associated with what constitutes the cause of the world, 
(they) are (all the same as) the Highest Person Himself, 
54 



426 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. I. Part. I. 

Sutra 29. Pranastathanugamat. 

That which is denoted by Prana (Indra and other 
such words is the Brahman), because it is so understood 
in the sequel. 

In the Kaushltakl-Brdhmana, the context 4 ' 3 dealing 
with the vldya (or form of worship) taught to Pratardana 
is begun with the passage " Now Pratardana, the son 
of Divodasa, went to the favourite abode of Indra by 
means of battle and valour" ; and therein it is remarked 
by Pratardana to Indra, who had asked him to choose a 
boon, " You yourself choose for me that boon which you 
think is most beneficial to man"; and thereafter, it is 
declared thus (in the same context) : " He said 'Indeed, 
I am the Prana and the omniscient Self. Worship and 
meditate on me as life, as immortality'." [Kaush. Up. III. 
i.]. 

Here the doubt arises whether this Being, who is de- 
noted by the words Indra and Prana to be the object 
of such worsh'ip as is most beneficial (to man), is the indi- 
vidual self himself j or whether He is the Supreme Self who 
is other than the individual self. It is perhaps thought 
right to hold that that (Being) is the individual self him- 
self. Why ? Because the word Indra is ordinarily well 
known to denote only a particular individual self, and the 
word Prana also which is grammatically equated with 
that (word Indra) signifies that same (individual self). 
When this individual self having the name of Indra was 
told by Pratardana to the effect " You yourself choose 
for me that boon which you think is most benefi- 

413. The context referred to here Bra/imana-Ufianishad. 
is the third chapter of the Kaushitakl- 



Adhik. XL Silt, jo.] SRI-BHASHYA. 427 

cial to man." [Kansk. Up. III. i.], he (/. c. Indra) 
taught the worship of himself as being the most beneficial 
by saying " Worship me." [Kaush. Up. III. i.]. And 
what is most beneficial (here) is nothing other than what 
forms the means for the attainment of immortality. That 
the worship of that (Being), which is the cause of the 
world, forms the means for the attainment of immortality, 
is made out from this passage " So long as he is not freed 
(from the body), so long there is delay ; then he will be 
blessed." [Qihdnd. Up. VI. 14. 2.]. Therefore the well 
known Indra himself who has the nature of an individual 
self is that Brahman who forms the cause of the world. 

To this supposition there is this reply " That 
which is denoted by Prdna (Indra and other such words 
is the Brahman}\ because it is so understood in the sequel.'' 
[Ved. Sfit. I. i. 29.] This Being who is denoted by 
the words Indra and Prdna is not merely the individual 
self; but, on the other hand, He is the Highest Brahman 
who is a different entity from the individual self; because it 
is only on such a supposition that that meaning in the 
sequel becomes appropriate which is derived from the 
grammatical equation of what is in the very commence- 
ment denoted by the words Indra and Prdna with the 
words dnanda (blissful), ajar a (undecaying), and amrita 
(immortal), as mentioned in the scriptural passage 
" That same Prdna is the omniscient Self who is blissful, 
undecaying and immortal." [Kaush. Up. III. 9.]. 



Sutra 30. Navakturatmopadesaditichedadhyatm&- 
sambandhabhu mahyasmin. 

If it be said that, on account of the speaker (Indra) 
declaring himself (to be the object of \vorship, \vhat i 



428 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. L Part. L 

denoted by the words Indra and Prara is) not (the Brah- 
man, it is replied that it cannot be right to say so); be- 
cause there is here (in this context) the mention of a mul- 
titude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self. 

What has been stated to the effect that He who is 
denoted by the words Indra and Prdna is the Supreme 
Brahman^ in as much as He is that same entity that is im- 
ported by the passage " He is blissful, undecaying, and 
immortal." \Kaush. Up. III. 9.], that is not appropriate; 
because Indra, who is the speaker in the passages "Know 
me alone." [Kaush. Up. III. i.j and "I am the Prdna 
and the omniscient self. Meditate on me as life, as immor- 
tality." [Kaush. 6^.111.1.], teaches Pratardana that he 
himself, who is made out to be of the nature of an indivi- 
dual self on account of his having killed Tvashtra and of 
having done other (such acts) as are stated in the following 
passage among others namely "I killed the three-headed 
Tvashtra", [Kaush. Up. III. i.], is undoubtedly the 
object of worship (sought after). Hence, it having been 
understood in the beginning (of the context,) that he (Indra) 
is a particular individual self, the conclusion (of that 
context) with "He is blissful, undecaying and immortal, 
&c." [Kaush. Up. III. 9.] has (necessarily) to be inter- 
preted in conformity with that (commencement). 

When it is so held, he (the Siitrakdra] disproves (such a 
supposition) by saying " Because there is here (in this 
context) the mention of a multitude of attributes belong- 
ing to the Inner Self." That related quality which 
exists in the Self is the attribute of the Inner Self. Its 
' multitudinousness ' is its abundance. The meaning is that 
it is manifold. This manifoldness of the related quality 
results from the manifoldness of the things which are 



Adhik. Jf/. Stf/. jo.] SRI-BHISHYA. 429 

related to the Self so as to be contained in Him. And 
this (manifoldness of attributes) is indeed possible only in 
relation to the Highest Self taken to be the speaker here. 
Thus, in the passage " Just as, in a chariot, the circum- 
ference (of a wheel) is fixed to the spokes and the spokes 
are fixed to the nave, so also these subtle material elements 
(bhulamatras) are made to depend on the subtle intelli- 
gences (prajilamatras], and the subtle intelligences are 
made to depend upon the Prana. This same Prana Him- 
self is the omniscient Self, who is blissful, undecaying, 
and immortal." \Kaush. Up.\\\. 9.], the whole collection 
of non-intelligent things is denoted by the word bhntamatra\ 
then by means of the word prajftdmatra the whole series 
of intelligent individual selves is denoted as forming the 
support of those (non-intelligent things) ; then it is pointed 
out that the subject of the context denoted by the words 
Indra and Prdna forms the support of those (intelligent 
individual selves) also ; and- (finally), it (viz. that context) 
teaches that that same Being is "blissful, undecaying, and 
immortal." The meaning is, that this quality of being the 
support of all the things, which consist of the intelligent 
and the non-intelligent entities, is appropriate only in 
relation to that Highest Self who is a different entity from 
the individual self. 

Or, in the expression " Because there is here (in 
this' context) the mention of a multitude of attributes be- 
longing to the Inner Self, " ' the attributes of the Inner 
Self are those attributes which are the peculiar charac- 
teristics of the Highest Self. Their 'multitudinousness', 
that is, their manifoldness is indeed found 'here', that is, in 
the present context. Accordingly, at the outset it is made 
out in the passages " You yourself choose for me that 
boon which you think is most beneficial to man," [Kaush, 



J6 SRi-BHisHYA. [Chap. I. Part. L 

Up. III.i.] and "Worship me." [Kaush. Up. III.i.], that 
the Indra, who is denoted by the word Prdna, is the 
object of that peculiar worship of the Highest Self, which 
forms the means for the attainment of final release. Simi- 
larly, to be the Impeller of all activities, in accordance with 
the passage "He of Himself induces him, whom He wishes 
to lead beyond these worlds, to do work which is good ; 
He of Himself induces him, whom He wishes to lead 
downwards, to do work which is not good." \_Kaush. Up. 
III. 9.], is also an attribute of the Supreme Self. So also 
to be the support of all, in accordance with the passage 
" Just as, in a chariot, the circumference (of a wheel) is 
fixed to the spokes, and the spokes are fixed to the nave, 
so also these subtle material elements are made to depend 
upon the subtle intelligences, and the subtle intelligences 
are made to depend upon the Prdna," \_Kansh. Up. 
III. 9.]' is an attribute of Himself. Similarly again those 
attributes, which are found mentioned in the passage 
" This same Prana Himself is the omniscient Self who 
is blissful, undecaying and immortal. " \Kaush. Up. 
III. 9.], belong to that Supreme Self Himself. And 
these (attributes) also, namely, that " He is the Lord of 
all the worlds " and that " He is the Lord of all "- 
\_Kansh. Up. III. 9.], are possible only in relation to 
the Supreme Self. Consequently, in as much as the 

attributes of the Supreme Self are here abundantly men- 
tioned, it is the Supreme Self Himself who is denoted by 
the words Indra and Prdna here. 

To point out how under such a circumstance it be- 
comes appropriate for Indra, who is well known to be of 
the nature of an individual self, to teach that he himself 
is the object of worship, he (the Sutrakdra] says ; 



Adhik. XL Silt, j/.] SRI-BHISHYA. 431 

Stitra 31. SSstraJ>'ish^yatJpaJeso Vamadevavat. 

And the teaching ^in the context) is, as in the case of 
Vamadeva, in accordance with the view found in the 
scripture. 

This teaching, which, in the statements " Know me 
alone" \_Kaiish. Up. III.i.] and "Worship me"-[Kaush. 
Up. III. i.], is given to the effect that his own self is the 
Brahman who has to be worshipped,is not derived from that 
self-knowledge which is obtained from other means of proof 
(than the scripture); but, on the other hand, it is the result 
of the self-knowledge which is derived from the scripture 
itself. What is said is this: In accordance with the follow- 
ing and other similar passages, namely, " Entering in 
along with this individual self, which is (also) the same as 
Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form " 
[ZVidtid. Up. VI. 3. 2.J, " All this has That for its Self." 
\Qhhand. Up. VI.S./.], " He who has entered within is the 
ruler of all things that are born, and is the Self of all."- 
[Taitt.Ar. III. 21.], "He who, dwelling in the self, is with- 
in the self, whom the self does not know, whose body 
is the self, and who internally rules the self, &c." \Madh. 
Brili. Up. III. 7. 22.], " He is the internal Self of all beings, 
He is devoid of sin, He is the Divine Lord, He is the One 
Xarayana." [Sud. Up. VII. i.], he (/. c. Indra) had in mind 
that the Supreme Self owns the individual selves as His 
body, and knew also that the words 7, thon, and others, 
which denote individual selves, include the Supreme Self 
Himself within their import ; and thereafter, by means of 
the scriptural statements " Know me alone" \_KausJi. 
Up. III. i.] and "Worship me " [A'aws//. Up. III. i.] 
he taught that none other than the Supreme Self who has 
(Indra) himself for His body forms the object of worship. 



43 2 SRI-BHISHYA. [Chap. 1. Par I. 1. 

"As in the case of Va made va. " That is, Vamadeva 
realised that the Highest Brahman forms the internal 
Self of all things and that all things form His body, and 
that those words which denote material embodiments in- 
clude the embodied in their import ; and then he -indicated 
the Highes